Fifty-one years ago, in 1963, as a student in the University of Durham I took part in a Union Society debate on the issues implicit in the Robbins Report on the future of the Universities. The Report was the outcome of a long investigation by a Royal Commission [the highest level of public inquiry] which was chaired by Lionel Robbins, the great man of the London School of Economics and one of the earliest Life Peers. The panel included the General Secretary of the TUC and a series of captains of industry and that magic circle known as the 'great and good' [then much more respected than they are now].
The predominant conclusion of the Commission was that it was vital for the future health of the economy, and of society in the wider sense, that there should be a vast increase in the number of people in university courses. There should be both new universities and great expansion of existing institutions. It seemed obvious that Britain must at least keep pace with other countries in expanding higher education: and very few people gainsaid that. However, I based my speech on a caveat to that consensual position.
Britain had developed a massive system of qualifications for industrial and commercial occupations, mostly validated by the City and Guilds of London Institute. Tens of thousands of people underwent a mixture of workplace experience and theoretical underpinning derived from day-release courses in technical colleges all over the country. I argued that these qualifications were at risk of becoming under-rated, with a cataclysmic impact on the quality and advancement of production. I proposed that City and Guilds qualifications should be recognised as equivalent to many technical degrees in other countries, with a dramatic positive impact on the comparative statistics for the UK. Constant review of both the practical and the academic quality and content of the diplomas could ensure that parity was maintained.
This was - of course - ignored, and Britain allowed the system to be weakened dramatically as the university system devised more and more irrelevant degrees for more and more students who regarded factory-floor employment with contempt. Britain has now reaped the results of this idiocy. While 49% of French firms, and 40% of German firms have apprentices, the proportion of British firms with apprentices is NINE. British factories are falling behind all their competitors. Between 1996 and 2013 British goods exports increased [in cash turnover terms] by 74%: while US exports increased by 133% and Germany's by 173%. Much of this gap was explained by the significant slowing in export increases between 2008 and 2012, the years of the 'recession'. Even at this comparatively low rate of growth, employers are reporting their fear of a coming skills shortage.
Graduates in [real] engineering subjects are invaluable, and the pathetically small number of British engineering graduates who complete higher degree studies is particularly worrying. For decades now, the research opportunities in engineering that have plentifully been available in the UK have been taken up by foreign students, who mostly take their high-level theoretical skills back to their native countries. With a serious dearth of native engineering doctorates, and a massive shortage of skilled factory employees who have a good understanding of the theory and mathematics that underpin the processes that they perform, Britain is denuded of the productive human resources that the economy needs.
I am not at all special: hundreds of thousands of people have recognised and worried about the issue on which this blog is based; but we are powerless in the face of an impregnable Establishment and a flood of disastrous evidence. Something must be done: and it can only begin at the grass roots. Government and higher education are too deeply sunk into their error to be expected to recognise the simple truth,
Economics is fundamentally unscientific. The economic crisis has speeded the shift of power to emergent economies. In Britain and the USA the theory of 'rational markets' removed controls from the finance sector, and things can still get yet worse. Read my book, No Confidence: The Brexit Vote and Economics - http://amzn.eu/ayGznkp
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Friday, 8 August 2014
Monday, 4 August 2014
False Optimism on the British Economy
Today the Institute of Chartered Accountants (ICAEW) and the Confederation of British Industry tell us that employers' optimism is high about the future of their businesses. The government data report that more people are in employment in the UK than ever before; but that industrial output and exports are still below the already-low level at which they stood in the fake boom of 2006. There is no good news here for the real economy.
Consumers' borrowing, especially for house purchases and imported goods, has increased while total bank lending has declined; pointing to the fact that lending to develop manufacturing firms' facilities, and their export. markets is stagnant or even declining. Indicators of business confidence are up to the level last seen in 1988, the year that was followed by the slump of the early 'nineties which saw huge falls in house prices, not least in London.
Thus the portents are bad, not good.
This issue in explained in my book SINKING BRITAIN which can be accessed via this blog site.
Consumers' borrowing, especially for house purchases and imported goods, has increased while total bank lending has declined; pointing to the fact that lending to develop manufacturing firms' facilities, and their export. markets is stagnant or even declining. Indicators of business confidence are up to the level last seen in 1988, the year that was followed by the slump of the early 'nineties which saw huge falls in house prices, not least in London.
