Five Tory MPs yesterday labelled themselves even more firmly as people who were willing to risk the economic future of the United Kingdom outside the carapace of the European Economic Area. They also accepted - whether or not they see it in those terms - the possibility of a recurrence of the 'war' waged over centuries by the IRA and its precursors. By refusing to recognise that the only secure way to carry forward the peace accords that have been achieved in Ireland since 1970 is for the UK and Ireland to remain integral to the the Common Market, these people have exposed the entire population of both islands to a very real danger.
I have repeatedly pointed out in this blog that by subsuming enough of the identities of the two states in a community it was made possible for Britain to put huge subsidies into Ireland [via various European funds] that were sufficient eventually to secure the Good Friday Agreement. It would be insanity to reverse that process; and it is fervently to be hoped that by remaining in the same economic space - even without the UK participating in the political European Union - the peace can be maintained. The majority of the Commons committee on Brexit sensibly agreed that the half-baked notions for a sham land border between the Irish Republic and the UK, secured by unachievable and unaffordable IT, would never be satisfactory. Unless the Tory party can formally decouple leaving the European Union from remaining in the European Economic Area, there is no 'cast iron' means of securing an open border in Ireland.
It is - literally - a matter of life or death for the DUP to insist that Northern Ireland is fully part of the UK [for as long as the present peace and constitutional status can be maintained]. They must oppose any half-witted pretence that anything else will do.
The Irish government and its 26 associates in the European Union would be wildly irresponsible not to make this point: and, if necessary, make it the sticking point in the upcoming EU summit. It is a moot point whether Mrs May understands this issue.
Meanwhile, the British political class has united to excoriate the US President for riding out his ego by quoting from a fringe right-wing political outfit in the UK, The publicity of this episode has apparently caused a rush of interest in the group [which I will avoid naming], including a rush of membership applications. That issue may have caused bad feeling in the egotist in the White House, and has certainly increased the misplaced contempt that the British Grauniadistas express for him; but it is not the most important nor the most relevant point. The election of Trump to the presidency was the consequence of a massively effective populist campaign. Trump promised to 'make America great again' and one of the preferred ways of doing that is to discriminate against imports. The UK is not a massive importer of goods into the US; but the UK is probably still second to the USA in the generation and worldwide diffusion of intellectual property, especially in fields of culture, entertainment and key areas of scientific innovation. Any idea that Britain will be pushed to the front of some queue for special access to US markets is dafter fantasy than the idea that some cosmetic 'solution' will resolve the Irish border question. If the UK economy is not within the European Common Market, it will be out in the cold. It will shrivel, living standards will collapse and any idea of renewing economic growth through investment will be an impossible dream.
We have very little time to 'get real'. The shortest route to sense is to separate the vote to 'leave the European Union' from the Tory minority's obsession that this rolls-in the ideas of leaving the Common Market and the economic area. No second referendum is necessary: just a dose of common sense.
Economics is fundamentally unscientific. The economic crisis has speeded the shift of power to emergent economies. In Britain and the USA the theory of 'rational markets' removed controls from the finance sector, and things can still get yet worse. Read my book, No Confidence: The Brexit Vote and Economics - http://amzn.eu/ayGznkp
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Showing posts with label Ireland. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Ireland. Show all posts
Friday, 1 December 2017
Sunday, 19 November 2017
Power, Legitimacy and the Economy
Chairman Mao declared that "power comes out of the barrel of a gun"; and over the millennia many regimes all over the world have gained and held power by the power of the sling, the arrow, the spear, the sword and the gun. The Bible tells how the pyramid-building rulers of Egypt consolidated their power over centuries by maintaining state granaries, in which crop surpluses were stored in fruitful years, which could then be doled-out to maintain the people when harvests were insufficient; whether that was due to crop failure [usually due to irregular weather] or to military intervention with the farming year [as when 'the peoples of the sea' invaded some provinces].
The comfortable delusion upon which the European Union was built is that the founder states were mature democracies, where the mass of the population acquiesced in the constitutional order and selected between political parties in regular, orderly elections; largely on the basis of their performance or promises in developing the economy. Since 1995 several states were admitted that had recently been 'democratised' after decades under the Communists gun-rule, and their dissent from the consensus established in Brussels [not least, on inward migration from outside Europe] has now become conspicuous. But [as has been pointed out before in this blog] the west European democracies were new when the Treaty of Rome was signed. Germany was fascist and brutal until mid-1945, Italy was in a similar state. France was still recovering from the hidden conflict between wartime collaborators and resistants. Smaller states with monarchies had been able more quickly after 1945 to establish a sort of normalcy, but all carried legacy issues from the war [except Sweden, which had the great luck to maintain its neutrality]. The EU had a mock-democratic parliament, which was subject to the farce of moving every month from Brussels to Strasbourg that was the proof of its impotence: if the assembly had an iota of real power the members would have opted for a fixed location.
