On a BBC News programme yesterday, I heard the UK defined as 'the world's sixth-largest economy'. I had been used to us being described as the fifth-largest, and had not seen any report of a new league table that relegated us; but that did not surprise me: I can't monitor everything, and we have become adept at burying bad news [as an unscrupulous civil servant suggested on 9/11].
It is no surprise to recognise that we will sometime be reduced to seventh, tenth and even - ultimately - twentieth unless policy is radically changed. As the superb Anthony Hilton pointed out in last night's Evening Standard, Mrs May's speech on Monday to the CBI Conference took her [and her government] no further forward on important issues; The 'industrial strategy' is yet to be be unveiled: but it is expected to be much less radical than had been expected in the first year of the May regime. There is no indication of the potential shape of a Transitional Agreement with the European Union after March 2019; to the obvious consternation of managers of large and small businesses in all sectors of the economy. The headbanging advocates of Britain being set adrift to sink - alone, alongside only Ecuador - in the cold waters of the WTO Rules, remain powerful in the government - to the extent that the Brexiteers are demanding that Priti Patel [who includes hard opposition to EU membership, or even close co-operation within the European Economic Area, to the stupidities that made her departure from government inevitable] must be replaced by someone with similar views.
Hilton points out that even the triumphant new-technology companies that now dominate the US stock market - Microsoft, Google, Apple etc - benefit from hugely from research that was done in state-funded laboratories decades ago. This observation does not belittle the originality and drive of those who have carried these concept into intellectual property which can then be marketed to millions of enthusiastic customers: they have - and deserve - their billions of dollars. But it does lead to the painful admission that the UK has no comparable corporation under British ownership; even though the country continues to be hugely generative of both deep concepts and and innovative applications of the highest thought. I have rabbited-on endlessly about the small British firms that have been created to implement such ideas, that have been unable to accumulate the finances necessary to support their voracious needs as they pass through the stages of implementation to the ability to deliver a final product to the market, and thus succumb to foreign ownership. In a few conspicuous cases, opportunist buyers have agreed - for the time being - to keep the company HQ and laboratories in the UK, but they can renege on that at any time; and the intellectual property - the all-important ik - is free for them to exploit anywhere, anytime.
A serious Industrial Strategy would provide finance for such emergent companies - or divisions of existing companies - in sufficient quantity and on sufficiently loose terms to allow developments to reach the global market in good time: recognising that not all the guesses can be correct. There will be losers as well as winners [though history shows that losers often have attributes that can be developed in different directions and circumstances to become successful themselves]. Even the sixth-richest country must be able to afford the few billions that would be involved [which the government could borrow on extremely favourable terms, against all historical comparisons].
The UK is also being criticised, deservedly, for its constant reductions in the size, efficiency and capability of the armed forces. One of the regular themes of this blog has been the symbiosis - over many centuries - of money spent on research for defensive weaponry and dividends later gained from the civil exploitation of those technologies, This is precisely the time when the country should be searching for new, super-effective weapons systems, communications and defence capabilities: in which the UK has led for almost a millennium.
Behind all these thoughts lies the need for investment - especially by the state, in combination with people with ideas - to bring new concepts, new materials and new processes into being. They can only be objectified by manufacturing, and it is through innovation in manufacturing that the productivity of the economy can be increased. Factories that produce highly-desired output [regardless of whether the buyer is the armed forces or the mass market] can make significant profits because the customers are prepared to support the exclusivity of the producer firm's ik, part of the profit can be reinvested in new concepts and processes, thus the productiveness of the firm is increased, which means that the average output per employee - the productivity - of the enterprise can be raised and the economy can grow substantially.
This virtuous circle cannot be achieved without individual entrepreneurship [both inside and outside companies] and the active, continuous support of the government. The cretinous Economics that has stressed free-enterprise and free markets with minimum state input has fostered the disastrous decline into which the British economy has been locked for more than a generation.
I will carry on blogging as a small voice for reason.
Economics is fundamentally unscientific. The economic crisis has speeded the shift of power to emergent economies. In Britain and the USA the theory of 'rational markets' removed controls from the finance sector, and things can still get yet worse. Read my book, No Confidence: The Brexit Vote and Economics - http://amzn.eu/ayGznkp
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Showing posts with label investment. Show all posts
Showing posts with label investment. Show all posts
Thursday, 9 November 2017
Tuesday, 10 October 2017
Back Again To Productiveness
There has been serious panic in the Treasury, which has resonated round other government departments, about the latest 'findings' of the Office for Budget Responsibility [OBR] on the basic facts about the UK economy. With no evidence in the raw data to support the supposition, it has been assumed that the productivity of the economy is increasing. If it were true, it would mean that on average, across all sectors of the economy, the output per worker per day is increasing. For half a century until 2007, year after year, on average productivity was increasing by around 2%. This constituted the strongest evidence that the output in the economy was growing and that there was more output to provide investment in new plant in industry and commerce, and to renew the economic infrastructure, and to improve welfare services and education, and still to afford more wages for most of the employed people year after year.
It is now admitted, rather shamefacedly by the government ministers and officials who have assumed that productivity 'must have been' rising since 2010 at something close to the historic norm of 2%, that this has not been the case. The financial crunch of 2007-8 was a huge shock to the whole economy; but it has optimistically been assumed that things have been returning to 'normal' since 2010. It is also noted that the entire world economy suffered a shock in 2007, and that most 'mature' economies' growth since 2010 has been less than the pre-crunch norm. Nevertheless, the USA, Canada, Australia and the Eurozone all have experience increasing productivity in recent years: while India and China have continued to make massive strides forward [though at an irregular rate year-on-year].
I am not alone in having banged-on since 2007 about the fact that productivity in the UK is abysmal because the people who control the country - grossly misled by the Econocracy [the professors of Economics] - are totally unaware that productivity is always dependent on the productiveness of the system; but not many people have been saying it, and nobody has been listening. Productiveness is the capacity of the system to deliver increased productivity; and it can only be increased by well-targeted investment. Karl Marx was at one with the other nineteenth-century Political Economists who saw that industrial progress [and the development of the infrastructure of railways, ships and ports, postal systems, banking and the telegraph] was entirely dependent on a surplus being accumulated from the sales of current output and withheld from consumption by the people so that it can be converted into new and improved means of production. Marx thought that he had made the discovery of the age by claiming that the accumulation of capital had been captured by a 'class' of capitalists, who were taking over the levers of economic power from the landlord/aristocratic class who had dominated Europe since the dark ages. Other Political Economists saw that the development of shareholder capital allocated the profits that were derived from from industrial and commercial activity between the controlling shareholders in firms [who could decide how they divided the dividends and wages that they received between their own consumption and re-investment of the profits to produce even higher returns from the business in future years] and the other shareholders who would decide for themselves how much of their dividend income they would apply to their own consumption and how much they would spend on buying more shares. Investors in shares could choose between all the shares and bonds that were on offer in the stock market: so provided those investors were reasonably sensible the majority of buyers would opt for putting their investment into firms that were effective and innovative: those that were enhancing the productiveness of the economy, whose fruits would be seen in terms of higher productivity and high future dividends. Workers could be rewarded with high wages [or even profit-sharing schemes] and thus the entire economic ans social systems would be strengthened.
Obsessed Marxists gained control of Russia in 1917 and it took their successors seven decades to prove decisively that a simplistic Marxist regime does not work. Mao tried the same, and drove China into even deeper poverty than had been achieved in Russia; only for China to be restored by pragmatists who know better than capitalists the importance of concentrating on the productiveness of all sectors of the economy.
Britain's 'productivity problem' arises from the failure of industry and commerce to invest since the 2007 crunch. Companies have built up cash piles, some of which has been distributed to shareholders through devices such as share buy-back; while consumers have increased their borrowing to carry on buying goods as prices rise faster than wages.
Now the Chancellor of the Exchequer has been driven into a corner by the productivity data: the entire nation is heartily sick of 'austerity', but output is [at best] stagnant. Hospitals and prisons are in crisis, schools are increasingly stressed, the police has been cut back too far. What can he offer in his autumn Budget?
