It is inevitable that the entire Economics establishment is critical of the new US tax regime that will [almost certainly] be approved by Congress today.
The package largely restores Mercantilism to fashion: that is, the idea that a country should build up its own commerce and industry, and only trade with others where there is an obvious advantage in doing so. It is significant that among the tax reductions there is a swingeing decrease in the tax on funds that are earned for the sale of intellectual property abroad. This can only strengthen the technology giants as exporters and earners, who will bring more of their overseas earnings into the USA for investment in new developments, the purchase of foreign intellectual property [UK beware!] and distribution in the USA as wages and dividend payments.
The Econocracy has been inculcated with the contrary view, that 'Free Trade' is an ideal to be pursued: as if any sane government would expose a country to imports from the rest of the world regardless of whether the prices charged are set deliberately to undercut - and ultimately to destroy - the native industry. The econocratic view has been prominent since 1766 [Adam Smith's year of publication] and predominant since 1890 [Alfred Marshall's Principles of Economics]. Britain's economic decline is pretty well coterminous with the adoption of Marshall's dogma in the universities between 1920 and 1940. That whole mindset needs to be swept away.
The great proof of the new Republican policies will be the extent to which the increasing US deficit supports growth of the US economy. If the economy is growing at a greater rate than the accumulated debt is growing, the ratio of debt to GDP will be declining, which will signify success and be the final proof of the extreme disutility of conventional Economics.
I am working slowly trough my text, and finding it a very depressing experience: the sheer pompousity of my style upsets me hugely: no wonder the last effort did not sell!
Showing posts with label Econocracy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Econocracy. Show all posts
Wednesday, 20 December 2017
Friday, 3 November 2017
Some Distinguished Economists
I remember a time when the Econocracy had not yet emerged. Economics was beginning to flounder, as the NeoKeynesian orthodoxy that had been established in the nineteen fifties began to reveal its fallibility in the emergence of excess inflation in the 'sixties; which was to lead to the chaos of the 'seventies and the rise of Monetarism that paved the way for the free marketeers who were the founders of the Econocratic hegemony that currently prevails.
For any reader who might happen upon this blog, and wonder what planet I am writing from, I explain that the term Econocracy has been created by the Post Crash Economics Society, a Manchester-based student movement that has successfully challenged the prevailing orthodoxy in formal Economics that has given us the 2007-9 crash, declining living standards, decayed industry, an intractable balance of payments deficit, austerity and [in a public backlash] the Brexit calamity. The Econocrats are the professors and established lecturers, senior lecturers, readers who demand of their students credulous adherence to the dogmas that have led to the ills in society and the economy that have just been listed. The Manchester group have produced the book - Econocracy -in which they explain the term in its context. They have also published research that shows how closely most university courses follow the 'official' line.
I was fortunate to pass through a university system that was vastly smaller than it is today: fewer than forty fully-fledged UK universities, and many of them had only one professor of Economics and up to six other teachers. I find it astonishing now to look back into old university Calendars and find that whole degrees were delivered by teams as small as four academics. The Great Man of the 'Economics profession' was Sir John Hicks [the first British recipient of the pseudo-Nobel prize], but the dominant individuals who decided who got appointed to which vacant chair in Economics were Lionel Robbins [Lord Robbins of Clare Market] the unchallenged boss-man of the LSE and Charles Carter, founder VC of Lancaster University and editor-in-chief of the highly influential Economic Journal.
Typically, syllabuses contained an element of Economic History [which would greatly benefit the students of today] and also a paper on the History of Economic Thought. Mathematical aspects were not prominent, and could often be avoided: in my own university it was even possible to evade the simple Statistics course by opting for Ethics. By 1945 all universities [so far as I know] had supplanted JS Mill as the basic source text by Alfred Marshall's Economics, and they all taught about Neo-Keynesian macroeconomics. Paul A Samuelson and JK Galbraith were the best sellers among a raft of fat textbooks that combined those two syllabus areas; and when I joined the University of Sheffield as a research fellow there was a well-established game by which students tracked Prof JC Gilbert's lectures through the textbooks.
One great characteristic of the small number of leading professors of the subject was their difference in emphasis and research orientation. Bob Black at Belfast, Terence Hutcheson at Birmingham, and Ron Meek in Leicester provided a choice of interpretations that is painfully lacking today. Mark Blaug, though he went through much of his career in the shadow of Lord Robbins, was a good independent scholar. It is very sad for the subject and for the country that such a range of talent is not available today.
For any reader who might happen upon this blog, and wonder what planet I am writing from, I explain that the term Econocracy has been created by the Post Crash Economics Society, a Manchester-based student movement that has successfully challenged the prevailing orthodoxy in formal Economics that has given us the 2007-9 crash, declining living standards, decayed industry, an intractable balance of payments deficit, austerity and [in a public backlash] the Brexit calamity. The Econocrats are the professors and established lecturers, senior lecturers, readers who demand of their students credulous adherence to the dogmas that have led to the ills in society and the economy that have just been listed. The Manchester group have produced the book - Econocracy -in which they explain the term in its context. They have also published research that shows how closely most university courses follow the 'official' line.
I was fortunate to pass through a university system that was vastly smaller than it is today: fewer than forty fully-fledged UK universities, and many of them had only one professor of Economics and up to six other teachers. I find it astonishing now to look back into old university Calendars and find that whole degrees were delivered by teams as small as four academics. The Great Man of the 'Economics profession' was Sir John Hicks [the first British recipient of the pseudo-Nobel prize], but the dominant individuals who decided who got appointed to which vacant chair in Economics were Lionel Robbins [Lord Robbins of Clare Market] the unchallenged boss-man of the LSE and Charles Carter, founder VC of Lancaster University and editor-in-chief of the highly influential Economic Journal.
Typically, syllabuses contained an element of Economic History [which would greatly benefit the students of today] and also a paper on the History of Economic Thought. Mathematical aspects were not prominent, and could often be avoided: in my own university it was even possible to evade the simple Statistics course by opting for Ethics. By 1945 all universities [so far as I know] had supplanted JS Mill as the basic source text by Alfred Marshall's Economics, and they all taught about Neo-Keynesian macroeconomics. Paul A Samuelson and JK Galbraith were the best sellers among a raft of fat textbooks that combined those two syllabus areas; and when I joined the University of Sheffield as a research fellow there was a well-established game by which students tracked Prof JC Gilbert's lectures through the textbooks.
One great characteristic of the small number of leading professors of the subject was their difference in emphasis and research orientation. Bob Black at Belfast, Terence Hutcheson at Birmingham, and Ron Meek in Leicester provided a choice of interpretations that is painfully lacking today. Mark Blaug, though he went through much of his career in the shadow of Lord Robbins, was a good independent scholar. It is very sad for the subject and for the country that such a range of talent is not available today.
Wednesday, 25 October 2017
Sprinklers: A Key Indicator of Economic and Social Wellbeing
I have rabbited on about sprinklers in buildings on several occasions in the past, most notably in the context of the Grenfell Tower disaster in Kensington. I do it today in the context of another issue that has surfaced in the media in the past 24 hours: namely the fact - as officially recorded - that fewer new schools are built with sprinkler systems than in past decades.