The United Kingdom and Ireland joined the Common Market together, with the secret agenda [agreed in London and Dublin, but not shared with the broad electorate in either country] that a 'peace process' could follow in Ireland as the identities of the two states was subsumed in the European project. Before Mrs Thatcher won her infamous 'rebate', the UK was paying in massive amounts to the Common Market funds that made similarly vast payments to Irish farmers and local authorities. A generation on, Mrs May and her pathetic cabinet seem not to know that, so they delude themselves that are avoiding the crunch on the Irish Question by putting up notions for a customs arrangement that is very much secondary to the political fudge. If the political fudge is ignored the whole Brexit project will end in violence. It is more than a coincidence that Gerry Adams has announced his intention to stand down: if there is to be a new civil war in Ireland [with inevitable excursions into the British mainland] it will necessarily be conducted by a new, vigorous Republican high command.
If this interpretation of current events seems apocalyptic, be aware that if consent is withdrawn by a coherent component of the population in any country [or province] the men and women of violence will seek to develop that situation. Mercifully, there is no sign of such a thing happening in Catalonia; but Ireland has been a different case, for centuries.
If a regime is able to provide the mass of the people with palpable economic benefits, as the pyramid-builders did - and as the welfare state did in western Europe for the half-century after 1950 - revolt against the centralised state is rare: Northern Ireland, the Basque region and a few other cases were the exceptions that proved the rule because there were deep historical reasons for those special cases. It is significant that as the Irish Republic gained more of the advantages of a welfare economy, so the politicians in that state eschewed the IRA and their political allies more and more deeply.
Meanwhile, in Zimbabwe massive crowds have assembled to support the army and the ruling ZanuPF party in their attempt to replace Mugabe by his erstwhile deputy. 'The crocodile', as he is known, is a notorious enforcer; hitherto in Mugabe's interests. It was he who unleashed North Korean mercenaries to support his own thugs in killing at least 20,000 Matabele. It was he who organised such beatings of opposition voters in the last presidential election that the opposition withdrew from the second round and allowed Mugabe to reap his 'democratic' mandate. By all accounts he is less blatantly kleptocratic than Grace Mugabe, who was being set up as the next president. Optimists are hoping that the crocodile will metamorphose into a consensualist who can forge a truly 'national' government, but the odds are stacked against that. Once the dust settles on Mugabe's departure, Zimbabwe will revert to rule by fist and cane, supplemented - as judged necessary - by bullets: as in the case in most of Africa.
The chances of Zimbabwe approaching any credible standard of democracy within fifty years are very small.
The chances of the beneficent Brussels fantasy lasting for another fifty years are diminishing: as Mrs Merkel's struggle to build a coalition well illustrates.
The comfortable delusion upon which the European Union was built is that the founder states were mature democracies, where the mass of the population acquiesced in the constitutional order and selected between political parties in regular, orderly elections; largely on the basis of their performance or promises in developing the economy. Since 1995 several states were admitted that had recently been 'democratised' after decades under the Communists gun-rule, and their dissent from the consensus established in Brussels [not least, on inward migration from outside Europe] has now become conspicuous. But [as has been pointed out before in this blog] the west European democracies were new when the Treaty of Rome was signed. Germany was fascist and brutal until mid-1945, Italy was in a similar state. France was still recovering from the hidden conflict between wartime collaborators and resistants. Smaller states with monarchies had been able more quickly after 1945 to establish a sort of normalcy, but all carried legacy issues from the war [except Sweden, which had the great luck to maintain its neutrality]. The EU had a mock-democratic parliament, which was subject to the farce of moving every month from Brussels to Strasbourg that was the proof of its impotence: if the assembly had an iota of real power the members would have opted for a fixed location.
The United Kingdom and Ireland joined the Common Market together, with the secret agenda [agreed in London and Dublin, but not shared with the broad electorate in either country] that a 'peace process' could follow in Ireland as the identities of the two states was subsumed in the European project. Before Mrs Thatcher won her infamous 'rebate', the UK was paying in massive amounts to the Common Market funds that made similarly vast payments to Irish farmers and local authorities. A generation on, Mrs May and her pathetic cabinet seem not to know that, so they delude themselves that are avoiding the crunch on the Irish Question by putting up notions for a customs arrangement that is very much secondary to the political fudge. If the political fudge is ignored the whole Brexit project will end in violence. It is more than a coincidence that Gerry Adams has announced his intention to stand down: if there is to be a new civil war in Ireland [with inevitable excursions into the British mainland] it will necessarily be conducted by a new, vigorous Republican high command.