Jeremy Corbyn's almost pristine Marxism cannot be any sort of solution; but at least he has adopted more reasonable rhetoric for the purposes of getting elected. Provided Labour produces - and adheres to - a rational Manifesto, they offer the best bet for the nation in the coming years. But the trust problem is probably unsurmountable.
It is now admitted, rather shamefacedly by the government ministers and officials who have assumed that productivity 'must have been' rising since 2010 at something close to the historic norm of 2%, that this has not been the case. The financial crunch of 2007-8 was a huge shock to the whole economy; but it has optimistically been assumed that things have been returning to 'normal' since 2010. It is also noted that the entire world economy suffered a shock in 2007, and that most 'mature' economies' growth since 2010 has been less than the pre-crunch norm. Nevertheless, the USA, Canada, Australia and the Eurozone all have experience increasing productivity in recent years: while India and China have continued to make massive strides forward [though at an irregular rate year-on-year].
I am not alone in having banged-on since 2007 about the fact that productivity in the UK is abysmal because the people who control the country - grossly misled by the Econocracy [the professors of Economics] - are totally unaware that productivity is always dependent on the productiveness of the system; but not many people have been saying it, and nobody has been listening. Productiveness is the capacity of the system to deliver increased productivity; and it can only be increased by well-targeted investment. Karl Marx was at one with the other nineteenth-century Political Economists who saw that industrial progress [and the development of the infrastructure of railways, ships and ports, postal systems, banking and the telegraph] was entirely dependent on a surplus being accumulated from the sales of current output and withheld from consumption by the people so that it can be converted into new and improved means of production. Marx thought that he had made the discovery of the age by claiming that the accumulation of capital had been captured by a 'class' of capitalists, who were taking over the levers of economic power from the landlord/aristocratic class who had dominated Europe since the dark ages. Other Political Economists saw that the development of shareholder capital allocated the profits that were derived from from industrial and commercial activity between the controlling shareholders in firms [who could decide how they divided the dividends and wages that they received between their own consumption and re-investment of the profits to produce even higher returns from the business in future years] and the other shareholders who would decide for themselves how much of their dividend income they would apply to their own consumption and how much they would spend on buying more shares. Investors in shares could choose between all the shares and bonds that were on offer in the stock market: so provided those investors were reasonably sensible the majority of buyers would opt for putting their investment into firms that were effective and innovative: those that were enhancing the productiveness of the economy, whose fruits would be seen in terms of higher productivity and high future dividends. Workers could be rewarded with high wages [or even profit-sharing schemes] and thus the entire economic ans social systems would be strengthened.
Obsessed Marxists gained control of Russia in 1917 and it took their successors seven decades to prove decisively that a simplistic Marxist regime does not work. Mao tried the same, and drove China into even deeper poverty than had been achieved in Russia; only for China to be restored by pragmatists who know better than capitalists the importance of concentrating on the productiveness of all sectors of the economy.
Britain's 'productivity problem' arises from the failure of industry and commerce to invest since the 2007 crunch. Companies have built up cash piles, some of which has been distributed to shareholders through devices such as share buy-back; while consumers have increased their borrowing to carry on buying goods as prices rise faster than wages.
Now the Chancellor of the Exchequer has been driven into a corner by the productivity data: the entire nation is heartily sick of 'austerity', but output is [at best] stagnant. Hospitals and prisons are in crisis, schools are increasingly stressed, the police has been cut back too far. What can he offer in his autumn Budget?
Jeremy Corbyn's almost pristine Marxism cannot be any sort of solution; but at least he has adopted more reasonable rhetoric for the purposes of getting elected. Provided Labour produces - and adheres to - a rational Manifesto, they offer the best bet for the nation in the coming years. But the trust problem is probably unsurmountable.
Friday, 6 October 2017
Productivity, Productiveness and Personnel
One of my professional institutes, the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development [CIPD], is holding its annual bash in Harrogate: a sign that the nights are drawing in and Christmas preparations should be made, Among all the stalls promoting clever systems for improving the efficacy of the personnel function and the the productivity of workers there will be the usual mix of 'motivational' and 'experiential' presentations from the stage. Employers will be encouraged to mobilise the funds that are grabbed by the government in the tax called the Apprenticeship Levy, and no doubt that will push along the trend to encourage 15-21 year-olds to undertake pseudo-apprenticeships as provided for in the state's heavy handed allocation of resources. Meanwhile the government remains deaf to requests that the support for vocational programmes that are actually sought for by people over 24 years of age, who have had time to learn on-the-job about work, and assess what they need to know and to understand to move to a better position for themselves and for their employers: a place where their productivity can really improve.
This whole structure of wasteful spending allocations and cuts is deeply depressing, and I have railed about it on many past occasions.
All I want to do in this piece is to reiterate a frequent assertion: that in Millicent Fawcett's brilliant little book Political Economy for Beginners [1870] the point is made, very clearly, that there is a link between productiveness and productivity. Productiveness is the capability of an installation - one work place, or a whole factory, or anything in between - to deliver output. Productiveness is increased by making relevant investment: in machinery, in staff training and development, in the selection of superior input materials etc. Productivity is the measure of the resultant output, stated in the cash return from the sale of the output as compared with the cash expended in wages [of management and of operatives] to achieve the output. It stands to reason that productivity can be increased by offering higher wages: sometimes. Or productivity can be increased by penalising 'slackers', as under some dictatorships: sometimes, for a short time. Or productivity can be increased [or be reported to have been increased, for propaganda purposes] by Stakhanovites: so called after a Russian worker called Stakhanov who was held up as an example by Stalin's publicists because he was alleged to have increased his effort and effectiveness out of sheer enthusiasm for the regime and its targets under the five-year-plan. The whole of the proletariat was urged to emulate him, and thus bring on the socialist paradise much quicker than could otherwise be done; and, of course, eventually the whole thing was exposed as a sham and was quietly shelved.
The most consistent and effective way to raise productivity is by increasing the productiveness of the plant that is provided for the workforce to work with, and by raising their own ability and willingness to use the a resourcesvailable optimally.
It is patently obvious that in many democracies, and especially in Britain, productivity has 'flatlined': it has hardly increased across the whole of industry and commerce, for the past decade; and, if anything, it is declining. This is because - again, over almost the whole economy - serious investment to improve the productiveness of plant and people has simple not taken place. Fake apprenticeships do nothing to relieve this situation: and companies sit on billions of pounds of profits because they do not have enough confidence in the future to apply that cash to new machinery and really deep improvement of their processes and their people.
So: what can be done about that? More next time...
This whole structure of wasteful spending allocations and cuts is deeply depressing, and I have railed about it on many past occasions.
All I want to do in this piece is to reiterate a frequent assertion: that in Millicent Fawcett's brilliant little book Political Economy for Beginners [1870] the point is made, very clearly, that there is a link between productiveness and productivity. Productiveness is the capability of an installation - one work place, or a whole factory, or anything in between - to deliver output. Productiveness is increased by making relevant investment: in machinery, in staff training and development, in the selection of superior input materials etc. Productivity is the measure of the resultant output, stated in the cash return from the sale of the output as compared with the cash expended in wages [of management and of operatives] to achieve the output. It stands to reason that productivity can be increased by offering higher wages: sometimes. Or productivity can be increased by penalising 'slackers', as under some dictatorships: sometimes, for a short time. Or productivity can be increased [or be reported to have been increased, for propaganda purposes] by Stakhanovites: so called after a Russian worker called Stakhanov who was held up as an example by Stalin's publicists because he was alleged to have increased his effort and effectiveness out of sheer enthusiasm for the regime and its targets under the five-year-plan. The whole of the proletariat was urged to emulate him, and thus bring on the socialist paradise much quicker than could otherwise be done; and, of course, eventually the whole thing was exposed as a sham and was quietly shelved.
The most consistent and effective way to raise productivity is by increasing the productiveness of the plant that is provided for the workforce to work with, and by raising their own ability and willingness to use the a resourcesvailable optimally.
