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Showing posts with label default. Show all posts
Showing posts with label default. Show all posts

Saturday, 29 October 2011

Credibility in Markets

One.

Italy's situation has not notably been improved by the supposed resolution of the Eurozone problem; as interest rates on Italian state debt have continued to rise. The Prime Minister who is regarded outside Italy as a buffoon remains a formidable operator within  the country: he has said that he is willing to stand down later in the year, but most observers are sceptical. Parliamentarians descended to fisticuffs while Berlusconi was in Brussels delivering a long and explicit letter to his Eurozone peers in which none of them placed complete credence.

If the politicians cannot even pretend that the Italian state is credible, how can anyone expect the herd of analysts and traders in international debt to have any faith in it? 'The markets' are just a network of websites: the avatars who inhabit them that reflect the decisions of company representatives who do not have the sort of freedom to take risks that they did in the years 2002 to 2008. Now the boards of their employing companies consciously set the parameters within which the traders can operate, and the terms in which analysts can summarise the data that they select as a basis for comment. As long as Italy is perceived as a public scandal and a rather obsecene private joke, the herd will take its cue from that assessment. Any investor who is contemplating putting money into the 're-engineered' Euro bail-out funds is advised to assess what 'the markets' indicate: and the declining valuation of Greek and Italian debt is a huge inhibiltion on the credibility of the financial engineering that was bodged in Brussels last week, The stock markets had a minor boost from the apparent solution of the problem: because companies based in Germany, France and Finland are trusted and their shares are more widely held than are industrial and bank shares in Italy and Greece, or Spain and Portugal. So over the coming weeks there will almost certainly be a bifurcation between 'northern' shares and 'southern' state stocks. The de facto division of the EU will be consolidated.

Two

Italy will probably eclipse Greece in the analysts' comments and in reports of the markets' behaviour for a few weeks: until the desperate state of Greek politics again demands the prime attention. The Greek people have been so misled by the the state's corruption in ignoring tax obligations, and by its reckless borrowing to pay them pensions and benefits that no economy on earth has ever been able to support from its earnings, that millions of them cannot believe that the austerity package that has been imposed by the Eurozone is either necessary or desirable. They have been told by the media that foreign banks have been induced to write-off half the value of the Greek state securities that they own: so why should not all the state's creditors do the same? And why not 99%, rather than just 50%? What can foreigners do to them, if they simply tell the Eurozone to forget the past and leave their future to them? The failure of CDSs on Greek debt [see Three below] will reinforce the opinion that 'the markets' don't really matter at all.

Three 

There has been a lot of comment on the recent collapse of 'value' in CDSs on Greek debt. The media have glibly described them as 'insurance policies' - which is precisely what they are not: that misrepresentation is wildly misleading. Credit Default Swaps [CDSs] are gambling contracts, of a special type that was invented in US wholesale banks in the nineteen nineties.

The concept was massively oversold by an ill-supervised wholesale-market branch of the greatest US insurance company, AIG, based in London [well away from scrutiny by the Head Office]. This small clique of people earned huge bonuses - and big notional profits for the firm - by selling these bets to banks, who wanted to be able to dress-up their balance sheets with an 'asset' that offset the perceived risk in owning bonds issued by institutions - mostly banks and governments - whose long-term credit worthiness could become questionable. In the credit crunch of 2007-8 holders of CDSs that offset assets that lost their 'value' came for their money, in such numbers that the small funds held by AIG's London office were instantly exhausted. There was a good chance that all the real insurance policies that had been underwritten by AIG would be voided if the company failed, due to the fact that its obligations under CDSs would massively exceed its reserves. One important consideration was that AIG - American International Group - was a huge player in the emergent markets in Asia, If the company failed the reputation of the USA would massively be diminished, especially in China, which had been the main target of the company's long-term Chief Executive 'Hank' Greenberg who had received massive political backing from the US government. Welching on China was considered unthinkable; so the US Administration and Congress agreed to support AIG with as many billion dollars as was needed to settle non-insurance obligations. The AIG case, however, gave credibility to the idiotic misdescription of CDSs as 'insurance policies'.

The really bad story about CDSs began after the bail-out of AIG. Despite that disaster, the players in the wholesale financial markets saw CDSs, alongside 'derivatives', as 'products' that they could sell in massive volume as ephemeral electronic contracts out there in cyberspace. Insurers as such had never been involved in the market: it was ab initio a bankers' creation and so it remained.  Banks bought CDSs - from each other - and reported them as 'assets' that could offset the risk that might exist in holding Greek or Italian government bonds as part of their reported capital reserves. Then they started selling each other CDSs as pure gambling slips, only notionally related to 'real' obligations: and in some cases multiple CDSs were raised in a series of separate contracts which notionally covered the same perceived risks. An increasing proportion of the purported risk-cover held by banks was in this form.

