Mrs May was talking in January about the importance of the 'Industrial Strategy' on which her government was supposedly working very hard. It has now been unveiled, and although there is some straight thinking in it there is also grave incomprehension of economic realities. Just to list a few:
*Brexit: it is vitally important that any drugs, designs or other innovations are marketable throughout the European Union on more-or-less the same terms as at present: otherwise, firms that are subsidised to employ teams of researchers in the UK will do the final stages of development within the Union so that the product is not inhibited by regulatory barriers from getting to its primary market. Innovative products will be held up at any border by licensing and regulatory systems, to allow indigenous companies in the potential importer countries to catch up. WTO Rules will not stop such chauvinistic chicanery. Even before the advent of Trump, the USA was notorious in that regard: while firms in emergent economies - including China and India - are not above simple intellectual theft.
*Profits can be shoved abroad by alien companies. So the British state will be sponsoring and helping alien-owned firms to develop products - employing some British scientists and technicians, true - but also allowed to import their own managers and experts for the duration of the period of product development. The manufacturing of the developed idea can that be conducted anywhere on the globe, and the pricing structure can be adjusted so that British taxpayer gets little back for the investment by the British state. Although some share of the intellectual property in some ideas may go to British universities and individuals, the vast majority will be owned by alien organisations; and can thus be alienated as they wish.
*Fake apprenticeships such as are being developed with schools and universities in the UK are most unlikely to produce people with the skill-set that is achieved by real apprenticeship in Germany. It is therefore unlikely that the programme will develop a strong and longstanding skilled workforce such as exists in the dreams of the contributors to the strategic plan. The ongoing delay in the actual launch of the Apprenticeship-MBA will provide no obstacle to the companies that have already agreed to participate in the Industrial Strategy.
*Any genuine development of science and technology in the UK is greatly to be welcomed. But I have observed personally for more than forty years that a huge proportion of the research that is carried out in the best British universities of technology - places like Birmingham, Manchester and Sheffield - is done by alien research students. Not enough Brits are capable of getting good degrees in science and technology, because of the awful state and status of science in schools. Side-tracking kids into fake apprenticeships where they simulate industrial processes instead of doing full-time hard learning will set the UK back in its development of the right skills for the twenty-first century.
My overwhelming feeling about the strategy is: "too little, too late"!
Most importantly, the 'strategists' still have not got lesson number one: that productivity improves only when productiveness gets the prime place. Productiveness is improved only when the profit from any activity is devoted to improving the plant, the processes, the materials used and the people employed. When that is done, productivity can improve and real economic growth [in the sense of generating more income-per-head from the workforce] can be achieved. I do not see that productiveness will significantly be enhanced by this new Strategy.
Economics is fundamentally unscientific. The economic crisis has speeded the shift of power to emergent economies. In Britain and the USA the theory of 'rational markets' removed controls from the finance sector, and things can still get yet worse. Read my book, No Confidence: The Brexit Vote and Economics - http://amzn.eu/ayGznkp
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Showing posts with label European Union. Show all posts
Showing posts with label European Union. Show all posts
Monday, 27 November 2017
Tuesday, 21 November 2017
Puerile Politics
The news media this morning tell me that some of the pathetic runts who have inveigled themselves into Parliament have come up with a spiffing wheeze. They suggest that as Mrs Merkel is in a possibly-terminal struggle for her political existence, the time is right to cut down the amount that the UK should offer to the European Union to settle our obligations as departing members.
Most of the citizens I know - many of whom voted Leave - agree with Mrs May's public assertions that we should pay all that we owe, fair and square. It should have been possible to produce openly-published estimates of the amount many months ago, and most people are bemused that this has not been done. It is a matter of accountancy: the items should be listed, defined, quantified [in sterling] and a total determined. The UK government's tabulation may not tally with that of the Brussels bureaucracy, and an arbitration might be needed; but the whole thing should be open and and conducted in a fair minded manner on both sides.
This is the latest incident of low-mindedness among some politicians, whose behaviour has become a national embarrassment. The word puerile derives from the Latin puer - a boy - and is used to denote human conduct [chiefly by apparently-adult males] that seems to others to be very like the sort of behaviour in which pubescent males engage: often when they group together and goad each other on towards a greater excess of silliness. Every male adolescent is puerile at times: that is human nature. When grown men act in a puerile manner that is always embarrassing: when men in public life behave thus, it is a national disgrace. We have almost become used to fractions of the Conservative Party behaving in such a way: yet it is still painful, and the nation is shamed by it. That Mrs May is so weakened by her election debacle that she is at the mercy of such men is a national tragedy.
It is very hard to see where we go from here. It does appear that the government has ignored the idiots, for the time being, and agreed that we should make an increased offer to get the financial conditions of Brexit settled. It is devoutly to be wished that the government can hold to that decision and move on to substantive discussions.
Most of the citizens I know - many of whom voted Leave - agree with Mrs May's public assertions that we should pay all that we owe, fair and square. It should have been possible to produce openly-published estimates of the amount many months ago, and most people are bemused that this has not been done. It is a matter of accountancy: the items should be listed, defined, quantified [in sterling] and a total determined. The UK government's tabulation may not tally with that of the Brussels bureaucracy, and an arbitration might be needed; but the whole thing should be open and and conducted in a fair minded manner on both sides.
This is the latest incident of low-mindedness among some politicians, whose behaviour has become a national embarrassment. The word puerile derives from the Latin puer - a boy - and is used to denote human conduct [chiefly by apparently-adult males] that seems to others to be very like the sort of behaviour in which pubescent males engage: often when they group together and goad each other on towards a greater excess of silliness. Every male adolescent is puerile at times: that is human nature. When grown men act in a puerile manner that is always embarrassing: when men in public life behave thus, it is a national disgrace. We have almost become used to fractions of the Conservative Party behaving in such a way: yet it is still painful, and the nation is shamed by it. That Mrs May is so weakened by her election debacle that she is at the mercy of such men is a national tragedy.
It is very hard to see where we go from here. It does appear that the government has ignored the idiots, for the time being, and agreed that we should make an increased offer to get the financial conditions of Brexit settled. It is devoutly to be wished that the government can hold to that decision and move on to substantive discussions.
Sunday, 19 November 2017
Power, Legitimacy and the Economy
Chairman Mao declared that "power comes out of the barrel of a gun"; and over the millennia many regimes all over the world have gained and held power by the power of the sling, the arrow, the spear, the sword and the gun. The Bible tells how the pyramid-building rulers of Egypt consolidated their power over centuries by maintaining state granaries, in which crop surpluses were stored in fruitful years, which could then be doled-out to maintain the people when harvests were insufficient; whether that was due to crop failure [usually due to irregular weather] or to military intervention with the farming year [as when 'the peoples of the sea' invaded some provinces].
The comfortable delusion upon which the European Union was built is that the founder states were mature democracies, where the mass of the population acquiesced in the constitutional order and selected between political parties in regular, orderly elections; largely on the basis of their performance or promises in developing the economy. Since 1995 several states were admitted that had recently been 'democratised' after decades under the Communists gun-rule, and their dissent from the consensus established in Brussels [not least, on inward migration from outside Europe] has now become conspicuous. But [as has been pointed out before in this blog] the west European democracies were new when the Treaty of Rome was signed. Germany was fascist and brutal until mid-1945, Italy was in a similar state. France was still recovering from the hidden conflict between wartime collaborators and resistants. Smaller states with monarchies had been able more quickly after 1945 to establish a sort of normalcy, but all carried legacy issues from the war [except Sweden, which had the great luck to maintain its neutrality]. The EU had a mock-democratic parliament, which was subject to the farce of moving every month from Brussels to Strasbourg that was the proof of its impotence: if the assembly had an iota of real power the members would have opted for a fixed location.
The United Kingdom and Ireland joined the Common Market together, with the secret agenda [agreed in London and Dublin, but not shared with the broad electorate in either country] that a 'peace process' could follow in Ireland as the identities of the two states was subsumed in the European project. Before Mrs Thatcher won her infamous 'rebate', the UK was paying in massive amounts to the Common Market funds that made similarly vast payments to Irish farmers and local authorities. A generation on, Mrs May and her pathetic cabinet seem not to know that, so they delude themselves that are avoiding the crunch on the Irish Question by putting up notions for a customs arrangement that is very much secondary to the political fudge. If the political fudge is ignored the whole Brexit project will end in violence. It is more than a coincidence that Gerry Adams has announced his intention to stand down: if there is to be a new civil war in Ireland [with inevitable excursions into the British mainland] it will necessarily be conducted by a new, vigorous Republican high command.
If this interpretation of current events seems apocalyptic, be aware that if consent is withdrawn by a coherent component of the population in any country [or province] the men and women of violence will seek to develop that situation. Mercifully, there is no sign of such a thing happening in Catalonia; but Ireland has been a different case, for centuries.
If a regime is able to provide the mass of the people with palpable economic benefits, as the pyramid-builders did - and as the welfare state did in western Europe for the half-century after 1950 - revolt against the centralised state is rare: Northern Ireland, the Basque region and a few other cases were the exceptions that proved the rule because there were deep historical reasons for those special cases. It is significant that as the Irish Republic gained more of the advantages of a welfare economy, so the politicians in that state eschewed the IRA and their political allies more and more deeply.
Meanwhile, in Zimbabwe massive crowds have assembled to support the army and the ruling ZanuPF party in their attempt to replace Mugabe by his erstwhile deputy. 'The crocodile', as he is known, is a notorious enforcer; hitherto in Mugabe's interests. It was he who unleashed North Korean mercenaries to support his own thugs in killing at least 20,000 Matabele. It was he who organised such beatings of opposition voters in the last presidential election that the opposition withdrew from the second round and allowed Mugabe to reap his 'democratic' mandate. By all accounts he is less blatantly kleptocratic than Grace Mugabe, who was being set up as the next president. Optimists are hoping that the crocodile will metamorphose into a consensualist who can forge a truly 'national' government, but the odds are stacked against that. Once the dust settles on Mugabe's departure, Zimbabwe will revert to rule by fist and cane, supplemented - as judged necessary - by bullets: as in the case in most of Africa.
The chances of Zimbabwe approaching any credible standard of democracy within fifty years are very small.
The chances of the beneficent Brussels fantasy lasting for another fifty years are diminishing: as Mrs Merkel's struggle to build a coalition well illustrates.
The comfortable delusion upon which the European Union was built is that the founder states were mature democracies, where the mass of the population acquiesced in the constitutional order and selected between political parties in regular, orderly elections; largely on the basis of their performance or promises in developing the economy. Since 1995 several states were admitted that had recently been 'democratised' after decades under the Communists gun-rule, and their dissent from the consensus established in Brussels [not least, on inward migration from outside Europe] has now become conspicuous. But [as has been pointed out before in this blog] the west European democracies were new when the Treaty of Rome was signed. Germany was fascist and brutal until mid-1945, Italy was in a similar state. France was still recovering from the hidden conflict between wartime collaborators and resistants. Smaller states with monarchies had been able more quickly after 1945 to establish a sort of normalcy, but all carried legacy issues from the war [except Sweden, which had the great luck to maintain its neutrality]. The EU had a mock-democratic parliament, which was subject to the farce of moving every month from Brussels to Strasbourg that was the proof of its impotence: if the assembly had an iota of real power the members would have opted for a fixed location.
The United Kingdom and Ireland joined the Common Market together, with the secret agenda [agreed in London and Dublin, but not shared with the broad electorate in either country] that a 'peace process' could follow in Ireland as the identities of the two states was subsumed in the European project. Before Mrs Thatcher won her infamous 'rebate', the UK was paying in massive amounts to the Common Market funds that made similarly vast payments to Irish farmers and local authorities. A generation on, Mrs May and her pathetic cabinet seem not to know that, so they delude themselves that are avoiding the crunch on the Irish Question by putting up notions for a customs arrangement that is very much secondary to the political fudge. If the political fudge is ignored the whole Brexit project will end in violence. It is more than a coincidence that Gerry Adams has announced his intention to stand down: if there is to be a new civil war in Ireland [with inevitable excursions into the British mainland] it will necessarily be conducted by a new, vigorous Republican high command.
If this interpretation of current events seems apocalyptic, be aware that if consent is withdrawn by a coherent component of the population in any country [or province] the men and women of violence will seek to develop that situation. Mercifully, there is no sign of such a thing happening in Catalonia; but Ireland has been a different case, for centuries.
If a regime is able to provide the mass of the people with palpable economic benefits, as the pyramid-builders did - and as the welfare state did in western Europe for the half-century after 1950 - revolt against the centralised state is rare: Northern Ireland, the Basque region and a few other cases were the exceptions that proved the rule because there were deep historical reasons for those special cases. It is significant that as the Irish Republic gained more of the advantages of a welfare economy, so the politicians in that state eschewed the IRA and their political allies more and more deeply.
Meanwhile, in Zimbabwe massive crowds have assembled to support the army and the ruling ZanuPF party in their attempt to replace Mugabe by his erstwhile deputy. 'The crocodile', as he is known, is a notorious enforcer; hitherto in Mugabe's interests. It was he who unleashed North Korean mercenaries to support his own thugs in killing at least 20,000 Matabele. It was he who organised such beatings of opposition voters in the last presidential election that the opposition withdrew from the second round and allowed Mugabe to reap his 'democratic' mandate. By all accounts he is less blatantly kleptocratic than Grace Mugabe, who was being set up as the next president. Optimists are hoping that the crocodile will metamorphose into a consensualist who can forge a truly 'national' government, but the odds are stacked against that. Once the dust settles on Mugabe's departure, Zimbabwe will revert to rule by fist and cane, supplemented - as judged necessary - by bullets: as in the case in most of Africa.
The chances of Zimbabwe approaching any credible standard of democracy within fifty years are very small.
The chances of the beneficent Brussels fantasy lasting for another fifty years are diminishing: as Mrs Merkel's struggle to build a coalition well illustrates.
Monday, 13 November 2017
A Symbolic Bonnet?
I was brought up, long ago, with the constant admonition: 'do not mock the afflicted!'
I usually avoid doing so; but sometimes it seems that a voluntarily-adopted affliction makes an important point about the person who has adopted it. I increasingly feel this about the prime minister's selection of clothes. I recognise that she is tall and slim: as many leading models are, so there is an amplitude of clothing for women of means who are of those dimensions to choose from. Mrs May's choices vary between the odd and the wildly eccentric; and yesterday at the Cenotaph I thought that she established a new, abnormal norm. The black bonnet that she had selected - possibly it was even designed for her - looked like something that a war widow of 100 years ago would have dressed her teenage daughter in for a remembrance event: yet it was also vaguely reminiscent of a German army helmet. Yesterday it simply looked anachronistic on a grown woman.
