It is a fascinating aspect of human society that in the year when the two Russian Revolutions of 1917 are being remembered there is also a furious lobby of individuals who oppose the screening of a film about the life of the last Tsar before he came to the throne. In rehashing a story that has been common knowledge since the events occurred, Tsarevitch Nicholas is show in the throes of a highly-sexed relationship with a dancer from the St Petersburg opera. He was simply doing what many of the nobility did. The story has been made into a film, whose producers hope to cash in on releasing it to coincide with the centenary of the second revolution. Unluckily for the producers, since the collapse of communism the careless disposal of the imperial family's remains has been exposed, bones from most of them have been identified [with the help of DNA from the Duke of Edinburgh: a reminder that he is a very pukka royal prince] and the Orthodox church has deemed the Tsar to be a saint; if only because he died a 'martyr's death'. The consequence is that the film - though it tells [somewhat sensationally] a true story - has been condemned as blasphemous.
For me, this incident is a perfect vignette of what has happened in Russia in the past thirty years; when those decades are set against the grim background of the previous nearly-seven decades of increasingly bankrupt Marxist-Leninist dogma in conflict with the realities of twentieth-century existence.
The March Revolution saw the abdication of the Tsar and the establishment of a Provisional Government. This group of liberal-conservative democrats struggled in vain both to establish a viable political system and to continue to fight the Germans. By this third year of the First World War Russian losses where huge, the significant capacity of Russian industry and railways had been stretched too far for too long and the soldiers were fed up of fighting under incompetent command with insufficient supplies. Mutinies were commonplace, even without the added stimulus to revolution that was added by the communists. The Germans facilitated Lenin's return to Russia, the Provisional Government recognised him as a potent enemy of their nascent state, he was able to escape arrest and begin to work with Trotsky, Stalin, Molotov and others to foment his more fundamental revolution.
The Provisional Government wanted to create a genuinely democratic republic; building up from the parliamentary institutions that the Tsar had created in 2005. Lenin was out to crush capitalism [including farming by free peasants] and recognised that the destruction of democratic institutions was a necessary step towards that end. Thus he was set to overthrow the state, capture all power for his communists and for the local trades councils - the soviets - that could be manipulated and 'educated' in Leninist dogma, and establish a pseudo-state that was wholly under the control of the party. The country descended into a half-hearted civil war. The Japanese sent troops to the Russian far east, without any particular objective, and they were later recalled home. The British sent a force to Archangel in northern Russia, but they never found sufficiently organised Russian democratic forces to align with in restoring some sort of democracy and they, too, were withdrawn.
Lenin and his gang were left to make what they could of the vast Russian empire. I will carry on with this account for a few days: at least, it will be a relief from Brexit and the collapse of UK political institutions.
Showing posts with label Germans. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Germans. Show all posts
Saturday, 4 November 2017
Friday, 28 September 2012
What is Spain Up To?
Spain has already inflicted huge economic sanctions on its citizens: 25% unemployment [at least], reduced pensions and increased age of retirement, underfunded schools and hospitals, bankrupt local authorities, tens of thousands of incomplete and unsold dwellings, increased taxes ... and the catalogue could go on and on. While the banks have borrowed from EU institutions and from foreign banks even in recent days, the markets are betting against the Spanish state being able to submit formally to the conditions that would be applied to a formal 'bailout' by the European Union, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Since it is generally understood that the conditions on any formal baliout would be very harsh, why should the Spanish government not have done what the Greeks did: take the bailout as soon as possible, and blame the Germans [and the rest of the EU] for the harsh treayment meted out to the population?
Simplistically, Prime Minister Rajoy is asserted to be over-endowed with Spanish pride; which makes him exceedingly reluctant to submit to mere north Europeans. More realistically, he has hoped to be able to avoid a bailout altogether. Meanwhile, his government has demonstrated that the Spanish state is sufficiently robust to be able to enforce very hard economic policies. Most importantly he has emphasised and demonstrated the huge difference between the Spanish situation, and the popular response to it, and that of Greece. Spain has presented strong evidence against the domino theory.
Greece will some day fairly soon be forced to withdraw from the euro; but that need not precipitate a gaderene rush by specluators to force Portugal, Sapin or Italy also to fail to manage their economy withon the eurozone.