Thus the portents are bad, not good.
This issue in explained in my book SINKING BRITAIN which can be accessed via this blog site.
Sunday, 3 August 2014
Why Didn't They Sack Haig?
As the commemoration of the tragedy of the First World War gets into top gear, there are already books and TV programmes focussing on the appalling carnage of the Battle of the Somme which began in July 1916. It was continued until the end of the year, despite the fact that there were 60,000 British casualties on the first day: with no significant gains. The British Commander-in-Chief, Douglas Haig (of the whisky firm) committed successive waves of men to death in further fruitless pursuit of the same barren strategy. He followed the Somme by a series of further 'great pushes' which had no significant success in the ensuing eighteen months.
uHis defenders claimed that by refining his techniques he eventually enabled the army to smash the German front in the late summer of 1918, by which time the German supply system was disrupted by civil unrest and the beginning of revolution.
Hundreds of thousands of men died in pointless repetition of the same boneheaded strategy as on the Somme, until new weapons and new training methods prepared the army to exploit the very different conditions that faced then from the middle of 1918.
Haig survived catastrophic failure, despite the repeated wish of the Prime Minister, Lloyd George, to be rid of him. The entire establishment, led by the King (George V) insisted that he should stay. 200,000 lives were valued at less than the vanity of Haig and of those who had appointed him.
I invite every reader to look at these articles and programmes, with the thought in the back of their minds that the position of the Economics establishment today is like that of Haig and his kind in 1916. " Just push harder and the strategy will work" said the boneheads; but it didn't.
Today the pointy-heads are saying " more competition, more cuts" and the economy will really rebuild itself.; but it won't. King George's granddaughter, Queen Elizabeth II, asked the assembled luminaries of the London School of Economics why they had not seen the crash of 2007 coming: and they had no answer. Haig had no answer for those who challenged him in 1917, but the old-boys' network saved him. Something similar is keeping the professors of Economics in their chairs now.
uHis defenders claimed that by refining his techniques he eventually enabled the army to smash the German front in the late summer of 1918, by which time the German supply system was disrupted by civil unrest and the beginning of revolution.
Hundreds of thousands of men died in pointless repetition of the same boneheaded strategy as on the Somme, until new weapons and new training methods prepared the army to exploit the very different conditions that faced then from the middle of 1918.
Haig survived catastrophic failure, despite the repeated wish of the Prime Minister, Lloyd George, to be rid of him. The entire establishment, led by the King (George V) insisted that he should stay. 200,000 lives were valued at less than the vanity of Haig and of those who had appointed him.
I invite every reader to look at these articles and programmes, with the thought in the back of their minds that the position of the Economics establishment today is like that of Haig and his kind in 1916. " Just push harder and the strategy will work" said the boneheads; but it didn't.
Today the pointy-heads are saying " more competition, more cuts" and the economy will really rebuild itself.; but it won't. King George's granddaughter, Queen Elizabeth II, asked the assembled luminaries of the London School of Economics why they had not seen the crash of 2007 coming: and they had no answer. Haig had no answer for those who challenged him in 1917, but the old-boys' network saved him. Something similar is keeping the professors of Economics in their chairs now.
Friday, 1 August 2014
Actuarial Armaggedon
The greatest destruction of value in the British economy over the past quarter-century has been the erasure of most of the value of the savings made by women and men through their pension funds. It has often been pointed out that fees charged to funds by fund managers have removed much of that value; but it is trivial compared to the purblind misguidance given by the self-styled Actuarial Profession, with the cynical collusion of accountants.
Every pension fund must have a named Scheme Actuary, who has huge influence over the decisions that are notionally taken by the Trustees. In the face of the facts that the scheme Actuary and the Auditor [a Chartered Accountant] must sign off the fund at least once a year, confirming that it meets the law and the standards set by their professions, the [usually non-expert] Trustees are virtually bound to follow any guidance from these signatories. Despite rules and 'Chinese walls', the accountancy giants manage to sell a lot of advice to their clients: the actuaries, who have no comparable constraints, have huge 'advisory' power to steer the funds into investing the deferred pensioners'' money according to their very limited understanding of the economic system.