But for me it also epitomised her situation. She gambled on winning enough seats in the Commons for the Conservative Party so that she could discount the ten-to-twenty headbanging Brexiteers who for various reasons - including pure stupidity - want to risk national economic ruin by interpreting the referendum result of 2016 as authorising the government to leave the European Economic Area altogether, on a cliff-edge date at the end of March 2019. As she totally misjudged the one-woman campaign that she ran, she lost her majority; since when the headbangers [and the DUP] have dominated her field for policy options. She has retreated into a psychological bunker, from which - so it is rumoured - she continues to radiate confidence that all will become well in the best of all possible worlds: sometime. And meanwhile, as M Barnier has said, the clock on the exit door is ticking.
Yesterday the Sunday Times - never known as a Labour-supporting vehicle - gave a prominent page to an article in the name of Jeremy Corbyn [which was, therefore, at least authorised by him]. In it he presaged a shift of parliamentary arithmetic, implying his recognition of the fact that while virtually all members of the Commons accept that the referendum result [though many of them think it unfortunate] must - at least, minimally - be implemented. But he also accepts that an overwhelming majority of members have come to recognise that to leave the Common Market and the European Union in a simple step would be a calamity for the country.
To demand a general election - which may become necessary if Mrs May is defeated by the defection of any section of her party - would mean that the current crop of MPs have abdicated all responsibility. It is deeply unclear what the result of a general election would be: but the most probable outcome would be a small renaissance for the LibDems, the Scots Tories at least holding their position, no change in Ulster, Labour gains in Scotland [but the Nats still in the lead] and no clear result from England. Labour might just be the biggest party, though the Tories have an equal chance of that; so the construction of a coalition would be a slow and painful business: while the Europeans could fold their arms and enjoy the British discomfiture and the tick of the clock.
The last time when Britain was in a comparable situation was in June, 1940; when a paralysis of government [albeit, with a strong Conservative majority] faced an existential threat. Talk of coalition was in the air; and Labour had already made clear that they could not support a Chamberlain-led government: though they also accepted that the Tory majority required that any coalition was led by a Conservative. In the crucial debate, as a government supporter spoke for the government, a fellow member challenged him to "speak for England". The government left the debate with a clear majority, but the loss of confidence in them was equally clear. Chamberlain - a sick man - resigned, and the amazing, anachronistic career of Winston Churchill reached its apogee.
Corbyn is no Churchill: he is no patriot, he has supported obnoxious alien regimes acting on the lines of the traduced anti-patriots of whom W S Gilbert wrote they admire "all centuries but this one, and all countries but their own". Corbyn's recent adoption of statesmanlike utterances - at odds with his career-long posturing - is utterly unconvincing: but if he were to prove capable of keeping to manifesto promises [and capable of keeping his close associates within those bounds] he might be useful in the hour of crisis.
I usually avoid doing so; but sometimes it seems that a voluntarily-adopted affliction makes an important point about the person who has adopted it. I increasingly feel this about the prime minister's selection of clothes. I recognise that she is tall and slim: as many leading models are, so there is an amplitude of clothing for women of means who are of those dimensions to choose from. Mrs May's choices vary between the odd and the wildly eccentric; and yesterday at the Cenotaph I thought that she established a new, abnormal norm. The black bonnet that she had selected - possibly it was even designed for her - looked like something that a war widow of 100 years ago would have dressed her teenage daughter in for a remembrance event: yet it was also vaguely reminiscent of a German army helmet. Yesterday it simply looked anachronistic on a grown woman.
But for me it also epitomised her situation. She gambled on winning enough seats in the Commons for the Conservative Party so that she could discount the ten-to-twenty headbanging Brexiteers who for various reasons - including pure stupidity - want to risk national economic ruin by interpreting the referendum result of 2016 as authorising the government to leave the European Economic Area altogether, on a cliff-edge date at the end of March 2019. As she totally misjudged the one-woman campaign that she ran, she lost her majority; since when the headbangers [and the DUP] have dominated her field for policy options. She has retreated into a psychological bunker, from which - so it is rumoured - she continues to radiate confidence that all will become well in the best of all possible worlds: sometime. And meanwhile, as M Barnier has said, the clock on the exit door is ticking.
Yesterday the Sunday Times - never known as a Labour-supporting vehicle - gave a prominent page to an article in the name of Jeremy Corbyn [which was, therefore, at least authorised by him]. In it he presaged a shift of parliamentary arithmetic, implying his recognition of the fact that while virtually all members of the Commons accept that the referendum result [though many of them think it unfortunate] must - at least, minimally - be implemented. But he also accepts that an overwhelming majority of members have come to recognise that to leave the Common Market and the European Union in a simple step would be a calamity for the country.
To demand a general election - which may become necessary if Mrs May is defeated by the defection of any section of her party - would mean that the current crop of MPs have abdicated all responsibility. It is deeply unclear what the result of a general election would be: but the most probable outcome would be a small renaissance for the LibDems, the Scots Tories at least holding their position, no change in Ulster, Labour gains in Scotland [but the Nats still in the lead] and no clear result from England. Labour might just be the biggest party, though the Tories have an equal chance of that; so the construction of a coalition would be a slow and painful business: while the Europeans could fold their arms and enjoy the British discomfiture and the tick of the clock.
The last time when Britain was in a comparable situation was in June, 1940; when a paralysis of government [albeit, with a strong Conservative majority] faced an existential threat. Talk of coalition was in the air; and Labour had already made clear that they could not support a Chamberlain-led government: though they also accepted that the Tory majority required that any coalition was led by a Conservative. In the crucial debate, as a government supporter spoke for the government, a fellow member challenged him to "speak for England". The government left the debate with a clear majority, but the loss of confidence in them was equally clear. Chamberlain - a sick man - resigned, and the amazing, anachronistic career of Winston Churchill reached its apogee.
Corbyn is no Churchill: he is no patriot, he has supported obnoxious alien regimes acting on the lines of the traduced anti-patriots of whom W S Gilbert wrote they admire "all centuries but this one, and all countries but their own". Corbyn's recent adoption of statesmanlike utterances - at odds with his career-long posturing - is utterly unconvincing: but if he were to prove capable of keeping to manifesto promises [and capable of keeping his close associates within those bounds] he might be useful in the hour of crisis.
Friday, 10 November 2017
Mrs May: Deadline or Deadbeat?
Theresa May has announced her intention to confirm March 2019 as the date on which the UK will leave the European Union; and has indicated an intention somehow to establish that date in law.
On the same day, a spokesperson for the European Union has said that unless there is to be a 'hard border' in Northern Ireland [which no party in Ireland will accept; and which the British state cannot afford to enforce] Northern Ireland must remain under EU jurisdiction permanently: regardless of what arrangement will apply to the rest of the UK. The Democratic Unionist Party, whose votes in the Commons keep Mrs May in power, thus faces a huge dilemma. The one thing that can deprive them of their majority mandate in Ulster would be for them to be seen on the island of Ireland as the group who would vote to enforce a hard frontier. However the DUP may decide that dilemma, there is a bigger one facing the UK government.
Can any UK government [Tory, Labour, fragile coalition - LibLab - or 'grand' coalition of three or more parties] contemplate bearing the cost or the odium of renewed conflict in Northern Ireland? This is an intractable question, to which I have drawn attention on previous occasions. The headbanging Brexiteers have put Ireland into the 'too difficult' file, as they busily fantasize about trade deals with countries that have no particular interest in doing Britain a good turn. Ireland has been a determining factor in British politics for centuries: and it is worth remembering that whenever the British think they have found an answer to 'the Irish question' the Irish change the question.
By a vote of 52% to 48% the UK population voted in favour of ceasing to be a member of the European Union: without any deep understanding of the implications of that question. Now that the ramifications of just a few of the implications are becoming clear, the proportion of the literate classes [especially of the civil service, which would have to administer Brexit Britain] that favours Brexit has declined rapidly.
Millions of people - including me - voted 'out' in genuine opposition to the ever-closer union of a corrupt political dictatorship [masquerading behind a facade of democratic institutions]; we also wanted to cock a snook at the British political class [represented by Cameron, Clegg and Osborne] who were the principal advocates of Remain and of austerity. None of us wanted to ruin the country economically. Some 'out' voters accepted assurances that that the world was open for free-trade deals on WTO terms. Some - me included - believed that, in the unlikely event of the 'outs' winning the vote, a continuance of the [Liberal-supported] government that had given us the referendum would negotiate terms that enabled stable economic life to continue. Nobody expected David Cameron to be such an utter coward as he proved to be. Nobody much minded what happened to Osborne: as he has demonstrated, he could move on to adopt half a dozen lucrative careers at once. On the day of the referendum nobody contemplated Mrs May being the prime minister; and we could not have conceived that she would place herself in thrall to people who actually would be prepared to see the British economy dismembered: starting with the crown jewels in the City of London.
Today, in the Silent Ceremony at Guildhall, a new Lord Mayor of the City will be installed. By the end of his year, the die will have been cast as to whether Britain will survive [and thrive] as an economy in association with the European Union, though with greater facilities for trade with the rest of the world.
Yesterday's two announcements - Mrs May's 'firm deadline' for leaving the EU, and the EU's comments on Ireland - are incompatible and will almost certainly ensure that no kind of Brexit happens in March 2019. Meanwhile, Mrs May's government looks increasingly unlikely to survive even to March 2018. The Tories will implode, even if the DUP do not simply repudiate their voting pact. Mrs May's chances of winning a by-election, even in the leafy home counties, are vanishingly small. Politics has become far too exciting; and that is before the inevitable mass movement against economic suicide begins to capture the headlines.
On the same day, a spokesperson for the European Union has said that unless there is to be a 'hard border' in Northern Ireland [which no party in Ireland will accept; and which the British state cannot afford to enforce] Northern Ireland must remain under EU jurisdiction permanently: regardless of what arrangement will apply to the rest of the UK. The Democratic Unionist Party, whose votes in the Commons keep Mrs May in power, thus faces a huge dilemma. The one thing that can deprive them of their majority mandate in Ulster would be for them to be seen on the island of Ireland as the group who would vote to enforce a hard frontier. However the DUP may decide that dilemma, there is a bigger one facing the UK government.
Can any UK government [Tory, Labour, fragile coalition - LibLab - or 'grand' coalition of three or more parties] contemplate bearing the cost or the odium of renewed conflict in Northern Ireland? This is an intractable question, to which I have drawn attention on previous occasions. The headbanging Brexiteers have put Ireland into the 'too difficult' file, as they busily fantasize about trade deals with countries that have no particular interest in doing Britain a good turn. Ireland has been a determining factor in British politics for centuries: and it is worth remembering that whenever the British think they have found an answer to 'the Irish question' the Irish change the question.
By a vote of 52% to 48% the UK population voted in favour of ceasing to be a member of the European Union: without any deep understanding of the implications of that question. Now that the ramifications of just a few of the implications are becoming clear, the proportion of the literate classes [especially of the civil service, which would have to administer Brexit Britain] that favours Brexit has declined rapidly.
Millions of people - including me - voted 'out' in genuine opposition to the ever-closer union of a corrupt political dictatorship [masquerading behind a facade of democratic institutions]; we also wanted to cock a snook at the British political class [represented by Cameron, Clegg and Osborne] who were the principal advocates of Remain and of austerity. None of us wanted to ruin the country economically. Some 'out' voters accepted assurances that that the world was open for free-trade deals on WTO terms. Some - me included - believed that, in the unlikely event of the 'outs' winning the vote, a continuance of the [Liberal-supported] government that had given us the referendum would negotiate terms that enabled stable economic life to continue. Nobody expected David Cameron to be such an utter coward as he proved to be. Nobody much minded what happened to Osborne: as he has demonstrated, he could move on to adopt half a dozen lucrative careers at once. On the day of the referendum nobody contemplated Mrs May being the prime minister; and we could not have conceived that she would place herself in thrall to people who actually would be prepared to see the British economy dismembered: starting with the crown jewels in the City of London.
Today, in the Silent Ceremony at Guildhall, a new Lord Mayor of the City will be installed. By the end of his year, the die will have been cast as to whether Britain will survive [and thrive] as an economy in association with the European Union, though with greater facilities for trade with the rest of the world.
Yesterday's two announcements - Mrs May's 'firm deadline' for leaving the EU, and the EU's comments on Ireland - are incompatible and will almost certainly ensure that no kind of Brexit happens in March 2019. Meanwhile, Mrs May's government looks increasingly unlikely to survive even to March 2018. The Tories will implode, even if the DUP do not simply repudiate their voting pact. Mrs May's chances of winning a by-election, even in the leafy home counties, are vanishingly small. Politics has become far too exciting; and that is before the inevitable mass movement against economic suicide begins to capture the headlines.
Saturday, 28 October 2017
The Sovereign Club, Crimea and Catalonia
The Spanish king and his government are adamant that there should be no truck with a purported 'sovereign' administration that has just been announced to exist in the region/province of Catalonia. The United Nations has asserted that a 'solution' should be found within the Spanish Constitution. Washington has declared that Catalonia is simply part of Spain, and that fact will not change in the perception of the United States [which fought a very nasty civil war to preserve their Union]. Britain, France and Germany have made similar assertions: there will be no recognition of a rebel 'government' by any European Union member state.
President Putin deeply deplores the fact that the Gorbachev administration in the last stage of the Soviet Union acted in accordance with the 'Stalin Constitution' which had enshrined the myth that the state was a federation of independent [largely ethnically-based] sovereign republics. This was very particularly Stalin's constitutional speciality. He had been sent to Vienna in the early years of the twentieth century to find out how the Habsburg regime was coping with the question of Nationality in Austria-Hungary. Slovaks and Czechs were asserting that they were distinct national groups, with a right to statehood of their own. Minorities of the population spoke Romanian, Polish, Ukrainian and various forms of German in distinctive territories split between the Kingdom of Hungary and the Austrian Empire [and the latter contained a massive range of entities from the Kingdom of Bohemia to small counties that were notionally sovereign]. The heir to the throne [Franz Ferdinand, who was to be killed in 1914 thus triggering the war that ended the monarchy] was said to want to change the 'dual monarchy' of Austria-Hungary into a 'trial' [or triple] monarchy with autonomy for the Slavs, in deference to his Czech wife.
Stalin produced a convoluted account of his thoughts on nationality, and after the revolution he was appointed Commissar for Nationalities. As the Soviet Union consolidated its absolute power over all the former Russian Empire, except Finland, it did not matter that a constitutional charade was enacted whereby the political entity was asserted to be a federation of notionally independent states. However, come the end of the Second World War, in their anxiety to keep Stalin on-side with the new United Nations, Britain, France and the USA agreed that three of the Soviet republics should each be independent members: Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. After Stalin's death, Khrushchev - a Ukrainian - almost casually transferred the Crimea from Russia to Ukraine: it did not seem to matter, at the time. The facts that the Crimea had been hard fought for under Peter the Great and Catherine II, and was seen as strategically important, did not cause any controversy while the USSR was operated as a single hegemonic state.
