A Less-than-half-cock Strategy

Mrs May was talking in January about the importance of the 'Industrial Strategy' on which her government was supposedly working very hard. It has now been unveiled, and although there is some straight thinking in it there is also grave incomprehension of economic realities. Just to list a few:

*Brexit: it is vitally important that any drugs, designs or other innovations are marketable throughout the European Union on more-or-less the same terms as at present: otherwise, firms that are subsidised to employ teams of researchers in the UK will do the final stages of development within the Union so that the product is not inhibited by regulatory barriers from getting to its primary market. Innovative products will be held up at any border by licensing and regulatory systems, to allow indigenous companies in the potential importer countries to catch up. WTO Rules will not stop such chauvinistic chicanery. Even before the advent of Trump, the USA was notorious in that regard: while firms in emergent economies - including China and India - are not above simple intellectual theft.

*Profits can be shoved abroad by alien companies. So the British state will be sponsoring and helping alien-owned firms to develop products - employing some British scientists and technicians, true - but also allowed to import their own managers and experts for the duration of the period of product development. The manufacturing of the developed idea can that be conducted anywhere on the globe, and the pricing structure can be adjusted so that British taxpayer gets little back for the investment by the British state. Although some share of the intellectual property in some ideas may go to British universities and individuals, the vast majority will be owned by alien organisations; and can thus be alienated as they wish.

*Fake apprenticeships such as are being developed with schools and universities in the UK are most unlikely to produce people with the skill-set that is achieved by real apprenticeship in Germany. It is therefore unlikely that the programme will develop a strong and longstanding skilled workforce such as exists in the dreams of the contributors to the strategic plan. The ongoing delay in the actual launch of the Apprenticeship-MBA will provide no obstacle to the companies that have already agreed to participate in the Industrial Strategy.

*Any genuine development of science and technology in the UK is greatly to be welcomed. But I have observed personally for more than forty years that a huge proportion of the research that is carried out in the best British universities of technology - places like Birmingham, Manchester and Sheffield - is done by alien research students. Not enough Brits are capable of getting good degrees in science and technology, because of the awful state and status of science in schools. Side-tracking kids into fake apprenticeships where they simulate industrial processes instead of doing full-time hard learning will set the UK back in its development of the right skills for the twenty-first century.

My overwhelming feeling about the strategy is: "too little, too late"!

Most importantly, the 'strategists' still have not got lesson number one: that productivity improves only when productiveness gets the prime place. Productiveness is improved only when the profit from any activity is devoted to improving the plant, the processes, the materials used and the people employed. When that is done, productivity can improve and real economic growth [in the sense of generating more income-per-head from the workforce]  can be achieved. I do not see that productiveness will significantly be enhanced by this new Strategy.

Austria's Choice

Today, there is to be a general election in Austria. Thanks to the actions of Angela Merkel two years ago, the conclusion of the election in this neighbouring country to Germany was clear before voting began. The overwhelming majority of Austrians agree that there are now too many Muslims in the country, that the strain they have put on the social assistance and housing and education and health systems is unacceptable; and that no further significant immigration - however desperate the plight of people claiming to be 'refugees' might be - should be permitted. The government that will emerge from the election will be a coalition with a more right-wing structure than any since the re-unification of Austria [after allied occupation] in 1956. The two stand-out policy positions that it is expected to adopt are to seal the frontiers of the EU against immigrants, and to review and restrict access to the social security and related systems.

Neigbouring Hungary has had a government with policies designed to minimise immigration from outside the EU for several years: access to that country is very heavily controlled, with high wire fences and a strong presence of border guards. To the south-west of the Hungarian frontier is Austria's border with Italy, which has already been 'strengthened' to limit the onward passage of any of the tens of thousands of economic migrants who reach Italy by sea every year. No doubt that border will further be toughened: but there will also be sympathy for the Italians in their situation of receiving the migrants, which is resulting in right-wing politicians rising through 'populist' movements there, too.

There will be resistance in Austria to any attempt by Germany to impose any quota of Muslim [or, indeed, any other category of] immigrants on any EU country. It is widely expected that Austria will adhere to, and may even join, the 'Visigrad' group of countries [Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary] that have 'ganged up' to resist pressure from Germany and France. Thus there is already the making of a very powerful subset of the EU that will simply decline to go along with aspects of the settlement that the USA imposed on 'liberated' Europe after 1945. The Liberal Consensus to which Roosevelt and Truman, Churchill and deGaulle subscribed is fading fast.