In 1987 almost exactly 50% of all investments by pension funds were in shares - equities - whose market prices vary regularly but over the long term rise significantly in market valuation. The other half was in government and other bonds, property and other assets that largely compensated in the stability of their prices for the volatility of the stock market. This ensured that whenever a fund member came to retire the fund could allocate them either a generous pension drawn from the future income of the fund or a large 'pot' of cash with which to buy an Annuity. The funds that backed Annuities were split between equities and other investments in broadly the same proportions as applied to pension funds.
In in the early 'nineties, Actuarial Tables [the basis on which scheme actuaries assessed how long fund members would live, and thus what each member's demand on the fund was likely to be, from the date of retirement] were hopelessly out of date: longevity had increased far beyond the assumptions shared by actuaries.. Hence they started to say that funds were over-funded, which came to the ears of the scavengers in the Treasury who decided to tax any 'over-funding' of pensions. So many firms declared a 'pensions contribution holiday', usually just on their payments-in to the fund, which meant that the tax on the employees' contributions was slightly reducing the pool of money available for the future pensions. Then the actuaries' idiocy was recognised, and many funds were suddenly under-funded according to the updated longevity tables. So firms and employees were asked to put more into the funds.
This was in the mad era of the 'dot-com bubble', which challenged comparison even with the idiocy of the early eighteenth-century 'South Sea bubble' when firms that had never made profit - in some cases had never received revenues - were valued in millions of pounds. The turn-of-the century [1999-2001] boom was 'valued' in trillions of dollars: and inevitably the collapse of that market dragged down the prices of sound industrial and commercial shares in a general panic. The combined impact of the miscalculations of the actuaries in the 'nineties and the crash of 2001-3 was to create in the 'actuarial profession' a panic conclusion that shares were a bad investment generically.
If a bond has a date for encashment, and a stated sum to be repaid on that date, it is relatively simple statistics to guesstimate reliably what the bond is 'worth' on any date. So as share prices were cashing down right across the spectrum actuaries - encouraged by Gordon Brown's Treasury [which was already industriously increasing the taxation of funds' investments, in the notorious 'three-billion pound grab'] - demanded that funds sell their shares and buy bonds. This intensified the collapse of share prices, while raising the prices of bonds; reducing the total valuation of assets in the funds and removing most of the assets that could have replenished the funds as stock markets recovered. The same tactics, of selling shares and demanding bonds, were required in the crunch of 2007-9: and this time it really suited the government because they needed the future pensioners' funds to buy the bonds with which they funded the deficit.
The net result of all of this is that now only 5% - yes, one-twentieth - of pension funds [on average] are invested in equities which have risen strongly since the crunch, while most of the rest is in government bonds whose riskiness increases by the day. Most companies have closed their 'final salary' pension funds, giving the staff the chance of getting only defined-benefit schemes or of choosing a private pension entirely at their own risk. Pensions are massively reduced from their equivalents as awarded by 1999.
George Osborne's cynical decision to give retirees with accumulated 'pension pots' the choice not to buy an annuity, and take responsibility for their own financial survival through a prolonged period of retirement, will potentially exacerbate old-age impoverishment. This sets the cap on a tale of devastation, by which millions of current and future pensioners will live in relative poverty compared to the lucky people who retired just a few years previously, So far, the accountants have taken some of the blame for some aspects of the crunch: but not very much for this facet of the present situation. The long-term depredations of the actuaries have yet to be attributed appropriately The contribution of these actuarial sins to the destruction of the material economy and the increase in the national debt deserve due recognition.
Every pension fund must have a named Scheme Actuary, who has huge influence over the decisions that are notionally taken by the Trustees. In the face of the facts that the scheme Actuary and the Auditor [a Chartered Accountant] must sign off the fund at least once a year, confirming that it meets the law and the standards set by their professions, the [usually non-expert] Trustees are virtually bound to follow any guidance from these signatories. Despite rules and 'Chinese walls', the accountancy giants manage to sell a lot of advice to their clients: the actuaries, who have no comparable constraints, have huge 'advisory' power to steer the funds into investing the deferred pensioners'' money according to their very limited understanding of the economic system.
In 1987 almost exactly 50% of all investments by pension funds were in shares - equities - whose market prices vary regularly but over the long term rise significantly in market valuation. The other half was in government and other bonds, property and other assets that largely compensated in the stability of their prices for the volatility of the stock market. This ensured that whenever a fund member came to retire the fund could allocate them either a generous pension drawn from the future income of the fund or a large 'pot' of cash with which to buy an Annuity. The funds that backed Annuities were split between equities and other investments in broadly the same proportions as applied to pension funds.