However, suddenly in 1990, the USSR collapsed; while the Communist party stooges who held office as the presidents and premiers of the various [formally fully sovereign] Socialist Republics simply colluded to ignore Gorbachev and his collapsing central authority and go their own ways. The largest component of the Union, Russia, had the charismatic Boris Yeltsin on hand to crush a half-cock attempt by party old hands to reverse all the democratic changes that Gorbachev had instituted: and as head of the Russian Republic's government Yeltsin established his hold over the biggest and most complex Soviet Socialist Republic; thus of Moscow. A notional federation was established of the former Soviet Republics, while the asserted sovereign authority in each of them began doling out the national assets to their families and friends. The Russian Republic itself became the Russian Federation including all the Autonomous Republics and Regions that Russia has inherited from Stalin's manipulations of notional boundaries. Yeltsin and his associates employed American Economists to assist them with a hugely corrupt and corrupting 'privatisation', which transferred much of industry to the hands of the so-called 'oligarchs' and caused massive deprivation to the mass of the population.
Putin's rise to power came after the damage derived from Stalin's constitutional machinations and Yeltsin's alcoholic incompetence had been done. In territorial terms, he has tried to rectify what he sees as two major failures: the transfer of the Crimea to Ukraine and the welfare of millions of Russians whose families were settled in the southern and eastern Ukraine, particularly in the reigns of Peter I, Catherine II and Stalin's post-1945 implant of Russian speakers into territory known as 'New Russia' that he had assigned to Ukraine. Stalin planted similar minorities of Russians in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; which has ensured that those countries have become very keen members of NATO in order to preserve their territorial integrity. Putin's attempts to make minor revisions of Stalin's and Khrushchev's cavalier actions, at the expense of Ukraine, have placed him under sanction by the western powers, who have set their faces against all tinkering with the pattern of states that was admitted to the United Nations in 1945 and subsequently. I have drawn attention previously to the idiocy of keeping the colonial frontiers in Africa: but they are also part of the stasis that goes with the present, deeply flawed concept of sovereignty.
East Germany was allowed to vanish into West Germany, and an independent Scotland arising from due democratic process would have gained international acceptance: provided it had been set on the international stage by the United Kingdom government acting as its sponsor.
On the other hand, if the Chechens declared themselves independent of the Russian Federation, President Putin could call on the UN to help him to suppress such pretension; at least, with verbal assurances such as have been given to Spain in respect of Catalonia.
The Catalans are having an exciting game; but they need to learn from history, quickly; before hotheads start getting hurt.
President Putin deeply deplores the fact that the Gorbachev administration in the last stage of the Soviet Union acted in accordance with the 'Stalin Constitution' which had enshrined the myth that the state was a federation of independent [largely ethnically-based] sovereign republics. This was very particularly Stalin's constitutional speciality. He had been sent to Vienna in the early years of the twentieth century to find out how the Habsburg regime was coping with the question of Nationality in Austria-Hungary. Slovaks and Czechs were asserting that they were distinct national groups, with a right to statehood of their own. Minorities of the population spoke Romanian, Polish, Ukrainian and various forms of German in distinctive territories split between the Kingdom of Hungary and the Austrian Empire [and the latter contained a massive range of entities from the Kingdom of Bohemia to small counties that were notionally sovereign]. The heir to the throne [Franz Ferdinand, who was to be killed in 1914 thus triggering the war that ended the monarchy] was said to want to change the 'dual monarchy' of Austria-Hungary into a 'trial' [or triple] monarchy with autonomy for the Slavs, in deference to his Czech wife.
Stalin produced a convoluted account of his thoughts on nationality, and after the revolution he was appointed Commissar for Nationalities. As the Soviet Union consolidated its absolute power over all the former Russian Empire, except Finland, it did not matter that a constitutional charade was enacted whereby the political entity was asserted to be a federation of notionally independent states. However, come the end of the Second World War, in their anxiety to keep Stalin on-side with the new United Nations, Britain, France and the USA agreed that three of the Soviet republics should each be independent members: Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. After Stalin's death, Khrushchev - a Ukrainian - almost casually transferred the Crimea from Russia to Ukraine: it did not seem to matter, at the time. The facts that the Crimea had been hard fought for under Peter the Great and Catherine II, and was seen as strategically important, did not cause any controversy while the USSR was operated as a single hegemonic state.
However, suddenly in 1990, the USSR collapsed; while the Communist party stooges who held office as the presidents and premiers of the various [formally fully sovereign] Socialist Republics simply colluded to ignore Gorbachev and his collapsing central authority and go their own ways. The largest component of the Union, Russia, had the charismatic Boris Yeltsin on hand to crush a half-cock attempt by party old hands to reverse all the democratic changes that Gorbachev had instituted: and as head of the Russian Republic's government Yeltsin established his hold over the biggest and most complex Soviet Socialist Republic; thus of Moscow. A notional federation was established of the former Soviet Republics, while the asserted sovereign authority in each of them began doling out the national assets to their families and friends. The Russian Republic itself became the Russian Federation including all the Autonomous Republics and Regions that Russia has inherited from Stalin's manipulations of notional boundaries. Yeltsin and his associates employed American Economists to assist them with a hugely corrupt and corrupting 'privatisation', which transferred much of industry to the hands of the so-called 'oligarchs' and caused massive deprivation to the mass of the population.
Putin's rise to power came after the damage derived from Stalin's constitutional machinations and Yeltsin's alcoholic incompetence had been done. In territorial terms, he has tried to rectify what he sees as two major failures: the transfer of the Crimea to Ukraine and the welfare of millions of Russians whose families were settled in the southern and eastern Ukraine, particularly in the reigns of Peter I, Catherine II and Stalin's post-1945 implant of Russian speakers into territory known as 'New Russia' that he had assigned to Ukraine. Stalin planted similar minorities of Russians in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; which has ensured that those countries have become very keen members of NATO in order to preserve their territorial integrity. Putin's attempts to make minor revisions of Stalin's and Khrushchev's cavalier actions, at the expense of Ukraine, have placed him under sanction by the western powers, who have set their faces against all tinkering with the pattern of states that was admitted to the United Nations in 1945 and subsequently. I have drawn attention previously to the idiocy of keeping the colonial frontiers in Africa: but they are also part of the stasis that goes with the present, deeply flawed concept of sovereignty.
East Germany was allowed to vanish into West Germany, and an independent Scotland arising from due democratic process would have gained international acceptance: provided it had been set on the international stage by the United Kingdom government acting as its sponsor.
On the other hand, if the Chechens declared themselves independent of the Russian Federation, President Putin could call on the UN to help him to suppress such pretension; at least, with verbal assurances such as have been given to Spain in respect of Catalonia.
The Catalans are having an exciting game; but they need to learn from history, quickly; before hotheads start getting hurt.
Labels:
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Catalonia,
Chechens,
Crimea,
European Union,
Gorbachev,
Nationality,
NATO,
Putin,
Russian Republic,
Second World War,
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Spain,
Stalin Constitution,
Ukraine,
United States,
Yeltsin
Saturday, 7 October 2017
Providential Penalties: A Salutary Case of Point Protectionism
This blog has often referred to point protectionism, my term for the myriad instances where governments override [or ignore] trade agreements - including those which are supposedly universal under the World Trade Organisation [WTO] - in order to give advantage to their native producers or to disadvantage alien producers who can outsell their native producers in some markets some of the time.
The recent cause celebre in this category is the action that the US government has taken against the Canadian aircraft firm Bombardier at the instance of Boeing, a US-Based competitor. Britain has a particular interest in this case as the wings of the aircraft under challenge are made in Northern Ireland. In the first instance, last week, the US slapped a 220% tariff on the import of the 'planes on the grounds that the Canadian and British governments had given grants to Bombardier. Yesterday the US took a second bite of the cherry, and added another 80% tariff. This 300% imposition is extremely high: in most cases where the US has accused another country of 'dumping' produce at lower prices than US firms can match, the levy has usually been below 100% of the sale price: as has happened in recent years with imports of basic classes of steel from China.
Britain and Canada have pointed out that Boeing is one of the most heavily state-supported companies in the world; which, of course, cuts no ice with the US Administration.
This is a crude and simple case where a competitor to the US market leader has introduced a product [to which no US firm currently provides a direct competitor] which is obviously highly desirable to US airlines. So the new product is to be priced-out of the American market.
This can happen in any sector of the economy, where a foreign firm attracts American customers to a new or redesigned product: and it probably will, as the world becomes ever more highly competitive. This is a timely and salutary lesson for the bonkers Brexiteers: those who say that Britain can thrive on its own in the world, under WTO Rules. Whenever it suits the USA, Australia, Brazil, Russia or any other country - however comprehensive a trade agreement Liam Fox can dream up with them - they can say "We have imposed this tariff! The WTO can whistle for their rules to apply; and the UK can put its trade deal where the monkey put the nuts." At such times - and there would be an infinite number of them - a solitary post-Brexit Britain would suffer immense disadvantage. To imagine otherwise requires a high degree of intoxication in a very small mind.
In the 2016 Referendum I voted for exit from the political absurdity of the European Union. I did not vote for this nation to die slowly, of starvation. We must stay within the European Economic Area, on the best terms that can be obtained. As Mrs May's moribund government fails to say what it wants to achieve, with any precision, the Torygraph today has a banner headline to the effect that the EU has opened up stronger channels of communication with Mr Corbyn and his associates. Mr Corbyn has learned a lot in the past year - more than I had previously thought possible - but whether he can absorb this particular lesson in Political Economy before he comes to power remains to be seen.
The recent cause celebre in this category is the action that the US government has taken against the Canadian aircraft firm Bombardier at the instance of Boeing, a US-Based competitor. Britain has a particular interest in this case as the wings of the aircraft under challenge are made in Northern Ireland. In the first instance, last week, the US slapped a 220% tariff on the import of the 'planes on the grounds that the Canadian and British governments had given grants to Bombardier. Yesterday the US took a second bite of the cherry, and added another 80% tariff. This 300% imposition is extremely high: in most cases where the US has accused another country of 'dumping' produce at lower prices than US firms can match, the levy has usually been below 100% of the sale price: as has happened in recent years with imports of basic classes of steel from China.
Britain and Canada have pointed out that Boeing is one of the most heavily state-supported companies in the world; which, of course, cuts no ice with the US Administration.
This is a crude and simple case where a competitor to the US market leader has introduced a product [to which no US firm currently provides a direct competitor] which is obviously highly desirable to US airlines. So the new product is to be priced-out of the American market.
This can happen in any sector of the economy, where a foreign firm attracts American customers to a new or redesigned product: and it probably will, as the world becomes ever more highly competitive. This is a timely and salutary lesson for the bonkers Brexiteers: those who say that Britain can thrive on its own in the world, under WTO Rules. Whenever it suits the USA, Australia, Brazil, Russia or any other country - however comprehensive a trade agreement Liam Fox can dream up with them - they can say "We have imposed this tariff! The WTO can whistle for their rules to apply; and the UK can put its trade deal where the monkey put the nuts." At such times - and there would be an infinite number of them - a solitary post-Brexit Britain would suffer immense disadvantage. To imagine otherwise requires a high degree of intoxication in a very small mind.
In the 2016 Referendum I voted for exit from the political absurdity of the European Union. I did not vote for this nation to die slowly, of starvation. We must stay within the European Economic Area, on the best terms that can be obtained. As Mrs May's moribund government fails to say what it wants to achieve, with any precision, the Torygraph today has a banner headline to the effect that the EU has opened up stronger channels of communication with Mr Corbyn and his associates. Mr Corbyn has learned a lot in the past year - more than I had previously thought possible - but whether he can absorb this particular lesson in Political Economy before he comes to power remains to be seen.
Thursday, 5 October 2017
What Brexit? What Price?
The future of Mrs May as the Prime Minister is being much discussed this morning, while her distress in delivering her conference speech yesterday was so awfully exposed on television and excessively discussed on all the media almost as soon as the coughing began. She was 'escorted' from the platform by her husband, and one could pause to ask how she would have been able to walk without his immense support. The scene was one of extreme [and most unfortunate] personal stress, exacerbated by the security failure that allowed the 'prankster' - as the media all-too-quickly dubbed him - to hand her a sheet of paper. Boris Johnson could have secured his future as leader by grabbing the man by the collar and frogmarching him towards the exit, but in the stress of the moment he merely [weakly] tried to wave him away.
The whole episode was sad.
But it was also shameful.
If Mrs May and Mr Hammond have agreed to spend £2 billion on more social housing [of what kinds, where, when?] they must have an idea how much they are going to offer to the European Union in the next round of Brexit talks. Mrs May should have told us. Just as she should have made her 'Florence speech' in the House of Commons last spring, she should have regarded her speech yesterday as the very final chance to share her thinking with the electorate on the uppermost issue of the day. The reaction of the EU Commission, Council and Parliament to the imprecision of the Florence proposition should, surely, have impressed even on Johnson and David Davis [though perhaps not yet on Liam Fox] the understanding that waffle never had its day, and is now deeply irritant to the rest of the European Union.
It is legitimate to say that resolving the question of the Irish border is inseparable from the resolution of the question what sort of economic border it is going to be; which can only be decided when the question of Britain's membership of the European Economic Area is determined. But the Irish question would be much easier to set aside until a later stage in negotiations if the British government would clearly articulate its hopes in that area.
On the other two questions that the EU insist must be close to resolution before the wider issue of trade is discussed, the answers must be simple. Davis has implied his acceptance of the two-year transitional period, Johnson has specifically agreed to his version of that, and Philip Hammond has advocated it consistently and strongly.
For two years after March, 2019, the existing rights of EU citizens in the UK will remain as they are, with the European Court as the ultimate arbiter. After March 2021 a new relationship must be agreed; and here Mrs May - as a 'failed' Home Secretary - apparently has a serious hang-up. The UK has been willing to make laws which allow US courts to require the extradition of British citizens to the United States to stand trial for alleged offences committed while the Brit [usually, but not always, a geeky young male who has developed perverse software or algorithms] was safely located back home; usually in the back bedroom. This has always seemed to me to be an amazing concession, which puts the British courts in the role of part of the supply chain to the US Justice System. Surely, something similar can be devised for EU citizens in the UK, and for UK citizens in the EU, after we leave the political union?
This then leaves the most basic issue. Does Brexit automatically mean that the UK MUST leave the single market, and must leave the customs union, and must leave all the agreements on drugs, nuclear control, civil aviation,. research co-operation and a long catalogue of other working agreements whose abrogation would desperately hurt the UK [and which would take decades to replace, once abandoned]? These issues were not specified in the referendum question, which referred solely and specifically to membership of 'the European Union'. The extreme Brexiteers who have taken up the negative position are relatively few in number; and for that very reason, as empty vessels, they are making most noise. They will be opposed massively in the House of Lords; but the Commons is the forum in which the debate will be focused in the end. And here one man can ruin the country on his own: Jeremy Corbyn has been viscerally against the 'club of capitalist states' for decades; and although his party has adopted a sensible stance, he could undermine it on the basis of his antediluvian Marxism. He must be corralled.
Meanwhile, Mrs May's total failure of leadership is now apparent to all. Let the agony end, soon.
The whole episode was sad.
But it was also shameful.