The right-wing AfD in Germany has gained seats in the Bundestag, sufficient in number to harass whatever coalition government Mrs Merkel may be able to cobble together. France has a completely unproved president; and there are huge questions as to whether his parliamentary majority and constitutional authority will be enough to overcome the inertia of the trade unions, farmers and other vested interests. It has been noted above that Italy has strong and growing right-wing parties, and the legacy of Fascism is ceasing to be seen as an embarrassment. Those countries in north and west Europe that have a couple of centuries of constitutional government [Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland and Luxembourg; plus non-EU-member Norway] have all seen some emergence of minority anti-migrant movements. The three Baltic States [Estonia Latvia and Lithuania] have no significant problem with Muslim immigrants; they have suffered, to varying degrees, net emigration to the more affluent west of the EU.

The Balkan EU members, and aspirants to membership, want to prove their democratic credentials; but they have limited resources to accommodate immigrants [balanced by limited means of keeping them out]. They will sympathise with [and envy] the countries to the north that have the means and the will to seal their borders to a significant extent.

Thus the European Union that is harassed by the Brexit issue is a very different political and emotional structure than it was at the beginning of 2015: the year in which Cowardy Cameron launched the Referendum as an election pledge. It is quickly becoming an entity about which any true democrat would have serious questions. Britain is so beset by a useless government that it has not yet faced up to the point: but there is a growing doubt as to whether we would wish to join, if that was the issue before us.

Brexit Buffoons, Regulations and Point Protectionism

Boris Johnson has sounded-off again, this time to the Sun, with his demands about Brexit. The transition must be absolutely no more than two years, and the UK should not accept new EU regulations in that period. This keeps him in front of the 'hard Brexiteers' in the Conservative Party, ahead of what is certain to be a very painful party conference for the Prime Minister who decided to hold an election, then ran it the way her close advisers suggested, and so lost her parliamentary majority. Members of the party from all factions know that the Corbyn-McDonnell chances of winning a general election [in England, Wales, and - just possibly - the lost Labour heartlands of Scotland] are astonishingly high. Thus the Tories dare not topple the leader, simply because there is no obvious alternative who could surely prevent the party from disintegrating sufficiently to force a general election.

Thus the Conservatives have to negotiate Brexit: with an increasing majority of the party daily becoming more aware [as are Labour MPs] that the complete separation of the UK from the European Economic Area would put the livelihoods of all sixty million people who depend on the UK economy in grave jeopardy. The Minority of fervent Brexiteers, together with the ambitious chancers who have joined them, assert that the UK can open up huge vistas of trade all over the world, by making trade agreements with a whole raft of countries under WTO Rules.

The World Trade Organisation had its origins in GATT - the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - which was set up alongside the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development [normally called the World Bank] and the International Monetary Fund [IMF] by the victorious allies at the end of the Second World War in the belief that the two devastating wars of the twentieth century were largely economic in origin. The USSR was wholly, dogmatically convinced that the First World War was the result of expansionist imperialist competition between the European powers; and they ascribed the second to a re-run of the same conflict between a resurgent Germany and the 'Anglo-Saxon' states that had succeeded in 1918 and then dissipated the fruits of victory in the Depression of the 'thirties. The USA and the UK shared the view that the competitive inefficiencies of capitalism had exacerbated the economic problems of the late 'twenties and early 'thirties. The idea behind the new system was to provide transparent means by which each economy could grow as part of a successful international community.

The USSR soon withdrew from active participation in the institutions, and compelled its satellites to leave as well. Then the international organisations served the 'capitalist' world, in an uneasy relationship with the 'third world' of notionally 'non-aligned' countries [which asserted their independence of both the USSR-led and US-led pattern of alliances that maintained the cold war from 1949 to 1992]. During that period the GATT became the WTO, and had to accommodate itself to a global reality where the rhetoric of free trade was greatly modified by each country building up defensive mounds of regulations that kept out many imports that other countries could offer them in greater quantity and of more sophisticated design than their own factories  could produce; without imposing tariffs that openly breached WTO rules. When such rules failed, and a government wanted to exclude some import, they could - and did - simply impose 'extraordinary' tariffs, usually 'temporarily' to keep out the unwelcome export. That is what I have called point protectionism in this blog. The recent spat engineered in the USA by Boeing is merely one of thousands of examples.

If Boris Johnson and Liam Fox are such starry-eyed innocents that they believe that WTO Rules will be enough to ensure that the UK can make a safe transit into a post-EU trading world, they are profoundly dangerous.