In in the early 'nineties, Actuarial Tables [the basis on which scheme actuaries assessed how long fund members would live, and thus what each member's demand on the fund was likely to be, from the date of retirement] were hopelessly out of date: longevity had increased far beyond the assumptions shared by actuaries.. Hence they started to say that funds were over-funded, which came to the ears of the scavengers in the Treasury who decided to tax any 'over-funding' of pensions. So many firms declared a 'pensions contribution holiday', usually just on their payments-in to the fund, which meant that the tax on the employees' contributions was slightly reducing the pool of money available for the future pensions. Then the actuaries' idiocy was recognised, and many funds were suddenly under-funded according to the updated longevity tables. So firms and employees were asked to put more into the funds.
This was in the mad era of the 'dot-com bubble', which challenged comparison even with the idiocy of the early eighteenth-century 'South Sea bubble' when firms that had never made profit - in some cases had never received revenues - were valued in millions of pounds. The turn-of-the century [1999-2001] boom was 'valued' in trillions of dollars: and inevitably the collapse of that market dragged down the prices of sound industrial and commercial shares in a general panic. The combined impact of the miscalculations of the actuaries in the 'nineties and the crash of 2001-3 was to create in the 'actuarial profession' a panic conclusion that shares were a bad investment generically.
If a bond has a date for encashment, and a stated sum to be repaid on that date, it is relatively simple statistics to guesstimate reliably what the bond is 'worth' on any date. So as share prices were cashing down right across the spectrum actuaries - encouraged by Gordon Brown's Treasury [which was already industriously increasing the taxation of funds' investments, in the notorious 'three-billion pound grab'] - demanded that funds sell their shares and buy bonds. This intensified the collapse of share prices, while raising the prices of bonds; reducing the total valuation of assets in the funds and removing most of the assets that could have replenished the funds as stock markets recovered. The same tactics, of selling shares and demanding bonds, were required in the crunch of 2007-9: and this time it really suited the government because they needed the future pensioners' funds to buy the bonds with which they funded the deficit.
The net result of all of this is that now only 5% - yes, one-twentieth - of pension funds [on average] are invested in equities which have risen strongly since the crunch, while most of the rest is in government bonds whose riskiness increases by the day. Most companies have closed their 'final salary' pension funds, giving the staff the chance of getting only defined-benefit schemes or of choosing a private pension entirely at their own risk. Pensions are massively reduced from their equivalents as awarded by 1999.
George Osborne's cynical decision to give retirees with accumulated 'pension pots' the choice not to buy an annuity, and take responsibility for their own financial survival through a prolonged period of retirement, will potentially exacerbate old-age impoverishment. This sets the cap on a tale of devastation, by which millions of current and future pensioners will live in relative poverty compared to the lucky people who retired just a few years previously, So far, the accountants have taken some of the blame for some aspects of the crunch: but not very much for this facet of the present situation. The long-term depredations of the actuaries have yet to be attributed appropriately The contribution of these actuarial sins to the destruction of the material economy and the increase in the national debt deserve due recognition.
Wednesday, 30 July 2014
Sinking Britain; This blog has been inactive since early in 2013, while I concentrated on publishing my new Book: SINKING BRITAIN. While Messers Cameron and Osborne gloat about the 'recovery' of the British economy, they also note that the country's position in terms of external balance of payments [in deficit], national debt [still growing], public spending [still in deficit], show that their policies have not succeeded In any meaningful sense. Exports and manufacturing are still way below their levels in 2007. The intractable problems of the British economy have not been addressed. All that the 'good' economic data - national income - shows is that people are turning-over more money in the economy to no good purpose.
WBritain is still sinking!
Wednesday, 6 February 2013
Sense
I have been offline for a month, as I got on with crucial jobs including a last attempt to re-present my basic ideas for the general interest. If that fails, I think I will abandon more than four decades of research and analysis.
Meanwhile, in the hope of belated success, I continue to comment on the matters of the day; seen from the perspective that my researches have endowed me with.
Under the Accounting Standard FRS 102 - supposedly bang-up-to-date and state-of-the-art - the powers that be have promulgated the crazy assertion that 'Financial Instruments' should be accounted for, especially in corporate balance sheets, at 'Fair Value'.
Neither of those terms has any substantial meaning.