Sprinklers are devices to produce a heavy shower of water inside a building that is on fire, and if they are properly installed to a good design [and an appropriate specification of devices used] they massively reduce the risk of destruction of the contents of the building and of death and serious damage to people and animals. There are advanced techniques for drying-out water-damaged assets.
The aspect of the prevalent free-markets dogma that is most directly damaging to human beings is the reduction and removal of controls that prevent dangerous structures and situations from being permitted. There was an almost-golden age of safety in factories and public buildings, when the local fire brigade had the power to insist that safety systems like supplementary escape staircases and sprinkler systems had to be installed in a building before it was granted a 'fire certificate' that permitted a range of uses of the premises. Buildings with fire certificates were usually acceptable to be insured - with their contents, including liabilities to people and to other entities than the owner or operator of the building - but nevertheless the insurance companies employed their own Inspectors who could enter the premises and check that safety systems, including sprinklers, were appropriate and properly maintained and fully functional. That last sentence is important, because it is possible to have a well-designed system that is regularly inspected but which can be switched off [or the water turned off] by human oversight or negligence: or as part of the preparations for a fraudulent insurance claim for loss of goods kept in the building which were burned in a fire where the sprinklers 'failed to operate'.
The free marketeers have been dominant in the United Kingdom since the Labour government submitted to the International Monetary Fund [IMF] in 1976: in return for being allowed a loan which was intended to 'stabilise' the external value of the pound sterling during a period of extremely high inflation and 'industrial strife', the Callaghan government accepted [very reluctantly] the free-market dogma that the Thatcher regime was to embrace after their election victory in 1979. On that reckoning, the free markets dogmatists - the Econocracy - have dominated society and the economy for forty-one years [though I have pointed out several times that 364 then-practicing Economists signed a letter to the Times in 1982 rejecting the dogma that was to gain hegemony by 2002].
The period since the autumn of 1976 is exactly the period of Britain's absolute decline as a manufacturing country. We have wantonly destroyed coal mining, most steelmaking, large-scale commercial shipbuilding, our separate aircraft industry, the mass production of textiles and most of the armaments industry [including even the capacity to supply uniforms for a mass military]. The economy has grown because new industries have arisen in high technology such as pharmaceuticals and microprocessors, and in the games and the entertainments industries; due to the brilliance of British inventors, some of them in the university system. The balance of payments deficit has been mitigated by sales of much of the new intellectual property to aliens.
At least equally important for the growth of the economy has been the expansion of government and personal debt. Some of the government's debt has been hidden from the official balance sheet, for example in the PFI schemes by which schools and hospitals have been built and funded by businesses on the understanding that the government [or agencies including the NHS and local authorities and their semi-independent social housing departments] will pay for the use of those buildings when complete. Those charges will for decades to come be paid out of the users' annual budgets; and the debt that would otherwise be required to build them is not listed in the public accounts.
In order to pare bits of expenditure off the public accounts, both from the admitted debt for construction and from the the running costs of premises, devices like sprinklers have been made optional. Building operators - including providers of social housing and free schools and the trusts that manage [and profit from] 'academies' - are exempted from costly requirements such as installing and maintaining sprinklers. Thus the 'economic burden' of building and operating the facilities is reduced: and so is the safety and utility of the premises.
The extreme shabbiness of this policy has rightly been attacked by the Commissioner of the London Fire Brigade, Dany Cotton. Human lives - even those of children is school and in care - are at unnecessary risk: due to the implementation of policies directly derived from Econocratic dogma. Thus has Economics become directly and fundamentally inhumane.
Sprinklers are devices to produce a heavy shower of water inside a building that is on fire, and if they are properly installed to a good design [and an appropriate specification of devices used] they massively reduce the risk of destruction of the contents of the building and of death and serious damage to people and animals. There are advanced techniques for drying-out water-damaged assets.
The aspect of the prevalent free-markets dogma that is most directly damaging to human beings is the reduction and removal of controls that prevent dangerous structures and situations from being permitted. There was an almost-golden age of safety in factories and public buildings, when the local fire brigade had the power to insist that safety systems like supplementary escape staircases and sprinkler systems had to be installed in a building before it was granted a 'fire certificate' that permitted a range of uses of the premises. Buildings with fire certificates were usually acceptable to be insured - with their contents, including liabilities to people and to other entities than the owner or operator of the building - but nevertheless the insurance companies employed their own Inspectors who could enter the premises and check that safety systems, including sprinklers, were appropriate and properly maintained and fully functional. That last sentence is important, because it is possible to have a well-designed system that is regularly inspected but which can be switched off [or the water turned off] by human oversight or negligence: or as part of the preparations for a fraudulent insurance claim for loss of goods kept in the building which were burned in a fire where the sprinklers 'failed to operate'.
The free marketeers have been dominant in the United Kingdom since the Labour government submitted to the International Monetary Fund [IMF] in 1976: in return for being allowed a loan which was intended to 'stabilise' the external value of the pound sterling during a period of extremely high inflation and 'industrial strife', the Callaghan government accepted [very reluctantly] the free-market dogma that the Thatcher regime was to embrace after their election victory in 1979. On that reckoning, the free markets dogmatists - the Econocracy - have dominated society and the economy for forty-one years [though I have pointed out several times that 364 then-practicing Economists signed a letter to the Times in 1982 rejecting the dogma that was to gain hegemony by 2002].
The period since the autumn of 1976 is exactly the period of Britain's absolute decline as a manufacturing country. We have wantonly destroyed coal mining, most steelmaking, large-scale commercial shipbuilding, our separate aircraft industry, the mass production of textiles and most of the armaments industry [including even the capacity to supply uniforms for a mass military]. The economy has grown because new industries have arisen in high technology such as pharmaceuticals and microprocessors, and in the games and the entertainments industries; due to the brilliance of British inventors, some of them in the university system. The balance of payments deficit has been mitigated by sales of much of the new intellectual property to aliens.
At least equally important for the growth of the economy has been the expansion of government and personal debt. Some of the government's debt has been hidden from the official balance sheet, for example in the PFI schemes by which schools and hospitals have been built and funded by businesses on the understanding that the government [or agencies including the NHS and local authorities and their semi-independent social housing departments] will pay for the use of those buildings when complete. Those charges will for decades to come be paid out of the users' annual budgets; and the debt that would otherwise be required to build them is not listed in the public accounts.
In order to pare bits of expenditure off the public accounts, both from the admitted debt for construction and from the the running costs of premises, devices like sprinklers have been made optional. Building operators - including providers of social housing and free schools and the trusts that manage [and profit from] 'academies' - are exempted from costly requirements such as installing and maintaining sprinklers. Thus the 'economic burden' of building and operating the facilities is reduced: and so is the safety and utility of the premises.
The extreme shabbiness of this policy has rightly been attacked by the Commissioner of the London Fire Brigade, Dany Cotton. Human lives - even those of children is school and in care - are at unnecessary risk: due to the implementation of policies directly derived from Econocratic dogma. Thus has Economics become directly and fundamentally inhumane.