Whenever Spain now applies for a bailout, on conditions that it will partially be able to dictate, that will not be a signal for the progressive withdrawal of all the weaker southern states from the euro. Spain has not just bought time for itself to get agreed terms; it has ensured that the gulf between Greece and the rest has become consolidated. Yes, there are demonstrations verging on the riotous in Spain; dismay affects most of the population some of the time, and some of the population all of the time; but there is not yet the degree of hopelessness and despair that now characterises the vast majority of Greeks.
The whole situation is classically tragic, but redemption for Greece is vastly different - and much more painful to achieve - than is the possibility to turn the Spanish economy round within the eurozone.
Simplistically, Prime Minister Rajoy is asserted to be over-endowed with Spanish pride; which makes him exceedingly reluctant to submit to mere north Europeans. More realistically, he has hoped to be able to avoid a bailout altogether. Meanwhile, his government has demonstrated that the Spanish state is sufficiently robust to be able to enforce very hard economic policies. Most importantly he has emphasised and demonstrated the huge difference between the Spanish situation, and the popular response to it, and that of Greece. Spain has presented strong evidence against the domino theory.
Greece will some day fairly soon be forced to withdraw from the euro; but that need not precipitate a gaderene rush by specluators to force Portugal, Sapin or Italy also to fail to manage their economy withon the eurozone.
Whenever Spain now applies for a bailout, on conditions that it will partially be able to dictate, that will not be a signal for the progressive withdrawal of all the weaker southern states from the euro. Spain has not just bought time for itself to get agreed terms; it has ensured that the gulf between Greece and the rest has become consolidated. Yes, there are demonstrations verging on the riotous in Spain; dismay affects most of the population some of the time, and some of the population all of the time; but there is not yet the degree of hopelessness and despair that now characterises the vast majority of Greeks.
The whole situation is classically tragic, but redemption for Greece is vastly different - and much more painful to achieve - than is the possibility to turn the Spanish economy round within the eurozone.
Thursday, 27 October 2011
Gambling
Today's news contains much good, and many items where it is clear that risk is being accepted by governments on behalf of populations who have little understanding of what is at stake. We will take three instances.
One.
27 October 2012 is the twenty-fifth anniversary of the 'Big Bang' in the City of London and the wider British financial market. A tightly managed group of self-regulated professions whose members largely bore personal financial responsibility for their actions [and set their own ethical standards] was replaced by an open marketplace. Foreign firms bought the stockbrokers and jobbing firms and began to use them as bases for gambling on an ever-expanding scale on their own account, abandoning the former focus on customer relations. Their leaders spoke about accepting and managing 'risk'; until 2007 when their frozen gambling debts were so great that governments had to bail them out to prevent systemic collapse of the economy. Because they paid a huge amount of tax on their reckless transactions the financial markets became the great favourite of British governments [especially the Brown-Balls Labour lot]; and it remains conventional wisdom that their 'markets' are essential components of the British economy. So there is yet more risk eventually to be absorbed by a debilitated economy; and little evidence that the politicians have a better understanding of this situation than did their predecessors in 1987 [except Ken Clarke, who is still there and may have learned a lot].
Two.
The Eurozone leaders have gone home to bed after a very late night session, content that they have shored up the system for an indeterminate period during which they will move slowly towards some sort of fiscal union. The longer the negotiations go on, the more risky situations will arise and the more scared the less-well-managed economies will periodically become, and the more the Germans will have their way in determining the shape and structure of the final deal.
Like it or not, there is now a 'two-tier' European Union. The in-crowd of the Eurozone have huge benefits and massive risks in their refreshed situation. Their banks have been bullied into surrendering 50% of the cash that the Greek state notionally owes them: and the whole Eurozone will now try to compel the Greek government to stay in the Euro and eventually pay up their remaining debts in Euros rather than in a putative devalued Drachma.
