Since the summer of 2008 central bankers, finance ministers and government spokesmen from all over the world have been saying that they understand how the world sank into depression in the nineteen thirties, and they have offered reassurance that they would ensure that such behaviour was not to be repeated now. Yet now we see serious signs of a slide to depression in Europe, despite the strong growth in emergent economies and tentative signs of recovery in the USA.
One small but glaring example of political stupidity has recently being enacted in the daily news in the UK. Politicians and journalists demanded that the board of the Royal Bank of Scotland should renege on the contract that they made with their chief executive, which was approved by the then Labour government. The failed bank had been nationalised and Stephen Hester accepted an offer to manage it as a patriotic duty: the remuneration was well below the norm for bank CEO jobs. He has performed at least satisfactorily. On his appointment the bank's board set a salary-plus-bonus package; but now the woodentops have questioned whether the bonus is 'earned' and whether the concept of a bonus is acceptable in principle. The screeches of politicians and the media eventually had their perverse effect, and Hester agreed not to take that which he was contractually entitled to receive. This furore demonstrates astonishing ignorance of the scandal in finance: the so-called bonuses that are in fact commissions on turnover for gambling in derivatives, futures and swaps. The traders constantly expand the coverage and range of the 'products' that they devise in cyberspace, finding new markets and discovering - sometimes creating - new counterparties. Before the crunch their daily trading exceeded months of material world trade, in nominal value; and bizarrely they have continued 'developing' the market since the crisis began. After the crunch the real-world-related trade done by the retail banking subsidiaries of the finance conglomerates was restricted by new capital requirements and constrained by the caution that is endemic in a recession; and their merchant banking activities [managing new issues of companies' shares and bonds, facilitating mergers and acquisitions of businesses, and offering analysis of firms and of markets] were all constrained by the cautious mood of investors. Therefore in providing notional profit for the conglomerates casino banking became even more important than it had been during the boom. Some of the notional profit from the traders' activity could be used to bolster the conglomerate's consolidated balance sheet; but most of it had to be paid the the traders in their 'bonuses', according to their contracts. The many successful traders were paid far more than the senior executives of the firms for which they placed their bets but it was considered normal that the executives' pay should be bolstered to reflect the size of the consolidated balance sheet that they were responsible for; and on that scale Mr Hester's £1million salary plus £1million bonus is peanuts. The fuss has completely misdirected mass anger and perverted public perception: and this is a typical of political rhetoric about the economy, which apparently follows the press in regarding contracted rights as subject t withdrawal on whim.
Political posturing and point-scoring are having even worse and more durable effects on the European mainland. In recent days the Greek government has refused another 'final offer' from non-governmental holders of Greek debt; and a further last chance is anticipated this weekend. Greece has promised to arrange billions of euros-worth of debt settlement by the middle of March, which it will only be able to do if the other eurozone countries and the IMF lend it the money. The other eurozone governments, orchestrated by the Germans, Dutch and Finns, have indicated that they will not provide the loan unless the Greeks settle the 'private' debts. A suggestion from Berlin that economic discipline might be imposed on Greece by a Commissioner who would control all state spending and oversee taxation has provoked fury in Greece, and embarrassment elsewhere in the EU. Propaganda and graffiti all over Greece have already harked back to the occupation in the Second World War: the appointment of a Commissioner [presumably controlled from Frankfurt] could well provoke revolt. The mere expression of the idea makes an eventual Greek exit from the eurozone more probable. It will make life simpler for the Greeks if they can first settle with their private sector creditors as a member state of the euro, then exit the system to manage their own restructuring of the economy
Angela Merkel's speech to the Davos assembly last Monday clearly implied that a Greek default is preferable for her to any toleration of demands for an unlimited bailout from Germany. The Germans' reluctance to risk their own prosperity has been increased by the antics of hedge funds. These professional chancers have bought Greek debt at significantly discounted prices. In many cases they have also bought Credit Default Swaps [CDSs] created by financial buccaneers, some of whom work for subsidiaries of the financial conglomerates. If the Greek debt is restructured the hedgies will profit by selling the assets for more than the knock-down prices at which they bought them. If Greek debt can be consolidated the CDSs would not be activated and the premiums that the hedge funds have paid for the swaps would go into the top line income of the firms that sold them. So the huge lobbying power of the financial conglomerates can be put behind the opportunistic option that the Greek debt will first be restructured [with the financiers taking a 'haircut' that they have already allowed for in the business plans] leaving them with some value, expressed in euros, before the Greeks slink away from the eurozone. The odds are that the lobbying will be successful: while the politicians' blustering about keeping Greece in the eurozone will ultimately be nugatory.