If this interpretation of current events seems apocalyptic, be aware that if consent is withdrawn by a coherent component of the population in any country [or province] the men and women of violence will seek to develop that situation. Mercifully, there is no sign of such a thing happening in Catalonia; but Ireland has been a different case, for centuries.
If a regime is able to provide the mass of the people with palpable economic benefits, as the pyramid-builders did - and as the welfare state did in western Europe for the half-century after 1950 - revolt against the centralised state is rare: Northern Ireland, the Basque region and a few other cases were the exceptions that proved the rule because there were deep historical reasons for those special cases. It is significant that as the Irish Republic gained more of the advantages of a welfare economy, so the politicians in that state eschewed the IRA and their political allies more and more deeply.
Meanwhile, in Zimbabwe massive crowds have assembled to support the army and the ruling ZanuPF party in their attempt to replace Mugabe by his erstwhile deputy. 'The crocodile', as he is known, is a notorious enforcer; hitherto in Mugabe's interests. It was he who unleashed North Korean mercenaries to support his own thugs in killing at least 20,000 Matabele. It was he who organised such beatings of opposition voters in the last presidential election that the opposition withdrew from the second round and allowed Mugabe to reap his 'democratic' mandate. By all accounts he is less blatantly kleptocratic than Grace Mugabe, who was being set up as the next president. Optimists are hoping that the crocodile will metamorphose into a consensualist who can forge a truly 'national' government, but the odds are stacked against that. Once the dust settles on Mugabe's departure, Zimbabwe will revert to rule by fist and cane, supplemented - as judged necessary - by bullets: as in the case in most of Africa.
The chances of Zimbabwe approaching any credible standard of democracy within fifty years are very small.
The chances of the beneficent Brussels fantasy lasting for another fifty years are diminishing: as Mrs Merkel's struggle to build a coalition well illustrates.
Sunday, 12 November 2017
Remembrance
Yesterday and today the British commemorate the people killed and injured in military campaigns: the official ceremonies are usually focused on those who were serving the crown in the armed forces and the police, fire and ambulance services [as in the London bliz and in Northern Ireland], but allied and associated units are also remembered as thought appropriate. In Australia and New Zealand 11 November stands coequal with Anzac Day, when those two countries recall the carnage wrought upon the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps [hence, the Anzacs] under incompetent British generalship at the invasion, siege and retreat from Gallipoli in the First World War. That tragedy is regarded as the episode that made both Antipodean countries aware that being loyal to the British crown - or even to the British Empire - was not the permanent best bet for the future of their peoples. So far they have stuck with the monarchy, but it is very widely anticipated that on the death of the Queen both countries will take the opportunity to review their constitutional position.
It is absolutely incredible that the Queen still reigns in Australia and New Zealand - obviously, under total constitutional restraint - 101 years after the disaster of the Dardanelles became apparent. It is incredible that Britain and Northern Ireland settled down in 1919 to live under a constitutional settlement that was temporarily patched up until the Irish Free State could be set up in the 'twenties without full-scale war between the Republican/Fenians and the Ulster protestants: a conflict in which the British army, navy and newly-minted Royal Air Force would have been of ambiguous loyalty.
I have mentioned in recent days that the headbanging Brexiteers will not have their way because the Irish question will prove intractable. Peace in Ireland can only be maintained - 99 years on from the first Armistice Day - by keeping the Good Friday Agreement and all that stems from it. Edward Heath combined his failed attempt at peace in Ireland [epitomised in the Sunningdale Agreement] with Britain and Ireland joining the European Common Market together in the expectation that the two would eventually surrender their statehood to the 'ever-closer Union'. John Major led huge steps towards peace in Ireland based on keeping the UK tightly within the Union [as it had become with the agreement - however completely understood - by Mrs Thatcher]. Then the apparently fresh, young Tony Blair was able to bring the process to a very satisfactory conclusion entirely within the EU context. Ireland has always been a major constraint on British policy, and anyone who dismisses that issue as unimportant in the run-up to 'serious' Brexit negotiations is in for a very major shock.
Returning to the main point of today, we can note that the monarchies which had obviously been defeated in the war - the many sovereign German princes, the Empire of Austria and Kingdom of Hungary, and [in effect] Russia - were wiped out; and red revolutions were attempted in Vienna, Budapest, Munich and Berlin. Soldiers with their weapons in hand put down the risings in central Europe, while the navy and the army mostly sided with the workers in Russia to permit Lenin to grab power.