The term fair has prominently been used in the past 24 hours by advocates of the idea that homosexual people should be allowed to marry: at this stage, only in twos. Although an Anglican, I have no fundamental objection to people of any sexual orientation [or of none] taking steps to protect their reputations and to safeguard their assets on a basis of legal and social equality with other people. But I do find completely silly the notion that a legally recognised relationship of two people can be called a 'marriage' in any sense other than that which has been traditional throughout the world for thousands of years. Changing the lexicon to be 'fair' to people who want to annexe the words 'marriage' and 'wedding' to events that simply are not what the words mean is an abuse of lawmaking and an affront to common sense. To use 'fairness' as the motivation for a mutilation of language further devalues the already debased concept of 'fairness:' that has come to mean "whatever will pander to the next demand upon the political system from some interest group". Each such concession to unreason tends in the end to make society ungovernable and the implementation of the plethora of conflicting demand unaffordable.
As to value, the more that is written around the term the clearer it becomes that it is even more meaningless than fair. Millions of times quoted is the adage condemning an individual who 'knows the price of everything, and the value of nothing'. In this all-too-real world prices matter to almost everybody all the time: as prices increase faster than wages and pensions and benefits received by the majority of the population, so living standards decline. This inevitable aspect of the forced move that society must make, from the fake affluence of the pre-credit-crunch era to a materially affordable future general standard of living, is set to intensify as the failure of the coalition government's 'austerity' policy becomes more blatant. People will be forced to decide what they wish to continue to consume, and [at least by default] what they are consequently prepared to drop from their shopping baskets. Some commentator may take the view that the resulting preferences reveal the relative value that different people apply to the items that have been in their pattern of consumption, but that simply means 'relative preference' and has no scientifically measurable or verifiable content.
The only possible meanings of 'Fair Value' that can responsibly be used to tell a firm or an individual what an asset is 'worth' are:
a] the current market price of the instrument;
b] a notional price [not being the price that exists momentarily in a specific trading arena], which is accepted by the current owners and by their actual and potential counter-parties as being an accurate average of the prices that were struck on a recent succession of trading days. Thus any exceptional leap or dip in the price of the asset would not invalidate the valuation; on the assumption that exceptional price movements will be corrected in a very short period.
Either of these concepts is more accurately expressed in the words just given than in the ephemeral term value. Far from meaning something absolute, value means nothing-in-particular. For centuries, Political Economists and Economists have pursued the notion that there should be something more meaningful than price, in disclosing how humans respond to an intrinsic quality of goods and of services, which causes the commodities to be priced higher or lower relative to the material costs of their production or provision: and this quality is called value. No such thing exists. Defining the components of price, and how the prices of different commodities and services deviate more or less from equality with their measured costs of production will be the subject of my next effusion.
Meanwhile, in the hope of belated success, I continue to comment on the matters of the day; seen from the perspective that my researches have endowed me with.
Under the Accounting Standard FRS 102 - supposedly bang-up-to-date and state-of-the-art - the powers that be have promulgated the crazy assertion that 'Financial Instruments' should be accounted for, especially in corporate balance sheets, at 'Fair Value'.
Neither of those terms has any substantial meaning.
The term fair has prominently been used in the past 24 hours by advocates of the idea that homosexual people should be allowed to marry: at this stage, only in twos. Although an Anglican, I have no fundamental objection to people of any sexual orientation [or of none] taking steps to protect their reputations and to safeguard their assets on a basis of legal and social equality with other people. But I do find completely silly the notion that a legally recognised relationship of two people can be called a 'marriage' in any sense other than that which has been traditional throughout the world for thousands of years. Changing the lexicon to be 'fair' to people who want to annexe the words 'marriage' and 'wedding' to events that simply are not what the words mean is an abuse of lawmaking and an affront to common sense. To use 'fairness' as the motivation for a mutilation of language further devalues the already debased concept of 'fairness:' that has come to mean "whatever will pander to the next demand upon the political system from some interest group". Each such concession to unreason tends in the end to make society ungovernable and the implementation of the plethora of conflicting demand unaffordable.