Monday, 23 October 2017
Economic Ignorance and Ignorant Economists
For the past few years, the self-styled 'Economics profession' has faced a direct challenge from the students who formed the Post-Crash Economics Society in Manchester. Their network is growing and spreading worldwide. Several years before that society emerged from classroom frustration at the real-world irrelevance of much that the professors asserted, George Soros - the man largely responsible for Britain having to crash out of the European Exchange Mechanism [ERM: forerunner to the euro] when John Major was the prime minister - funded an institute for new economic thinking which has dissipated the founder's concept by engaging Economists who have released no significant alternative thought. In recent days a well-funded group of recognised Economists [including a couple of holders of the pseudo-Nobel prize] has been set up in recognition of the fact that Economics as taught by the Econocracy does not offer even a sensible explanation of how modern mass poverty has occurred. There might be a slight hope that this group may provide some new insight that is of practical utility; but the experience of similar initiatives is not encouraging.
There is a widely-recognised perception among the general public and much of the commentariat, that formal Economics does not address the issues of living humans in the real world; but that has not led to mass resignations by professors who have become ashamed to draw salaries for preaching irrelevant dogma. Nor have the professors gone into purdah to think anew and recast their propositions: no, they continue to assert them with absolute confidence in the 'scientific rigour' of their abstractions. There is a widespread assumption that groups like Soros' institute and the new 'commission' might just add something to the existing corpus of Economics that will enable the professors and their students to carry on teaching and learning the same stuff; to which a new wrinkle will be added that vindicates the mass of the subject and resolves the outstanding issues without anybody having to eat humble pie.
That will not happen.
Meanwhile, practical politics is bedeviled by the impact of Economics upon it. The rise of 'populism' in the USA, in Europe and in other parts of the world is largely associated with the failure of economic policies based on established formulas that have been formed with the participation of the Econocracy. It has been manifest in the USA for almost three decades that redundant steel workers in the rustbelt states do not mutate into migrants who mystically acquire the skills to gain employment in silicone valley that pays them all enough to get new houses [at Californian prices] and live a west-coast lifestyle. That is what the professors say should happen in a fully-fledged free-trading economy; but it does not happen. People have families and associations and familiar landmarks in the places where they [or their parents] have been settled since when times were good: so they mostly stay there. The brightest graduates, the prettiest girls and other identifiable groups who have characteristics that support social mobility may move on in significant numbers, but they are a minority; and the core population will be left in misery awaiting a saviour: who appeared in the US rustbelt in the highly improbable shape of Donald Trump. Trump will fail, as both Bushes and Obama and even Clinton failed, to turn round the march of economic events and the persistence of people in refusing to behave as textbook specimens.
In the UK the practical irrelevance of Economics has become acute, as the head-banging Brexiteers [mostly in the Conservative party] cite the views of extreme Econocrats: such as Patrick Minford, a Thatcher guru who has suddenly returned to prominence with his confident assertions about how good the world will be for the UK if we leave the European Union with no deal. Minford and his little friends have claimed that the British economy could grow by some 7% if all the restraints [and advantages] of membership of the Union were simple sloughed-off. People who try to form a mature and balanced view of the probable impact of Brexit see summaries of these assertions, and the fact that their advocate is Professor Minford: and they wonder whether they should just dismiss his propositions; might he be right? Might the UK be passing-up a great opportunity if we try to stay close to the European Free Trade Area?
The answer is, of course, on the ground all over the UK. The factories and mines and dockyards that were abandoned at the behest of the Thatcherites may have been prettified into tourism sites like the Titanic area of Belfast; but even there a significant proportion of the consumer-facing staff on minimum wages are immigrants who came to the UK prepared to do such work [and they are mostly better at it that taciturn under-educated Brits]. There is no well-paid long-term highly-productive employment for the rising generation in any of the despoiled regions that were once world-leading hives of industry. The formula didn't work in the nineteen-eighties or the 'nineties: and it is even less likely to apply to the real world now. if the headbangers win, mass misery is the only probable outcome: and the growth in new, longer-term non-employment will be well over 7% per year for several years.
There is a widely-recognised perception among the general public and much of the commentariat, that formal Economics does not address the issues of living humans in the real world; but that has not led to mass resignations by professors who have become ashamed to draw salaries for preaching irrelevant dogma. Nor have the professors gone into purdah to think anew and recast their propositions: no, they continue to assert them with absolute confidence in the 'scientific rigour' of their abstractions. There is a widespread assumption that groups like Soros' institute and the new 'commission' might just add something to the existing corpus of Economics that will enable the professors and their students to carry on teaching and learning the same stuff; to which a new wrinkle will be added that vindicates the mass of the subject and resolves the outstanding issues without anybody having to eat humble pie.
That will not happen.
Meanwhile, practical politics is bedeviled by the impact of Economics upon it. The rise of 'populism' in the USA, in Europe and in other parts of the world is largely associated with the failure of economic policies based on established formulas that have been formed with the participation of the Econocracy. It has been manifest in the USA for almost three decades that redundant steel workers in the rustbelt states do not mutate into migrants who mystically acquire the skills to gain employment in silicone valley that pays them all enough to get new houses [at Californian prices] and live a west-coast lifestyle. That is what the professors say should happen in a fully-fledged free-trading economy; but it does not happen. People have families and associations and familiar landmarks in the places where they [or their parents] have been settled since when times were good: so they mostly stay there. The brightest graduates, the prettiest girls and other identifiable groups who have characteristics that support social mobility may move on in significant numbers, but they are a minority; and the core population will be left in misery awaiting a saviour: who appeared in the US rustbelt in the highly improbable shape of Donald Trump. Trump will fail, as both Bushes and Obama and even Clinton failed, to turn round the march of economic events and the persistence of people in refusing to behave as textbook specimens.
In the UK the practical irrelevance of Economics has become acute, as the head-banging Brexiteers [mostly in the Conservative party] cite the views of extreme Econocrats: such as Patrick Minford, a Thatcher guru who has suddenly returned to prominence with his confident assertions about how good the world will be for the UK if we leave the European Union with no deal. Minford and his little friends have claimed that the British economy could grow by some 7% if all the restraints [and advantages] of membership of the Union were simple sloughed-off. People who try to form a mature and balanced view of the probable impact of Brexit see summaries of these assertions, and the fact that their advocate is Professor Minford: and they wonder whether they should just dismiss his propositions; might he be right? Might the UK be passing-up a great opportunity if we try to stay close to the European Free Trade Area?
The answer is, of course, on the ground all over the UK. The factories and mines and dockyards that were abandoned at the behest of the Thatcherites may have been prettified into tourism sites like the Titanic area of Belfast; but even there a significant proportion of the consumer-facing staff on minimum wages are immigrants who came to the UK prepared to do such work [and they are mostly better at it that taciturn under-educated Brits]. There is no well-paid long-term highly-productive employment for the rising generation in any of the despoiled regions that were once world-leading hives of industry. The formula didn't work in the nineteen-eighties or the 'nineties: and it is even less likely to apply to the real world now. if the headbangers win, mass misery is the only probable outcome: and the growth in new, longer-term non-employment will be well over 7% per year for several years.
Tuesday, 17 October 2017
Intellectual Property and Corporate Power
One of the key components of my 'dissident' approach to economic science [or political economy] is my assertion that all ownable things - assets - come in four categories:
1. Keyn. anything in the category that J M Keynes described as chartalist in his definitive Treatise on Money. These are all the immaterial creations of the human mind that can be claimed as the possession of the person who invented them, or of the person who was able to capture such command over them as would be recognised in a court of law. Thus people and corporate entities [governments, local government, institutions, companies etc] come to be the 'owners' of control of the land, and owners of shares, stocks, bank deposits, patents, copyrights, brand names, trademarks etc. Most defined keyns can be sold . The most massively increasing category of keyns in the contemporary economy are items of intellectual property [or 'intellectual keyns' shown as ik in my text].