But in Belgium, where much of the country had been devastated by the war, the king returned as a national hero. In Britain during the war there had been rumblings about the king being a German - which, in ancestral terms, he was - leading to the proclamation of Windsor as the royal family surname. The king loyally supported his ministers, while intervening to keep crass generals - first French, then Haig - in supreme command even though their stupidity could not be concealed. Haig accepted assurances that the third major assault on the Somme, known as the Battle of Paschendael, would succeed because such an efficient artillery barrage would be launched before troops were sent 'over the top' that all the barbed wire in front of them would be destroyed and 'not even a rat' would be able to survive the gunfire. The men went over the top, the barbed wire was in place; and as soon as the artillery barrage was lifted the Germans restored their machine-guns to be ready to slaughter the British, Canadian and Indian infantry who were sent forward. Then came the rain, and the churned-up ground turned to deep mud; but Haig sent more and more troops forward for four months, until the Canadians' capture of a small ridge of land enabled the idiots at HQ to proclaim the battle a 'success'. That was just one of the most conspicuous, crass, wastes of human lives that went on from Mons in 1914 until November 11, 1918.
Almost every street and every extended family in the United Kingdom - including, then, Ireland - suffered casualties. Yet the regime, the politicians, the generals and the king were exonerated from blame: individual generals were the subject of loathing from conscripts whose companions had been killed, injured and deprived of their reason as a result of the commanders' stupidity and arrogance, but the regime was not seriously challenged on the mainland of Britain. However, the losses of the war - in men, industrial output wasted, foreign debts incurred and international power - could not be ignored. So a huge propaganda effort, such as had never before been seen, was launched: with massive effect. A temporary 'Cenotaph' - a tall plinth for a coffin - was erected in Whitehall for the first anniversary of Armistice Day, and 'the Glorious Dead' were honoured as national heroes. A couple of years later the 'unknown soldier' was disinterred from a war grave in France and moved to Westminster Abbey, so that every bereaved mother could imagine that her son would ever after be honoured by kings, princes and politicians. That could only continue if kings and princes were kept in place; and so the regime was more deeply cemented in national sentiment than ever before.
This is a spectacular achievement, adopted throughout the Empire and the United States; and with a similar set of events in France and Belgium. Its force in maintaining the socio-economic order is rarely recognised: but the Irish dimension is again being exposed.
It is absolutely incredible that the Queen still reigns in Australia and New Zealand - obviously, under total constitutional restraint - 101 years after the disaster of the Dardanelles became apparent. It is incredible that Britain and Northern Ireland settled down in 1919 to live under a constitutional settlement that was temporarily patched up until the Irish Free State could be set up in the 'twenties without full-scale war between the Republican/Fenians and the Ulster protestants: a conflict in which the British army, navy and newly-minted Royal Air Force would have been of ambiguous loyalty.
I have mentioned in recent days that the headbanging Brexiteers will not have their way because the Irish question will prove intractable. Peace in Ireland can only be maintained - 99 years on from the first Armistice Day - by keeping the Good Friday Agreement and all that stems from it. Edward Heath combined his failed attempt at peace in Ireland [epitomised in the Sunningdale Agreement] with Britain and Ireland joining the European Common Market together in the expectation that the two would eventually surrender their statehood to the 'ever-closer Union'. John Major led huge steps towards peace in Ireland based on keeping the UK tightly within the Union [as it had become with the agreement - however completely understood - by Mrs Thatcher]. Then the apparently fresh, young Tony Blair was able to bring the process to a very satisfactory conclusion entirely within the EU context. Ireland has always been a major constraint on British policy, and anyone who dismisses that issue as unimportant in the run-up to 'serious' Brexit negotiations is in for a very major shock.
Returning to the main point of today, we can note that the monarchies which had obviously been defeated in the war - the many sovereign German princes, the Empire of Austria and Kingdom of Hungary, and [in effect] Russia - were wiped out; and red revolutions were attempted in Vienna, Budapest, Munich and Berlin. Soldiers with their weapons in hand put down the risings in central Europe, while the navy and the army mostly sided with the workers in Russia to permit Lenin to grab power.
But in Belgium, where much of the country had been devastated by the war, the king returned as a national hero. In Britain during the war there had been rumblings about the king being a German - which, in ancestral terms, he was - leading to the proclamation of Windsor as the royal family surname. The king loyally supported his ministers, while intervening to keep crass generals - first French, then Haig - in supreme command even though their stupidity could not be concealed. Haig accepted assurances that the third major assault on the Somme, known as the Battle of Paschendael, would succeed because such an efficient artillery barrage would be launched before troops were sent 'over the top' that all the barbed wire in front of them would be destroyed and 'not even a rat' would be able to survive the gunfire. The men went over the top, the barbed wire was in place; and as soon as the artillery barrage was lifted the Germans restored their machine-guns to be ready to slaughter the British, Canadian and Indian infantry who were sent forward. Then came the rain, and the churned-up ground turned to deep mud; but Haig sent more and more troops forward for four months, until the Canadians' capture of a small ridge of land enabled the idiots at HQ to proclaim the battle a 'success'. That was just one of the most conspicuous, crass, wastes of human lives that went on from Mons in 1914 until November 11, 1918.