Intellectual Property and Point Protection

Patents were invented in Europe, specifically in Monarchical France, and the concept was taken up enthusiastically around the continent. During the eighteenth century, France was way ahead of the UK in the number of patents registered; but by 1800 a clear difference was emerging: while most patents were never to make much money for their owners, some patents - notably British patents - were massively generative of wealth because they were fundamental to the change that was sweeping the United Kingdom into the predominant position in the process that was soon to be called 'the industrial revolution'. Then, into the nineteenth century, the process that led to the unification of Germany ran in parallel with the industrialisation of key areas in that territory; most notably in the Ruhr and Saxony, and around Hamburg and Bremen; and German industrialisation was accompanied by a flurry of patents that included an increasing proportion that were based on methodical research.

The United States developed as a group of former British and French colonies, with a significant proportion of German-speaking settlers helping to drive industrial growth in that vast continent. For a considerable period there was considerable piracy of European intellectual property in the emergent economy of the United States; and eventually the US legislature recognised the good sense of mutual protection of industrially valuable intellectual property [simply because, if the US stole from others, others could steal from them: and thus they could undermine each other]. But, even then, copyright in literature, drama and art seemed less important - especially in the context of US law which was designed to make the acquisition of information and education as cheap as possible - so such property was to be protected mutually much later; hence arose Charles Dickens' famous endeavours to get his new output into the hands of  American readers before all the revenue was lost to pirates.

There are pseudo-scientific explanations as to why the UK and Germany, in particular among European states, have been prolific in inventing useful things and processes; but those theories do not explain why the USA has been at least equal to the European leaders in invention and innovation. The Great Exhibition in London in 1851 was meant to show the British people and the rest of the world the range and brilliance of British industrial output, and [to a certain extent] it did: but it also shocked the British visitors to see how sophisticated and clever the French, German and American innovations were. Britain was still primarily an agricultural country in 1851, and most of the urban population had only recently moved into town and still had links to the countryside: so to a huge proportion of the million or so Brits who walked round the Exhibition the most amazing device on display was the McCormick Reaper from the USA. The great plains of the USA were beginning to be prepared to grow crops, and the sort of mechanisation that the reaper represented showed how the American farmers would be able to undercut labour-intensive European suppliers of the principal cereal crops without needing to wait for a mass of immigrant labourers. One of the bizarre side-issues to emerge from the conversations that were driven by the perceived shift in the balance of advantage from Europe to America [and, to a much lesser degree, to Australia] was that Russia remained a peasant economy: the development of that vast empire would have been utterly transformed if the same extensive mechanised farming were to be installed there as in the USA. Russian peasants were still enslaved as serfs in 1851, and the Cossacks roamed free over the future wheatlands. The potential short-cut to massive advancement and wealth was not taken up.

Over the decades since 1851, Britain, Germany and the USA have remained the global leaders in invention and innovation: France and the low countries have been in the league too, but the dominant three have remained in the lead. And now the UK is going through the throes of implementing the decision to leave the protectionism of the European Union; and there is frequent mention of the notion that Britain can 'go it alone' with a hotch-potch of free-trade agreements with other countries: notably China and India, and maybe Brazil, alongside the USA. As the strongly emerging economies develop their industrial capability, they know that the mutual protection of patents will become ever more important. Chinese goods can simply be frozen out of the US and the EU if they are produced in breach of patent: so it is in the interests of the Chinese economy that the state becomes more and more forthright in protecting foreign patents.

On quite different grounds, the major economic blocks can close their markets to specific Chinese exports - or slap punitive tariffs on them - if Chinese exporters try to 'dump' that output in export markets at less than the cost-price of making the equivalent in the receiving country. Raising such barriers is what I have called point protectionism. Big economies, or economic communities, can retaliate against each other if they believe that point protectionism is unfairly being applied against them. This is a powerful tool in the armoury of each major economy. An isolated Britain will not have adequate leverage to apply against the emerging mass economies that might infringe British patents or apply unfair point protectionism against the UK. This is the decisive reason why the crazy Tory Brexiteers must be exposed for what they are, now. The European Union stinks, from the Parliament to the Commission to the Court; the UK must get as far away from those institutions as is feasible; while remaining in the necessary protection of the economic community.

What Comes Next, After North Sea Oil?

Mrs Thatcher's government's economic and social policies were made viable only by the fact that her era coincided with the United Kingdom being able to exploit the oil and gas reserves that had been found under the North Sea over the previous couple of decades. The tax revenues derived from those resources largely funded the welfare state, enabled the government to give redundancy pay and early pensions to unwanted employees from the nationalised industries, and maintained the nation's defences. The material fact of having sufficient gas to meet the national need, and a significant oil supply that diminished the need for imports, enabled the country to shut down the coal industry almost completely. 