It is patently obvious that in many democracies, and especially in Britain, productivity has 'flatlined': it has hardly increased across the whole of industry and commerce, for the past decade; and, if anything, it is declining. This is because - again, over almost the whole economy - serious investment to improve the productiveness of plant and people has simple not taken place. Fake apprenticeships do nothing to relieve this situation: and companies sit on billions of pounds of profits because they do not have enough confidence in the future to apply that cash to new machinery and really deep improvement of their processes and their people.
So: what can be done about that? More next time...
Sunday, 17 September 2017
QE: The Social Cost
The Labour governments of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown [1977-2010] progressively moved from following their Tory predecessor's conservative budgetary policy to creating a deficit on government spending [the amount by which the government spent more than their income from taxes, tolls etc]. As Chancellor of the Exchequer, then Prime Minister, Gordon Brown made a very quaint use of the word 'investment'. It has been normal for a couple of centuries [at least] to use the word 'spending' [or expenditure] to mean the amount that is spent on pay-as-you-go government activity, and the word 'investment' to mean spending on projects that have a net cost as they are undertaken, but which it is hoped will yield an economic or a social dividend - ideally, both - when they have been completed. Under Labour, this distinction was eliminated. 'Investment' was just part of current spending: it just sounded better to make it seem as if some future return was in mind.
Alongside this abuse of words [and of common sense] the Labour government introduced the wildly irresponsible PFI concept, by which a school or a hospital building [which could be seen as an investment for the long term, in the conventional understanding of the term] would be built by a private contractor who could then charge a rent for the building while it was in use. This crazy system meant that the contractors, and the funders with whom they formed consortia, would be able to take a high rent from the health service or the school governing body. In addition, many such contracts gave the builder the right to undertake all maintenance work - at their own 'costing' - for several years, at the expense of the user of the building. This obviously provided a massive drain on the income of the user organisation when the premises came into use. As the premises had often been designed many years before they came into use, the designs were often very much less that state-of-the-art when they became operational. Thus taxpayers were involuntarily having to meet these charges.
Thus, when the Tory-LibDem coalition came into power they were horrified at the 'out-of-control' public spending obligations that they confronted. They decided that the burgeoning annual deficit on the national budget must be reduced: then they experienced their own brainstorm, and decided that they must cut future spending projections by the state. Hence began the regime of 'austerity'. Under that regime, public spending has been held down; almost as a matter of faith.
This policy was imposed in 2010, just after the Bank of England had become used to administering its programme of Quantitative Easing, as explained in the previous two blogs. The orderly queue of bankers was allowed each to encash approved securities for new credit, which they could then spend as they wished. This meant that they could keep in being the securities whose existence had been threatened by the market crash of 2007-8 until they came to their term dates; and an increasing proportion of them could be sold once their face-value had been restored [more or less] within the highly flexible wholesale finance market. So while people running public services were increasingly constrained by what they could spend - including on wages and social benefits - the banks could lend more money to firms and to individuals. Not many firms needed to borrow from the banks: the successful among them could derive all the investment they needed from their profits and from share issues; the unsuccessful drew in their horns and hoped to survive. Furthermore, the government provided modest funds to help some classes of start-up and developing businesses [although most of the more successful of them fell prey to overseas takeover, whereupon the technological innovation that they embodied was alienated].
In both the public and the private sectors, wages were constrained; in the public sector by the austerity rules, which included either nil or 1% increases each year. The private sector was able to import staff from less high-wage countries, and a consensus of commentators accepted that the combination of immigration with the appallingly low level of skills among the indigenous British population kept wages low; in both cash terms and real terms. Hence after 2010, most people found that the only way to increase their spending on consumption was by borrowing. Loans and credit card debts were freely available, so people borrowed; largely to buy imported commodities. So the balance-or-payments deficit burgeoned, while the government struggled to keep public spending within the limits that Osborne and then Hammond vainly aimed to enforce. Unsecured household indebtedness increased, alongside the debt that the UK owed to the rest of the wThen it became apparent that QE had another perverse effect on ordinary people. After the financial crisis, new starts in house building had reduced to a record low level; and virtually nobody was building social housing. Thus the resale prices on existing properties increased: but with interest rates set at their lowest ever level by the Bank of England the cost of borrowing [per pound] seemed affordable. Cassandra-like warnings that people who had mortgaged their property heavily might not be able to maintain payments when interest rates rose received scant attention.To get a new home, people had to borrow the money to buy expensive new properties on terms that profitable to their constructors. Mortgages were freely available for house buyers with even modest incomes, thanks to QE and government schemes to enable a minority of first-time buyers to enter the market. The majority of would-be first time buyers could not find the cash deposit they needed to enter the housing market; and anyway their incomes, especially for those burdened by student loan debt, could not support the ongoing cost of house purchase. In addition to the existing poor, there was a growing cohort of nearly-poor, including many graduates. In the next blog I will examine the pattern of poverty in Mrs May's Brexit Britain, and relate it to QE and to austerity.
Alongside this abuse of words [and of common sense] the Labour government introduced the wildly irresponsible PFI concept, by which a school or a hospital building [which could be seen as an investment for the long term, in the conventional understanding of the term] would be built by a private contractor who could then charge a rent for the building while it was in use. This crazy system meant that the contractors, and the funders with whom they formed consortia, would be able to take a high rent from the health service or the school governing body. In addition, many such contracts gave the builder the right to undertake all maintenance work - at their own 'costing' - for several years, at the expense of the user of the building. This obviously provided a massive drain on the income of the user organisation when the premises came into use. As the premises had often been designed many years before they came into use, the designs were often very much less that state-of-the-art when they became operational. Thus taxpayers were involuntarily having to meet these charges.
Thus, when the Tory-LibDem coalition came into power they were horrified at the 'out-of-control' public spending obligations that they confronted. They decided that the burgeoning annual deficit on the national budget must be reduced: then they experienced their own brainstorm, and decided that they must cut future spending projections by the state. Hence began the regime of 'austerity'. Under that regime, public spending has been held down; almost as a matter of faith.
This policy was imposed in 2010, just after the Bank of England had become used to administering its programme of Quantitative Easing, as explained in the previous two blogs. The orderly queue of bankers was allowed each to encash approved securities for new credit, which they could then spend as they wished. This meant that they could keep in being the securities whose existence had been threatened by the market crash of 2007-8 until they came to their term dates; and an increasing proportion of them could be sold once their face-value had been restored [more or less] within the highly flexible wholesale finance market. So while people running public services were increasingly constrained by what they could spend - including on wages and social benefits - the banks could lend more money to firms and to individuals. Not many firms needed to borrow from the banks: the successful among them could derive all the investment they needed from their profits and from share issues; the unsuccessful drew in their horns and hoped to survive. Furthermore, the government provided modest funds to help some classes of start-up and developing businesses [although most of the more successful of them fell prey to overseas takeover, whereupon the technological innovation that they embodied was alienated].
In both the public and the private sectors, wages were constrained; in the public sector by the austerity rules, which included either nil or 1% increases each year. The private sector was able to import staff from less high-wage countries, and a consensus of commentators accepted that the combination of immigration with the appallingly low level of skills among the indigenous British population kept wages low; in both cash terms and real terms. Hence after 2010, most people found that the only way to increase their spending on consumption was by borrowing. Loans and credit card debts were freely available, so people borrowed; largely to buy imported commodities. So the balance-or-payments deficit burgeoned, while the government struggled to keep public spending within the limits that Osborne and then Hammond vainly aimed to enforce. Unsecured household indebtedness increased, alongside the debt that the UK owed to the rest of the wThen it became apparent that QE had another perverse effect on ordinary people. After the financial crisis, new starts in house building had reduced to a record low level; and virtually nobody was building social housing. Thus the resale prices on existing properties increased: but with interest rates set at their lowest ever level by the Bank of England the cost of borrowing [per pound] seemed affordable. Cassandra-like warnings that people who had mortgaged their property heavily might not be able to maintain payments when interest rates rose received scant attention.To get a new home, people had to borrow the money to buy expensive new properties on terms that profitable to their constructors. Mortgages were freely available for house buyers with even modest incomes, thanks to QE and government schemes to enable a minority of first-time buyers to enter the market. The majority of would-be first time buyers could not find the cash deposit they needed to enter the housing market; and anyway their incomes, especially for those burdened by student loan debt, could not support the ongoing cost of house purchase. In addition to the existing poor, there was a growing cohort of nearly-poor, including many graduates. In the next blog I will examine the pattern of poverty in Mrs May's Brexit Britain, and relate it to QE and to austerity.