Almost every street and every extended family in the United Kingdom - including, then, Ireland - suffered casualties. Yet the regime, the politicians, the generals and the king were exonerated from blame: individual generals were the subject of loathing from conscripts whose companions had been killed, injured and deprived of their reason as a result of the commanders' stupidity and arrogance, but the regime was not seriously challenged on the mainland of Britain. However, the losses of the war - in men, industrial output wasted, foreign debts incurred and international power - could not be ignored. So a huge propaganda effort, such as had never before been seen, was launched: with massive effect. A temporary 'Cenotaph' - a tall plinth for a coffin - was erected in Whitehall for the first anniversary of Armistice Day, and 'the Glorious Dead' were honoured as national heroes. A couple of years later the 'unknown soldier' was disinterred from a war grave in France and moved to Westminster Abbey, so that every bereaved mother could imagine that her son would ever after be honoured by kings, princes and politicians. That could only continue if kings and princes were kept in place; and so the regime was more deeply cemented in national sentiment than ever before.
This is a spectacular achievement, adopted throughout the Empire and the United States; and with a similar set of events in France and Belgium. Its force in maintaining the socio-economic order is rarely recognised: but the Irish dimension is again being exposed.
Thursday, 7 September 2017
More Pathetic Government Papers on Brexit
It is becoming increasingly apparent that the British State does not have the resources that are necessary to arrange for any sort of Brexit. Some commentators [from both sides of the debate] have welcomed this absence of any clear thinking and positive planning as a time during which a consensus can emerge in the wider public, in favour of a 'soft Brexit' based on remaining in the European Economic Area [EEA]. Such commentators argue - persuasively - that Mrs May's government does not possess sufficient brainpower [either in numbers of people or on a basis of their average intelligence] to work out alternative solutions to the tens of thousands of issues that are emerging, within eighteen months.
The EU has now produced two papers [among others] that are unanswerable by the May team within the constraints of time and human resources that apply. One challenges Britain to find a way of carrying forward the European system for designating such products as Cornish pasty, Stilton, Camembert and Parma Ham. The other carries the ultimate challenge: it throws entirely on the British government the initiative in creating open borders in Ireland that is acceptable to the Irish Republic and supported by all 26 other EU member states. England opened the 'Irish Question' when the English Pope Hadrian gave King Henry II an invitation to assume the role of Lord of Ireland, and the Union of England and Scotland has been struggling with the aftermath for at least two hundred years. The chances of it being resolved, other than in the context of the EEA, are negligible. Mrs May depends on the support of the most hardline opponents of concessions to the Irish Republicans for her majority in the House of Commons; thus there is no chance of the Irish Question leading to any new answers.
This blog has also emphasised the simple fact that a 'hard Brexit' could only be implemented at the cost of many billions of pounds of extra state spending on border and customs controls, both to implement the hard border then to maintain it. It would be impossible to continue to implement 'austerity' if such extra costs were being imposed on the state budget. Borrowing to pay for such border controls would make the government's attempt to end state borrowing [that has failed so far] even more ridiculous than it already is. The alternative, to try to pay for the new resources of equipment and manpower by increasing taxes, would result in revolt by business lobbies and the general public. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, whose department would have to present this scenario to the public [and must, surely, have attempted to warn the Brexiteers in the Cabinet of these facts], has argued for the general acceptance of a transition period in recognition of the fact that none of these issues can be resolved by March 2019: which is deadline set by Mrs May when she formally notified the EU of her interpretation of the referendum result.
The headbanging Brexiteers know that the longer time passes before a resolution is imposed on the country, the chances of a rational solution - withdrawal from the political EU while remaining in the EEA - will rise; and they hate this concept. They will therefore be hell-bent on pushing the weakest Prime Minister since the Second World War to take panicky decisions in a show of uncharacteristic determination that would make her ridiculous, and almost certainly push her to a position where the DUP would refuse to support her and Tory Remainers would be opposed to her.