Those were the material conditions in which the financial revolution of 1986 was facilitated: and the financial services [with their related activities like the courts and arbitration services] were opened to the international community and became a significant earner of foreign exchange. The loss of the textile, crockery and steel industries was mitigated by the sale of financial and related service globally. In particular, Britain's membership of the European Economic Community as it went through the transition to the European Union enabled London to become the unchallenged financial hub of the Union. It will be interesting to see how far President Macron, as an ex-banker, is able to steal business for Paris in the coming years; but that will be a side-show compared to the issue that is being considered here.

The key fact is that material assets - oil and gas - enabled the immaterial activities of 'the City' to become established as major export markets. Simultaneously, the incomprehension of successive governments as to what was happening in the domestic financial services market was building up to the crash that almost brought down the entire economy in 2007-8. New forms of contract, most particularly securitisation, enabled the domestic financial sector to grow in an unprecedented ways to an extent that was way beyond the regulators' power to comprehend or to control it. Securitisation was developed simultaneously in the USA and the UK, as a means whereby borrowing by some firms and most individuals could be lifted off the books of the banks and building societies that made the original loans, and sold on as new forms of security to suddenly emerging 'wholesale' traders and investors. This meant that the retail banks reduced the amount of lending in their books, and could lend more again; which loans could then be securitised: and so on. The debts owed to their banks by small and medium-sized firms largely remained with the banks, because they were recognised to be too risky for securitisation. But the mortgages and credit card debts owed by millions of ordinary people were seen as safe debts to be securitised. Thus when the crash came, the banks faced the fact that they had many billions of pounds of debts from smaller companies on their balance sheets, most of which the companies could not settle in the depressed condition after the crash. So the debts were kept on the books, the Bank of England allowed the banks to cash in government bonds in sufficient volume and value to make those books look balanced, and a huge problem for the future in the form of 'zombie' companies was created [and it now seems almost permanent: impossible in the near term to resolve].

Meanwhile the financial institutions collectively have carried on lending pretty freely to house buyers with reliable incomes, fueling a boom in property prices for the sectors of society than can afford to maintain their repayments and causing a major social division between those who can 'buy' homes and those who can not. Juggling money to keep the mortgage market expanding, largely by expanding the money supply through the Bank of England's 'quantitative easing' trick, has maintained the illusion that 'owners' of property are asset-rich: and this has kept the economy buoyant with regularly reported 'growth' of the Gross Domestic Product of the economy. This is all based on a bubble of credit; about which the Bank of England is becoming increasingly concerned.

Meanwhile, the 'real economy' of goods made and imported and exported and consumed has shrunk to a minor proportion of the domestic economy. The country has become import dependent: to a degree that ongoing sales of financial and related services to the rest of the world will not enable he country to pay its way. Departure from the European Union, even if the UK is able to retain its status as the financial hub within the European Economic Area, will make this situation worse.

It is usually condemned as old-fashioned and uncomprehending to stress the overriding importance of the material economy. But the success of Germany as a material-exporting country [of high-value-added products] is the living demonstration of the point. The reckless use of North Sea assets to finance a material standard of living that the country can no longer afford, and to fund a finance sector that has exacerbated the nation's problems, is a horror story which will haunt economic reality for at least a generation to come: and no politicians are preparing to cope with it.

Concern at the IMF: About What?

The Managing Director of the IMF has expressed concern about the probability that their forecasts for economic growth throughout the world must be downgraded. Her foreboding is justified by the regular downward revision of estimates for growth that are being published in various countries, especially in the light of the ongoing crisis in the eurozone and its potential negative impact on its trading partners in other parts of the world. In the face of such a negative mood among Economists, politicians, journalists, bankers and some business managers it is unsurprising that there is a growing feeling of unease among the general public.

During the so-called credit crunch of 2007-8 many governments tried to secure the future of banks in their territories by guaranteeing the deposits that people and businesses had placed in those banks. When banks could not meet depositors' demands for cash from their own resources the government supplied the money. Governments that had control of their own currencies, such as the US dollar and the British pound, could authorise their central banks to create 'new' money and make it available to the banks: some went further and actually create the money with which to buy control of threatened banks. In the USA this process was extended to the one insurance company, AIG, that had ruined itself by creating contracts by which it guaranteed to fund banks in certain circumstances which had been thought highly improbable until they happened to several big banks all at once.