2. Quon. A material asset whose price includes both the costs of assembling the material thing and a charge for the intellectual property that the owner of the object is able to enjoy with the material thing. The owner of the ik sells the user a right to enjoy the benefits of their brand, and the intellectual property that inheres in the object.
3. Jev. A material asset whose price when resold is determined by its perceived rarity and aesthetic quality, rather than by its cost of production or its contemporary usefulness in any material sense to the owner. Thus this category covers antiques, works or art etc; which can be bought and sold and which - over time - often appreciate in retain price, so they can be assets of increasing inventory 'value'.
4. Marcom. These are commodities which are sold at prices that equal, or are close to, the cost of production and delivery [allowing for a reasonable return on capital to the producers and distributors], with no premium for any ik such as occurs in the price of a quon.
There are huge implications that arise from this differentiation of assets. I refer to two today.
A. Firms that are licensed and regulated as 'banks' have huge privileges. In particular, because they manage keynic money for natural and corporate persons they get special guarantees from the state. The most extreme version of this protection was the 'rescue' of the banking system in 2007-9, whose effects are still affecting everybody in the advanced economies. Despite the huge direct and indirect cost of 'saving' the banks, governments and their agents, the central banks [e.g. the Bank of England] have done nothing that definitively separates the socially-necessary and economically-indispensable banking functions of the huge complex firms that include banking divisions from the parts of the firm that trade in stocks and shares, bonds, investment advice, creating and trading in derivatives and futures and other speculative keyns. Thus the entire western world remains at risk from rogue trading or sheer incompetence in these pampered businesses. This remains one of the biggest risks to civilisation; even allowing for jihadism, rogue states, cybercrime, plague and famine.
B. Hundreds of thousands of people and firms own ik that has become increasingly desired by more and more people over the past twenty years. Computer games, films and records and all accessed from cyberspace, and social media have become massive foci of consumption; and although the ownership of such assets is widely diffused, a small number of points of access are used by the vast preponderance of users. Thus Google, Alibaba, Facebook and a few other leading points in the cyberworld are absolutely dominant. The creators of these platforms have established their intellectual property with immense rigour, and are constantly extending their [patented] means of checking on their customers so that they can increasingly tailor 'special offers' that will tempt them to spend their money and their time at the profitable direction of the ik owner. This gives more power over the consumers and their world to a small number of firms than has ever been held by firms that control material commodities. Economic models have not even begun to cope with it: the Econocracy have been content to monopolise their fantasies while Silicon Valley has established a much firmer hegemony than the professors can comprehend. Politicians are increasingly exercised by the new sort of power that is held by the dominant holders of the ik that shapes hundreds of millions of consumer's lifestyle; and don't know what to do about it. They can't even work out how to tax the massive cash flow that they receive.
My basic taxonomy of economic assets forms a basis on which public control, exercised by the political system of the state, can properly be established over the cybernauts within a sensible structure of political economy. One small step for man?
1. Keyn. anything in the category that J M Keynes described as chartalist in his definitive Treatise on Money. These are all the immaterial creations of the human mind that can be claimed as the possession of the person who invented them, or of the person who was able to capture such command over them as would be recognised in a court of law. Thus people and corporate entities [governments, local government, institutions, companies etc] come to be the 'owners' of control of the land, and owners of shares, stocks, bank deposits, patents, copyrights, brand names, trademarks etc. Most defined keyns can be sold . The most massively increasing category of keyns in the contemporary economy are items of intellectual property [or 'intellectual keyns' shown as ik in my text].
2. Quon. A material asset whose price includes both the costs of assembling the material thing and a charge for the intellectual property that the owner of the object is able to enjoy with the material thing. The owner of the ik sells the user a right to enjoy the benefits of their brand, and the intellectual property that inheres in the object.
3. Jev. A material asset whose price when resold is determined by its perceived rarity and aesthetic quality, rather than by its cost of production or its contemporary usefulness in any material sense to the owner. Thus this category covers antiques, works or art etc; which can be bought and sold and which - over time - often appreciate in retain price, so they can be assets of increasing inventory 'value'.
4. Marcom. These are commodities which are sold at prices that equal, or are close to, the cost of production and delivery [allowing for a reasonable return on capital to the producers and distributors], with no premium for any ik such as occurs in the price of a quon.
There are huge implications that arise from this differentiation of assets. I refer to two today.
A. Firms that are licensed and regulated as 'banks' have huge privileges. In particular, because they manage keynic money for natural and corporate persons they get special guarantees from the state. The most extreme version of this protection was the 'rescue' of the banking system in 2007-9, whose effects are still affecting everybody in the advanced economies. Despite the huge direct and indirect cost of 'saving' the banks, governments and their agents, the central banks [e.g. the Bank of England] have done nothing that definitively separates the socially-necessary and economically-indispensable banking functions of the huge complex firms that include banking divisions from the parts of the firm that trade in stocks and shares, bonds, investment advice, creating and trading in derivatives and futures and other speculative keyns. Thus the entire western world remains at risk from rogue trading or sheer incompetence in these pampered businesses. This remains one of the biggest risks to civilisation; even allowing for jihadism, rogue states, cybercrime, plague and famine.
B. Hundreds of thousands of people and firms own ik that has become increasingly desired by more and more people over the past twenty years. Computer games, films and records and all accessed from cyberspace, and social media have become massive foci of consumption; and although the ownership of such assets is widely diffused, a small number of points of access are used by the vast preponderance of users. Thus Google, Alibaba, Facebook and a few other leading points in the cyberworld are absolutely dominant. The creators of these platforms have established their intellectual property with immense rigour, and are constantly extending their [patented] means of checking on their customers so that they can increasingly tailor 'special offers' that will tempt them to spend their money and their time at the profitable direction of the ik owner. This gives more power over the consumers and their world to a small number of firms than has ever been held by firms that control material commodities. Economic models have not even begun to cope with it: the Econocracy have been content to monopolise their fantasies while Silicon Valley has established a much firmer hegemony than the professors can comprehend. Politicians are increasingly exercised by the new sort of power that is held by the dominant holders of the ik that shapes hundreds of millions of consumer's lifestyle; and don't know what to do about it. They can't even work out how to tax the massive cash flow that they receive.
My basic taxonomy of economic assets forms a basis on which public control, exercised by the political system of the state, can properly be established over the cybernauts within a sensible structure of political economy. One small step for man?
Monday, 16 October 2017
Disrupting the Econocracy? Thaler's Prize
The mutual admiration event of the Econocracy's year is the award of the 'Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Science', which is announced at about the same time and in the same sort of way as the real Nobel prizes. But this prize was funded by Scandinavian banks, many decades after the original Nobel benefaction; before the absolute triumph of the 'rational expectations' dogma but well into the era when Economics had been captured by the neo-Keynesians who were about to show the dangerous impact of their views as applied [on their advice] by governments when the inflation that was the inevitable result of the flawed dogma began to bite into individuals' welfare and to undermine government strategies. Through the later nineteen sixties and into the 'seventies a back-catalogue of economic writers from the previous forty years were rewarded with the new prize, which was often split between two or more winners [thus quickly building-up the list of 'Laureates'] . After that the prize has been awarded to a mix of writers who have [in general] more or less closely subscribed to the increasingly tight dogmatic requirements of the Econocracy as they have tightened their control of the standard syllabus in Economics for students [as explained in the text Econocracy, frequently mentioned in the blog and created by the Post-Crash Economics Society at Manchester].