Chancellor Merkel has also repeatedly stated that the problems of the eurozone would be speedily resolved through closer integration of the member states. But her vision of integration would focus on establishing discipline over the finances of all the member countries: it would not entail Germany opening up her reserved to support the debts of other countries' governments: and still less t support the debts to which their banks have exposed themselves. Her argument is exactly contrary to what bankers based in London, New York and the far east want to hear: so they assume that the current state of the EU and of the eurozone economies is unsustainable, consequently they discount the euro in global markets where it it traded against the yen, the pound and the US, Canadian and Australian dollars. The weaknesses of the EU and especially of the euro are increased by the political rhetoric which follows the ideological basis on which the EU institutions have developed. Besotted politicians ignore the corruption that is endemic in the unaudited and unaccountable Commission; the obvious lies on which the euro was floated; and the counter-intuitive Franco-German policy of giving even more powers over member states to the sclerotic Brussels bureaucracy.
Now, to add to the mess, the probable winner of the coming French presidential election has come up with a Manifesto - a long list of policies that he promises to introduce if he wins - including a strong counter-Merkel bias and attacks on the finance sector [with scarcely-veiled threats specifically to undermine London's leading role in financial markets. M Hollande proposes to reverse all the measures of economic discipline that have been introduced by the Sarkozy regime: which would further put him at loggerheads with Germany and would undoubtedly lead to a major [further] downgrading of France's debt by the rating agencies. His election would undermine the current consensus, and thereby threaten the future of the euro as French debt joined Italian, Spanish and Portugese debt as 'junk'.Sarkozy has responded by announcing the unilateral imposition in France of a tax [0.01%] on 'financial transactions': it is not yet clear [and may never need to be clarified, if Sarkzy looses] as to what range of transactions the tax will apply to. Whichever candidate wins the French election will be at loggerheads with Germany, or with the UK, or both. Sarkozy will support the new EU treaty today - in principle - but by the time that the deal is formally due for ratification [probably in March] the divergence of his policy from Germany may stymie the completion of the new deal.
Britain's tentative planning to cope with a eurozone collapse needs to be beefed-up, urgently: as does contingency planning for that scenario in China and the USA, and all their trading counterparties.
Economics is fundamentally unscientific. The economic crisis has speeded the shift of power to emergent economies. In Britain and the USA the theory of 'rational markets' removed controls from the finance sector, and things can still get yet worse. Read my book, No Confidence: The Brexit Vote and Economics - http://amzn.eu/ayGznkp
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Showing posts with label Greek debt. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Greek debt. Show all posts
Friday, 27 January 2012
Saturday, 29 October 2011
Credibility in Markets
One.
Italy's situation has not notably been improved by the supposed resolution of the Eurozone problem; as interest rates on Italian state debt have continued to rise. The Prime Minister who is regarded outside Italy as a buffoon remains a formidable operator within the country: he has said that he is willing to stand down later in the year, but most observers are sceptical. Parliamentarians descended to fisticuffs while Berlusconi was in Brussels delivering a long and explicit letter to his Eurozone peers in which none of them placed complete credence.
If the politicians cannot even pretend that the Italian state is credible, how can anyone expect the herd of analysts and traders in international debt to have any faith in it? 'The markets' are just a network of websites: the avatars who inhabit them that reflect the decisions of company representatives who do not have the sort of freedom to take risks that they did in the years 2002 to 2008. Now the boards of their employing companies consciously set the parameters within which the traders can operate, and the terms in which analysts can summarise the data that they select as a basis for comment. As long as Italy is perceived as a public scandal and a rather obsecene private joke, the herd will take its cue from that assessment. Any investor who is contemplating putting money into the 're-engineered' Euro bail-out funds is advised to assess what 'the markets' indicate: and the declining valuation of Greek and Italian debt is a huge inhibiltion on the credibility of the financial engineering that was bodged in Brussels last week, The stock markets had a minor boost from the apparent solution of the problem: because companies based in Germany, France and Finland are trusted and their shares are more widely held than are industrial and bank shares in Italy and Greece, or Spain and Portugal. So over the coming weeks there will almost certainly be a bifurcation between 'northern' shares and 'southern' state stocks. The de facto division of the EU will be consolidated.
Two
Italy will probably eclipse Greece in the analysts' comments and in reports of the markets' behaviour for a few weeks: until the desperate state of Greek politics again demands the prime attention. The Greek people have been so misled by the the state's corruption in ignoring tax obligations, and by its reckless borrowing to pay them pensions and benefits that no economy on earth has ever been able to support from its earnings, that millions of them cannot believe that the austerity package that has been imposed by the Eurozone is either necessary or desirable. They have been told by the media that foreign banks have been induced to write-off half the value of the Greek state securities that they own: so why should not all the state's creditors do the same? And why not 99%, rather than just 50%? What can foreigners do to them, if they simply tell the Eurozone to forget the past and leave their future to them? The failure of CDSs on Greek debt [see Three below] will reinforce the opinion that 'the markets' don't really matter at all.