In countries that did not have control of their money supply, notably those in the eurozone, the means available to governments to stabilise the economic situation were seriously constrained. For seven years before the credit crunch occurred the member countries of the eurozone issued bonds and bills [certificates of government debt] denominated in euros; and bonds that had been issued before the creation of the euro had become redeemable in euros. Those governments could not follow the lead of the Americans and the British in creating the money that they had to pay out to buy the bonds that fell due to be cashed: they had to borrow the necessary euros from the European Central Bank or the International Monetary Fund, or tap new funds created by other eurozone governments. In considering any of those options a government was faced with strict conditions attaching to any loan, that usually included the imposition of restrictive economic policies. At an early stage in the banking crisis the Irish government decided to guarantee all banks' obligations, raised a large loan and imposed dramatically restrictive conditions on the economy. Southern European members of the eurozone faced up to the crisis more slowly and then took the very different stance of demanding bail-out loans and prevaricated about imposing the conditions that they had accepted, threatening the northern eurozone countries with progressive economic collapse and political chaos. The northern eurozone countries regard this as simple cheating and are resisting any further concessions to the south unless they are accompanied by enforceable sanctions. Meanwhile the population of the whole Union is getting used to commentators covering the arguments about the possible withdrawal of some countries from the euro or the collapse of the entire venture. The fact that the eurozone is not coterminous with the European Union is widely understood: the Union could survive either the defection of some members or  the total collapse of the single currency.

The possibility of chaos in much of the EU - the world's largest economic bloc - is the cause of worry throughout the world economy. The shabby history of the Union - the political fudges, the pervasive unaccountability of the Brussels bureaucracy and the notorious 'democratic deficit' by which the eurorats have evaded public concerns in aggregating power in their own hands - has created the circumstances in which there is little mass empathy with any proposal to give more power to the Union. Spaniards and Italians would like the Union to be able to grab Germany's wealth and hand it to them in return for promises to which nobody gives the slightest credibility: Germany would never assent to such a scheme. The extension of another loan to Spain, agreed overnight, is an allocation of the existing funds which the Finns and the Dutch and the Slovaks and the Germans have already written off. This time round the northern eurozone members seem to be so little concerned about this further handout that they have agreed to give the Spanish government longer to impose austerity.

 And so the sorry saga drags on. Greece will leave the euro. With that example in their sights it is just possible that the Spanish, the Portuguese and the Italians will accept enough 'discipline' to keep the euro staggering along for a year or two. There is no hope of Europe leading the world economy to a new era of prosperity; and not much sign of the emergent economies or the US providing a 'motor' to drag the global economy into an era of growth. New thinking is needed, urgently.

Guff at the G20

Some of the people who are regarded as the most important 'leaders' and office-holders in the world have been to the seaside in Mexico with the ostensible purpose of stabilising the global economy. The slow-motion unwinding of the eurozone has been extended by the emergent powers placing additional credit with the International Monetary Fund so that it will be available to be pumped into Europe: conditions will be specified but it is most unlikely that these would be so draconian that they would ensure that the euro collapses. Low-grade politicians who hold on to power by default in countries outside the eurozone have again admonished those inside the common currency to get their act together; once more these focus on trying to bully Germany into dissipating its savings on helping other eurozone countries. So far, Germany has declined to obey, and the President of the EU Commission has blamed 'North America' for the crisis.

My analysis firmly locates the origin of the global financial crisis in London, England. With the 'big bang' of 1986.the Thatcher government smashed the traditional division of financial transactions in the City of London between stock brokers and jobbers, banks and merchant banks, separate exchanges for different types of transaction, self-regulation within each sector and ultimate oversight from the Bank of England [which preferred to steer market members into approved ways of working by winks and nods and secret meetings]. The phrase big bang had become central to theoretical physics, to describe the moment immediately after the creation of the universe when its great expansion and diversification began. By applying that phrase to the finance sector enthusiastic commentators implied that here was a new beginning in a newly structured market that could grow immeasurably and bring great profit to the participants: who could then be taxed to meet some of the growing deficit on government income as industry was destroyed while farming and fisheries were left to wallow under heavily protectionist EU regulations. The rapidly advancing capabilities of computers enabled the markets to be operated at speeds and with complexity far beyond the former trading patterns that had depended on word-of-mouth and typewriters. New types of 'product' - most obviously derivatives and new processes for securitisation - burgeoned on an almost astronomical scale, and old contract types such as futures were reformatted and used in vastly different new ways. The world's banks brought business to London and Wall Street looked set to lose the dominance of global markets that it had gained in the nineteen-thirties and consolidated through the Second World War, Marshall Aid and Cold War. Ferocious lobbying of the politicians in Washington led to the repeal of legislation that had mandated the separation of 'retail' and 'wholesale' banking,  and had differentiated banking from broking; with the specific intention of enabling Wall Street to compete with the City of London. Small differences in regulations led globalised businesses to put some business in New York, some in London and a little in other centres such as Hong Kong and Singapore.