As to value, the more that is written around the term the clearer it becomes that it is even more meaningless than fair. Millions of times quoted is the adage condemning an individual who 'knows the price of everything, and the value of nothing'. In this all-too-real world prices matter to almost everybody all the time: as prices increase faster than wages and pensions and benefits received by the majority of the population, so living standards decline. This inevitable aspect of the forced move that society must make, from the fake affluence of the pre-credit-crunch era to a materially affordable future general standard of living, is set to intensify as the failure of the coalition government's 'austerity' policy becomes more blatant. People will be forced to decide what they wish to continue to consume, and [at least by default] what they are consequently prepared to drop from their shopping baskets. Some commentator may take the view that the resulting preferences reveal the relative value that different people apply to the items that have been in their pattern of consumption, but that simply means 'relative preference' and has no scientifically measurable or verifiable content.
The only possible meanings of 'Fair Value' that can responsibly be used to tell a firm or an individual what an asset is 'worth' are:
a] the current market price of the instrument;
b] a notional price [not being the price that exists momentarily in a specific trading arena], which is accepted by the current owners and by their actual and potential counter-parties as being an accurate average of the prices that were struck on a recent succession of trading days. Thus any exceptional leap or dip in the price of the asset would not invalidate the valuation; on the assumption that exceptional price movements will be corrected in a very short period.
Either of these concepts is more accurately expressed in the words just given than in the ephemeral term value. Far from meaning something absolute, value means nothing-in-particular. For centuries, Political Economists and Economists have pursued the notion that there should be something more meaningful than price, in disclosing how humans respond to an intrinsic quality of goods and of services, which causes the commodities to be priced higher or lower relative to the material costs of their production or provision: and this quality is called value. No such thing exists. Defining the components of price, and how the prices of different commodities and services deviate more or less from equality with their measured costs of production will be the subject of my next effusion.
Friday, 4 January 2013
Economic Blindness
The start of 2013 has brought more mild, cloudy and [here in the Peak District] drizzly weather. Just a dawn on which to take the BBC's TODAY Programme with the morning tea.
One of several depressing items was a discussion by Economists about the phenomenon that is thrown up by British economic statistics. Employment is at its highest level in recent decades: but perceived productivity has declined and the national product is not increasing significantly [indeed, it may just have 'flatlined' over the whole of 2012].
Wages are increasing overall at less than the government's indexed figure for 'inflation', and a high percentage of the workforce are attending their workplaces for less than the 35 hours a week that sensibly can be classified as full-time employment. Some firms have put reliable, trained employees on 'short time' to keep them on-side in case business improves; but the majority of part-timers are engaged on that basis. Many of the part-timers receive only the statutory minimum wage per hour; and for the majority there is no pension provision. The new catch-all pensions legislation will draw many such people into basic schemes: which implies that a further deduction will be taken from their wages and put into a pot with a promised yield in retirement that will be derisorily small. The loss of even a couple of percent of an exiguous wage will have a depressing effect on overall 'cansumer demand' in the economy, when multiplied by millions of affected individuals; but the sums gathered for investment by the pension providers will not be sufficient to create investments that will absorb significant numbers of the unemployed into new jobs and thus increase demand through their enhanced spending.
Wage-earners are still buying imports on an heroic scale: everything from East African fruit, veg and flowers to web using technology from the Far East.
Any increase in the real wages of empoyed people, or in the number of employed people, would most likely increase the deficit on the balance of payments: so in a seriously depressing sense the government is contributing to its target of deficit reduction by keeping a pretty tight cap on incomes.
This is the context in which the Economists this morning discussed these recent economic data. One of them had recently publiched a Paper with a mind-blowingly complex title, replete with pseudo-scientific terminology adding up to zero usefulness. They spoke of productivity as if there was no qualitative difference between the various categories of output: as if it did not matter what was the level of notional value-added by different firms' plant. This is in line with the textbook assumption that all output is of widgets: it is almost impossible for non-Economists to understand the primitivism of this lack of thinking.
To say that "the productivity of the British economy is declining" is to say that products and services are sold for a declining number of money-units per unit of output. This means that prices of goods made in British factories are falling. This does not necessarily mean that fewer units of output are being sold; it can equally mean that goods are being sold for lower 'factory gate prices'. How could such a thing occur?