In all this political maelstrom key facts could get lost; but here the sheer incompetence of the UK government's papers on Brexit are significant. A draft text on immigration, post-Brexit [leaked to the Guardian], assumed that Britain does have the native resources of skilled, fit and willing labour to fill most of the jobs that would be vacant in the period after a 'hard Brexit'. The mass of work that has been done on labour supply and skills shortages in the UK contradicts that naive assumption; unless - and this is a really chilling thought - the authors assume that there would be so big a contraction in the economy that skills shortages would disappear. The absence from the paper of any reference to seasonal labour from the EU, on which much of UK agriculture depends, illustrates the sheer incompetence and inadequacy of the work that is being done in Whitehall.
This all serves to strengthen one's fear that those who have a clear policy, who I call the headbanging Brexiteers, will have too much of the argument for too long; because everybody else is inadequately informed to make judgements on myriad issues that any form of Brexit will throw up.
The EU has now produced two papers [among others] that are unanswerable by the May team within the constraints of time and human resources that apply. One challenges Britain to find a way of carrying forward the European system for designating such products as Cornish pasty, Stilton, Camembert and Parma Ham. The other carries the ultimate challenge: it throws entirely on the British government the initiative in creating open borders in Ireland that is acceptable to the Irish Republic and supported by all 26 other EU member states. England opened the 'Irish Question' when the English Pope Hadrian gave King Henry II an invitation to assume the role of Lord of Ireland, and the Union of England and Scotland has been struggling with the aftermath for at least two hundred years. The chances of it being resolved, other than in the context of the EEA, are negligible. Mrs May depends on the support of the most hardline opponents of concessions to the Irish Republicans for her majority in the House of Commons; thus there is no chance of the Irish Question leading to any new answers.
This blog has also emphasised the simple fact that a 'hard Brexit' could only be implemented at the cost of many billions of pounds of extra state spending on border and customs controls, both to implement the hard border then to maintain it. It would be impossible to continue to implement 'austerity' if such extra costs were being imposed on the state budget. Borrowing to pay for such border controls would make the government's attempt to end state borrowing [that has failed so far] even more ridiculous than it already is. The alternative, to try to pay for the new resources of equipment and manpower by increasing taxes, would result in revolt by business lobbies and the general public. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, whose department would have to present this scenario to the public [and must, surely, have attempted to warn the Brexiteers in the Cabinet of these facts], has argued for the general acceptance of a transition period in recognition of the fact that none of these issues can be resolved by March 2019: which is deadline set by Mrs May when she formally notified the EU of her interpretation of the referendum result.
The headbanging Brexiteers know that the longer time passes before a resolution is imposed on the country, the chances of a rational solution - withdrawal from the political EU while remaining in the EEA - will rise; and they hate this concept. They will therefore be hell-bent on pushing the weakest Prime Minister since the Second World War to take panicky decisions in a show of uncharacteristic determination that would make her ridiculous, and almost certainly push her to a position where the DUP would refuse to support her and Tory Remainers would be opposed to her.
In all this political maelstrom key facts could get lost; but here the sheer incompetence of the UK government's papers on Brexit are significant. A draft text on immigration, post-Brexit [leaked to the Guardian], assumed that Britain does have the native resources of skilled, fit and willing labour to fill most of the jobs that would be vacant in the period after a 'hard Brexit'. The mass of work that has been done on labour supply and skills shortages in the UK contradicts that naive assumption; unless - and this is a really chilling thought - the authors assume that there would be so big a contraction in the economy that skills shortages would disappear. The absence from the paper of any reference to seasonal labour from the EU, on which much of UK agriculture depends, illustrates the sheer incompetence and inadequacy of the work that is being done in Whitehall.
This all serves to strengthen one's fear that those who have a clear policy, who I call the headbanging Brexiteers, will have too much of the argument for too long; because everybody else is inadequately informed to make judgements on myriad issues that any form of Brexit will throw up.
Wednesday, 16 August 2017
Brexit and Ireland
At least since the time when the only English pope 'asked' King Henry II of England to take full possession of his Lordship of Ireland, there has been an endless and fascinating sequence of tense relations between the rulers based in Westminster and the people of Ireland. Several times, kings and the Cromwellian republic tried to settle conformable populations of Scots and English in Ireland, and between 1670 and 1690 the great Sir William Petty wrote extensively about his plan to resettle half the Irish population on the island of Britain and/or in British colonies elsewhere, replacing them in Ireland with Brits, so that a short period of interbreeding could eradicate the difficult characteristics of the native Irish. Often, British policy in Ireland has been highly revealing about the actual character of British government and the real intentions of British policy.
Thus the publication yesterday of a less-than-half-baked paper on the future of the Irish border under Brexit is in that revealing context. As I have commented previously in this blog, the present UK government can not possibly give effect to any sort of Brexit that involves leaving the European Economic Area whilst retaining the policy of austerity. Actually to erect realistic customs borders and controls on the passage of people all around the UK - which would be necessary before Britain could begin to trade with anybody under the rules of the World Trade Organisation, outside the EU - is totally incompatible with austerity.