Thus far the London big bang was the origin for the new pattern of trade; but then the US government decided to tap into the markets in the interests of social engineering. Given that such huge and flexible financial markets existed, surely they could be required to lend money to people who sat at the bottom of the heap in society. Let even the poorest become home-owners and thus gain some pride of possession and learn to earn the money necessary to service their mortgages and care for their homes. Mortgage lenders were required to allocate some of their funds to 'sub-prime' mortgage borrowers: two government-backed institutions underpinned the mortgage market, but the wholesale market practitioners became increasingly keen to securitise 'bundles' of mortgages and re-sell the securities into the general financial markets. After a very few years just about every bank and securities manager included some sub-prime mortgages buried within their so-called 'assets'. Once it was demonstrated that hundreds of thousands of feckless Americans were not paying their mortgage debts or maintaining their houses well, it was clear that some portion of the 'value' of many hundreds of thousands of 'assets' was non-existent. Thus the trigger for the crisis was squeezed in North America, but financial institutions from all over the world were deep in the mess and the resultant reckoning is ongoing. American sub-prime lending was the mechanism for the disaster; but its origin lay in the reckless gamble by the Thatcher government.

Democratic Deficit

One of the discredited Rating Agencies has downgraded Belgian government debt: apparently on the grounds that they have not had an established government for well over a year. The cause of the bickering between political parties arises from an excess of democracy, that pretty well ensures that there is never a predominant party with a parliamentary majority. Belgium's policy options are restricted by the fact that the state is a member both of the European Union and of the euro: the national capital, Brussels is overshadowed by a few buildings within that city from which the EU is run and by Frankfort where the European Central Bank is located. Every opinion and brand of Flemish nationalism is represented in the Belgian Parliament; as are all the factions and aspirations of the French-speaking Walloons. This wonderfully democratic outcome is impotent: the politicians can't agree formally how to share out ministerial posts, so they have just shuffled the pack and carried on from week to week as 'caretaker' ministers; and operationally it doesn't matter. But cosmetically it looks untidy, so Standard & Poors have chosen to give Belgium a kick by reducing their rating from AA+ to AA: this will license market traders to have a whirl at making a bit more money by selling Belgian debt short: a great game for the insiders, and a worry for ordinary folk, who know that policy on trade and industry is made by the EU, and well understand that the euro is completely beyond influence from any Belgian government.

A Belgian is President of the EU Council of Ministers, but he has no power: he can merely try to co-ordinate 27 heads of state and heads of government. The EU Parliament remunerates it members exceptionally well, in the combination of salary [related to the local parliamentary salary in the members' home countries] and EU expenses; but they have no real power. The Commissioners are nominated by the governments of the member states without any convincing pretence of democratic consent. Britain's Commissioner is a Labour Party hack who has never held national elected office, was totally unknown to the public on her appointment [made in haste when the sitting Commissioner was recalled to serve in Brown's despairing government], and whose rare appearances on the British TV News cause a surge of national embarrassment.The democratic deficit on the EU probably exceeds 100%.

The new Italian and Greek Prime Ministers are described as 'technocrats'. The 'technology' that they are supposed to understand is Economics, the discredited subject whose practitioners sanctioned and applauded all the excesses that have created the crises in business and in personal and in governmental debt; that none of the 'Atlantic economies' has yet begun to addressed effectively for the long term. They personally applied their Economics in bringing their countries into the tissue of lies and false hopes that enabled a very disparate group of countries to create the euro. They went on to occupy cushy roles in the unaudited EU mechanism and now have been set up as proconsuls for their cronies. They are part of the problem, not of any radical solution.

Germany has a carefully drafted democratic constitution, with a special court to protect it and a Chancellor who grew up as a subject of a militarily occupied satellite state. She is committed to democratic principles  and is accutely aware of the fraud that was committed by the founders of the euro. She is reported to be viscerally unwilling to legitimate the lunacy that has created the state debts of those eurozone countries that have systematically [and knowingly] lived beyond their means by 'monetising' those obligations under a German guarantee. So she is pressing for something like a democratic structure to be created, within which at least part of the eurozone can move close to fiscal union [a united tax and budgetary system]. Ms Merkel is not prepared to guarantee past follies and frauds in the mean time.