Then came the Irish crisis: where the government saved the situation by accepting all the banks' debts itself, and so the CDSs held against that possible default were not activated. As the Greek crisis approached its first peak even bankers saw it coming, so they mostly sold off the CDSs that they held against Greek debt [at heavily discounted prices] on the crude assumption that it was better to have a tiny asset rather than an undeliverable promise. This made it possible for the club of banks known as the international derivatives association, which was accepted by all the member banks as having authority to say when CDSs should be activated by declaring a 'default' by the issuer of the underlying assets - in this case, Greek government debt - to declare that the 50% write-down of Greek debt was not a default, so the remaining CDSs against Greek debt could not be activated and the balance sheets of the issuers of the CDSs were unimpaired. In the immediate event, the issuing banks were protected: but the longer-term credibility of CDSs as a cover for potential losses was challenged, possibly beyond repair.

There are still trillions of dollarsworth of CDSs in existence: they are still held as balance-sheet cover for the banks' perceived risks; and they may well be useless. Casino Banking has been storming ahead even while the bankers have supposedly been in the pillory and under close examination: so much for regulation, so much for the competency of government.

The more one knows, the less one can believe.

Even if one is irritated by the inarticulate clods who are wasting their time outside Saint Paul's Cathedral, it has to be conceeded that they have a point: if only they understood it.

Sunday, 23 October 2011

Governments in Terror of the Markets

The media are at one with European Finance Ministers in asserting that 'the markets' threaten mayhem in the world economy unless the eurozone solves the 'Greek crisis' expeditiously. The deadline for a solution that was to be agreed between the German and French governments has slipped from Saturday to Wednesday, raising the sense of urgency.

In the mean time another 800million Euros have been given to the Greek government to meet immediate obligations [largely owing to west European banks and investing institutions], and a further eight billion have been earmarked for the Greek bailout subject to evidence that the blatantly unco-operative Greek population are actually enforcing the necessary austerity and tax-paying measures that are minimally necessary to meet the government's assurances to their partners in the Eurozone. There is no credible evidence that Greece can go far enough to appear plausibly to bring living standards within the earnings of the economy, year on year. If the Greek state and the Greek banks stop paying interest on their debts, and declare themselves unable to pay in full where debts have to be repaid, then it is asserted that 'the markets' will create problems for the banks that are not being paid what they were owed by the Greeks.

Banks in almost every trading country have lent money to Greeks to fund businesses and to grant mortgages  to households. If they are not being repaid in full, holes will appear in the balance sheets of those lenders. It is taken for granted that 'the markets' will instantly start selling shares of those threatened banks, and withdrawing deposits that were placed with them, as soon as there is clear evidence of an impending Greek default. The argument goes that there will then be a risk of a 'run' on the threatened banks: and conventional wisdom has it that the governments of the banks' home countries will have to take whatever measures are necessary to reassure investors and depositors in the banks that their money is safe. President Sarkozi wants to be able to draw on Germany's assets to give French banks the assurance of unconditional support: and within the eurozone what is available to one country must be available to all. So Germany came once more  under pressure to lead the bail-out of anybody else: otherwise it is asserted that 'the markets' will force a domino-effect collapse of one eurozone economy after another.

It would be much easier - and cheaper - to allow Greece to default on its debts and then to ensure the security of the other Eurozone countries: and that will probably be how the whole issue is ultimately resolved, however much bravado is displayed in the mean time about levying the rest of the zone to continue to prop up Greek corruption and indulgence.

In the received wisdom 'the markets' will require a convincing resolution of the eurozone crisis to be concluded, at the latest by the closure of the forthcoming G20 Meeting, if it cannot be sealed-off by the European leaders on Wednesday. And what can the markets do if they do not consider the solution to be workable or sufficient? On investigation, it immediately becomes apparent that the markets as such never 'do' anything. Actions taken by participants in markets can be supportive or disruptive of government and of EU policies: but it is equally apparent that the full-time market players are ultimately and abjectly dependant on governments. No significant bank or investment house in Europe or the United States of America would be in existence now if they had not been supported by their government and Central Bank in 2008-9. How then could the same firms undermine governments and Central Banks in 2011-12? The conventional responding assumption is that the banks would demand repayment of advances that they had made to banks in the supposedly at-risk countries - Portugal, Spain and Italy are the favoured candidates for this role - and they would sell government bonds from the most-threatened country at ever-declining prices; while they would refuse to buy any new issues of bonds by those governments].

Governments need not roll over in shock at such actions by financial institutions. Governments [or Central Banks acting on their behalf] can freeze or  'demonetise' the cash that institutions get by selling 'distressed' government bonds of named states, and the money they collect from recalling deposits made in their banks, so they cannot make any use of the funds, which would remain inaccessible until governments release them in stabilised circumstances. Governments can react to the threat of sovereign credit being downgraded by the rating agencies by banning any publication of ratings in any context within their territories. They  can suspend banks' licences if their actions threaten to be disruptive of state policy. Governments have a massive range of powers - some of them not yet imagined - which they can use to cajole and if necessary compel institutions to conform with urgently-necessary policy requirements. Econmists will screech that such policies would undermine 'the market': so what value do Economists bring to the debate? They have not helped hitherto.

Governments should ignore threats from market operatives, or market forecasters, or market trends, or market analysts. The government can always freeze transactions across a market or in any part of it; or they can freeze any cache of cash or credit within the system.  Markets and their participants are the government's creatures. They just need the guts to act decisively. Of course there will be an aftermath: but that is in the future and sufficient unto the time is the evil thereof.