There have been occasional exceptions to this command of the prize by the dominant faction of Economics grandees, achievable because the electors' view of the world from the expanses of Scandinavia is broader than from Chicago, Princeton, the LSE or Cambridge; and thus other points of view have had a look-in from time to time. But those individuals have deferred, in general, to the overriding assertions of 'scientific' rigour, purity and authority that has been claimed by the Econocrats.
Thus this year's prize has been hailed as a novelty, a breakthrough; maybe as the gateway to a new era. This is the award of the prize to the hugely respected Richard Thaler, best known as the advocate of the 'Nudge Theory': a psychological insight that can be said directly to contradict the assumptions about humans' behaviour that lie at the heart of Econocratic dogma. Thaler has drawn on psychology to suggest that people do not behave as Alfred Marshall assumed in his Principles of Economics [1890] and which subsequent authoritative figures have built up constantly as the core of current theory. The critics have been delighted to welcome this award to Thaler as evidence that even the committee awarding the pseudo-Nobel Prize are open to the view that homo economicus - 'economic man' - is not a true or fair representation of real, living and breathing human beings.
The entire modus operandi of the Econocracy is based on the assertion that people will act 'rationally' if they have enough access to the facts on which they should reach economic decisions. Individuals will allocate their scarce resources to those purchases that will maximise their welfare over their lifetimes; thus dividing their spending between present needs and the demands of the future [such as providing for pensions and medical care in old age]. Recognising that resources are scarce, economic man will always buy what will do him most good and and least harm: always assuming that sufficient evidence of potential outcomes is available to him.
A few minutes' observation of real humans gives the lie to this daft assumption. Stand in any street and watch the obese people waddle laboriously along, eating something from a packet. Look at the flashy cars that young men can only afford to hire-purchase at the cost of making no provision for the future [and often not insuring the vehicles]. Look at the drunk, drugged young women in the gutters in any major city at weekend. Read the data on early deaths and completely burnt-out people still in their twenties.
Since real people behave so irrationally, it cannot be expected that whole communities whose coalmine or steelworks is closed down on the basis of fake data by a Thatcherite government [whose real objective is to eradicate the trade union that is embedded in the 'redundant' plant] will abandon their community, their homes and their connections, and migrate as individual families to places where there may or may not be new jobs for them. How do five hundred redundant miners assess such a situation? They can't: and anyway even a Thatcherite government is subject to the 'irrational' need to win the next election: so they maintain the denizens of the pit villages in situ with social security payments, early access to pensions and other means by which no 'rational' economic decisions need to be taken by the population. Hence both people and their political systems can be seen to be 'irrational' every day.
Thaler does not approach the issue as I do in this comment; but he suggests means by which people can be 'nudged' more constructively to react to the situations in which they find themselves. In doing this he has performed a major service: not just to 'economic science' but potentially to humanity. But this does not rescue Economics from its guilty hold on the essentials of human interaction: Thaler has cast light, and proved that his theories have traction in reality: which is great. But much more is needed to smash the Econonocracy; who can choose to teach their students that real people can be nudged to behave more like homo economicus: which would be the worst outcome of all.
There have been occasional exceptions to this command of the prize by the dominant faction of Economics grandees, achievable because the electors' view of the world from the expanses of Scandinavia is broader than from Chicago, Princeton, the LSE or Cambridge; and thus other points of view have had a look-in from time to time. But those individuals have deferred, in general, to the overriding assertions of 'scientific' rigour, purity and authority that has been claimed by the Econocrats.
Thus this year's prize has been hailed as a novelty, a breakthrough; maybe as the gateway to a new era. This is the award of the prize to the hugely respected Richard Thaler, best known as the advocate of the 'Nudge Theory': a psychological insight that can be said directly to contradict the assumptions about humans' behaviour that lie at the heart of Econocratic dogma. Thaler has drawn on psychology to suggest that people do not behave as Alfred Marshall assumed in his Principles of Economics [1890] and which subsequent authoritative figures have built up constantly as the core of current theory. The critics have been delighted to welcome this award to Thaler as evidence that even the committee awarding the pseudo-Nobel Prize are open to the view that homo economicus - 'economic man' - is not a true or fair representation of real, living and breathing human beings.
The entire modus operandi of the Econocracy is based on the assertion that people will act 'rationally' if they have enough access to the facts on which they should reach economic decisions. Individuals will allocate their scarce resources to those purchases that will maximise their welfare over their lifetimes; thus dividing their spending between present needs and the demands of the future [such as providing for pensions and medical care in old age]. Recognising that resources are scarce, economic man will always buy what will do him most good and and least harm: always assuming that sufficient evidence of potential outcomes is available to him.
A few minutes' observation of real humans gives the lie to this daft assumption. Stand in any street and watch the obese people waddle laboriously along, eating something from a packet. Look at the flashy cars that young men can only afford to hire-purchase at the cost of making no provision for the future [and often not insuring the vehicles]. Look at the drunk, drugged young women in the gutters in any major city at weekend. Read the data on early deaths and completely burnt-out people still in their twenties.
Since real people behave so irrationally, it cannot be expected that whole communities whose coalmine or steelworks is closed down on the basis of fake data by a Thatcherite government [whose real objective is to eradicate the trade union that is embedded in the 'redundant' plant] will abandon their community, their homes and their connections, and migrate as individual families to places where there may or may not be new jobs for them. How do five hundred redundant miners assess such a situation? They can't: and anyway even a Thatcherite government is subject to the 'irrational' need to win the next election: so they maintain the denizens of the pit villages in situ with social security payments, early access to pensions and other means by which no 'rational' economic decisions need to be taken by the population. Hence both people and their political systems can be seen to be 'irrational' every day.
Thaler does not approach the issue as I do in this comment; but he suggests means by which people can be 'nudged' more constructively to react to the situations in which they find themselves. In doing this he has performed a major service: not just to 'economic science' but potentially to humanity. But this does not rescue Economics from its guilty hold on the essentials of human interaction: Thaler has cast light, and proved that his theories have traction in reality: which is great. But much more is needed to smash the Econonocracy; who can choose to teach their students that real people can be nudged to behave more like homo economicus: which would be the worst outcome of all.
Tuesday, 10 October 2017
Back Again To Productiveness
There has been serious panic in the Treasury, which has resonated round other government departments, about the latest 'findings' of the Office for Budget Responsibility [OBR] on the basic facts about the UK economy. With no evidence in the raw data to support the supposition, it has been assumed that the productivity of the economy is increasing. If it were true, it would mean that on average, across all sectors of the economy, the output per worker per day is increasing. For half a century until 2007, year after year, on average productivity was increasing by around 2%. This constituted the strongest evidence that the output in the economy was growing and that there was more output to provide investment in new plant in industry and commerce, and to renew the economic infrastructure, and to improve welfare services and education, and still to afford more wages for most of the employed people year after year.