If Mrs May and Mr Hammond have agreed to spend £2 billion on more social housing [of what kinds, where, when?] they must have an idea how much they are going to offer to the European Union in the next round of Brexit talks. Mrs May should have told us. Just as she should have made her 'Florence speech' in the House of Commons last spring, she should have regarded her speech yesterday as the very final chance to share her thinking with the electorate on the uppermost issue of the day. The reaction of the EU Commission, Council and Parliament to the imprecision of the Florence proposition should, surely, have impressed even on Johnson and David Davis [though perhaps not yet on Liam Fox] the understanding that waffle never had its day, and is now deeply irritant to the rest of the European Union.
It is legitimate to say that resolving the question of the Irish border is inseparable from the resolution of the question what sort of economic border it is going to be; which can only be decided when the question of Britain's membership of the European Economic Area is determined. But the Irish question would be much easier to set aside until a later stage in negotiations if the British government would clearly articulate its hopes in that area.
On the other two questions that the EU insist must be close to resolution before the wider issue of trade is discussed, the answers must be simple. Davis has implied his acceptance of the two-year transitional period, Johnson has specifically agreed to his version of that, and Philip Hammond has advocated it consistently and strongly.
For two years after March, 2019, the existing rights of EU citizens in the UK will remain as they are, with the European Court as the ultimate arbiter. After March 2021 a new relationship must be agreed; and here Mrs May - as a 'failed' Home Secretary - apparently has a serious hang-up. The UK has been willing to make laws which allow US courts to require the extradition of British citizens to the United States to stand trial for alleged offences committed while the Brit [usually, but not always, a geeky young male who has developed perverse software or algorithms] was safely located back home; usually in the back bedroom. This has always seemed to me to be an amazing concession, which puts the British courts in the role of part of the supply chain to the US Justice System. Surely, something similar can be devised for EU citizens in the UK, and for UK citizens in the EU, after we leave the political union?
This then leaves the most basic issue. Does Brexit automatically mean that the UK MUST leave the single market, and must leave the customs union, and must leave all the agreements on drugs, nuclear control, civil aviation,. research co-operation and a long catalogue of other working agreements whose abrogation would desperately hurt the UK [and which would take decades to replace, once abandoned]? These issues were not specified in the referendum question, which referred solely and specifically to membership of 'the European Union'. The extreme Brexiteers who have taken up the negative position are relatively few in number; and for that very reason, as empty vessels, they are making most noise. They will be opposed massively in the House of Lords; but the Commons is the forum in which the debate will be focused in the end. And here one man can ruin the country on his own: Jeremy Corbyn has been viscerally against the 'club of capitalist states' for decades; and although his party has adopted a sensible stance, he could undermine it on the basis of his antediluvian Marxism. He must be corralled.
Meanwhile, Mrs May's total failure of leadership is now apparent to all. Let the agony end, soon.
Wednesday, 30 August 2017
Mrs May in Japan
I find it increasingly difficult to believe that Mrs May has any significant common sense at all. She demonstrates daily that she has no dress sense; and in the selection of her kitchen cabinet when she went into Number Ten she created a machine that came close to destroying her credibility with her party and her relations with her most necessary ministerial colleagues.
The Chairman of the EU Commission was quite right yesterday to assert that the position papers that have been cobbled together for the UK government lack both conceptual clarity and essential data. It appears that the Prime Minister - who was an indecisive 'Remainer' in the 2016 EU Referendum - has been bullied into quiescence by the noisy minority in her party who choose to believe that the narrow result of the Referendum must be interpreted to mean that the UK must leave the political Union and also the European Economic Area.
And now she has gone to Japan, where she will encounter almost-infinite courtesy but where it is most unlikely that anyone will speak directly to her of their country's attitude to the risks that are inherent for them in the present utterly unclear Brexit situation. Thousands of Japanese firms in both manufacturing and the financial services have established facilities and bases in Britain. One major factor in this is that London is [obviously] an English-speaking city so this suits the Japanese, most of whom are not great linguists but have been schooled in English for at least a decade of their lives. But a bigger factor than the use of English is that the UK is fully in the European Common Market and the customs union.
The "hard Brexiteer" position on the future relations of the UK with the EU will seem to the Japanese - who located their assets in Britain-in-Europe in good faith - to be a complete betrayal of the understanding on which they have invested so heavily in the United Kingdom. The Japanese are still keen on concepts of honour, and if Mrs May and her team dishonourably shuffle their papers and equivocate on the key question of whether Britain will remain in the European Economic Area after any 'transition period', Japanese finance will be withheld: and if Britain is sufficiently idiotic as to opt openly for a 'hard Brexit' Japanese firms will be among the first to move assets out of Britain. There is no equivocation about this, and however much Mrs May might try to con herself by accepting Japanese courtesy as acceptance of any stance that she might take up, the fact remains that Japan will be strictly self-interested. Grandiloquent talk about "island peoples furthering their common interests in a wide trading world" will just be talk.
Britain outside the European Economic Area is only of minimal interest to Japan, as a minor market for some exports. The main Japanese concern about Britain, in the event of a 'hard Brexit', will be to get their assets out of the UK with the least possible loss of money and of 'face'.
Prime Minister Abe is an unusual Japanese: he is more capable of directly expressing his individual thoughts than are many of his compatriots: and he seems to be more willing than most to do it. There is just a small hope that he will be able to educate Mrs May [who is, indubitably, difficult to educate], but I am not optimistic.
Now that the Labour Party has approached a sensible position on Brexit, the Tory majority of 'moderates' are realising that they have very limited time to talk their leader into common sense. I doubt that she is capable of undergoing that learning process: if so, the sooner she is removed from office, the better.
The Chairman of the EU Commission was quite right yesterday to assert that the position papers that have been cobbled together for the UK government lack both conceptual clarity and essential data. It appears that the Prime Minister - who was an indecisive 'Remainer' in the 2016 EU Referendum - has been bullied into quiescence by the noisy minority in her party who choose to believe that the narrow result of the Referendum must be interpreted to mean that the UK must leave the political Union and also the European Economic Area.
And now she has gone to Japan, where she will encounter almost-infinite courtesy but where it is most unlikely that anyone will speak directly to her of their country's attitude to the risks that are inherent for them in the present utterly unclear Brexit situation. Thousands of Japanese firms in both manufacturing and the financial services have established facilities and bases in Britain. One major factor in this is that London is [obviously] an English-speaking city so this suits the Japanese, most of whom are not great linguists but have been schooled in English for at least a decade of their lives. But a bigger factor than the use of English is that the UK is fully in the European Common Market and the customs union.
The "hard Brexiteer" position on the future relations of the UK with the EU will seem to the Japanese - who located their assets in Britain-in-Europe in good faith - to be a complete betrayal of the understanding on which they have invested so heavily in the United Kingdom. The Japanese are still keen on concepts of honour, and if Mrs May and her team dishonourably shuffle their papers and equivocate on the key question of whether Britain will remain in the European Economic Area after any 'transition period', Japanese finance will be withheld: and if Britain is sufficiently idiotic as to opt openly for a 'hard Brexit' Japanese firms will be among the first to move assets out of Britain. There is no equivocation about this, and however much Mrs May might try to con herself by accepting Japanese courtesy as acceptance of any stance that she might take up, the fact remains that Japan will be strictly self-interested. Grandiloquent talk about "island peoples furthering their common interests in a wide trading world" will just be talk.
Britain outside the European Economic Area is only of minimal interest to Japan, as a minor market for some exports. The main Japanese concern about Britain, in the event of a 'hard Brexit', will be to get their assets out of the UK with the least possible loss of money and of 'face'.
Prime Minister Abe is an unusual Japanese: he is more capable of directly expressing his individual thoughts than are many of his compatriots: and he seems to be more willing than most to do it. There is just a small hope that he will be able to educate Mrs May [who is, indubitably, difficult to educate], but I am not optimistic.
Now that the Labour Party has approached a sensible position on Brexit, the Tory majority of 'moderates' are realising that they have very limited time to talk their leader into common sense. I doubt that she is capable of undergoing that learning process: if so, the sooner she is removed from office, the better.
Sunday, 27 August 2017
Labour, Brexit and an Alt-Econocrat
There is no more pressing issue in British politics than that of the future relationship of the UK to the European Union, and therefore no apology is required on returning to the subject.
The Labour Party has taken a huge step towards rationality on that matter over this Bank Holiday weekend by making a new and very different statement on its policy. Under the new Shadow Secretary of State for exit, Sir Keir Starmer, they now accept that it would be essential for there to be significant transition period during which the UK would continue to enjoy the comfort of being within the European Economic Area [though out of the political Union, in deference to the referendum resut]. This would be at the expense of keeping the country under the jurisdiction of the European Court, and obliged to accept the free movement of people with the EU. Starmer can claim to be far more traditionally Labour than the public schoolboy Jeremy Corbyn, because his working parents named him in honour of Keir Hardie: an early Labour leader. If discussions during the transition can include the resolution of the two difficult issues of free movement and the extent of the powers of the European Court, Labour holds out the prospect that the 'transitional' could become the permanent basis for the relationship of Britain to the EU: while the country would be able to make additional pacts on trade with other countries provided the conditions for retaining membership of the European Economic Area are maintained.
This presents a package on which Labour can make a strong bid for the 'middle ground' of politics, and knocks any idea of the LibDems forming the core of a strong new 'Centre Party' right out of the picture. Corbyn's caricature student-leftery can virtually be ignored if the party continues to promote rational 'moderates' [with good political credentials] to shadow posts. Pro-EU Tory MPs - who formed the vast majority at the time of the referendum, and who have been largely ignored since Mrs May's 'conversion' to hard Brexitry - should be really scared, to the extent that they should now make clear their reservations about the tone of Cabinet policy, in view of the fact that Labor has displayed a capacity for rationality.
Also in recent days, Professor Patrick Minford has obtained publicity for his view that a 'hard Brexit' would be beneficial for the United Kingdom. According to his ultra-Econocratic model of the economy, Britain would gain massively by being completely outside the European Union [including all aspects of the European Economic Area], with a GDP at least 6.5% higher than is being achieved within the union. This rests on the assumption that the country could trade on a completely level playing field with all economic entities in the world; according to his model of a market economy whose participants operate on the basis of 'rational expectations' of each others' actions conforming to the psychological assumptions that are implicit in the model. Professor Minford achieved prominence when he supported extreme Thatcherism against the majority of the then-still-NeoKeynesian 'economics profession' in 1981. For a while he had the Prime Minster's favour, though he was eventually palmed-off with a CBE.
The fruits of Thatcherism are here for him to see, and to input into his model [which is now even more comprehensively Econocratic]: desperately low productivity, nil productiveness, a massive deficit on public spending, a constant deficit on the balance of payments, over-dependence of the economy on the service sector and on consumers spending borrowed money. To that catalogue of the achievements that are ascribable to the policies that he recommended to the Thatcher government, we can be sure that after a hard Brexit the UK would find that there was no permanently level patch on the playing field of global trade. Point protectionism [as mentioned several times in this blog], combined with long-term protectionism of favoured sectors in virtually every economy on the planet will ensure that a naked Britain, alone in the wicked world - which still remembers the slights from the British Empire of the past - would be nothing like the heroic entity in the professor's model, and the irrational prejudice which is more common in global statecraft than anything like Minford's 'rationality' would ensure that the model could not work. The limit to the Econocrats' world view is seen in the fact that real people have not vanished from the villages that surrounded the closed coal mines: they stay as second and third generation malcontents whose habits undermine their health, while they survive on a combination of low wages from non-productive jobs, state benefits and borrowing.
Keit Starmer is well on the way to producing a rational and humane model of Brexit for the Labour Party. Patrick Minford is trying to power the nutty Tory Brexiteers along a path that would enable
them massively to intensify the range and extent of the problems that already confront the real-world population of this benighted country.
The Labour Party has taken a huge step towards rationality on that matter over this Bank Holiday weekend by making a new and very different statement on its policy. Under the new Shadow Secretary of State for exit, Sir Keir Starmer, they now accept that it would be essential for there to be significant transition period during which the UK would continue to enjoy the comfort of being within the European Economic Area [though out of the political Union, in deference to the referendum resut]. This would be at the expense of keeping the country under the jurisdiction of the European Court, and obliged to accept the free movement of people with the EU. Starmer can claim to be far more traditionally Labour than the public schoolboy Jeremy Corbyn, because his working parents named him in honour of Keir Hardie: an early Labour leader. If discussions during the transition can include the resolution of the two difficult issues of free movement and the extent of the powers of the European Court, Labour holds out the prospect that the 'transitional' could become the permanent basis for the relationship of Britain to the EU: while the country would be able to make additional pacts on trade with other countries provided the conditions for retaining membership of the European Economic Area are maintained.
This presents a package on which Labour can make a strong bid for the 'middle ground' of politics, and knocks any idea of the LibDems forming the core of a strong new 'Centre Party' right out of the picture. Corbyn's caricature student-leftery can virtually be ignored if the party continues to promote rational 'moderates' [with good political credentials] to shadow posts. Pro-EU Tory MPs - who formed the vast majority at the time of the referendum, and who have been largely ignored since Mrs May's 'conversion' to hard Brexitry - should be really scared, to the extent that they should now make clear their reservations about the tone of Cabinet policy, in view of the fact that Labor has displayed a capacity for rationality.
Also in recent days, Professor Patrick Minford has obtained publicity for his view that a 'hard Brexit' would be beneficial for the United Kingdom. According to his ultra-Econocratic model of the economy, Britain would gain massively by being completely outside the European Union [including all aspects of the European Economic Area], with a GDP at least 6.5% higher than is being achieved within the union. This rests on the assumption that the country could trade on a completely level playing field with all economic entities in the world; according to his model of a market economy whose participants operate on the basis of 'rational expectations' of each others' actions conforming to the psychological assumptions that are implicit in the model. Professor Minford achieved prominence when he supported extreme Thatcherism against the majority of the then-still-NeoKeynesian 'economics profession' in 1981. For a while he had the Prime Minster's favour, though he was eventually palmed-off with a CBE.
The fruits of Thatcherism are here for him to see, and to input into his model [which is now even more comprehensively Econocratic]: desperately low productivity, nil productiveness, a massive deficit on public spending, a constant deficit on the balance of payments, over-dependence of the economy on the service sector and on consumers spending borrowed money. To that catalogue of the achievements that are ascribable to the policies that he recommended to the Thatcher government, we can be sure that after a hard Brexit the UK would find that there was no permanently level patch on the playing field of global trade. Point protectionism [as mentioned several times in this blog], combined with long-term protectionism of favoured sectors in virtually every economy on the planet will ensure that a naked Britain, alone in the wicked world - which still remembers the slights from the British Empire of the past - would be nothing like the heroic entity in the professor's model, and the irrational prejudice which is more common in global statecraft than anything like Minford's 'rationality' would ensure that the model could not work. The limit to the Econocrats' world view is seen in the fact that real people have not vanished from the villages that surrounded the closed coal mines: they stay as second and third generation malcontents whose habits undermine their health, while they survive on a combination of low wages from non-productive jobs, state benefits and borrowing.