The outer circle is composed of the willing Euro-abstainers like Britain, the Czech Republic and Sweden and of the reluctant who have simply not passed the economic tests that Greece should never have been allowed to self-certify - especially Poland. There is little probability that the outer ten will have the slightest wish to seek the sort of coherence that is essential among the insiders. Some of them will still seek admission to the Eurozone. Some may form informal alliances, such as the former members of EFTA who joined the EEC together in 1973 [Sweden, Denmark and Britain] and may forge a new relationship with the other ex-EFTA members Norway and Switzerland who are in the European Economic Area but outside the European Union. If this step were taken it could prove an attractive alternative option for Poland but may not be attractive to the Czechs or Hungarians. There is all to play for: no option is risk-free, but there are now clear options.
Three.
The British Office for National Statistics has announced that Britain can expect the population to exceed seventy million by 2030. This is perceived to be 'good news', in that millions of immigrants and their children will be of working age, offsetting a steep forecast risk that there will be a doubling of the number of people over ninety years of age who will impose heavy costs on health and social services. This assumption entails huge risks; not least the fact that there is already a growing anti-immigrant sentiment. That politicians have either ignored the hardening of the popular mood, or stigmatised it as 'racist', is a major risk for the coherence of the country. There are real worries about Muslim colonisation of the country [and, indeed, of the Continent], which will not be assuaged by bland political reassurances. Demography is becoming dicey!
One.
27 October 2012 is the twenty-fifth anniversary of the 'Big Bang' in the City of London and the wider British financial market. A tightly managed group of self-regulated professions whose members largely bore personal financial responsibility for their actions [and set their own ethical standards] was replaced by an open marketplace. Foreign firms bought the stockbrokers and jobbing firms and began to use them as bases for gambling on an ever-expanding scale on their own account, abandoning the former focus on customer relations. Their leaders spoke about accepting and managing 'risk'; until 2007 when their frozen gambling debts were so great that governments had to bail them out to prevent systemic collapse of the economy. Because they paid a huge amount of tax on their reckless transactions the financial markets became the great favourite of British governments [especially the Brown-Balls Labour lot]; and it remains conventional wisdom that their 'markets' are essential components of the British economy. So there is yet more risk eventually to be absorbed by a debilitated economy; and little evidence that the politicians have a better understanding of this situation than did their predecessors in 1987 [except Ken Clarke, who is still there and may have learned a lot].
Two.
The Eurozone leaders have gone home to bed after a very late night session, content that they have shored up the system for an indeterminate period during which they will move slowly towards some sort of fiscal union. The longer the negotiations go on, the more risky situations will arise and the more scared the less-well-managed economies will periodically become, and the more the Germans will have their way in determining the shape and structure of the final deal.
Like it or not, there is now a 'two-tier' European Union. The in-crowd of the Eurozone have huge benefits and massive risks in their refreshed situation. Their banks have been bullied into surrendering 50% of the cash that the Greek state notionally owes them: and the whole Eurozone will now try to compel the Greek government to stay in the Euro and eventually pay up their remaining debts in Euros rather than in a putative devalued Drachma.
The outer circle is composed of the willing Euro-abstainers like Britain, the Czech Republic and Sweden and of the reluctant who have simply not passed the economic tests that Greece should never have been allowed to self-certify - especially Poland. There is little probability that the outer ten will have the slightest wish to seek the sort of coherence that is essential among the insiders. Some of them will still seek admission to the Eurozone. Some may form informal alliances, such as the former members of EFTA who joined the EEC together in 1973 [Sweden, Denmark and Britain] and may forge a new relationship with the other ex-EFTA members Norway and Switzerland who are in the European Economic Area but outside the European Union. If this step were taken it could prove an attractive alternative option for Poland but may not be attractive to the Czechs or Hungarians. There is all to play for: no option is risk-free, but there are now clear options.
Three.
The British Office for National Statistics has announced that Britain can expect the population to exceed seventy million by 2030. This is perceived to be 'good news', in that millions of immigrants and their children will be of working age, offsetting a steep forecast risk that there will be a doubling of the number of people over ninety years of age who will impose heavy costs on health and social services. This assumption entails huge risks; not least the fact that there is already a growing anti-immigrant sentiment. That politicians have either ignored the hardening of the popular mood, or stigmatised it as 'racist', is a major risk for the coherence of the country. There are real worries about Muslim colonisation of the country [and, indeed, of the Continent], which will not be assuaged by bland political reassurances. Demography is becoming dicey!
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