It is now admitted, rather shamefacedly by the government ministers and officials who have assumed that productivity 'must have been' rising since 2010 at something close to the historic norm of 2%, that this has not been the case. The financial crunch of 2007-8 was a huge shock to the whole economy; but it has optimistically been assumed that things have been returning to 'normal' since 2010. It is also noted that the entire world economy suffered a shock in 2007, and that most 'mature' economies' growth since 2010 has been less than the pre-crunch norm. Nevertheless, the USA, Canada, Australia and the Eurozone all have experience increasing productivity in recent years: while India and China have continued to make massive strides forward [though at an irregular rate year-on-year].
I am not alone in having banged-on since 2007 about the fact that productivity in the UK is abysmal because the people who control the country - grossly misled by the Econocracy [the professors of Economics] - are totally unaware that productivity is always dependent on the productiveness of the system; but not many people have been saying it, and nobody has been listening. Productiveness is the capacity of the system to deliver increased productivity; and it can only be increased by well-targeted investment. Karl Marx was at one with the other nineteenth-century Political Economists who saw that industrial progress [and the development of the infrastructure of railways, ships and ports, postal systems, banking and the telegraph] was entirely dependent on a surplus being accumulated from the sales of current output and withheld from consumption by the people so that it can be converted into new and improved means of production. Marx thought that he had made the discovery of the age by claiming that the accumulation of capital had been captured by a 'class' of capitalists, who were taking over the levers of economic power from the landlord/aristocratic class who had dominated Europe since the dark ages. Other Political Economists saw that the development of shareholder capital allocated the profits that were derived from from industrial and commercial activity between the controlling shareholders in firms [who could decide how they divided the dividends and wages that they received between their own consumption and re-investment of the profits to produce even higher returns from the business in future years] and the other shareholders who would decide for themselves how much of their dividend income they would apply to their own consumption and how much they would spend on buying more shares. Investors in shares could choose between all the shares and bonds that were on offer in the stock market: so provided those investors were reasonably sensible the majority of buyers would opt for putting their investment into firms that were effective and innovative: those that were enhancing the productiveness of the economy, whose fruits would be seen in terms of higher productivity and high future dividends. Workers could be rewarded with high wages [or even profit-sharing schemes] and thus the entire economic ans social systems would be strengthened.
Obsessed Marxists gained control of Russia in 1917 and it took their successors seven decades to prove decisively that a simplistic Marxist regime does not work. Mao tried the same, and drove China into even deeper poverty than had been achieved in Russia; only for China to be restored by pragmatists who know better than capitalists the importance of concentrating on the productiveness of all sectors of the economy.
Britain's 'productivity problem' arises from the failure of industry and commerce to invest since the 2007 crunch. Companies have built up cash piles, some of which has been distributed to shareholders through devices such as share buy-back; while consumers have increased their borrowing to carry on buying goods as prices rise faster than wages.
Now the Chancellor of the Exchequer has been driven into a corner by the productivity data: the entire nation is heartily sick of 'austerity', but output is [at best] stagnant. Hospitals and prisons are in crisis, schools are increasingly stressed, the police has been cut back too far. What can he offer in his autumn Budget?
Jeremy Corbyn's almost pristine Marxism cannot be any sort of solution; but at least he has adopted more reasonable rhetoric for the purposes of getting elected. Provided Labour produces - and adheres to - a rational Manifesto, they offer the best bet for the nation in the coming years. But the trust problem is probably unsurmountable.
It is now admitted, rather shamefacedly by the government ministers and officials who have assumed that productivity 'must have been' rising since 2010 at something close to the historic norm of 2%, that this has not been the case. The financial crunch of 2007-8 was a huge shock to the whole economy; but it has optimistically been assumed that things have been returning to 'normal' since 2010. It is also noted that the entire world economy suffered a shock in 2007, and that most 'mature' economies' growth since 2010 has been less than the pre-crunch norm. Nevertheless, the USA, Canada, Australia and the Eurozone all have experience increasing productivity in recent years: while India and China have continued to make massive strides forward [though at an irregular rate year-on-year].
I am not alone in having banged-on since 2007 about the fact that productivity in the UK is abysmal because the people who control the country - grossly misled by the Econocracy [the professors of Economics] - are totally unaware that productivity is always dependent on the productiveness of the system; but not many people have been saying it, and nobody has been listening. Productiveness is the capacity of the system to deliver increased productivity; and it can only be increased by well-targeted investment. Karl Marx was at one with the other nineteenth-century Political Economists who saw that industrial progress [and the development of the infrastructure of railways, ships and ports, postal systems, banking and the telegraph] was entirely dependent on a surplus being accumulated from the sales of current output and withheld from consumption by the people so that it can be converted into new and improved means of production. Marx thought that he had made the discovery of the age by claiming that the accumulation of capital had been captured by a 'class' of capitalists, who were taking over the levers of economic power from the landlord/aristocratic class who had dominated Europe since the dark ages. Other Political Economists saw that the development of shareholder capital allocated the profits that were derived from from industrial and commercial activity between the controlling shareholders in firms [who could decide how they divided the dividends and wages that they received between their own consumption and re-investment of the profits to produce even higher returns from the business in future years] and the other shareholders who would decide for themselves how much of their dividend income they would apply to their own consumption and how much they would spend on buying more shares. Investors in shares could choose between all the shares and bonds that were on offer in the stock market: so provided those investors were reasonably sensible the majority of buyers would opt for putting their investment into firms that were effective and innovative: those that were enhancing the productiveness of the economy, whose fruits would be seen in terms of higher productivity and high future dividends. Workers could be rewarded with high wages [or even profit-sharing schemes] and thus the entire economic ans social systems would be strengthened.
Obsessed Marxists gained control of Russia in 1917 and it took their successors seven decades to prove decisively that a simplistic Marxist regime does not work. Mao tried the same, and drove China into even deeper poverty than had been achieved in Russia; only for China to be restored by pragmatists who know better than capitalists the importance of concentrating on the productiveness of all sectors of the economy.
Britain's 'productivity problem' arises from the failure of industry and commerce to invest since the 2007 crunch. Companies have built up cash piles, some of which has been distributed to shareholders through devices such as share buy-back; while consumers have increased their borrowing to carry on buying goods as prices rise faster than wages.
Now the Chancellor of the Exchequer has been driven into a corner by the productivity data: the entire nation is heartily sick of 'austerity', but output is [at best] stagnant. Hospitals and prisons are in crisis, schools are increasingly stressed, the police has been cut back too far. What can he offer in his autumn Budget?
Jeremy Corbyn's almost pristine Marxism cannot be any sort of solution; but at least he has adopted more reasonable rhetoric for the purposes of getting elected. Provided Labour produces - and adheres to - a rational Manifesto, they offer the best bet for the nation in the coming years. But the trust problem is probably unsurmountable.
Saturday, 16 September 2017
QE For Ten Years: Saving the Banks and Smashing Society
My last blog began with a second reference to the ten years that have elapsed since the collapse of Northern Rock told the public - and the unobservant Econocracy - that there was a crisis already well developed in the world of banking. More than a year before the Northern Rock event hit the British system, the USA had had its own crisis in the collapse of several institutions which the Clinton regime had induced to accept 'sub-prime' mortgages. The term sub-prime was not in common currency in the UK, and the USA was far away, so not much notice was taken of those events even in the London money market.