Yesterday's UK government paper on the Irish border rejects any hegemonic physical line, either on the land border between the Republic and Northern Ireland or enforced by frigates in the middle of the Irish Sea. One radio commentator summed up the potential control methods as "an iPad in every truck's cab". Interestingly, this looks as if it would put the primary cost of compliance with any new system of "technological" border and customs control onto the private sector; but, of course, billions of pounds would have to be spent for the government to acquire the equipment and train up and pay the skilled people [who probably do not exist anyway] who would be needed to create and maintain the records that would be needed of the passage of people and goods over the borders. The notion implicit in yesterday's paper is simply potty.
Both the British and Irish government are adamant that there cannot be a hard border in Ireland: not just prosperity, but also peace is dependent on free movement of people, goods and arguments.
Ireland will prove to be a sticking-point: the first - and probably the most fundamental - of all. Any genuine Brexit is not affordable to the British state, even if Osbornian austerity were relaxed. Corbyn will not understand this; but, more importantly the headbanging Tory Brexiteers - on whom Mrs May relies for her parliamentary survival - will not understand it: some because they do not want to, and some because their intellectual capabilities do not stretch that far.
The Irish Question will again be a determining factor in British history: and [as Sellars and Yeatman said, in their inimitable 1066 and All that] the English will never solve the Irish Question because whenever they come up with an answer, the Irish change the question. This is certainly the present situation, where the new Irish Prime Minister has set new terms for the discussion of the border: and we can be sure that the great bulk of the European Union will back him to the hilt. Nigel Farage and the 'hard Brexiteers' will claim that the electorate is being betrayed as a 'transition period' mutates into continuing membership of the European Economic Area [but without membership of the Brussels political set-up]. The 'betrayal' will come from the incomprehension and incompetence of the political class: against which a majority of the nation voted on 23 June 2016. Hence, the political class - the very people who are least trusted by the nation - froth and posture about 'taking back control'. They don't know how to do it, because there is no affordable way to achieve it within their mental universe.
Interesting times indeed.
Thus the publication yesterday of a less-than-half-baked paper on the future of the Irish border under Brexit is in that revealing context. As I have commented previously in this blog, the present UK government can not possibly give effect to any sort of Brexit that involves leaving the European Economic Area whilst retaining the policy of austerity. Actually to erect realistic customs borders and controls on the passage of people all around the UK - which would be necessary before Britain could begin to trade with anybody under the rules of the World Trade Organisation, outside the EU - is totally incompatible with austerity.
Yesterday's UK government paper on the Irish border rejects any hegemonic physical line, either on the land border between the Republic and Northern Ireland or enforced by frigates in the middle of the Irish Sea. One radio commentator summed up the potential control methods as "an iPad in every truck's cab". Interestingly, this looks as if it would put the primary cost of compliance with any new system of "technological" border and customs control onto the private sector; but, of course, billions of pounds would have to be spent for the government to acquire the equipment and train up and pay the skilled people [who probably do not exist anyway] who would be needed to create and maintain the records that would be needed of the passage of people and goods over the borders. The notion implicit in yesterday's paper is simply potty.
Both the British and Irish government are adamant that there cannot be a hard border in Ireland: not just prosperity, but also peace is dependent on free movement of people, goods and arguments.
Ireland will prove to be a sticking-point: the first - and probably the most fundamental - of all. Any genuine Brexit is not affordable to the British state, even if Osbornian austerity were relaxed. Corbyn will not understand this; but, more importantly the headbanging Tory Brexiteers - on whom Mrs May relies for her parliamentary survival - will not understand it: some because they do not want to, and some because their intellectual capabilities do not stretch that far.
The Irish Question will again be a determining factor in British history: and [as Sellars and Yeatman said, in their inimitable 1066 and All that] the English will never solve the Irish Question because whenever they come up with an answer, the Irish change the question. This is certainly the present situation, where the new Irish Prime Minister has set new terms for the discussion of the border: and we can be sure that the great bulk of the European Union will back him to the hilt. Nigel Farage and the 'hard Brexiteers' will claim that the electorate is being betrayed as a 'transition period' mutates into continuing membership of the European Economic Area [but without membership of the Brussels political set-up]. The 'betrayal' will come from the incomprehension and incompetence of the political class: against which a majority of the nation voted on 23 June 2016. Hence, the political class - the very people who are least trusted by the nation - froth and posture about 'taking back control'. They don't know how to do it, because there is no affordable way to achieve it within their mental universe.