Wednesday, 6 September 2017
Neither Econocrats Nor Brexiteers Understand Productiveness
The Archbishop of Canterbury had significant business experience in a major company before he was ordained, and can therefore speak on economic matters with at least equal authority to most Members of the House of Commons. As a member of a commission whose interim report has just been published, he has issued his own statement that declares the British model of managing the economy to be 'broken'. Living standards for the mass of the population have been static [on the average] and declining [for many] since the financial crisis ten years ago; and this is noted to be the longest period of stagnant earnings since the 'great depression' around 1870.
The interim report highlights the fact that has frequently been referred to in this blog: this issue of productiveness. It is well understood that productivity in British companies is some 20% below the more advanced European economies, and a greater productivity gap exists between the UK and the USA. Successive government members have wailed about it, and promised to do something about it; and they have not done so. The more important fact about productiveness has been ignored: and it is brilliantly summed up in the commission interim report. The British economy as a whole is recording more depreciation of productive resources than investment in new plant and equipment: if you tot up the notional 'value' of the amount of equipment that is abandoned or accepted as becoming obsolescent [and thus recorded in company and government accounts], that total exceeds the total spend on new equipment.
In real terms, in its capacity to support living material human beings, the British economy is shrinking: FACT!
But the government asserts that there is constant economic growth. Only a couple of years ago Britain's reported growth was boasted to be the fastest in the group of advanced economies. This blog pointed out that what is recorded in these figures is the fact that more money is spent on more transactions, at higher prices; and an increasing majority of these transactions that include a material component in the goods traded are handling imported commodities. Thus the balance of payments deficit increases.
Confronting the evidence accumulated by the commission, Treasury spokespersons affirm the growth rate, the fact that on the basis of national income figures the UK still is the 'fifth largest economy in the world', and the assertion that 'inequality' between socio-economic groups is reducing. You can claim anything with statistics, of course: but the issues of productivity and productiveness are fundamentals to an understanding of the economic system: which is certainly failing in Britain.
Two groups of people who ignore the concept of productiveness are the Econocracy - the professors of Economics, as characterised by a group of dissident students - and the 'hard Brexiteers' who lurk within the Conservative Party. These are they who encourage each other to believe that the economy will automatically grow much faster if Britain is freed from the constraints of the European Economic Area.They are utterly wrong. The world does not conform to Economists' models: all countries and communities are heavily protectionist when it suits them, not least in their protection of agriculture. All the evidence of real-world activity by human animals, as opposed to the specious models that can be produced from statistics of turnover in a UK economy whose money supply has massively been inflated by a decade of Quantitative Easing, is of dereliction, decay and decline.
Regrettably, this truth has to take a major part in the blog. One could hope that things were different: but they aren't.
The interim report highlights the fact that has frequently been referred to in this blog: this issue of productiveness. It is well understood that productivity in British companies is some 20% below the more advanced European economies, and a greater productivity gap exists between the UK and the USA. Successive government members have wailed about it, and promised to do something about it; and they have not done so. The more important fact about productiveness has been ignored: and it is brilliantly summed up in the commission interim report. The British economy as a whole is recording more depreciation of productive resources than investment in new plant and equipment: if you tot up the notional 'value' of the amount of equipment that is abandoned or accepted as becoming obsolescent [and thus recorded in company and government accounts], that total exceeds the total spend on new equipment.
In real terms, in its capacity to support living material human beings, the British economy is shrinking: FACT!
But the government asserts that there is constant economic growth. Only a couple of years ago Britain's reported growth was boasted to be the fastest in the group of advanced economies. This blog pointed out that what is recorded in these figures is the fact that more money is spent on more transactions, at higher prices; and an increasing majority of these transactions that include a material component in the goods traded are handling imported commodities. Thus the balance of payments deficit increases.
Confronting the evidence accumulated by the commission, Treasury spokespersons affirm the growth rate, the fact that on the basis of national income figures the UK still is the 'fifth largest economy in the world', and the assertion that 'inequality' between socio-economic groups is reducing. You can claim anything with statistics, of course: but the issues of productivity and productiveness are fundamentals to an understanding of the economic system: which is certainly failing in Britain.
Two groups of people who ignore the concept of productiveness are the Econocracy - the professors of Economics, as characterised by a group of dissident students - and the 'hard Brexiteers' who lurk within the Conservative Party. These are they who encourage each other to believe that the economy will automatically grow much faster if Britain is freed from the constraints of the European Economic Area.They are utterly wrong. The world does not conform to Economists' models: all countries and communities are heavily protectionist when it suits them, not least in their protection of agriculture. All the evidence of real-world activity by human animals, as opposed to the specious models that can be produced from statistics of turnover in a UK economy whose money supply has massively been inflated by a decade of Quantitative Easing, is of dereliction, decay and decline.
Regrettably, this truth has to take a major part in the blog. One could hope that things were different: but they aren't.
Sunday, 30 July 2017
The Very Basics
It is some time since I simply stated the basic assumption on which this blog is based. Although it was one of the earliest principles of Political Economy to be established, I have repeatedly cited Millicent Fawcett's introduction to the topic in her Political Economy for Beginners, which was published for use in the elementary schools which all children were legally enabled to attend under the Education Act of 1870. The book can be accessed on line via the Library of the University of California. I recently commented that it is highly appropriate that Mrs Fawcett is to become the first woman honoured with a statue in Parliament Square, Westminster.
It is a truism today that when the British economy comes under examination, there is a focus on the deplorably low productivity of employment in this country. Just scratch the surface of any such discussion, and the shocking fact emerges that productivity has scarcely improved [and in some sectors of the economy it has declined] since the financial crisis took hold in 2007.
When she mentioned productivity, Mrs Fawcett also dealt with productiveness; which is virtually never mentioned at all in the current discussions. Yet for Mrs Fawcett - as for me - it is the very key to understanding the basic economic problem that bedevils the country.
Productiveness means the extent to which any economic activity yields a surplus [of output, that can be converted to cash] that is used for investment. The investment may be applied to expanding or updating the plant that yielded the surplus, or to training the people who work there, or to recruiting better-skilled people; or it can be invested in other sectors of the economy. There are three main ways in which such cross-economy investment is facilitated:
1. by firms transferring profits from one part of the complex organisation to another, or
2. by the surplus being given to shareholders or bondholders as dividends or bonuses, which they can reinvest at their discretion,or
3. by firms that retain some profit as reserves or receivers of dividend depositing the money with banks, which the banks then lend to firms with ideas for expanding or improving production.
In any of the above circumstances, there is a realistic prospect that many [though not all] of the investments will improve the productivity of the sector in which the investment is made. Sometimes an investment fails, because it is wrongly timed, or a mistaken choice of technology is selected, or inept individuals are selected to manage the investment; or for a dozen other reasons: and the more risky the investment is, while it may yield spectacular returns, it also carries a higher degree of probability that it will fail.
The crucial fact is that the only way to raise productivity [and production] in general is if the productiveness of the system is properly understood and a sufficient proportion of the surplus that is generated sector by sector is applied optimally to investment in those sectors that will contribute most to the productivity and productiveness of the economy in the future. In simple terms, unless investment is the absolute focus of business thinking and of economic policy, the economy can not succeed optimally: because everybody in a decision-making role is looking in a wrong direction. Warren Buffet has become an international celebrity by persuading people to let him make investment decisions with their money; and by delivering excellent results [overall] for decades on end. Mrs Fawcett would have approved of him, strongly.