Within the US financial system, it had slowly become apparent that the sub-prime mortgages had been sold on [in the manner described yesterday] as parts of securities which were just bundles of debts where the borrowers would [in the main] carry on making the payments they were contracted to make: thus the buyer of such a security was effectively buying a cash-flow of future payments. The original lender of the money would retain the duty to collect the payments and pay the interest on the security, and there would be an allowance for the proportion of the borrowers who would default on their payments. So the original price of the security was based on a supposedly objective view of what it would yield to its owner during the term for which it was valid. On that basis, the security could be sold on, for inclusion in larger or more inventive types of security. The sub-prime mortgages were a category where the borrower was very likely to default, and the continuing decline of the old industries in what were quickly becoming known as the 'rustbucket' areas meant that many families lost their main earnings and could not afford the repayments. Defaults on payments of sub-prime mortgages seemed, at first, an American problem: but during 2007 an increasing proportion of securities traders became worried about UK securities that included packages of mortgages issued by banks and building societies whose lending had become [by all historic comparison] reckless.
Among these was Northern Rock, which was borrowing credit in the wholesale market [see last two blogs in this series for details] in order to lend to new customers. The lending was reckless: more than 100% of the asking-price for the house was available to clients who were taken at their word as to how much they earned. This sort of lending [in which the Rock was only the most conspicuously adrift from traditional caution] led to clever traders realising that securities based on Northern Rock loans, and securities containing a 'repackaged' share of Northern Rock, may not perform as promised. So the wholesale market stopped buying Rock securities: and the Rock had no ready money in its tills beyond the usual daily turnover. Hence, as customers heard the rumours and queued with their documentation to demand their own money, the firm failed and [as explained previously] the government instructed to Bank of England to provide the money that the customers were demanding. After the crisis the residue of the Rock was sold off: its trading branches were taken over by Virgin Money and most of them are still trading, and the mortgage debts were sold to firms that managed the run-off so that most of the securities that the Rock had sold were successfully [and profitably] carried forward to their terminal dates.
Behind this happily makeshift resolution of the crisis caused by one smallish [albeit prominent] firm, the financial markets as a whole were beginning to panic about the multi-trillion pound market in securities that had been built up by 'innovative' firms that had been making their own paths to untold wealth by taking the fullest advantage of the market freedom created by the Thatcherites on the urging of the Econocracy in 1986. Within a year of the Northern Rock crisis, there was an emergent crisis throughout the market. Nobody could be sure which securities contained how big a proportion of debt that might become 'sub-prime' if the root provider of the cash flow failed. So the Bank of England was instructed to copy the US Federal Reserve, which had already begun an indefinitely large open-market operation which it called QE: Quantitative Easing. Though the detail is mind-bogglingly complex, the principle is simple. The banks were told to form an orderly queue, and slowly to arrange their portfolios of securities so that they could present government bonds at the Bank of England which would [in essence] 'print money' with which they bought the government securities [and just kept them in their vault, metaphorically]. Thus any bank could get cash by selling government securities to the Bank, and use that cash to fund the orderly winding-down of the 'assets' in the market. Those that were considered 'toxic' were disposed of cheaply, and holders of the rest of the mass of securities could resume trading, albeit cautiously. Nobody realised, when Britain adopted QE in 2008, that the queue would continue shuffling to the Bank asking for cash until now: but that has happened. it has saved the banks and the wholesale securities trade that lies behind the banks; but it has been ruinous to the economy in which human beings depend, and to the society that binds humans into a community. This is the subject for the next blog.
Within the US financial system, it had slowly become apparent that the sub-prime mortgages had been sold on [in the manner described yesterday] as parts of securities which were just bundles of debts where the borrowers would [in the main] carry on making the payments they were contracted to make: thus the buyer of such a security was effectively buying a cash-flow of future payments. The original lender of the money would retain the duty to collect the payments and pay the interest on the security, and there would be an allowance for the proportion of the borrowers who would default on their payments. So the original price of the security was based on a supposedly objective view of what it would yield to its owner during the term for which it was valid. On that basis, the security could be sold on, for inclusion in larger or more inventive types of security. The sub-prime mortgages were a category where the borrower was very likely to default, and the continuing decline of the old industries in what were quickly becoming known as the 'rustbucket' areas meant that many families lost their main earnings and could not afford the repayments. Defaults on payments of sub-prime mortgages seemed, at first, an American problem: but during 2007 an increasing proportion of securities traders became worried about UK securities that included packages of mortgages issued by banks and building societies whose lending had become [by all historic comparison] reckless.
Among these was Northern Rock, which was borrowing credit in the wholesale market [see last two blogs in this series for details] in order to lend to new customers. The lending was reckless: more than 100% of the asking-price for the house was available to clients who were taken at their word as to how much they earned. This sort of lending [in which the Rock was only the most conspicuously adrift from traditional caution] led to clever traders realising that securities based on Northern Rock loans, and securities containing a 'repackaged' share of Northern Rock, may not perform as promised. So the wholesale market stopped buying Rock securities: and the Rock had no ready money in its tills beyond the usual daily turnover. Hence, as customers heard the rumours and queued with their documentation to demand their own money, the firm failed and [as explained previously] the government instructed to Bank of England to provide the money that the customers were demanding. After the crisis the residue of the Rock was sold off: its trading branches were taken over by Virgin Money and most of them are still trading, and the mortgage debts were sold to firms that managed the run-off so that most of the securities that the Rock had sold were successfully [and profitably] carried forward to their terminal dates.
Behind this happily makeshift resolution of the crisis caused by one smallish [albeit prominent] firm, the financial markets as a whole were beginning to panic about the multi-trillion pound market in securities that had been built up by 'innovative' firms that had been making their own paths to untold wealth by taking the fullest advantage of the market freedom created by the Thatcherites on the urging of the Econocracy in 1986. Within a year of the Northern Rock crisis, there was an emergent crisis throughout the market. Nobody could be sure which securities contained how big a proportion of debt that might become 'sub-prime' if the root provider of the cash flow failed. So the Bank of England was instructed to copy the US Federal Reserve, which had already begun an indefinitely large open-market operation which it called QE: Quantitative Easing. Though the detail is mind-bogglingly complex, the principle is simple. The banks were told to form an orderly queue, and slowly to arrange their portfolios of securities so that they could present government bonds at the Bank of England which would [in essence] 'print money' with which they bought the government securities [and just kept them in their vault, metaphorically]. Thus any bank could get cash by selling government securities to the Bank, and use that cash to fund the orderly winding-down of the 'assets' in the market. Those that were considered 'toxic' were disposed of cheaply, and holders of the rest of the mass of securities could resume trading, albeit cautiously. Nobody realised, when Britain adopted QE in 2008, that the queue would continue shuffling to the Bank asking for cash until now: but that has happened. it has saved the banks and the wholesale securities trade that lies behind the banks; but it has been ruinous to the economy in which human beings depend, and to the society that binds humans into a community. This is the subject for the next blog.
Thursday, 14 September 2017
Ten Years After the Northern Rock Crisis: and the Economy is in a Worse Condition
We are now ten years away from the date when a still-under-rated minister, Alastair Darling, took the decisive steps that 'rescued' Northern Rock; and, with it, the economy. I referred yesterday to the fact that some five years after the crash a few students in the University of Manchester dared to challenge the fact that their teachers in Economics classes could not explain [within their own intellectual universe] how the crisis happened, precisely what constituted the crisis, and why they had not adjusted their 'analysis' of the economy in the light of a shattering, cataclysmic event. A second set of questions, soon to be posed and left unanswered, was how and why all these clever professors had not seen the disaster approaching.