Three
There has been a lot of comment on the recent collapse of 'value' in CDSs on Greek debt. The media have glibly described them as 'insurance policies' - which is precisely what they are not: that misrepresentation is wildly misleading. Credit Default Swaps [CDSs] are gambling contracts, of a special type that was invented in US wholesale banks in the nineteen nineties.
The concept was massively oversold by an ill-supervised wholesale-market branch of the greatest US insurance company, AIG, based in London [well away from scrutiny by the Head Office]. This small clique of people earned huge bonuses - and big notional profits for the firm - by selling these bets to banks, who wanted to be able to dress-up their balance sheets with an 'asset' that offset the perceived risk in owning bonds issued by institutions - mostly banks and governments - whose long-term credit worthiness could become questionable. In the credit crunch of 2007-8 holders of CDSs that offset assets that lost their 'value' came for their money, in such numbers that the small funds held by AIG's London office were instantly exhausted. There was a good chance that all the real insurance policies that had been underwritten by AIG would be voided if the company failed, due to the fact that its obligations under CDSs would massively exceed its reserves. One important consideration was that AIG - American International Group - was a huge player in the emergent markets in Asia, If the company failed the reputation of the USA would massively be diminished, especially in China, which had been the main target of the company's long-term Chief Executive 'Hank' Greenberg who had received massive political backing from the US government. Welching on China was considered unthinkable; so the US Administration and Congress agreed to support AIG with as many billion dollars as was needed to settle non-insurance obligations. The AIG case, however, gave credibility to the idiotic misdescription of CDSs as 'insurance policies'.
The really bad story about CDSs began after the bail-out of AIG. Despite that disaster, the players in the wholesale financial markets saw CDSs, alongside 'derivatives', as 'products' that they could sell in massive volume as ephemeral electronic contracts out there in cyberspace. Insurers as such had never been involved in the market: it was ab initio a bankers' creation and so it remained. Banks bought CDSs - from each other - and reported them as 'assets' that could offset the risk that might exist in holding Greek or Italian government bonds as part of their reported capital reserves. Then they started selling each other CDSs as pure gambling slips, only notionally related to 'real' obligations: and in some cases multiple CDSs were raised in a series of separate contracts which notionally covered the same perceived risks. An increasing proportion of the purported risk-cover held by banks was in this form.
Then came the Irish crisis: where the government saved the situation by accepting all the banks' debts itself, and so the CDSs held against that possible default were not activated. As the Greek crisis approached its first peak even bankers saw it coming, so they mostly sold off the CDSs that they held against Greek debt [at heavily discounted prices] on the crude assumption that it was better to have a tiny asset rather than an undeliverable promise. This made it possible for the club of banks known as the international derivatives association, which was accepted by all the member banks as having authority to say when CDSs should be activated by declaring a 'default' by the issuer of the underlying assets - in this case, Greek government debt - to declare that the 50% write-down of Greek debt was not a default, so the remaining CDSs against Greek debt could not be activated and the balance sheets of the issuers of the CDSs were unimpaired. In the immediate event, the issuing banks were protected: but the longer-term credibility of CDSs as a cover for potential losses was challenged, possibly beyond repair.
There are still trillions of dollarsworth of CDSs in existence: they are still held as balance-sheet cover for the banks' perceived risks; and they may well be useless. Casino Banking has been storming ahead even while the bankers have supposedly been in the pillory and under close examination: so much for regulation, so much for the competency of government.
The more one knows, the less one can believe.
Even if one is irritated by the inarticulate clods who are wasting their time outside Saint Paul's Cathedral, it has to be conceeded that they have a point: if only they understood it.
Italy's situation has not notably been improved by the supposed resolution of the Eurozone problem; as interest rates on Italian state debt have continued to rise. The Prime Minister who is regarded outside Italy as a buffoon remains a formidable operator within the country: he has said that he is willing to stand down later in the year, but most observers are sceptical. Parliamentarians descended to fisticuffs while Berlusconi was in Brussels delivering a long and explicit letter to his Eurozone peers in which none of them placed complete credence.
If the politicians cannot even pretend that the Italian state is credible, how can anyone expect the herd of analysts and traders in international debt to have any faith in it? 'The markets' are just a network of websites: the avatars who inhabit them that reflect the decisions of company representatives who do not have the sort of freedom to take risks that they did in the years 2002 to 2008. Now the boards of their employing companies consciously set the parameters within which the traders can operate, and the terms in which analysts can summarise the data that they select as a basis for comment. As long as Italy is perceived as a public scandal and a rather obsecene private joke, the herd will take its cue from that assessment. Any investor who is contemplating putting money into the 're-engineered' Euro bail-out funds is advised to assess what 'the markets' indicate: and the declining valuation of Greek and Italian debt is a huge inhibiltion on the credibility of the financial engineering that was bodged in Brussels last week, The stock markets had a minor boost from the apparent solution of the problem: because companies based in Germany, France and Finland are trusted and their shares are more widely held than are industrial and bank shares in Italy and Greece, or Spain and Portugal. So over the coming weeks there will almost certainly be a bifurcation between 'northern' shares and 'southern' state stocks. The de facto division of the EU will be consolidated.