In Britain, especially since the crisis of 2007-8, profitable businesses have been piling up cash reserves and returning cash to investors [through special dividends and share buy-backs]. In the current circumstances, shareholders who receive these cash bonuses use them to meet current spending because real earned incomes have been tightening; rather than making their own independent investment decisions for the future. This situation has greatly been exacerbated by the combination of institutional and policy disasters that have meant that major investing institutions [such as pensions funds and insurers] are discouraged from making equity investments.
Economic policy has become a conspiracy against productiveness, rather than a stimulus to investment. That is contrary to the basics that Mrs Fawcett set out for elementary schoolchildren in 1870: and the shocking fact that cabinet ministers have no notion of the concept of productiveness is a wonderful measure of the intellectual regression through which Britain has descended since the nineteen-twenties, when fantasy Economics was allowed to supplant the truths of Political Economy: because simplified mathematical models were easier to teach than the complex inter-relationships that are exposed in Political Economy.
It is a truism today that when the British economy comes under examination, there is a focus on the deplorably low productivity of employment in this country. Just scratch the surface of any such discussion, and the shocking fact emerges that productivity has scarcely improved [and in some sectors of the economy it has declined] since the financial crisis took hold in 2007.
When she mentioned productivity, Mrs Fawcett also dealt with productiveness; which is virtually never mentioned at all in the current discussions. Yet for Mrs Fawcett - as for me - it is the very key to understanding the basic economic problem that bedevils the country.
Productiveness means the extent to which any economic activity yields a surplus [of output, that can be converted to cash] that is used for investment. The investment may be applied to expanding or updating the plant that yielded the surplus, or to training the people who work there, or to recruiting better-skilled people; or it can be invested in other sectors of the economy. There are three main ways in which such cross-economy investment is facilitated:
1. by firms transferring profits from one part of the complex organisation to another, or
2. by the surplus being given to shareholders or bondholders as dividends or bonuses, which they can reinvest at their discretion,or
3. by firms that retain some profit as reserves or receivers of dividend depositing the money with banks, which the banks then lend to firms with ideas for expanding or improving production.
In any of the above circumstances, there is a realistic prospect that many [though not all] of the investments will improve the productivity of the sector in which the investment is made. Sometimes an investment fails, because it is wrongly timed, or a mistaken choice of technology is selected, or inept individuals are selected to manage the investment; or for a dozen other reasons: and the more risky the investment is, while it may yield spectacular returns, it also carries a higher degree of probability that it will fail.
The crucial fact is that the only way to raise productivity [and production] in general is if the productiveness of the system is properly understood and a sufficient proportion of the surplus that is generated sector by sector is applied optimally to investment in those sectors that will contribute most to the productivity and productiveness of the economy in the future. In simple terms, unless investment is the absolute focus of business thinking and of economic policy, the economy can not succeed optimally: because everybody in a decision-making role is looking in a wrong direction. Warren Buffet has become an international celebrity by persuading people to let him make investment decisions with their money; and by delivering excellent results [overall] for decades on end. Mrs Fawcett would have approved of him, strongly.
In Britain, especially since the crisis of 2007-8, profitable businesses have been piling up cash reserves and returning cash to investors [through special dividends and share buy-backs]. In the current circumstances, shareholders who receive these cash bonuses use them to meet current spending because real earned incomes have been tightening; rather than making their own independent investment decisions for the future. This situation has greatly been exacerbated by the combination of institutional and policy disasters that have meant that major investing institutions [such as pensions funds and insurers] are discouraged from making equity investments.
Economic policy has become a conspiracy against productiveness, rather than a stimulus to investment. That is contrary to the basics that Mrs Fawcett set out for elementary schoolchildren in 1870: and the shocking fact that cabinet ministers have no notion of the concept of productiveness is a wonderful measure of the intellectual regression through which Britain has descended since the nineteen-twenties, when fantasy Economics was allowed to supplant the truths of Political Economy: because simplified mathematical models were easier to teach than the complex inter-relationships that are exposed in Political Economy.
Friday, 9 June 2017
What Is the Point?
I often ask myself, why do I make a daily post on this blog when virtually nobody reads it?
The answer is always the same: I can prove that I expressed my thoughts and views on specific dates. So, just as I can prove that I laid out exactly why there must inevitably be a crash in the global financial market [and especially in New York and London], over several months before it eventuated in 2007, I will be able to show how the failure of Mrs May's hubristic election campaign was predictable stage-by-stage over the past eight weeks.
Mr Corbyn showed a remarkable capability to stick to a script that was profoundly unlike his utterances over the previous four decades, and his party was rewarded with a mass of under-thirties' votes. It was essential that Corbyn kept to that brief - and wore suits and ties as he did so - and he obeyed advice [most likely, from his chum the Shadow Chancellor] to insist that the programme in the Labour Manifesto was 'fully costed', even though the possibility that their funding plan would meet the spending promises was nonexistent.
I now predict that we will not be entering a period of two-party politics such as is presented as the norm in simple textbooks on the British non-constitution. Instead, it will increasingly become clear that a majority of Brits would vote to separate the country from the political institutions of the EU - the Commission and the Parliament, where the UK has been treated with contempt since the Brexit vote. On the other hand, the more the implications are understood, the more idiotic Mrs May's talk of a 'hard Brexit' becomes. The idea that she could walk away from a 'bad deal' [which she has never defined, due to her lack of vision] and take the whole country into an economic wilderness - where she could be accepted as the New Mrs Moses - is very sick fantasy. Britain must remain within the European Economic space, preferably within EFTA which the UK helped to create while deGaulle was keeping us out the the then-EEC.
The Tories will have to show formal loyalty to Mrs May in the period during which she tries to bring solidity and stability to her shattered party.
Thus it falls to the other parties to seize the opportunity to shape a new consensus for the UK. They should not be embarrassed about proposing some of the same things as Donald Trump has offered Americans, especially massive investment largely funded by state-guaranteed borrowing. It the is underlying mantra of this blog that production of wealth in this country can only increase if we improve the productivity of our jobs, and that rising productivity can only be stimulated and sustained by emphasising the need for greater productiveness in all sectors. The majority of Conservative MPs are not idiots: they will recognise sense if it emerges through consensually agreed policies brought forward by other parties.
The key policies include:
Leave the EU political institutions.
Stay in the European Economic Area, preferably within EFTA [The European Free Trade Area].
Replace the Cameron-Osborne-Clegg austerity programme by a bold national investment and expansion plan.
Move towards a consensus on pensions, welfare and social care that is rationally affordable.
Move towards a national consensus on the funding and management of education: no new grammar schools, no more racketeering chains of academies, no tolerance of 'schools' where dogma is substituted for learning, and rigorous oversight of failing schools - combined with adequate funding in each case. Review the purpose of higher education, what is should provide, for whom, at what cost to the state and to individuals.
Fund the NHS properly, with rigorous accountability.
Restore adequate police and military protection for the nation.
The answer is always the same: I can prove that I expressed my thoughts and views on specific dates. So, just as I can prove that I laid out exactly why there must inevitably be a crash in the global financial market [and especially in New York and London], over several months before it eventuated in 2007, I will be able to show how the failure of Mrs May's hubristic election campaign was predictable stage-by-stage over the past eight weeks.
Mr Corbyn showed a remarkable capability to stick to a script that was profoundly unlike his utterances over the previous four decades, and his party was rewarded with a mass of under-thirties' votes. It was essential that Corbyn kept to that brief - and wore suits and ties as he did so - and he obeyed advice [most likely, from his chum the Shadow Chancellor] to insist that the programme in the Labour Manifesto was 'fully costed', even though the possibility that their funding plan would meet the spending promises was nonexistent.
I now predict that we will not be entering a period of two-party politics such as is presented as the norm in simple textbooks on the British non-constitution. Instead, it will increasingly become clear that a majority of Brits would vote to separate the country from the political institutions of the EU - the Commission and the Parliament, where the UK has been treated with contempt since the Brexit vote. On the other hand, the more the implications are understood, the more idiotic Mrs May's talk of a 'hard Brexit' becomes. The idea that she could walk away from a 'bad deal' [which she has never defined, due to her lack of vision] and take the whole country into an economic wilderness - where she could be accepted as the New Mrs Moses - is very sick fantasy. Britain must remain within the European Economic space, preferably within EFTA which the UK helped to create while deGaulle was keeping us out the the then-EEC.