Keit Starmer is well on the way to producing a rational and humane model of Brexit for the Labour Party. Patrick Minford is trying to power the nutty Tory Brexiteers along a path that would enable
them massively to intensify the range and extent of the problems that already confront the real-world population of this benighted country.
Tuesday, 22 August 2017
Afghanistan: Trump Digs Deeper
Donald Trump has a genius for digging holes to sink into. Amid the several areas of confusion that he has created in US politics, he has now announced the opposite of one of his most consistent campaign promises. His new minders have persuaded him that the risks in abandoning the disastrous Afghan campaign are so much greater than any potential benefits of quitting that the US must stay. And if they are to stay, they have to reinforce their resources there. Then they have to cajole their allies into helping them. Mrs May has already committed more forces, though less than 100 troops: for now. As has been noted here several times, Afghanistan has never been 'pacified' by alien forces. Alexander the Great, the great Moguls, the British Empire, and the Tsars all failed; before Brezhnev brought the USSR to bankruptcy by his attempt to subdue the country.
Ever since the US sent forces into Afghanistan in pursuit of Osama Bin Laden under the Command-in-Chief of George W Bush, many strategists have argued that the 'real' seat of terror is probably in Pakistan: which is where Bin Laden was finally tracked down. The people who were sheltering Bin laden temporarily were the Taliban, so removing them from power became objective number one. Once that was achieved, at least to the extent of having avowedly non-Taliban ministers installed in Kabul, it became clear that Afghanistan would be dangerously unstable - from the American perspective - if alien forces left. So the US and its little herd of followers stayed, and continued to loose lives and use up resources.
In the terms of western democracies, Afghanistan will never be stabilised. Trump, at least, has recognised this to the extent that he has renounced any pretension at building a democratic state: yesterday he simply said that his troops will 'kill terrorists'. How to identify an enemy or a 'terrorist' among the tribesmen of the Himalayas has never been answered explicitly. If someone if carrying a gun, it may be to protect his sheep from wolves. In such a social context, when someone is actually attacking western forces they can be regarded as legitimate targets; but not otherwise. The conflict cannot be won; but it will send a new flood of young men on the trail to Europe, hoping to join Merkel's million: some of whom will have nefarious intentions. And so the migrant problem for Europe, and explicitly for the European Union, becomes more intense.
In this one sense, Brexit might seem to provide a desirable context for the UK to strengthen its borders further. But then we came up against the problem of paying for proper border controls. To establish, man and maintain adequate borders for the UK would require a vast investment, followed up by hundreds of millions of pounds of recurrent expenditure. If that border is both a customs border and a border against the passage of people and financial assets, as Mrs May seems to desire, the cost is multiplied. Either austerity will have to be abandoned, or state expenditure in all areas but border controls will have to be cut back so far as to create intolerable strains throughout society.
So Trump's abandonment of yet another campaign commitment leads directly to a double dilemma for Britain. First comes the question, how can we meaningfully join 'the leader of the free world' in his madcap Afghan plan: if, as indicated by the government, we will submit so to do; within the present limits of defence spending? Second, how do we pay for meaningful border controls here in the UK?
Thus we come to the most consistent and fundamental issue with which this blog has always been concerned: how can we create the national income that will enable Britain to afford a better living standard for all and maintain the position of the UK in world affairs and in the world economy? The answer begins with the repudiation of the Economics that enforces austerity on the regime: we need a Political Economy that reinforces the concept of productivity by recovering from limbo the need for productiveness. I will return to this topic in the coming days: meanwhile, when you have time, do a word search in the past issues of this blog to see what productiveness means and implies.
Ever since the US sent forces into Afghanistan in pursuit of Osama Bin Laden under the Command-in-Chief of George W Bush, many strategists have argued that the 'real' seat of terror is probably in Pakistan: which is where Bin Laden was finally tracked down. The people who were sheltering Bin laden temporarily were the Taliban, so removing them from power became objective number one. Once that was achieved, at least to the extent of having avowedly non-Taliban ministers installed in Kabul, it became clear that Afghanistan would be dangerously unstable - from the American perspective - if alien forces left. So the US and its little herd of followers stayed, and continued to loose lives and use up resources.
In the terms of western democracies, Afghanistan will never be stabilised. Trump, at least, has recognised this to the extent that he has renounced any pretension at building a democratic state: yesterday he simply said that his troops will 'kill terrorists'. How to identify an enemy or a 'terrorist' among the tribesmen of the Himalayas has never been answered explicitly. If someone if carrying a gun, it may be to protect his sheep from wolves. In such a social context, when someone is actually attacking western forces they can be regarded as legitimate targets; but not otherwise. The conflict cannot be won; but it will send a new flood of young men on the trail to Europe, hoping to join Merkel's million: some of whom will have nefarious intentions. And so the migrant problem for Europe, and explicitly for the European Union, becomes more intense.
In this one sense, Brexit might seem to provide a desirable context for the UK to strengthen its borders further. But then we came up against the problem of paying for proper border controls. To establish, man and maintain adequate borders for the UK would require a vast investment, followed up by hundreds of millions of pounds of recurrent expenditure. If that border is both a customs border and a border against the passage of people and financial assets, as Mrs May seems to desire, the cost is multiplied. Either austerity will have to be abandoned, or state expenditure in all areas but border controls will have to be cut back so far as to create intolerable strains throughout society.
So Trump's abandonment of yet another campaign commitment leads directly to a double dilemma for Britain. First comes the question, how can we meaningfully join 'the leader of the free world' in his madcap Afghan plan: if, as indicated by the government, we will submit so to do; within the present limits of defence spending? Second, how do we pay for meaningful border controls here in the UK?
Thus we come to the most consistent and fundamental issue with which this blog has always been concerned: how can we create the national income that will enable Britain to afford a better living standard for all and maintain the position of the UK in world affairs and in the world economy? The answer begins with the repudiation of the Economics that enforces austerity on the regime: we need a Political Economy that reinforces the concept of productivity by recovering from limbo the need for productiveness. I will return to this topic in the coming days: meanwhile, when you have time, do a word search in the past issues of this blog to see what productiveness means and implies.
Monday, 14 August 2017
Brexit: Trouvez la Femme
So now we know, for sure; definitely.
As on the previous Sunday, when I went to get a copy of the Mail to check on the context of remarks by Vince Cable, so yesterday I bought the Telegraph so that I could read exactly the piece attributed to Philip Hammond and Liam Fix. It was cited on the radio as representing the formation of a joint strategy for Brexit, and thus the conclusion of a cabinet spat that has been reported over this year's 'silly season' by much of the media.
It was a short piece, attributed to the two men [and doubtless accepted by them] but indubitably crafted in 10, Downing Street, and polished by party professionals. It represented what had generally been understood to be Mrs May's position ever since she made her sublimely idiotic remark that "Brexit means Brexit". Since it was coined, derived from 'Grexit' which meant the threatened departure of Greece from the eurozone, the term Brexit has simply meant "the departure of the United Kingdom from the European Union, in response to the referendum decision of 23 June 2016". Mrs May was asked how she interpreted the terms: did it mean withdrawal from the European Common Market and the Customs Union? Did it simply require departure from the political institutions only? What mix-and-match of possible options did she favour?
None of this has been clear: either in her much-cited 'Lancaster House Speech' early this year or in her disastrous election campaign. Nor has it been any clearer whether she favours a 'hard Brexit' [undefined] or some 'softer' version. Two things that do appear to be consistent in her few and often oblique remarks on the matter are:
1. Her proclaimed determination to reduce net immigration: the great 'failure' of her six year tenure of the Home Office which she apparently thinks she can achieve from Number Ten. If she does achieve it, she will alienate industry and commerce, the universities, and the immigrant communities from the Commonwealth who had seen a reduction in EU immigration to the UK as a chance for them to bring more friends and family members into the country.
2. Her equally definite declarations that there is no place in the UK post-Brexit for the European Court are equally likely to make for an extremely difficult negotiation with M Barnier on trade matters that should be straightforward.
Lewis Carroll, in one of the most brilliant satires on society, has a character declare that they can think of six impossible things before breakfast. Mrs May, without saying anything on those lines, has made it abundantly clear that she has one impossible thing on her mind all the time: the removal of the British economy from its European Economic Community context without significant damage to Gross National Product or to the standard of living of the mass of the nation.
It now appears that Fox and Hammond have accepted that they must both support this point of view, at least publicly and for time being. This is a consensus that cannot last. The crisis in British politics will continue: well done, David Cameron, Nick Clegg and Odious Osborne!
As on the previous Sunday, when I went to get a copy of the Mail to check on the context of remarks by Vince Cable, so yesterday I bought the Telegraph so that I could read exactly the piece attributed to Philip Hammond and Liam Fix. It was cited on the radio as representing the formation of a joint strategy for Brexit, and thus the conclusion of a cabinet spat that has been reported over this year's 'silly season' by much of the media.
It was a short piece, attributed to the two men [and doubtless accepted by them] but indubitably crafted in 10, Downing Street, and polished by party professionals. It represented what had generally been understood to be Mrs May's position ever since she made her sublimely idiotic remark that "Brexit means Brexit". Since it was coined, derived from 'Grexit' which meant the threatened departure of Greece from the eurozone, the term Brexit has simply meant "the departure of the United Kingdom from the European Union, in response to the referendum decision of 23 June 2016". Mrs May was asked how she interpreted the terms: did it mean withdrawal from the European Common Market and the Customs Union? Did it simply require departure from the political institutions only? What mix-and-match of possible options did she favour?
None of this has been clear: either in her much-cited 'Lancaster House Speech' early this year or in her disastrous election campaign. Nor has it been any clearer whether she favours a 'hard Brexit' [undefined] or some 'softer' version. Two things that do appear to be consistent in her few and often oblique remarks on the matter are:
1. Her proclaimed determination to reduce net immigration: the great 'failure' of her six year tenure of the Home Office which she apparently thinks she can achieve from Number Ten. If she does achieve it, she will alienate industry and commerce, the universities, and the immigrant communities from the Commonwealth who had seen a reduction in EU immigration to the UK as a chance for them to bring more friends and family members into the country.
2. Her equally definite declarations that there is no place in the UK post-Brexit for the European Court are equally likely to make for an extremely difficult negotiation with M Barnier on trade matters that should be straightforward.
Lewis Carroll, in one of the most brilliant satires on society, has a character declare that they can think of six impossible things before breakfast. Mrs May, without saying anything on those lines, has made it abundantly clear that she has one impossible thing on her mind all the time: the removal of the British economy from its European Economic Community context without significant damage to Gross National Product or to the standard of living of the mass of the nation.
It now appears that Fox and Hammond have accepted that they must both support this point of view, at least publicly and for time being. This is a consensus that cannot last. The crisis in British politics will continue: well done, David Cameron, Nick Clegg and Odious Osborne!
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Saturday, 12 August 2017
Not Another Party, Please!
When it looked as if Jeremy Corbyn was leading Labour to the expected [and deserved] electoral catastrophe a couple of months ago, siren voices were calling for a split in the party; which could lead to the 'moderates' joining up with the LibDems and hoping to attract some Tory Remainer MPs; and thus forming a coalition that could reverse the Brexit decision. The depth of politicians' squalor was again confirmed when Mrs May lost the election and Labour was beefed-up as being a potential governing party. So, although Labour MPs are viscerally split between those who are keen to compromise with Corbyn and those who know him for what he is [an unreconstructed Marxist who has a wide range of casuistic devices], the party has been held together by the fragile cement of ambition.
Subsequently, other voices have been raised - now, within the Tory ranks - hoping to cobble together an anti-Brexit coalition. As with the SDP, it would be impossible for such a party to gain traction with the electorate; even if they had a period of years available to make the attempt. As it is, the Brussels clock is ticking down to March 2019; and the chances of getting Mrs May to understand anything of the ruin to which she is driving the nation are minimal. There is not time enough to reconfigure British politics, or to educate the prime minister.
The great majority of MPs, mostly with regret, accept that the referendum vote was decisive. The question was whether the UK should "leave the European Union" or "remain in the European Union". There was no definition of the European Union. It was left unstated whether the European Economic Area, or the European Economic Community [the common market and customs union] - as Mrs May now says is inextricably the case - were included in the vote. This is the basis on which honest men and women who accept the referendum result can legitimately believe that the vote was to withdraw from the political aspects of the EU - the Parliament, the Commission and the Court - but not to undermine the economy by withdrawal from the economic area.
From everything that I have heard and read in recent weeks, there could well now be a strong majority of the electorate in favour of splitting the economic from the political aspects of the Union. The Economic Community pre-existed the Union, and membership of that club was clearly accepted in the referendum on withdrawal that was held under Harold Wilson's premiership. The electorate was not allowed an opinion on the transmutation of the Community into the undemocratic morass of Brussels under the nomenclature of the Union [and with the intention that the Union should become 'ever-closer': which means 'ever less accountable to the people']. I believe that a national petition - a reflection of the People's Charter of the 1840s - might be the most effective way of proving to the boneheaded Brexiteers that a very clear majority of the nation is capable of making the distinction between the Community and the Union.
If that could be proven, I like to think that majority of MPs have sufficient dregs of integrity then to act as representatives of the nation, and compel the government [whether the present shoddy shower, or a coalition containing the heavily-compromised Corbyn] to make a sensible and mutually beneficial deal to remain in the Community.
The issues of the European Court and of migration would remain to be resolved; but they will be much easier to define within the context outlined above. Time is short, but there is enough time to implement this suggestion of a People's Charter, deploying the resources of up-to-date social media.
Subsequently, other voices have been raised - now, within the Tory ranks - hoping to cobble together an anti-Brexit coalition. As with the SDP, it would be impossible for such a party to gain traction with the electorate; even if they had a period of years available to make the attempt. As it is, the Brussels clock is ticking down to March 2019; and the chances of getting Mrs May to understand anything of the ruin to which she is driving the nation are minimal. There is not time enough to reconfigure British politics, or to educate the prime minister.
The great majority of MPs, mostly with regret, accept that the referendum vote was decisive. The question was whether the UK should "leave the European Union" or "remain in the European Union". There was no definition of the European Union. It was left unstated whether the European Economic Area, or the European Economic Community [the common market and customs union] - as Mrs May now says is inextricably the case - were included in the vote. This is the basis on which honest men and women who accept the referendum result can legitimately believe that the vote was to withdraw from the political aspects of the EU - the Parliament, the Commission and the Court - but not to undermine the economy by withdrawal from the economic area.
From everything that I have heard and read in recent weeks, there could well now be a strong majority of the electorate in favour of splitting the economic from the political aspects of the Union. The Economic Community pre-existed the Union, and membership of that club was clearly accepted in the referendum on withdrawal that was held under Harold Wilson's premiership. The electorate was not allowed an opinion on the transmutation of the Community into the undemocratic morass of Brussels under the nomenclature of the Union [and with the intention that the Union should become 'ever-closer': which means 'ever less accountable to the people']. I believe that a national petition - a reflection of the People's Charter of the 1840s - might be the most effective way of proving to the boneheaded Brexiteers that a very clear majority of the nation is capable of making the distinction between the Community and the Union.