Two
Italy will probably eclipse Greece in the analysts' comments and in reports of the markets' behaviour for a few weeks: until the desperate state of Greek politics again demands the prime attention. The Greek people have been so misled by the the state's corruption in ignoring tax obligations, and by its reckless borrowing to pay them pensions and benefits that no economy on earth has ever been able to support from its earnings, that millions of them cannot believe that the austerity package that has been imposed by the Eurozone is either necessary or desirable. They have been told by the media that foreign banks have been induced to write-off half the value of the Greek state securities that they own: so why should not all the state's creditors do the same? And why not 99%, rather than just 50%? What can foreigners do to them, if they simply tell the Eurozone to forget the past and leave their future to them? The failure of CDSs on Greek debt [see Three below] will reinforce the opinion that 'the markets' don't really matter at all.
Three
There has been a lot of comment on the recent collapse of 'value' in CDSs on Greek debt. The media have glibly described them as 'insurance policies' - which is precisely what they are not: that misrepresentation is wildly misleading. Credit Default Swaps [CDSs] are gambling contracts, of a special type that was invented in US wholesale banks in the nineteen nineties.
The concept was massively oversold by an ill-supervised wholesale-market branch of the greatest US insurance company, AIG, based in London [well away from scrutiny by the Head Office]. This small clique of people earned huge bonuses - and big notional profits for the firm - by selling these bets to banks, who wanted to be able to dress-up their balance sheets with an 'asset' that offset the perceived risk in owning bonds issued by institutions - mostly banks and governments - whose long-term credit worthiness could become questionable. In the credit crunch of 2007-8 holders of CDSs that offset assets that lost their 'value' came for their money, in such numbers that the small funds held by AIG's London office were instantly exhausted. There was a good chance that all the real insurance policies that had been underwritten by AIG would be voided if the company failed, due to the fact that its obligations under CDSs would massively exceed its reserves. One important consideration was that AIG - American International Group - was a huge player in the emergent markets in Asia, If the company failed the reputation of the USA would massively be diminished, especially in China, which had been the main target of the company's long-term Chief Executive 'Hank' Greenberg who had received massive political backing from the US government. Welching on China was considered unthinkable; so the US Administration and Congress agreed to support AIG with as many billion dollars as was needed to settle non-insurance obligations. The AIG case, however, gave credibility to the idiotic misdescription of CDSs as 'insurance policies'.
The really bad story about CDSs began after the bail-out of AIG. Despite that disaster, the players in the wholesale financial markets saw CDSs, alongside 'derivatives', as 'products' that they could sell in massive volume as ephemeral electronic contracts out there in cyberspace. Insurers as such had never been involved in the market: it was ab initio a bankers' creation and so it remained. Banks bought CDSs - from each other - and reported them as 'assets' that could offset the risk that might exist in holding Greek or Italian government bonds as part of their reported capital reserves. Then they started selling each other CDSs as pure gambling slips, only notionally related to 'real' obligations: and in some cases multiple CDSs were raised in a series of separate contracts which notionally covered the same perceived risks. An increasing proportion of the purported risk-cover held by banks was in this form.
Then came the Irish crisis: where the government saved the situation by accepting all the banks' debts itself, and so the CDSs held against that possible default were not activated. As the Greek crisis approached its first peak even bankers saw it coming, so they mostly sold off the CDSs that they held against Greek debt [at heavily discounted prices] on the crude assumption that it was better to have a tiny asset rather than an undeliverable promise. This made it possible for the club of banks known as the international derivatives association, which was accepted by all the member banks as having authority to say when CDSs should be activated by declaring a 'default' by the issuer of the underlying assets - in this case, Greek government debt - to declare that the 50% write-down of Greek debt was not a default, so the remaining CDSs against Greek debt could not be activated and the balance sheets of the issuers of the CDSs were unimpaired. In the immediate event, the issuing banks were protected: but the longer-term credibility of CDSs as a cover for potential losses was challenged, possibly beyond repair.
There are still trillions of dollarsworth of CDSs in existence: they are still held as balance-sheet cover for the banks' perceived risks; and they may well be useless. Casino Banking has been storming ahead even while the bankers have supposedly been in the pillory and under close examination: so much for regulation, so much for the competency of government.
The more one knows, the less one can believe.
Even if one is irritated by the inarticulate clods who are wasting their time outside Saint Paul's Cathedral, it has to be conceeded that they have a point: if only they understood it.
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