The Tories will have to show formal loyalty to Mrs May in the period during which she tries to bring solidity and stability to her shattered party.
Thus it falls to the other parties to seize the opportunity to shape a new consensus for the UK. They should not be embarrassed about proposing some of the same things as Donald Trump has offered Americans, especially massive investment largely funded by state-guaranteed borrowing. It the is underlying mantra of this blog that production of wealth in this country can only increase if we improve the productivity of our jobs, and that rising productivity can only be stimulated and sustained by emphasising the need for greater productiveness in all sectors. The majority of Conservative MPs are not idiots: they will recognise sense if it emerges through consensually agreed policies brought forward by other parties.
The key policies include:
Leave the EU political institutions.
Stay in the European Economic Area, preferably within EFTA [The European Free Trade Area].
Replace the Cameron-Osborne-Clegg austerity programme by a bold national investment and expansion plan.
Move towards a consensus on pensions, welfare and social care that is rationally affordable.
Move towards a national consensus on the funding and management of education: no new grammar schools, no more racketeering chains of academies, no tolerance of 'schools' where dogma is substituted for learning, and rigorous oversight of failing schools - combined with adequate funding in each case. Review the purpose of higher education, what is should provide, for whom, at what cost to the state and to individuals.
Fund the NHS properly, with rigorous accountability.
Restore adequate police and military protection for the nation.
Sunday, 4 June 2017
No Safe Haven
I sit down to write this blog entry at seven o'clock on a bright and tranquil Sunday morning. But I am acutely aware that I am exactly one mile from Tower Bridge, where the latest reported terrorist incident occurred. When I went to bed last night, it was being reported that all three killers had themselves been shot by the police; within half an hour of the first call being made to the emergency services.
The assailants, who had been armed with knives, had apparently said; in English: "This is for Allah!" as they stabbed people at random.
Although my flat is on the north bank of the Thames, many of my friends and neighbours regularly go to Borough High Street and Borough Market [as I do]; it is an easily accessible place for dining and shopping. It is quite likely that in the coming days I will learn that someone I know is a victim of the incident; but now it is most important to give consideration to all the people who were victims of the attack and to their families.
It is usual to say - and to mean - after such incidents that 'we are not afraid', 'we will not be intimidated'. Yet there will be an intensification of the admonitions to be on our guard and to report anything suspicious. The pressure on the police will intensify, and this pathetic government will try to cut some other aspect of public spending to pay for some increase in the security services.
It is likely that shoddy plans to reduce still further the number of soldiers and sailors and airforce personnel will be hardened to cover some of the funding gap; thus ensuring that the UK is even less likely to be able contribute sufficiently to the growing threats to peace and security around the world.
The current General Election is increasingly being recognised as a surreal event. The Conservatives have almost no policies, relying on the silly notion that the nation can be made to trust the prime minister to dream up policies that she has not yet enunciated, once she is returned to power. Meanwhile Mrs May is making an appeal to 'hard-working families' to support her, despite the fact that the social and community services around them have savagely been cut: and more cuts are promised. The Conservatives have abandoned their usual attempt to woo 'the business community', despite the fact that they are again generously being supported by backers who believe that the Tories are still a less-bad option than the Labour Party.
Mrs May has returned to Downing Street to be able to appear 'prime ministerial' as she makes statements of the usual vacuity and chairs a meeting of the COBRA committee that has command of no additional resources with which to enhance the security of the country.
The paradox of the election is that Labour's plans to re-energise the economy could produce resources both to strengthen industry and to fund more resources for the security services and the police. Only by investing in the growth of the economy can our society secure its future. For centuries, the state has been a major investor; often through militarily investment, but also in the nationalised industries when the UK had a functioning 'mixed economy': that was not a golden age, but it was infinitely more comfortable for hard-working families than is Mrs May's depressing environment of cuts and dissimulation.
The assailants, who had been armed with knives, had apparently said; in English: "This is for Allah!" as they stabbed people at random.
Although my flat is on the north bank of the Thames, many of my friends and neighbours regularly go to Borough High Street and Borough Market [as I do]; it is an easily accessible place for dining and shopping. It is quite likely that in the coming days I will learn that someone I know is a victim of the incident; but now it is most important to give consideration to all the people who were victims of the attack and to their families.
It is usual to say - and to mean - after such incidents that 'we are not afraid', 'we will not be intimidated'. Yet there will be an intensification of the admonitions to be on our guard and to report anything suspicious. The pressure on the police will intensify, and this pathetic government will try to cut some other aspect of public spending to pay for some increase in the security services.
It is likely that shoddy plans to reduce still further the number of soldiers and sailors and airforce personnel will be hardened to cover some of the funding gap; thus ensuring that the UK is even less likely to be able contribute sufficiently to the growing threats to peace and security around the world.
The current General Election is increasingly being recognised as a surreal event. The Conservatives have almost no policies, relying on the silly notion that the nation can be made to trust the prime minister to dream up policies that she has not yet enunciated, once she is returned to power. Meanwhile Mrs May is making an appeal to 'hard-working families' to support her, despite the fact that the social and community services around them have savagely been cut: and more cuts are promised. The Conservatives have abandoned their usual attempt to woo 'the business community', despite the fact that they are again generously being supported by backers who believe that the Tories are still a less-bad option than the Labour Party.
Mrs May has returned to Downing Street to be able to appear 'prime ministerial' as she makes statements of the usual vacuity and chairs a meeting of the COBRA committee that has command of no additional resources with which to enhance the security of the country.
The paradox of the election is that Labour's plans to re-energise the economy could produce resources both to strengthen industry and to fund more resources for the security services and the police. Only by investing in the growth of the economy can our society secure its future. For centuries, the state has been a major investor; often through militarily investment, but also in the nationalised industries when the UK had a functioning 'mixed economy': that was not a golden age, but it was infinitely more comfortable for hard-working families than is Mrs May's depressing environment of cuts and dissimulation.
Wednesday, 17 May 2017
Productiveness, Science and Politics
In the book that is promoted in the strapline of this blog, I emphasise the difference that several great nineteenth-century political economists made between productivity and productiveness. Millicent Fawcett, whose statue will soon be unveiled at Parliament Square [the first woman to so be honoured] was an advocate of the distinction, though it is not for her achievements in economic science that she is to become a permanent feature of Westminster.
Productivity means the measured output achieved in a set time from a defined economic activity, set against the cost of the measured inputs: for example, the cost of one hour of one worker's time, plus all the resources required to enable that worker to be effective, set against the estimated 'value' of the output achieved in that hour. I have often pointed out, that a high level of productivity can be achieved by workers who unpack and sell cheap imported clothing: but their work serves to increase the balance of payments deficit and, insofar as the shop's customers borrow money to buy the clothes it increase net personal debt. The turnover of the business that employs these people is included in the national income statistics, and if that turnover increases year after year this shows 'growth' of the business [and is a potential contributor to claimed overall 'economic growth'] while its long-term detriment to the economy is obvious.
Many modern Economists argue that it is not detrimental to an economy if the country buys cheap clothes from other countries, provided it sells them high-tech exports: and that can be true, provided the overall balance of trade is favourable. When the balance of payments is adverse to a country, however, as is the case of the UK, every extension of the deficit is potentially painful [and eventually some trivial import could trigger a catastrophic recognition by global commentators - perhaps in a rating agency - that the country's situation is irrecoverable under the present regime].
Hence comes the importance of productiveness, the business outcome that meets all the costs actual production, plus providing a significant surplus to fund expansion of the factories that produce the surplus, and/or t fund research to devise even better and more innovative products by the firm, and/or to pay high returns to banks and other investors in the firm who can allocate their enhanced income flow to investments in other firms that can have innovative new products and techniques to offer, and/or some of the surplus can be paid as higher workers' wages and increased shareholders' dividends, giving individuals the power to buy the new and improved products. The more money consumers can use at their discretion to buy the products that they most prefer, that will help to steer the next generation of investment into the most lucrative channels, leading to the most successful firms in the market to have the highest level of productiveness.