If that could be proven, I like to think that majority of MPs have sufficient dregs of integrity then to act as representatives of the nation, and compel the government [whether the present shoddy shower, or a coalition containing the heavily-compromised Corbyn] to make a sensible and mutually beneficial deal to remain in the Community.
The issues of the European Court and of migration would remain to be resolved; but they will be much easier to define within the context outlined above. Time is short, but there is enough time to implement this suggestion of a People's Charter, deploying the resources of up-to-date social media.
Monday, 31 July 2017
Odd Ministers at Odds
Dr Liam Fox is a non-practicing physician, which means that he might have some advantage over a person with a doctorate in Economics when it comes to diagnosing the mind of the British population. But for him to suggest that it would be some sort of breach of faith for the government to seek a 'soft Brexit', or a period of transition from membership of the common market to some other status, because a small majority of the voters in the 2006 Referendum voted to "leave the European Union", would be too far to stretch credibility.
I voted to leave, partly because I thought that we 'leavers' would loose but that a strong marker could be put down against the continentals' nonsense of developing an "ever closer union" with its own military capability. When my side won, I hailed the narrow victory as a licence to negotiate a rational settlement with the remaining states of the European Union that would get the United Kingdom out of the morass of the Brussels and Strasbourg institutions but keep this country in the close European free-trade pact that pre-existed the Union. That Dr Fox is now putting up his version of what the vote means is in some ways helpful; because it shows that the Tory 'hard Brexiteers' are truly dangerous for this country.
The rhetoric around the time of the last general election, that both Labour and Conservative parties accepted the majority decision in favour of [undefined] Brexit, masked the underlying fact that most Members of Parliament from both parties who were to be returned in the election had voted to remain in whole shebang of the Union in the referendum. It would now appear that most Members of the Commons do not know how to interpret the referendum result, while an overwhelming majority of the Lords are opposed to the whole concept of Brexit but recognise that they cannot blatantly overturn the decision of the electorate.
The present constitutional position appears to be that referendum result stands as an historic fact, but the sovereignty of parliament was not abandoned by that result. Thus any resultant agreement with the European Union - as with the USA, or Australia, of Belarus - will be made with the assent of the Queen, the Lords and the Commons.
The present political fact appears to be that a small group of headbanging Brexiteers have been given licence by Mrs May to discuss half-baked promises of potential free-trade agreements with various governments that all have the common purpose of clinging on to power by not upsetting too large a proportion of their electorate. These tentative discussions about trade treaties appear to be understood to mean that the hardliners can simply effect a British exit from the European Union with no comprehensive draft treaty with the EU in place. This is infantile absurdity. If such a cliff-edge Brexit were to be undertaken, in a world characterised by point protectionism [as defined in this blog: do a word-check], it would be a recipe for economic devastation in this country.
Mrs May seems to have been flattened by references to her past 'failure', as Home Secretary, to reduce net immigration to a few tens of thousands of people annually. She seems to be caught in the headlights of a juggernaut that is bearing down on her, terrified lest she would be seen to oppose those few party colleagues who assure the electorate that they can keep out mass migration without detriment to the health service or the wider economy. The spectacularly dull Chancellor of the Exchequer is bringing some sense to the discussion, and thus earning the odium of those parts of the press that enjoy the power to press for reckless policies simply because they cannot be held responsible for any outcome. Those same media constantly carry stories to the effect that before the election Mrs May wanted to get rid of Mr Hammond, and can not now do it because of the precariousness of her own position. If the sort of sense that Hammond is promoting is swept aside by the 'hard Brexiteers' the country will be brought to a point of crisis which Mrs May shows no sign of a capability to control.
What Liam Fox was reported to have said over the weekend is gravely alarming: so the sooner the Democratic Unionists abandon their contract with Mrs May to sell her their votes, the better. The collapse of the government into backbiting is the harbinger of collapse; so let it all happen soon.
I voted to leave, partly because I thought that we 'leavers' would loose but that a strong marker could be put down against the continentals' nonsense of developing an "ever closer union" with its own military capability. When my side won, I hailed the narrow victory as a licence to negotiate a rational settlement with the remaining states of the European Union that would get the United Kingdom out of the morass of the Brussels and Strasbourg institutions but keep this country in the close European free-trade pact that pre-existed the Union. That Dr Fox is now putting up his version of what the vote means is in some ways helpful; because it shows that the Tory 'hard Brexiteers' are truly dangerous for this country.
The rhetoric around the time of the last general election, that both Labour and Conservative parties accepted the majority decision in favour of [undefined] Brexit, masked the underlying fact that most Members of Parliament from both parties who were to be returned in the election had voted to remain in whole shebang of the Union in the referendum. It would now appear that most Members of the Commons do not know how to interpret the referendum result, while an overwhelming majority of the Lords are opposed to the whole concept of Brexit but recognise that they cannot blatantly overturn the decision of the electorate.
The present constitutional position appears to be that referendum result stands as an historic fact, but the sovereignty of parliament was not abandoned by that result. Thus any resultant agreement with the European Union - as with the USA, or Australia, of Belarus - will be made with the assent of the Queen, the Lords and the Commons.
The present political fact appears to be that a small group of headbanging Brexiteers have been given licence by Mrs May to discuss half-baked promises of potential free-trade agreements with various governments that all have the common purpose of clinging on to power by not upsetting too large a proportion of their electorate. These tentative discussions about trade treaties appear to be understood to mean that the hardliners can simply effect a British exit from the European Union with no comprehensive draft treaty with the EU in place. This is infantile absurdity. If such a cliff-edge Brexit were to be undertaken, in a world characterised by point protectionism [as defined in this blog: do a word-check], it would be a recipe for economic devastation in this country.
Mrs May seems to have been flattened by references to her past 'failure', as Home Secretary, to reduce net immigration to a few tens of thousands of people annually. She seems to be caught in the headlights of a juggernaut that is bearing down on her, terrified lest she would be seen to oppose those few party colleagues who assure the electorate that they can keep out mass migration without detriment to the health service or the wider economy. The spectacularly dull Chancellor of the Exchequer is bringing some sense to the discussion, and thus earning the odium of those parts of the press that enjoy the power to press for reckless policies simply because they cannot be held responsible for any outcome. Those same media constantly carry stories to the effect that before the election Mrs May wanted to get rid of Mr Hammond, and can not now do it because of the precariousness of her own position. If the sort of sense that Hammond is promoting is swept aside by the 'hard Brexiteers' the country will be brought to a point of crisis which Mrs May shows no sign of a capability to control.
What Liam Fox was reported to have said over the weekend is gravely alarming: so the sooner the Democratic Unionists abandon their contract with Mrs May to sell her their votes, the better. The collapse of the government into backbiting is the harbinger of collapse; so let it all happen soon.
Saturday, 8 July 2017
Hospitality and Productiveness
An area of significant growth within the 'dominant services sector of the British economy' is designated as Hospitality. This covers hotels, restaurants, pubs, cafes and all such outlets; which directly employ 3.2 million people, supported by 2.8 million people who work in support and supply trades to the sector. Thus six million households are wholly or partially maintained by the business. The trade association for the sector, the British Hospitality Association, has undertaken studies that show that the sector is well spread across the whole country, with Hospitality constituting a top-six employer in every region of the United Kingdom.
It is also a sector that has defied the general sluggishness of the British economy since 2008. The increase in output measured over the period is 5.9%, double performance of the whole economy. Labour productivity [measured as gross 'value added' per hour] is around 3.2%, which compares favourably with the shameful national figure for the whole economy of only 1.5%. The sector paid £38 billion in direct taxes and claimed to have brought £161 billion of turnover into the economy in 2016.
The sector also displays many of the structural weaknesses to which the British economy is prone. It is very heavily dependent on low-paid labour, much of which is recruited from abroad: mostly from the European Union and the Commonwealth. This is obvious in the patchy linguistic skills of the staff, where more 'white Europeans' are in front-line jobs, with a higher concentration of non-white people as cleaners, kitchen porters etc. There is very considerable use of casual staff on very uncertain contracts, who receive low wages and thus make little contribution to the buoyant consumer demand on which the momentum of the economy depends. The British Hospitality Association emphasises that there is great potential for growth in the sector, so long as foreign travelers are attracted to the many well-marketed natural and urban assets that Britain and Ireland have to offer, and so long as the resident population have sufficient incomes to enable them to use catering and related facilities. If the now-evident slowdown in the real earnings of the nation at large continues, it will impact disproportionately heavily on the hospitality sector as people buy ready meals and take drinks home from the supermarket rather than eat and drink out.
Over the past twenty years hundreds of pubs have closed in every part of the country as social habits have changed. It is increasingly unacceptable for chauvinist husbands to leave their wives at home with the television and the children and cups of tea, while they booze with their cronies several nights weekly. Couples, often with their children, dine out together; though it is notable that many families sit as three or more isolated individuals who are communicating with different sectors of the games business, or with different contacts, even as they eat: so they may just as well stay at home where the kids could access 'unsuitable' sites from the bedrooms. It is little hardship to a family to cut out a restaurant meal when economy is forced on the household budget; but the negative impact of that happening a million times to the hospitality business is huge. Supermarket takings increase, and more pubs close.
To preserve their market, the better-designed and best-located pubs are moved upmarket as dining and drinking establishments; and, increasingly, managers are deterring 'traditional drinkers' from occupying floor space in 'gastropubs'. Significant investments are being made in the physical plant and in the image of selected catering outlets: and this requires the 'right sort of customer' to be attracted to them: people with sufficient money to provide a return on the investment [in premises, staff and the offering that is made] and who have the inclination to use just that sort of outlet. So this enhances the need for specialisation, branding, image-building and the need to advertise; which also require heavy investment. The returns that come to successful outlets are increased turnover, higher productivity from staff and increased productiveness which justifies constant further investment. A very few pubs survive as retrospective examples of the 'spit and sawdust' image of hostelries: though sawdust is not welcome on customers' shoes and most people would deeply be offended by any use of spittoons: it is a very subtle job to make an 'olde Englishe pub' attractive to capable consumers.
It is also a sector that has defied the general sluggishness of the British economy since 2008. The increase in output measured over the period is 5.9%, double performance of the whole economy. Labour productivity [measured as gross 'value added' per hour] is around 3.2%, which compares favourably with the shameful national figure for the whole economy of only 1.5%. The sector paid £38 billion in direct taxes and claimed to have brought £161 billion of turnover into the economy in 2016.
The sector also displays many of the structural weaknesses to which the British economy is prone. It is very heavily dependent on low-paid labour, much of which is recruited from abroad: mostly from the European Union and the Commonwealth. This is obvious in the patchy linguistic skills of the staff, where more 'white Europeans' are in front-line jobs, with a higher concentration of non-white people as cleaners, kitchen porters etc. There is very considerable use of casual staff on very uncertain contracts, who receive low wages and thus make little contribution to the buoyant consumer demand on which the momentum of the economy depends. The British Hospitality Association emphasises that there is great potential for growth in the sector, so long as foreign travelers are attracted to the many well-marketed natural and urban assets that Britain and Ireland have to offer, and so long as the resident population have sufficient incomes to enable them to use catering and related facilities. If the now-evident slowdown in the real earnings of the nation at large continues, it will impact disproportionately heavily on the hospitality sector as people buy ready meals and take drinks home from the supermarket rather than eat and drink out.
Over the past twenty years hundreds of pubs have closed in every part of the country as social habits have changed. It is increasingly unacceptable for chauvinist husbands to leave their wives at home with the television and the children and cups of tea, while they booze with their cronies several nights weekly. Couples, often with their children, dine out together; though it is notable that many families sit as three or more isolated individuals who are communicating with different sectors of the games business, or with different contacts, even as they eat: so they may just as well stay at home where the kids could access 'unsuitable' sites from the bedrooms. It is little hardship to a family to cut out a restaurant meal when economy is forced on the household budget; but the negative impact of that happening a million times to the hospitality business is huge. Supermarket takings increase, and more pubs close.
To preserve their market, the better-designed and best-located pubs are moved upmarket as dining and drinking establishments; and, increasingly, managers are deterring 'traditional drinkers' from occupying floor space in 'gastropubs'. Significant investments are being made in the physical plant and in the image of selected catering outlets: and this requires the 'right sort of customer' to be attracted to them: people with sufficient money to provide a return on the investment [in premises, staff and the offering that is made] and who have the inclination to use just that sort of outlet. So this enhances the need for specialisation, branding, image-building and the need to advertise; which also require heavy investment. The returns that come to successful outlets are increased turnover, higher productivity from staff and increased productiveness which justifies constant further investment. A very few pubs survive as retrospective examples of the 'spit and sawdust' image of hostelries: though sawdust is not welcome on customers' shoes and most people would deeply be offended by any use of spittoons: it is a very subtle job to make an 'olde Englishe pub' attractive to capable consumers.
Monday, 29 May 2017
Putin Near Paris
President Putin is today due to visit France, where he will open an exhibition on Franco-Russian relations over three centuries and have lunch with President Macron in a house once lent to Peter the Great of Russia during his study-tour of western Europe.
Macron will go into the meeting with a list of conversational objectives, all of which will be to some extent constrained by his commitment to the European Union. The French president's smirk during last week's Trump tirade against those members of NATO who under-provide for their defence spending will have been copied into Putin's file; together with a reminder that France [unlike the UK] has a truly independent capability to deliver nuclear weapons. Britain's nuclear missiles are under joint American-UK control; France's are entirely at the disposal of M Macron. This alone makes France a 'power', and the commitment that Macron has expressed to a closer EU must be set alongside that independent capability. France is also one of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, which alone will justify the two presidents comparing their positions on the major global issues that have recently been on the Council's agenda, and those that might appear there soon.
France was, in effect, the colonial power over Syria from 1919 to the nineteen-fifties, under the Franco-British carve-up of the Arab lands that were separated from the Ottoman Empire as a result of the First World War. More recently, France has played little active part in the awful war in Syria, as the Russian commitment to the Assad regime has been increasing. France has huge background knowledge and understanding of the country, and the opinion of the French establishment [of which Macron is a selected product] may be helpful to Putin as he looks through the murk that is deepening in Syria as Trump appears to be more willing to take more military action against Assad. France's role in helping to keep the EU states [and NATO, as such] out of that conflict can be useful to Putin; and reinforcing the pressure for a benign neutrality of 'Europe' towards Russia will be well worth the visit.
Closer to home, for Putin, are the questions of Ukraine and Crimea. France has supported the NATO and EU policies of utter opposition to the recent Russian seizure of the Crimea, including the imposition of sanctions. The French economy has suffered slightly from the loss of trade with Russia that has resulted from the sanctions; and gained no benefit from them. There may be time in the two presidents' wide-ranging discussion to exchange hints on how that standoff could be resolved.