The EU has never been even slightly democratic: the 'European project' is the imposition of an elite who have drawn on the widespread fear of European wars to justify their own job-creation machine. Any currency zone that adopts Merkel's principles will certainly be smaller that the eurozone of seventeen states that is just about surviving into another week. A German-led outcome may be a eurozone shorn of the weaker bretheren, or it may be a Neumark zone comprising Germany, Austria, Croatia, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Slovakia, Finland and Estonia, probably Belgium, and possibly France, Poland, Latvia and Lithuania. The Czech Republic, Hungary and the Scandinavian EU members would probably be welcome to apply to join once the system were up and running. The 'Club Med' countries would not be considered for candidacy until their devalued euro - or their separate currencies - had well stabilised and their balance of payments was restored.

Britain's desperate imbalance of payments and its structural budget deficit would become even more conspicuous when it drew comparison with the Neumark bloc. It would become clearer that party politicians cannot solve the problems, and the yaa-boo antics of the House of Commons and in the TV  'question' programmes would move from being a national joke to become recognised as evidence of the failure of the entire political structure. The British situation is worse than that of the EU: it is worse than a democratic deficit: it is an advanced case of defective democracy. This tragedy has been developing for several decades: in Can Britain Survive? [1971] Ken Watkins and I wrote:
"...there is a kind of auction of popular programmes carried on by the major parties, in which the highest bidder tends to win the lot. Since the parties do not wish to commit political suicide they are, willy-nilly, compelled to act accordingly. The fact that this inhibits them from tackling the fundamental structural weaknesses in the in the economy can be seen from the study of the elections since the end of the Second World War."
The same political auction game has continued unabated for forty more years! The deep defects of democracy, British-style, will not easily be corrected; and yet only when that correction has taken place can a rational economic strategy be formulated: then implemented over several decades. If the democratic defect is not corrected by completely fresh democratic means; a less democratic solution is quite likely to intervene.

The oldest current Constitution in the world, that of the USA, is not directly under threat. But American commentators from all segments of the political spectrum are worried about a failure of their institutions to provide clear policy in a very grave national crisis. Franklin D Roosevelt was - in effect - given exceptional powers to lead the economy out of depression, and he continued to exercise exceptional powers, sanctioned by Congress and unimpeded by the Supreme Court, for the Second World War. Harry S Truman had barely begun the process of surrendering the special powers when the emergence of the Cold War brought the Marshall Plan. Then came the Korean War, then the long stalemate of the nuclear confrontation. After 1991 the US was the unique superpower and the Clinton presidency was the first 'normal' incumbency since the mid-nineteen-thirties. It led to impeachment proceedings and a reassertion of party politics over constitutional propriety. George W Bush was continuing with the diminished role when 9/11 created a crisis and led to two overseas wars. The role of the Commander-in-Chief was once again unquestioned, and guided by the Vice-President and Secretary of Defence it transcended constitutional propriety. The limits to US global power were challenged and the end of hegemony was slowly acknowledged. Obama came into office in a diminished power and he has faced the full force of a resurgent, if uncomfortable, congressional democracy. His fluency became his greatest failing: he was unable to listen to and to interpret the diverse dialogues that had been unleashed by the collapse of the financial system and the weakening of the military-industrial complex. The attempts at bold initiatives to deal with the human consequences of the crisis that he has promoted seem to be based on the European welfare state from the nineteen-fifties: which the Europeans themselves are having to abandon under the burden of debt with which it saddled them. The result is that the USA has its own, very specific demcratic deficit: it is a real and urgent stress-point, that has been confronted by a dialogue of the deaf in a polarised Congress that exactly mirrors the depth of division in the country. Meanwhile, the prophets of economic Armageddon are having a bonanza.

Classic Cocking Up

Greece
Now a turn-up for the books! No serious commentator thought that Greece would ever be able to squeeze living standards cruelly at the behest of the EU - and of Germany, in particular [as displayed in the viciously silly 'Nazi' propaganda]. Nobody could say exactly how the impossibility would be articulated. Now we know!

In a brilliant piece of intuitive populism, the Greek government has opted for a referendum. This will enable the vast majority of the population to refuse to give effect to the EU requirements. The country will have to default on its public debt, and drop out of the Eurozone. Within the zone, all hands will turn to preventing contagion from running to Italy: 'the markets' will not focus on Spain or Portugal, but go for the big scalp. The EU and the Eurozone should be able to defeat the markets if they really summon up the will and exercise the relative power of governments. More of that in the coming days.