Most innovation requires scientific input: new applications of proven techniques, modification of techniques, new computer applications, and new materials. A country must have a sufficient output of science graduates and high-level technical experts to serve these activities; and that must be backed up by the highest level of research.
In the current UK election, some lip-service is paid in passing to a perceived need to maintain the science base on which much of Britain's surviving material export industry depends [and which could be threatened by massive tax increases on both firms and on key employees]; but there is a tendency by politicians of all parties to put in the 'too difficult' tray the whole issue of how badly the scientific community can be harmed by a crass approach to Brexit. This key aspect of achieving greater productiveness is not at all understood, anywhere in the political class. Oh dear!
Productivity means the measured output achieved in a set time from a defined economic activity, set against the cost of the measured inputs: for example, the cost of one hour of one worker's time, plus all the resources required to enable that worker to be effective, set against the estimated 'value' of the output achieved in that hour. I have often pointed out, that a high level of productivity can be achieved by workers who unpack and sell cheap imported clothing: but their work serves to increase the balance of payments deficit and, insofar as the shop's customers borrow money to buy the clothes it increase net personal debt. The turnover of the business that employs these people is included in the national income statistics, and if that turnover increases year after year this shows 'growth' of the business [and is a potential contributor to claimed overall 'economic growth'] while its long-term detriment to the economy is obvious.
Many modern Economists argue that it is not detrimental to an economy if the country buys cheap clothes from other countries, provided it sells them high-tech exports: and that can be true, provided the overall balance of trade is favourable. When the balance of payments is adverse to a country, however, as is the case of the UK, every extension of the deficit is potentially painful [and eventually some trivial import could trigger a catastrophic recognition by global commentators - perhaps in a rating agency - that the country's situation is irrecoverable under the present regime].
Hence comes the importance of productiveness, the business outcome that meets all the costs actual production, plus providing a significant surplus to fund expansion of the factories that produce the surplus, and/or t fund research to devise even better and more innovative products by the firm, and/or to pay high returns to banks and other investors in the firm who can allocate their enhanced income flow to investments in other firms that can have innovative new products and techniques to offer, and/or some of the surplus can be paid as higher workers' wages and increased shareholders' dividends, giving individuals the power to buy the new and improved products. The more money consumers can use at their discretion to buy the products that they most prefer, that will help to steer the next generation of investment into the most lucrative channels, leading to the most successful firms in the market to have the highest level of productiveness.
Most innovation requires scientific input: new applications of proven techniques, modification of techniques, new computer applications, and new materials. A country must have a sufficient output of science graduates and high-level technical experts to serve these activities; and that must be backed up by the highest level of research.
In the current UK election, some lip-service is paid in passing to a perceived need to maintain the science base on which much of Britain's surviving material export industry depends [and which could be threatened by massive tax increases on both firms and on key employees]; but there is a tendency by politicians of all parties to put in the 'too difficult' tray the whole issue of how badly the scientific community can be harmed by a crass approach to Brexit. This key aspect of achieving greater productiveness is not at all understood, anywhere in the political class. Oh dear!
Sunday, 23 September 2012
'Fair' taxation
In the United States, Britain and France - in particular - there is a debate about 'fair' taxation which is on the verge of reaching crisis proportions. In all three countries, there is deep concern about the need for economic growth to lead the economy out of recession. Growth comes from investment. A minority of the population directly contribute to investment by putting their savings and some of their income into shares and bonds that provide funds for commerce and industry; and a diminishing proportion of the population make indirect investments in shares and bonds through collective savings funds such as voluntary pensions schemes and insurance reserves. The inept extension of taxation of pension funds by Gordon Brown in the UK [combined with the disastrous ineptitude of the actuaries] has devastated the value of pensions, and thus has destroyed public confidence in the merit of saving through such funds, which have a much lower take-up than in previous decades. A compulsory state scheme will not correct this situation: it will merely produce pension 'pots' that are so small that they will have no impact on the growing disaster of pensioner poverty.
Investment by richer individuals has always been essential for economic growth to occur in any free society. In centrally planned authoritarian states, much of investment is wasted because a small cohort of bureaucrats cannot have the sensitivity to economic possibilities, and to adverse trends in productivity and the desirableness of products, that a wide range of personal investors can achieve. The optimisation of investment is only achieved by personal decision. There is now a hugely powerful intellectually-led movement to increase taxation of the rich - and thus to reduce the quantum and the selectivity of investment - on the idiotic ground that higher and higher taxation of the relatively 'rich' is intrinsically 'fair' and therefore appropriate. Some advocates of such taxation regard widening and intensifying the ruinous taxation as the most important cause in politics. The Obama Democrats in the USA and the Liberal Democrats in Britain and the Socialists who have quickly become querulous with their new president in France are all devotees of the doctrine that the investable funds should be grabbed from the relatively 'rich' and disbursed as immediate spending-power to the relatively 'poor'. This is an intensification of the ruinous policies that have helped to bring their economies into a condition of low growth and high 'welfare' spending. As long as this nonsense is prevalent, real economic capability will be destroyed and the potential of the economies to give their people real welfare will continue to decline.
There is also a socially divisive component to this issue. Class conflict is being promoted, with the classes defined in terms of tax-bands applied to incomes or to assets. People who do not declare earnings large enough to be required to pay tax on them are to be more explicitly defined as 'disadvantaged' or 'deprived' and [according the British Liberal Democrats] 'the rich' who earn more that £50,000 a year are to be taxed to transfer money to the 'deprived'; and then their assets will be valued and subjected to a further levy. If that levy is met from income their income will doubly have been diminished: their consumption and their potential to invest will be reduced - both inflicting direct damage on the economy; and if the levy is met by asset sales, leading to a mass sell-of of a range of assets [both material and financial assets] their prices will fall with further detriment to the economy. To this idiocy the same politicians are adding the notion that young people should be able to enter the housing markets by having the deposits on their houses secured by their parents' and grandparents' 'pension pots'. The funds that people hold in their pension funds are vastly reduced by the crass policies of the past two decades; and now they are being challenged to risk the loss of those funds altogether - and to face old-age poverty - if they take up the new scheme. If they decline to do so, there will be serious discord in families: if they do comply, they will be constrained in how much pension they can draw by the contractual form of the guarantee; and if there is another house-price slump they may loose their pension assets when the property is repossessed. Even if the housing market holds up, it is obscure as to how many years the guarantee [and therefore the restriction on the pension fund] will be maintained. None of this looks like constructive social engineering: it would be crude exploitation of the relatively-thrifty, leading to massive destruction of accumulated wealth.
Investment by richer individuals has always been essential for economic growth to occur in any free society. In centrally planned authoritarian states, much of investment is wasted because a small cohort of bureaucrats cannot have the sensitivity to economic possibilities, and to adverse trends in productivity and the desirableness of products, that a wide range of personal investors can achieve. The optimisation of investment is only achieved by personal decision. There is now a hugely powerful intellectually-led movement to increase taxation of the rich - and thus to reduce the quantum and the selectivity of investment - on the idiotic ground that higher and higher taxation of the relatively 'rich' is intrinsically 'fair' and therefore appropriate. Some advocates of such taxation regard widening and intensifying the ruinous taxation as the most important cause in politics. The Obama Democrats in the USA and the Liberal Democrats in Britain and the Socialists who have quickly become querulous with their new president in France are all devotees of the doctrine that the investable funds should be grabbed from the relatively 'rich' and disbursed as immediate spending-power to the relatively 'poor'. This is an intensification of the ruinous policies that have helped to bring their economies into a condition of low growth and high 'welfare' spending. As long as this nonsense is prevalent, real economic capability will be destroyed and the potential of the economies to give their people real welfare will continue to decline.