Russia regards Ukraine as an integral part of a single homeland. Kiev, now the Ukrainian capital, was the centre of the first city-state that grew into Russia. Moscow [the Grand Duchy of Muscovy] is a much more recent development; and deep in Russian history and sentiment are the sense that Moscow and Kiev belong together in a single state. The fact that the people who speak Ukrainian were abominably brutalised during Stalin's collectivisation of agriculture made many of them willing, at first, to welcome the German invaders in 1942 as liberators. Within a year most people recognised their mistake: the racist brutality of the Nazis exceeded even what Stalin's police had imposed, and thus the eventual Soviet victory was welcomed; at first. Then the Communist regime imported ethnic Russians who had been made homeless by the war to rebuild the shattered industrial cities, especially in the Donbas, adding linguistic complexity to the situation within the Soviet Republic of Ukraine [which, along with Belarussia was a given a separate seat in the UN, alongside Russia, as an inducement for Stalin to join the organisation]. The separate soviet republics had no independent power anyway, until the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics simply fell apart when Gorbachev lost his grip. Then the former soviet republics gained international recognition as sovereign states, as that term was generally understood in international law. Colonel Putin and his colleagues in the KGB watched, aghast, as the Baltic states, the Balkan states, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and even Putin's former workplace East Germany joined NATO and applied to be admitted to the EU.
While Belarus was consolidated as a puppet state to Russia, Ukraine made attempts to establish itself as a significant, independent European power; but fell prey to corruption, faction and alien interference. Russia would like the Ukraine to form a close federating with Russia, accepting Russian foreign and defence policy. France has joined with its allies in opposing Russian attempts to push that situation along. There is every reason to expect that Putin will push Macron to take a more pragmatic view of the Ukrainian [and thus the Crimean] situation than have his predecessors; and it would be interesting to know what quid-pro-quo Putin is able to offer France on that delicate topic.
Macron will go into the meeting with a list of conversational objectives, all of which will be to some extent constrained by his commitment to the European Union. The French president's smirk during last week's Trump tirade against those members of NATO who under-provide for their defence spending will have been copied into Putin's file; together with a reminder that France [unlike the UK] has a truly independent capability to deliver nuclear weapons. Britain's nuclear missiles are under joint American-UK control; France's are entirely at the disposal of M Macron. This alone makes France a 'power', and the commitment that Macron has expressed to a closer EU must be set alongside that independent capability. France is also one of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, which alone will justify the two presidents comparing their positions on the major global issues that have recently been on the Council's agenda, and those that might appear there soon.
France was, in effect, the colonial power over Syria from 1919 to the nineteen-fifties, under the Franco-British carve-up of the Arab lands that were separated from the Ottoman Empire as a result of the First World War. More recently, France has played little active part in the awful war in Syria, as the Russian commitment to the Assad regime has been increasing. France has huge background knowledge and understanding of the country, and the opinion of the French establishment [of which Macron is a selected product] may be helpful to Putin as he looks through the murk that is deepening in Syria as Trump appears to be more willing to take more military action against Assad. France's role in helping to keep the EU states [and NATO, as such] out of that conflict can be useful to Putin; and reinforcing the pressure for a benign neutrality of 'Europe' towards Russia will be well worth the visit.
Closer to home, for Putin, are the questions of Ukraine and Crimea. France has supported the NATO and EU policies of utter opposition to the recent Russian seizure of the Crimea, including the imposition of sanctions. The French economy has suffered slightly from the loss of trade with Russia that has resulted from the sanctions; and gained no benefit from them. There may be time in the two presidents' wide-ranging discussion to exchange hints on how that standoff could be resolved.
Russia regards Ukraine as an integral part of a single homeland. Kiev, now the Ukrainian capital, was the centre of the first city-state that grew into Russia. Moscow [the Grand Duchy of Muscovy] is a much more recent development; and deep in Russian history and sentiment are the sense that Moscow and Kiev belong together in a single state. The fact that the people who speak Ukrainian were abominably brutalised during Stalin's collectivisation of agriculture made many of them willing, at first, to welcome the German invaders in 1942 as liberators. Within a year most people recognised their mistake: the racist brutality of the Nazis exceeded even what Stalin's police had imposed, and thus the eventual Soviet victory was welcomed; at first. Then the Communist regime imported ethnic Russians who had been made homeless by the war to rebuild the shattered industrial cities, especially in the Donbas, adding linguistic complexity to the situation within the Soviet Republic of Ukraine [which, along with Belarussia was a given a separate seat in the UN, alongside Russia, as an inducement for Stalin to join the organisation]. The separate soviet republics had no independent power anyway, until the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics simply fell apart when Gorbachev lost his grip. Then the former soviet republics gained international recognition as sovereign states, as that term was generally understood in international law. Colonel Putin and his colleagues in the KGB watched, aghast, as the Baltic states, the Balkan states, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and even Putin's former workplace East Germany joined NATO and applied to be admitted to the EU.
While Belarus was consolidated as a puppet state to Russia, Ukraine made attempts to establish itself as a significant, independent European power; but fell prey to corruption, faction and alien interference. Russia would like the Ukraine to form a close federating with Russia, accepting Russian foreign and defence policy. France has joined with its allies in opposing Russian attempts to push that situation along. There is every reason to expect that Putin will push Macron to take a more pragmatic view of the Ukrainian [and thus the Crimean] situation than have his predecessors; and it would be interesting to know what quid-pro-quo Putin is able to offer France on that delicate topic.
Tuesday, 10 July 2012
Concern at the IMF: About What?
The Managing Director of the IMF has expressed concern about the probability that their forecasts for economic growth throughout the world must be downgraded. Her foreboding is justified by the regular downward revision of estimates for growth that are being published in various countries, especially in the light of the ongoing crisis in the eurozone and its potential negative impact on its trading partners in other parts of the world. In the face of such a negative mood among Economists, politicians, journalists, bankers and some business managers it is unsurprising that there is a growing feeling of unease among the general public.
During the so-called credit crunch of 2007-8 many governments tried to secure the future of banks in their territories by guaranteeing the deposits that people and businesses had placed in those banks. When banks could not meet depositors' demands for cash from their own resources the government supplied the money. Governments that had control of their own currencies, such as the US dollar and the British pound, could authorise their central banks to create 'new' money and make it available to the banks: some went further and actually create the money with which to buy control of threatened banks. In the USA this process was extended to the one insurance company, AIG, that had ruined itself by creating contracts by which it guaranteed to fund banks in certain circumstances which had been thought highly improbable until they happened to several big banks all at once.
In countries that did not have control of their money supply, notably those in the eurozone, the means available to governments to stabilise the economic situation were seriously constrained. For seven years before the credit crunch occurred the member countries of the eurozone issued bonds and bills [certificates of government debt] denominated in euros; and bonds that had been issued before the creation of the euro had become redeemable in euros. Those governments could not follow the lead of the Americans and the British in creating the money that they had to pay out to buy the bonds that fell due to be cashed: they had to borrow the necessary euros from the European Central Bank or the International Monetary Fund, or tap new funds created by other eurozone governments. In considering any of those options a government was faced with strict conditions attaching to any loan, that usually included the imposition of restrictive economic policies. At an early stage in the banking crisis the Irish government decided to guarantee all banks' obligations, raised a large loan and imposed dramatically restrictive conditions on the economy. Southern European members of the eurozone faced up to the crisis more slowly and then took the very different stance of demanding bail-out loans and prevaricated about imposing the conditions that they had accepted, threatening the northern eurozone countries with progressive economic collapse and political chaos. The northern eurozone countries regard this as simple cheating and are resisting any further concessions to the south unless they are accompanied by enforceable sanctions. Meanwhile the population of the whole Union is getting used to commentators covering the arguments about the possible withdrawal of some countries from the euro or the collapse of the entire venture. The fact that the eurozone is not coterminous with the European Union is widely understood: the Union could survive either the defection of some members or the total collapse of the single currency.
The possibility of chaos in much of the EU - the world's largest economic bloc - is the cause of worry throughout the world economy. The shabby history of the Union - the political fudges, the pervasive unaccountability of the Brussels bureaucracy and the notorious 'democratic deficit' by which the eurorats have evaded public concerns in aggregating power in their own hands - has created the circumstances in which there is little mass empathy with any proposal to give more power to the Union. Spaniards and Italians would like the Union to be able to grab Germany's wealth and hand it to them in return for promises to which nobody gives the slightest credibility: Germany would never assent to such a scheme. The extension of another loan to Spain, agreed overnight, is an allocation of the existing funds which the Finns and the Dutch and the Slovaks and the Germans have already written off. This time round the northern eurozone members seem to be so little concerned about this further handout that they have agreed to give the Spanish government longer to impose austerity.
And so the sorry saga drags on. Greece will leave the euro. With that example in their sights it is just possible that the Spanish, the Portuguese and the Italians will accept enough 'discipline' to keep the euro staggering along for a year or two. There is no hope of Europe leading the world economy to a new era of prosperity; and not much sign of the emergent economies or the US providing a 'motor' to drag the global economy into an era of growth. New thinking is needed, urgently.
During the so-called credit crunch of 2007-8 many governments tried to secure the future of banks in their territories by guaranteeing the deposits that people and businesses had placed in those banks. When banks could not meet depositors' demands for cash from their own resources the government supplied the money. Governments that had control of their own currencies, such as the US dollar and the British pound, could authorise their central banks to create 'new' money and make it available to the banks: some went further and actually create the money with which to buy control of threatened banks. In the USA this process was extended to the one insurance company, AIG, that had ruined itself by creating contracts by which it guaranteed to fund banks in certain circumstances which had been thought highly improbable until they happened to several big banks all at once.
In countries that did not have control of their money supply, notably those in the eurozone, the means available to governments to stabilise the economic situation were seriously constrained. For seven years before the credit crunch occurred the member countries of the eurozone issued bonds and bills [certificates of government debt] denominated in euros; and bonds that had been issued before the creation of the euro had become redeemable in euros. Those governments could not follow the lead of the Americans and the British in creating the money that they had to pay out to buy the bonds that fell due to be cashed: they had to borrow the necessary euros from the European Central Bank or the International Monetary Fund, or tap new funds created by other eurozone governments. In considering any of those options a government was faced with strict conditions attaching to any loan, that usually included the imposition of restrictive economic policies. At an early stage in the banking crisis the Irish government decided to guarantee all banks' obligations, raised a large loan and imposed dramatically restrictive conditions on the economy. Southern European members of the eurozone faced up to the crisis more slowly and then took the very different stance of demanding bail-out loans and prevaricated about imposing the conditions that they had accepted, threatening the northern eurozone countries with progressive economic collapse and political chaos. The northern eurozone countries regard this as simple cheating and are resisting any further concessions to the south unless they are accompanied by enforceable sanctions. Meanwhile the population of the whole Union is getting used to commentators covering the arguments about the possible withdrawal of some countries from the euro or the collapse of the entire venture. The fact that the eurozone is not coterminous with the European Union is widely understood: the Union could survive either the defection of some members or the total collapse of the single currency.
The possibility of chaos in much of the EU - the world's largest economic bloc - is the cause of worry throughout the world economy. The shabby history of the Union - the political fudges, the pervasive unaccountability of the Brussels bureaucracy and the notorious 'democratic deficit' by which the eurorats have evaded public concerns in aggregating power in their own hands - has created the circumstances in which there is little mass empathy with any proposal to give more power to the Union. Spaniards and Italians would like the Union to be able to grab Germany's wealth and hand it to them in return for promises to which nobody gives the slightest credibility: Germany would never assent to such a scheme. The extension of another loan to Spain, agreed overnight, is an allocation of the existing funds which the Finns and the Dutch and the Slovaks and the Germans have already written off. This time round the northern eurozone members seem to be so little concerned about this further handout that they have agreed to give the Spanish government longer to impose austerity.
And so the sorry saga drags on. Greece will leave the euro. With that example in their sights it is just possible that the Spanish, the Portuguese and the Italians will accept enough 'discipline' to keep the euro staggering along for a year or two. There is no hope of Europe leading the world economy to a new era of prosperity; and not much sign of the emergent economies or the US providing a 'motor' to drag the global economy into an era of growth. New thinking is needed, urgently.
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Tuesday, 6 December 2011
Politicians: Out of their Depth?
Witty people who have never borne political or business responsibility can be highly vocal in expressing their criticism - and their ridicule, quickly descending into contempt - for office-holders who are struggling to pursue their ends in difficult, unpredictable and often adverse conditions. There are a large number of leaders at the present time who seem to have a limited [or even obtuse] perception of the situations that they are attempting to manage.Critical opposition is very often easier to mount than is reasoned presentation of feasible alternative options. Let us take a few examples that are in the News this evening.
In Moscow and other Russian cities there are small but significant demonstrations against the continuance of Vladimir Putin in office: either as Prime Minister or as President. These are at least matched numerically by demonstrating supporters of Putin's party; but it is notably oppositionists who are being arrested. In recent months, around the time of his announcement that he will again run for the Presidency of the Russian Federation, Putin has presented himself as a fitness fanatic, and a game hunter, and a supporter of the Arts, and a politico-economic polymath, and a populist who was astonished to hear boos directed at him when he came into the arena during a recent sporting event. He has done enough positive things for the country to enable him to seek re-election on the basis of that healthy record; but he seems to be unable to believe that. He also appears to lack any vision about how he can increase genuine popular support by tackling endemic problems that have emerged in a rapidly developing and changing socio-economic nexus. He has tried to project a 'personality' that is so multi-faceted as to be unsustainable, as well as fundamentally incredible; while he has been notoriously indulgent to corruption. He will never convince the punters that he is Superman; and by every device that he uses to try to demonstrate the impossible he increases the opportunities for satire. Even his fiercest critics have conceded that he has had every chance to gain the presidency by a real electoral majority: but now he is threatening his chances both by inviting ridicule at his antics, and by his toleration of cronyism and corrupt business practice, and by the exploitation of political and bureaucratic processes by venial officials who he retains in post. This is very sad for him [and it could be terminal, if he allows his personality to sink into megalomania] and it is tragic for Russia which he has demonstrated the ability to serve so well.
President Obama's gift, which is also his curse and his potential doom, is his fluency. He can be highly articulate both in set speeches and in off-the-cuff utterances; but the more he says off-script, the more apparent it is to the growing army of his critics that his understanding of issues is incomplete [at least], his power to analyse complex data appears to be exiguous, and he appears to have no attainable plans for delivering benefits to voters, despite the release of many billions of dollars by his administration and by the Federal Reserve system acting in cahoots with the federal government. The more Obama takes centre-stage and holds forth, the less credible he appears to be; the more money his administration spends, the less relevant he seems to be in the legislative process and yet he carries the primary blame for the lack of impact of the limited policies that are adopted.
The remarkable Prime Minister of India, Manmohan Singh, is constantly criticised for doing too much and to little to grow the economy, for obstructing measures of liberalisation and for letting in too much alien capitalism, for tolerating the residual curse of the caste system and for indulging capricious [and probably crooked] untouchable politicians, for being locked-in to party-political croneyism and for being meritocratic. All of which adds up to showing balance, moderation, and a positive skill in directing a cabinet of more than thirty ministers and in getting responses out of an immense, inert bureaucracy. This is an outstanding political achievement that is working to the economic and social benefit of a massive and fast-expanding population.