A] It could mean that global competition is forcing factory owners to lower the prices at which they sell their branded goods Or
B] it could mean that firms have been bought by foreign owners who buy the output as being part-processed [though it is physically complete] and then ship it to the export markets where it will be sold, and the magic transformation by which a pile of coats or a cartoon feature film becomes a branded commodity [in the terms of my own analysis, a quon] takes place outside the UK - it may even notionally be reinported to the UK as a quon - so that the final, most significant 'addition of value' is ascribed not to the UK factory but to the corporate owner's success in transfer pricing the product offshore. Or
C] it could mean that rising wages and other industrial costs in China are making it viable to start or restart or increase the output of basic industrial products in the UK; which only have modest price tags such that an increasing proportion of British factory output is of modestly priced goods [what I describe as marcoms].
All those three possibilities point to a sharp decline in the profitability of British industry, and in the taxes that firms can pay to the state, and the level of wages they can pay to employees: all of which presage declining investment, declining public and social services, and diminishing real wages.
The policy options that are being presented to the government, and to the opposition, and to the Bank of England display the economic ignorance of Economists.
Hard times are ahead of us: and mitigation will only become feasible when the proven principles of Political Economy are reinstated as the basis of policy.
One of several depressing items was a discussion by Economists about the phenomenon that is thrown up by British economic statistics. Employment is at its highest level in recent decades: but perceived productivity has declined and the national product is not increasing significantly [indeed, it may just have 'flatlined' over the whole of 2012].
Wages are increasing overall at less than the government's indexed figure for 'inflation', and a high percentage of the workforce are attending their workplaces for less than the 35 hours a week that sensibly can be classified as full-time employment. Some firms have put reliable, trained employees on 'short time' to keep them on-side in case business improves; but the majority of part-timers are engaged on that basis. Many of the part-timers receive only the statutory minimum wage per hour; and for the majority there is no pension provision. The new catch-all pensions legislation will draw many such people into basic schemes: which implies that a further deduction will be taken from their wages and put into a pot with a promised yield in retirement that will be derisorily small. The loss of even a couple of percent of an exiguous wage will have a depressing effect on overall 'cansumer demand' in the economy, when multiplied by millions of affected individuals; but the sums gathered for investment by the pension providers will not be sufficient to create investments that will absorb significant numbers of the unemployed into new jobs and thus increase demand through their enhanced spending.
Wage-earners are still buying imports on an heroic scale: everything from East African fruit, veg and flowers to web using technology from the Far East.
Any increase in the real wages of empoyed people, or in the number of employed people, would most likely increase the deficit on the balance of payments: so in a seriously depressing sense the government is contributing to its target of deficit reduction by keeping a pretty tight cap on incomes.
This is the context in which the Economists this morning discussed these recent economic data. One of them had recently publiched a Paper with a mind-blowingly complex title, replete with pseudo-scientific terminology adding up to zero usefulness. They spoke of productivity as if there was no qualitative difference between the various categories of output: as if it did not matter what was the level of notional value-added by different firms' plant. This is in line with the textbook assumption that all output is of widgets: it is almost impossible for non-Economists to understand the primitivism of this lack of thinking.
To say that "the productivity of the British economy is declining" is to say that products and services are sold for a declining number of money-units per unit of output. This means that prices of goods made in British factories are falling. This does not necessarily mean that fewer units of output are being sold; it can equally mean that goods are being sold for lower 'factory gate prices'. How could such a thing occur?
A] It could mean that global competition is forcing factory owners to lower the prices at which they sell their branded goods Or
B] it could mean that firms have been bought by foreign owners who buy the output as being part-processed [though it is physically complete] and then ship it to the export markets where it will be sold, and the magic transformation by which a pile of coats or a cartoon feature film becomes a branded commodity [in the terms of my own analysis, a quon] takes place outside the UK - it may even notionally be reinported to the UK as a quon - so that the final, most significant 'addition of value' is ascribed not to the UK factory but to the corporate owner's success in transfer pricing the product offshore. Or
C] it could mean that rising wages and other industrial costs in China are making it viable to start or restart or increase the output of basic industrial products in the UK; which only have modest price tags such that an increasing proportion of British factory output is of modestly priced goods [what I describe as marcoms].
All those three possibilities point to a sharp decline in the profitability of British industry, and in the taxes that firms can pay to the state, and the level of wages they can pay to employees: all of which presage declining investment, declining public and social services, and diminishing real wages.
The policy options that are being presented to the government, and to the opposition, and to the Bank of England display the economic ignorance of Economists.
Hard times are ahead of us: and mitigation will only become feasible when the proven principles of Political Economy are reinstated as the basis of policy.
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