As far as the Greeks are concerned, they will be on their own: presumably within the EU on a similar footing to Romania [unless they opt out, which is unlikely]. They will be subject to the Laws of Political Economy, which few [if any] of their Economists understand. The experience will be painful.If any reader wants to get ahead of the game, and learn the Laws, link to Personal Political Economy via this site.

Saint Paul's Cathedral
has now endured all the reputational risk that is available in the present incident: so the only sensible course is to achieve the removal of the 'protesters' and the attendant mob within a few days. The incident will then be a single event in the popular memory, over and done with [ideally] in three weeks.

Then the toil will begin.

The Bishop has taken charge of the cathedral, and has indicated that his priority will be to restore the church's role as the leading commentator and preacher on Ethics in business and public life: as Dean Inge was in Saint Paul's pulpit in the interwar years, when he became a nationally known irritant to the powerful and complacent. His books of sermons and his essays sold hundreds of thousands of copies.

This prophetic reality will not be achieved quickly: it will take the cathedral years to recover from its concentration on magnificent services and raising tens of millions of pounds for a magical restoration. The Bishop has a formidable intellect and a great presence: but even his abilities [as well as his time] will be stretched, and he must stay the course in his new leadership role.

Six Days To go

After a nugatory meeting of the G20 Finance Ministers over the last weekend, the world economic community is still waiting for France and Germany to overcome their significant differences about how the Greek crisis can be solved in a way that will assure the future of the euro. European Ministers are to have a 'summit meeting' over the next weekend: meanwhile, as the US Treasury Secretary put it, France and Germany "have six days to save the world". That is no less than the truth, about 'the world as we know it' . It will be important to follow that key story as the days go by; but it is even more important to understand what other realities the world community should be facing up to, regardless of whether or not the euro can be nursed into some sort of health.

I have just spent a couple of days in the Derbyshire Peak District, and on my return to London I noticed a phenomenon that I have not seen before: the leaves in the south are going brown before those in the north: normally spring comes earlier in the south, and the leaves remain on the trees longer in the south than in the north. I assume that this year's deviation is a consequence of the unusually dry weather in the south and east of the country, which has left the trees exhausted and deprived of nutriments. Parts of Derbyshire have also been drier than usual in the past year, but not sufficiently to have a comparable effect on the trees. Crop yields in the south and east - Britain's heaviest agrarian regions - are down this year. As the global population trend is raising more awareness that countries [and economic communities, if they can survive] must become more nearly self-sufficient, given that that they must export surpluses of what they produce if they want to continue to be able to buy crops that their climate will not sustain. Meanwhile, if it is implemented, EU environmental legislation will massively reduce the rights of farmers to access rivers and ground water when rainfall is insufficient to support the growth of the crops, and will increase the charges that the government makes for the permitted abstractions: so food is likely to become both more scarce and more expensive.

Another key sign is exemplified today by the Prime Minister meeting the main gas and electricity suppliers to ask them to lower their charges, at least to 'vulnerable' customers: and this at a time when the government is pursuing environmental targets that will require the companies to invest massively in 'green' energy supplies. The cost of that capital spending can only be repaid from charges to customers in the future. So it is becoming dearer to heat as well as to eat, in response to deliberate government policy: and that is happening in more and more households across Britain this year, as real incomes fall.

It remains fashionable, almost compulsory, in journalistic circles and in academia to scoff at the few commentators who advance a worst-case Malthusian proposition that the world is close to the point where it cannot feed the population that will be born in the next few years. And even when the possibility of a crisis of overpopulation in some faraway countries is allowed, it is assumed that this will not affect the old advanced economies. Yet it is now speculated by demographers that the ageing of the indigenous European population will lead to massively increased immigration of culturally alien Africans and Asians. Japan has absolutely refused to allow immigration to dilute the racial structure; and Europeans are becoming increasingly resentful of immigrants who draw on the benefits system while they 'outbreed' the indigenous population. Opposition to immigration has usually been based on racial and/or religious grounds: which means that people have muted their expressions of concern because of the existence of laws against 'racial hatred' . Ambitious politicians will soon recognise that dependent immigrants will cost so much in benefits that the rate of benefit for all claimants - indigenous and immigrant - will be reduced [at least in real terms] and large immigrant families will be seen relatively to benefit. Then opposition to immigration will become 'economic' rather than 'racist', which will make it respectable.

As the economic squeeze intensifies, the date at which this grim forecast for socio-political consequences will be applicable comes closer. That gives increased importance to the downward revision of unprejudiced forecasts for the British economy: the announcement by the Item Club today is consistent with the worsening prospect.