No such single figure prevails in China. The complex hierarchy of past, present and future holders of the highest posts in the echelons of the Communist Part - and thus of the state- is partially understood by foreign commentators; though all assessments of power shifts and secret alliances are subject constantly to revision. No system that channels humans who are heavily endowed with ambition and personality through the corridors of the Great Hall of the People and the courtyards of the Forbidden City can work as smoothly as the Chinese authorities would have one believe: but their system has responded remarkably well to the complex processes of liberalisation and hugely rapid economic change and development, delivering 9%+ economic growth despite the turmoil in global capital markets and its impact on American and European buyers of Chinese goods. In recent days various Chinese ministers and bank officials have popped up as expert spokespersons on the specific issues of the day; talking truth to the diminishing western powers, asserting China's independent assessment of policy options, emphasising that their country is now a responsible global superpower and demonstrating that this truly is the case.
The different modes of success of Indian and Chinese leadership do not betoken a general superiority of Asian political models, or of Asian politicians over the rest of the global crop. I have lost count of the succession of ineffectual Japanese Prime Ministers who have come and gone since I first had the privilege of being a visiting professor there; and the politics of South Korea hardly bear forensic examination. Thailand has a Prime Minister who was elected solely because she is somebody's sister; and the entire country is scared of what will happen when the revered King dies and his heir - generally regarded as a wastrel, or worse - claims the inheritance. Sri Lanka is a military dictatorship, Pakistan is prey to factions that assemble and undermine sullenly-consensual governments that exist by striking compromises with the military. Politics in Indonesia and Malaysia is being edged slowly in the direction of 'moderate Islamism', which also seems to be the trend is the Arab world from Saudi Arabia to Morocco. Iran is suffering an attempt at permanent revolution that could be ridiculous if it were not armed to be dangerous to its neighbours; while Iraq is the agonised outcome of more than half a century of conflict.
We have not yet glanced at the prevailing political mode in most Asian states, nor any in Latin America: so there is much of the world left to review in future blogs. One area that must briefly be mentioned in this wide-ranging look at the political effectiveness of various people and situations is Europe. Two countries - Italy and Greece - are directly ruled by EU Proconsuls; and half a dozen are constitutional monarchies where the party-political mix in government is pragmatic and is not existentially important. In France, Germany and the United Kingdom, despite very different rhetoric surrounding the relative position of the state government to the EU, it is clear that their politically-insecure leaders see the maintenance of the Union as the key priority. The original purpose of the Union was to prevent a third 'world' war: now it is seen as potentially [though not yet actually] an entity big enough to allow the European economy that is being overtaken by emergent powers to have a chance of survival on the world stage. The political leaders in the predominant EU member states, and [often more so] in the smaller states that follow them, are focussed on what Europe can do for the economic environment, and thus enable growth to return and eventually generate enough new wealth to transcend the present gloomy prospect. That was the proposition on which Heath 'sold' the EEC to the British Parliament and people, and Cameron and Merkel and Sarkozi are relying upon the same hope today. Not much fruit has sprung from Heath's planting of forty years ago and the politicians of 2011 understand that they cannot get away for long simply by saying that the long-term gains [when we are all dead] will make the short-term pains [that will be felt for several years of the immediate future] worth while. The message is impossible to deliver in a positive package, but that is the message to which the inescapable impact of the Iron Law of Wages has driven them. For European connoisseurs of politician rhetoric, if for nobody else, interesting times lie ahead.
For an explanation of the Iron Law of Wages, see Personal Political Economy which is accessible from this site.
No such single figure prevails in China. The complex hierarchy of past, present and future holders of the highest posts in the echelons of the Communist Part - and thus of the state- is partially understood by foreign commentators; though all assessments of power shifts and secret alliances are subject constantly to revision. No system that channels humans who are heavily endowed with ambition and personality through the corridors of the Great Hall of the People and the courtyards of the Forbidden City can work as smoothly as the Chinese authorities would have one believe: but their system has responded remarkably well to the complex processes of liberalisation and hugely rapid economic change and development, delivering 9%+ economic growth despite the turmoil in global capital markets and its impact on American and European buyers of Chinese goods. In recent days various Chinese ministers and bank officials have popped up as expert spokespersons on the specific issues of the day; talking truth to the diminishing western powers, asserting China's independent assessment of policy options, emphasising that their country is now a responsible global superpower and demonstrating that this truly is the case.
The different modes of success of Indian and Chinese leadership do not betoken a general superiority of Asian political models, or of Asian politicians over the rest of the global crop. I have lost count of the succession of ineffectual Japanese Prime Ministers who have come and gone since I first had the privilege of being a visiting professor there; and the politics of South Korea hardly bear forensic examination. Thailand has a Prime Minister who was elected solely because she is somebody's sister; and the entire country is scared of what will happen when the revered King dies and his heir - generally regarded as a wastrel, or worse - claims the inheritance. Sri Lanka is a military dictatorship, Pakistan is prey to factions that assemble and undermine sullenly-consensual governments that exist by striking compromises with the military. Politics in Indonesia and Malaysia is being edged slowly in the direction of 'moderate Islamism', which also seems to be the trend is the Arab world from Saudi Arabia to Morocco. Iran is suffering an attempt at permanent revolution that could be ridiculous if it were not armed to be dangerous to its neighbours; while Iraq is the agonised outcome of more than half a century of conflict.
We have not yet glanced at the prevailing political mode in most Asian states, nor any in Latin America: so there is much of the world left to review in future blogs. One area that must briefly be mentioned in this wide-ranging look at the political effectiveness of various people and situations is Europe. Two countries - Italy and Greece - are directly ruled by EU Proconsuls; and half a dozen are constitutional monarchies where the party-political mix in government is pragmatic and is not existentially important. In France, Germany and the United Kingdom, despite very different rhetoric surrounding the relative position of the state government to the EU, it is clear that their politically-insecure leaders see the maintenance of the Union as the key priority. The original purpose of the Union was to prevent a third 'world' war: now it is seen as potentially [though not yet actually] an entity big enough to allow the European economy that is being overtaken by emergent powers to have a chance of survival on the world stage. The political leaders in the predominant EU member states, and [often more so] in the smaller states that follow them, are focussed on what Europe can do for the economic environment, and thus enable growth to return and eventually generate enough new wealth to transcend the present gloomy prospect. That was the proposition on which Heath 'sold' the EEC to the British Parliament and people, and Cameron and Merkel and Sarkozi are relying upon the same hope today. Not much fruit has sprung from Heath's planting of forty years ago and the politicians of 2011 understand that they cannot get away for long simply by saying that the long-term gains [when we are all dead] will make the short-term pains [that will be felt for several years of the immediate future] worth while. The message is impossible to deliver in a positive package, but that is the message to which the inescapable impact of the Iron Law of Wages has driven them. For European connoisseurs of politician rhetoric, if for nobody else, interesting times lie ahead.
For an explanation of the Iron Law of Wages, see Personal Political Economy which is accessible from this site.
Wednesday, 19 October 2011
Three Days To Go
On Sunday last the US Treasury Secretary said that the leaders of the Eurozone - France and Germany - had 'six days to save the world'. That leaves today, Thursday and Friday before the European Summit meeting convenes.
Chancellor Merkel has said that they are approaching a solution 'millimetre by millimetre' with no hurry to move towards the reputed French ambition to draw upon Germany's assets and strong reputation in an effectively unlimited bail-out fund for the whole of the Eurozone, including Greece. Mrs Merkel knows that her electorate are furious at the extent to which their assets have already been committed for the resuscitation of the common currency; and the significant Turkish minority are not reluctant to stress the idle and exploitative reputation of the Greeks. Merkel's government would face an electoral massacre next year if she risks ruining all that has been achieved since the foundation of the Federal Republic in order to rescue olive farmers who have been subsidised by the Common Agricultural Policy for implausibly-large numbers of trees whose 'existence' the overpaid bureaucrats vouched-for during their ten-hours of weekly attendance in the office between coffee time and lunch. It does not matter how far this is an unfair caricature of Greece: it is the embedded image that rests in sufficient truth to be sustainable.
Nobody can tell whether or not a domino effect would happen if Greece was simply shoved out of the Eurozone and given modest assistance from the IMF and the EU to soften the landing that would nevertheless be very hard indeed. With Greece out, would global speculators put so much 'pressure' on Portugese, Spanish or Italian state finances that they might also be pushed out, one by one? The apprehension that this could be so is a major factor in the consideration of options that have to be made by the European leaders this weekend: the negative prospect of a serial unravelling of the Eurozone, the European Union and the 'European Dream' is strongly canvassed.
But there is an alternative vision that should quickly get more exposure. This begins with the fact that the Greeks have been vastly more untruthful and self-indulgent than Italians, Portuguese or Spaniards. Those three far-from-spotless countries have adopted stringency programmes that must be pursued rigorously, and possibly extended as the rest of Europe's governments also cut their 'systemic' public indebtedness while they all take specific short-term measures to stimulate sufficient economic impetus to break the depressive trend that at present is threatening to descend into another Great Depression. Dumping Greece would give the three most exposed countries the necessary shock to ensure that they really implement the undertakings that they have given. The more hardship the Greeks experience outside the eurozone, the more evidence there would be to encourage their Mediterranean neighbours to stick with the discipline that will be necessary to consolidate the bodged and ill-founded common currency into a valid international medium of exchange. The expulsion of Greece can mark the rebirth of the Euro. That is a desirable objective: a thoroughly good thing.
But if Greece is 'rescued' and fails to meet the almost-certainly unattainable targets that will be necessary to remain in the eurozone, there will be a huge temptation in Italy and Spain to soft-pedal on their austerity programmes: then the dominoes will begin to fall and the Euro will either collapse altogether or become the local currency for a hard core of Germany, Austria and the 'northern' Eurozone states whom the Germans trust.
In summary, if the Greeks are evicted, the Euro can have a future. If Greece is 'rescued', the chances of its survival are massively reduced.
Chancellor Merkel has said that they are approaching a solution 'millimetre by millimetre' with no hurry to move towards the reputed French ambition to draw upon Germany's assets and strong reputation in an effectively unlimited bail-out fund for the whole of the Eurozone, including Greece. Mrs Merkel knows that her electorate are furious at the extent to which their assets have already been committed for the resuscitation of the common currency; and the significant Turkish minority are not reluctant to stress the idle and exploitative reputation of the Greeks. Merkel's government would face an electoral massacre next year if she risks ruining all that has been achieved since the foundation of the Federal Republic in order to rescue olive farmers who have been subsidised by the Common Agricultural Policy for implausibly-large numbers of trees whose 'existence' the overpaid bureaucrats vouched-for during their ten-hours of weekly attendance in the office between coffee time and lunch. It does not matter how far this is an unfair caricature of Greece: it is the embedded image that rests in sufficient truth to be sustainable.
Nobody can tell whether or not a domino effect would happen if Greece was simply shoved out of the Eurozone and given modest assistance from the IMF and the EU to soften the landing that would nevertheless be very hard indeed. With Greece out, would global speculators put so much 'pressure' on Portugese, Spanish or Italian state finances that they might also be pushed out, one by one? The apprehension that this could be so is a major factor in the consideration of options that have to be made by the European leaders this weekend: the negative prospect of a serial unravelling of the Eurozone, the European Union and the 'European Dream' is strongly canvassed.
But there is an alternative vision that should quickly get more exposure. This begins with the fact that the Greeks have been vastly more untruthful and self-indulgent than Italians, Portuguese or Spaniards. Those three far-from-spotless countries have adopted stringency programmes that must be pursued rigorously, and possibly extended as the rest of Europe's governments also cut their 'systemic' public indebtedness while they all take specific short-term measures to stimulate sufficient economic impetus to break the depressive trend that at present is threatening to descend into another Great Depression. Dumping Greece would give the three most exposed countries the necessary shock to ensure that they really implement the undertakings that they have given. The more hardship the Greeks experience outside the eurozone, the more evidence there would be to encourage their Mediterranean neighbours to stick with the discipline that will be necessary to consolidate the bodged and ill-founded common currency into a valid international medium of exchange. The expulsion of Greece can mark the rebirth of the Euro. That is a desirable objective: a thoroughly good thing.
But if Greece is 'rescued' and fails to meet the almost-certainly unattainable targets that will be necessary to remain in the eurozone, there will be a huge temptation in Italy and Spain to soft-pedal on their austerity programmes: then the dominoes will begin to fall and the Euro will either collapse altogether or become the local currency for a hard core of Germany, Austria and the 'northern' Eurozone states whom the Germans trust.
In summary, if the Greeks are evicted, the Euro can have a future. If Greece is 'rescued', the chances of its survival are massively reduced.
Monday, 3 October 2011
Cameron's constitutionality
In quashing the members of his Party Conference who want to challenge Britain's status in the European Union David Cameron is bang in line with his predecessors.
Prime Minsters and their Cabinets have their massive power because they are the active members of Her Majesty's Privy Council. After each election the Queen is advised whom to ask to be Prime Minister: that Privy Councillor then invites members and candidate members of the Council to come to Cabinet meetings, and all the other Councillors stand aside. Some Councillors in 'loyal opposition' parties speak against individual proposals to change, or even to keep, policies that they enacted when in government; but the underlying reality is the commitment of all Privy Councillors to the continuity of Her Majesty's Government.
Cameron is resisting a challenge to that continuity.
This position is reinforced by the fact that the United Kingdom's immersion is Europe has been made by a succession of Conservative Prime Ministers:
Treaty of Rome - Heath;
change from Economic Community to European Union - Thatcher;
Maastricht - Major.
No Labour Prime Minister has such explicit responsibility [or culpability]. The EU is essentially a Tory gift to the British people, and to turn away from it would be a denial of the past that it would be extremely hard for any Conservative Leader to risk.
As to the democratic wish of the people: when has that really mattered?
Prime Minsters and their Cabinets have their massive power because they are the active members of Her Majesty's Privy Council. After each election the Queen is advised whom to ask to be Prime Minister: that Privy Councillor then invites members and candidate members of the Council to come to Cabinet meetings, and all the other Councillors stand aside. Some Councillors in 'loyal opposition' parties speak against individual proposals to change, or even to keep, policies that they enacted when in government; but the underlying reality is the commitment of all Privy Councillors to the continuity of Her Majesty's Government.
Cameron is resisting a challenge to that continuity.
This position is reinforced by the fact that the United Kingdom's immersion is Europe has been made by a succession of Conservative Prime Ministers:
Treaty of Rome - Heath;
change from Economic Community to European Union - Thatcher;
Maastricht - Major.
No Labour Prime Minister has such explicit responsibility [or culpability]. The EU is essentially a Tory gift to the British people, and to turn away from it would be a denial of the past that it would be extremely hard for any Conservative Leader to risk.
As to the democratic wish of the people: when has that really mattered?
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