Interesting times indeed.
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Monday, 11 June 2012
Dubloons for the Dons
Today's German press is highly critical of the fudge by which the eurozone is to bail out the Spanish banking system with a fund of up to 100 billion euros, by means to be clarified at an indeterminate cost to the currency union in general and to Germany in particular. In some editorials the term 'blackmail' is used frankly; in others the same analysis is more delicately expressed. While Greece and Ireland were implicitly deemed to be 'small enough to fail' Spain [like Goldman or Morgan] has been treated as 'too big to allow it to fail'. The eurozone could survive without Greece and Cyprus; provided there was no domino effect on Spain or Italy: but the impression over the past week became a conviction that if Spain was allowed to collapse financially the eurozone would be under terminal threat and the whole European project would massively be enfeebled.
All the eurozone finance ministers were complicit in the round of conference calls that took place at the end of last week. All their governments have become almost-unconditionally susceptible to being organised by Germany into a superstate. The details of the fusion, and of the way the inner union will articulate with the non-euro EU member states must be settled quickly; and Germany will predominate in all the discussions. The vulnerabilities of Italy and France are so significant that neither will have a veto on the integration process: and the influence of the eurorats in Brussels will be diminished in favour of the smooth suits in Frankfort.
The first few hours of trading in international markets after the announcement of the purported loan-guarantee to the Spanish banks demonstrated that supernational gamblers would only give credibility to the package when they can see the funds actually allocated by the Germans. The package was announced on trust: and it was not trusted. The eurozone expressed an intention to support Spanish banks, in circumstances where no fund had yet been established from which the guarantee could be converted into a series of payouts. 'The markets' on which the prices of Spanish [and Italian] bonds have fallen since the 'rescue' was announced are only in a tiny proportion driven by real-world firms [such as pension funds] that hold such bonds as part of their long-term investment portfolios. The majority of recent purchases and sales of state bonds and of bonds issued by south European banks are speculative gambles: the 'value' of the bonds is utterly irrelevant to the gamblers, who are interested only in making a gain by rightly predicting a rise or a fall in the price of the euro in terms of dollars, sterling, yen or other currencies. The market reaction strengthens the Germans' hand: the Spanish deal - and any subsequent deal for Italy or France - will only have credibility if Germany actually places resources in the appropriate backing funds. Chancellor Merkel faces elections: she and her party will be annihilated if they are perceived to have sold the German taxpayer short. Serious negotiations must now begin, with the collapse of the euro as the imminent threat. The eurorats will posture around the periphery, but the power unconditionally rests between Berlin and Frankfort; the modern and the medieval capitals of the German Reich.
Britain has blundered into the position where most of the electorate want the UK to be separated from this whole mess: so it can't be all bad!
All the eurozone finance ministers were complicit in the round of conference calls that took place at the end of last week. All their governments have become almost-unconditionally susceptible to being organised by Germany into a superstate. The details of the fusion, and of the way the inner union will articulate with the non-euro EU member states must be settled quickly; and Germany will predominate in all the discussions. The vulnerabilities of Italy and France are so significant that neither will have a veto on the integration process: and the influence of the eurorats in Brussels will be diminished in favour of the smooth suits in Frankfort.
The first few hours of trading in international markets after the announcement of the purported loan-guarantee to the Spanish banks demonstrated that supernational gamblers would only give credibility to the package when they can see the funds actually allocated by the Germans. The package was announced on trust: and it was not trusted. The eurozone expressed an intention to support Spanish banks, in circumstances where no fund had yet been established from which the guarantee could be converted into a series of payouts. 'The markets' on which the prices of Spanish [and Italian] bonds have fallen since the 'rescue' was announced are only in a tiny proportion driven by real-world firms [such as pension funds] that hold such bonds as part of their long-term investment portfolios. The majority of recent purchases and sales of state bonds and of bonds issued by south European banks are speculative gambles: the 'value' of the bonds is utterly irrelevant to the gamblers, who are interested only in making a gain by rightly predicting a rise or a fall in the price of the euro in terms of dollars, sterling, yen or other currencies. The market reaction strengthens the Germans' hand: the Spanish deal - and any subsequent deal for Italy or France - will only have credibility if Germany actually places resources in the appropriate backing funds. Chancellor Merkel faces elections: she and her party will be annihilated if they are perceived to have sold the German taxpayer short. Serious negotiations must now begin, with the collapse of the euro as the imminent threat. The eurorats will posture around the periphery, but the power unconditionally rests between Berlin and Frankfort; the modern and the medieval capitals of the German Reich.
Britain has blundered into the position where most of the electorate want the UK to be separated from this whole mess: so it can't be all bad!
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