There is also a socially divisive component to this issue. Class conflict is being promoted, with the classes defined in terms of tax-bands applied to incomes or to assets. People who do not declare earnings large enough to be required to pay tax on them are to be more explicitly defined as 'disadvantaged' or 'deprived' and [according the British Liberal Democrats] 'the rich' who earn more that £50,000 a year are to be taxed to transfer money to the 'deprived'; and then their assets will be valued and subjected to a further levy. If that levy is met from income their income will doubly have been diminished: their consumption and their potential to invest will be reduced - both inflicting direct damage on the economy; and if the levy is met by asset sales, leading to a mass sell-of of a range of assets [both material and financial assets] their prices will fall with further detriment to the economy. To this idiocy the same politicians are adding the notion that young people should be able to enter the housing markets by having the deposits on their houses secured by their parents' and grandparents' 'pension pots'. The funds that people hold in their pension funds are vastly reduced by the crass policies of the past two decades; and now they are being challenged to risk the loss of those funds altogether - and to face old-age poverty - if they take up the new scheme. If they decline to do so, there will be serious discord in families: if they do comply, they will be constrained in how much pension they can draw by the contractual form of the guarantee; and if there is another house-price slump they may loose their pension assets when the property is repossessed. Even if the housing market holds up, it is obscure as to how many years the guarantee [and therefore the restriction on the pension fund] will be maintained. None of this looks like constructive social engineering: it would be crude exploitation of the relatively-thrifty, leading to massive destruction of accumulated wealth.
Thursday, 2 August 2012
Four London Markets
Until the so-called 'big bang' in the middle of the nineteen eighties there was a complex of specialist markets: retail and wholesale insurance, retail and business banking, building societies, pension funds, investment management, stock broking, stock jobbing, bond trading, bill trading and several others. Some merchant banks covered a range of these functions; but they all kept clear of retail banking and of all categories of insurance. After the bang most of the non-insurance functions were pretty quickly subsumed into large conglomerates: as a general rule, only the firms that remained under the control of families stuck to a selected range of specialist functions, while the majority leapt into a spectrum of activities that was so broad that the central board of directors could not possibly hope to maintain adequate oversight.
That all came unstuck in 2007-8 and now there is mounting tension between the City of London, weakly 'supported' by the UK government, and the Commission of the European Union who want to impose common methods of regulation and taxation over all finance sectors in all EU member states [and not just the eurozone]. The press is slowly becoming cognisant that insurance will became increasingly expensive if absurd rules of reserving - which may be relevant for banking - are imposed on insurers, More recently feature articles and leaders have been written on the crazy proposal that pension funds should similarly be undermined; shrinking the value of all past and future pension contributions and building up a huge increase in old-age poverty for the future.
It is now urgent and vitally important that the UK government - and, in this, the Labour opposition should declare complete support for the position - declares unconditionally that they will protect the interests of investors, savers [including contributors to pension funds] and those who wish prudently to insure their assets in a rational and affordable system.
It is also crucially important for the survivial of the economy that the international earnings of the financial industries are at least maintained. Assuming that the irrational and irresponsible system of giving traders bonuses proportional to turnover [however risky] rather than on the basis of achieved real profits is replaced by a more rational system of remuneration, it is likely that the income-tax yield from the City will decline hugely; and alternative sources of government revenue will urgently be required if the national deficit is to be diminished. If the historic and entirely rational requirement for reserving by insurers is maintained [and if the daft actuarial preference for bond over equity investment is set aside] that sector can remain the world leader. The Vickers Commission's recommendation that 'retail' banking should be separated [in regulatory terms, if not by separation of ownership - though that would be desirable] from 'wholesale' has been accepted by the government and should be implemented: though fears of the government compromising and thus undermining the separation are mounting. Given that Vickers will, to some limited extent, be implemented, attention should then be focussed on driving genuine wedges between materially useful merchant banking and the huge mass of activity that is appropriately called 'casino banking'.
Before the intrusion of modern Economics in the eighteen-seventies, Political Economists had tought - correctly - that a distinction should be draen between 'productive' and unproductive investment. Productive investment laid down the basis for more production in the future; unproductive investment provided products that were consumed in ways that did not put anything into future economic activity. That distinction should be restored, and those wholesale financial activities that conduce to the facilitation of productive investment should be in one category [let us call it merchant banking] and those that manage purely speculative finance or hedge financial deals unrelated to material economic capital formation [casino finance] should be in another category. Merchant banking should be regulated and taxed as banking is managed by governments all over the world. Casino finance should be registered, regulated and taxed for what it is: betting. Just as appropriate regulation and taxation have made London casinos popular among global high rollers, and the retail British betting industry has been highly successful, so both face-to-face and online finance gambling in futures, derivatives, short-selling [of shares not owned by the sellers] should be legalised and regulated and taxed as a great British business. Before anyone else does it, the City should develop on its great tradition as the magnet for an expanding global trade in bets, which is what most of the turnover was before the crunch. The credit crisis has arisen largely because governments mistakenly adopted and monetised the so-called "banks'" gambling debts; and part of Britain's way out of the mess can be speeded by optimising on the existing City expertise.
In due course, real productive investment must enable industry [including creative industrial sectors] to grow and provide an increasing part of the national product; but for a quick fix the opening of the casino finance business - on an open and honest basis - is the primary feasible option.
That all came unstuck in 2007-8 and now there is mounting tension between the City of London, weakly 'supported' by the UK government, and the Commission of the European Union who want to impose common methods of regulation and taxation over all finance sectors in all EU member states [and not just the eurozone]. The press is slowly becoming cognisant that insurance will became increasingly expensive if absurd rules of reserving - which may be relevant for banking - are imposed on insurers, More recently feature articles and leaders have been written on the crazy proposal that pension funds should similarly be undermined; shrinking the value of all past and future pension contributions and building up a huge increase in old-age poverty for the future.
It is now urgent and vitally important that the UK government - and, in this, the Labour opposition should declare complete support for the position - declares unconditionally that they will protect the interests of investors, savers [including contributors to pension funds] and those who wish prudently to insure their assets in a rational and affordable system.
It is also crucially important for the survivial of the economy that the international earnings of the financial industries are at least maintained. Assuming that the irrational and irresponsible system of giving traders bonuses proportional to turnover [however risky] rather than on the basis of achieved real profits is replaced by a more rational system of remuneration, it is likely that the income-tax yield from the City will decline hugely; and alternative sources of government revenue will urgently be required if the national deficit is to be diminished. If the historic and entirely rational requirement for reserving by insurers is maintained [and if the daft actuarial preference for bond over equity investment is set aside] that sector can remain the world leader. The Vickers Commission's recommendation that 'retail' banking should be separated [in regulatory terms, if not by separation of ownership - though that would be desirable] from 'wholesale' has been accepted by the government and should be implemented: though fears of the government compromising and thus undermining the separation are mounting. Given that Vickers will, to some limited extent, be implemented, attention should then be focussed on driving genuine wedges between materially useful merchant banking and the huge mass of activity that is appropriately called 'casino banking'.
Before the intrusion of modern Economics in the eighteen-seventies, Political Economists had tought - correctly - that a distinction should be draen between 'productive' and unproductive investment. Productive investment laid down the basis for more production in the future; unproductive investment provided products that were consumed in ways that did not put anything into future economic activity. That distinction should be restored, and those wholesale financial activities that conduce to the facilitation of productive investment should be in one category [let us call it merchant banking] and those that manage purely speculative finance or hedge financial deals unrelated to material economic capital formation [casino finance] should be in another category. Merchant banking should be regulated and taxed as banking is managed by governments all over the world. Casino finance should be registered, regulated and taxed for what it is: betting. Just as appropriate regulation and taxation have made London casinos popular among global high rollers, and the retail British betting industry has been highly successful, so both face-to-face and online finance gambling in futures, derivatives, short-selling [of shares not owned by the sellers] should be legalised and regulated and taxed as a great British business. Before anyone else does it, the City should develop on its great tradition as the magnet for an expanding global trade in bets, which is what most of the turnover was before the crunch. The credit crisis has arisen largely because governments mistakenly adopted and monetised the so-called "banks'" gambling debts; and part of Britain's way out of the mess can be speeded by optimising on the existing City expertise.
In due course, real productive investment must enable industry [including creative industrial sectors] to grow and provide an increasing part of the national product; but for a quick fix the opening of the casino finance business - on an open and honest basis - is the primary feasible option.
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