Off her own bat, the Queen posed the same question on a visit to the London School of Economics, and received no immediate response. A few weeks later a group of professors sent her a totally unsatisfactory sequence of exculpatory piffle, which satisfied no-one. The Queen later put the same question on a visit to the Bank of England; and because they had no answer to the challenge why they had not anticipated the crisis - and thus been able to avert it, or mininise it - they could not give any sort of satisfactory response.
The Econocracy, the Manchester students' term to describe the wrong-headed devotees of free-market Economics, cannot formulate an answer within their terms of reference: I have frequently damned them in this blog, and set them aside again today as being potentially part of a solution to the mess that their dogma created when it was embraced as deep state policy by the Thatcher gang. To anybody who questions the use of the term 'gang' I respond that the tight group of people who advised Mrs Thatcher and her guru Keith Joseph, several of whom were ex-communists, intended their ideologically-driven policies utterly to destroy the mixed economy no less completely than the Bolsheviks had planned to destroy capitalism.
I have perhaps not stated this point strongly enough in this blog so far. It lies at the root cause of the crisis of 2007-9, and thus it still overshadows the British economy, and damns millions of people to diminishing real incomes as they drag out their days on minimum wages in jobs with barely measurable productivity and negative productiveness. Behind the relatively few specific policies that are still recognised as having been 'Thatcherite' [such as selling council houses] there lay a serious ideology which informed the 'deep policy' that lay behind everything that they did. This dogma is the unconditional belief that 'free markets' release the inventiveness of the brightest and best of the rising entrepreneurial cohort: and that their spontaneous actions would give sufficient positive momentum to the economy that hundreds of thousands of redundancies and billions of poundsworth of plant and equipment that were scrapped [or just left underground] could simply be ignored. If you believed this fervently enough, no specific policy and no government investment would be needed to free self-centred components of the economy to expand at an unprecedented rate.
Of course, this ideology comes up against a mass of real-world inhibitions: laws against defrauding or cheating fellow-citizens, laws controlling dangerous substances, the requirements of national defence, the absolute belief of the public that there must be a national health service, the entrenched tradition that children should attend school, and many more. While telecommunications, gas, water and electricity supply were privatised quickly, many areas of the economy could not directly be attacked in the first wave of Thatcherism. Meanwhile the flow of taxation and government spending had to be maintained to keep the publicly-recognised essentials in being; though plans could be made to privatise hospitals and schools; and other public services were required to cut their real cost to the state. The government made a virtue of shutting down the most heavily-invested material industries [where the state had been the prime investor for decades: in some cases for centuries] such as shipbuilding, iron and steel, shipyards and coal mines, regardless of the damage that was done to the economy.
Much of the material economy went into a state of shock, as protections against competing imports were removed and supply chains from foreign countries had to be accessed because British suppliers had disappeared. When the mines and shipyards and steelworks closed, their suppliers were ruined also, and many supply-chain firms failed; which meant that across much of industry there arose a need to import components that had previously come from the British firms whose major customers had been taken out in accordance with the prevailing ideology.
The one area where buccaneering entrepreneurs could thrive was in banking and finance, where many controls were removed precisely at the time when the emergence of sophisticated computers became available to firms; while the regulators [most notably the Bank of England] did not develop the means to understand what was happening. That was the fruitful field on which the the crisis, to be recognised by ministers in 2007, was developed over twenty years from 1986.
[Next installment tomorrow]
Off her own bat, the Queen posed the same question on a visit to the London School of Economics, and received no immediate response. A few weeks later a group of professors sent her a totally unsatisfactory sequence of exculpatory piffle, which satisfied no-one. The Queen later put the same question on a visit to the Bank of England; and because they had no answer to the challenge why they had not anticipated the crisis - and thus been able to avert it, or mininise it - they could not give any sort of satisfactory response.
The Econocracy, the Manchester students' term to describe the wrong-headed devotees of free-market Economics, cannot formulate an answer within their terms of reference: I have frequently damned them in this blog, and set them aside again today as being potentially part of a solution to the mess that their dogma created when it was embraced as deep state policy by the Thatcher gang. To anybody who questions the use of the term 'gang' I respond that the tight group of people who advised Mrs Thatcher and her guru Keith Joseph, several of whom were ex-communists, intended their ideologically-driven policies utterly to destroy the mixed economy no less completely than the Bolsheviks had planned to destroy capitalism.
I have perhaps not stated this point strongly enough in this blog so far. It lies at the root cause of the crisis of 2007-9, and thus it still overshadows the British economy, and damns millions of people to diminishing real incomes as they drag out their days on minimum wages in jobs with barely measurable productivity and negative productiveness. Behind the relatively few specific policies that are still recognised as having been 'Thatcherite' [such as selling council houses] there lay a serious ideology which informed the 'deep policy' that lay behind everything that they did. This dogma is the unconditional belief that 'free markets' release the inventiveness of the brightest and best of the rising entrepreneurial cohort: and that their spontaneous actions would give sufficient positive momentum to the economy that hundreds of thousands of redundancies and billions of poundsworth of plant and equipment that were scrapped [or just left underground] could simply be ignored. If you believed this fervently enough, no specific policy and no government investment would be needed to free self-centred components of the economy to expand at an unprecedented rate.
Of course, this ideology comes up against a mass of real-world inhibitions: laws against defrauding or cheating fellow-citizens, laws controlling dangerous substances, the requirements of national defence, the absolute belief of the public that there must be a national health service, the entrenched tradition that children should attend school, and many more. While telecommunications, gas, water and electricity supply were privatised quickly, many areas of the economy could not directly be attacked in the first wave of Thatcherism. Meanwhile the flow of taxation and government spending had to be maintained to keep the publicly-recognised essentials in being; though plans could be made to privatise hospitals and schools; and other public services were required to cut their real cost to the state. The government made a virtue of shutting down the most heavily-invested material industries [where the state had been the prime investor for decades: in some cases for centuries] such as shipbuilding, iron and steel, shipyards and coal mines, regardless of the damage that was done to the economy.
Much of the material economy went into a state of shock, as protections against competing imports were removed and supply chains from foreign countries had to be accessed because British suppliers had disappeared. When the mines and shipyards and steelworks closed, their suppliers were ruined also, and many supply-chain firms failed; which meant that across much of industry there arose a need to import components that had previously come from the British firms whose major customers had been taken out in accordance with the prevailing ideology.
The one area where buccaneering entrepreneurs could thrive was in banking and finance, where many controls were removed precisely at the time when the emergence of sophisticated computers became available to firms; while the regulators [most notably the Bank of England] did not develop the means to understand what was happening. That was the fruitful field on which the the crisis, to be recognised by ministers in 2007, was developed over twenty years from 1986.
[Next installment tomorrow]
Wednesday, 13 September 2017
People and Political Economy Versus Econocracy
Yesterday a Times leader-writer who frequently writes an Economics column for the paper recognised the Manchester action group that created the Post-Crash Economics Society, and the related movement that has spread around the world [as frequently mentioned in this blog]. He noted that a very few university teachers have cobbled-together courses that give an introduction to the different approaches to the subject that have been taken over the last couple of centuries; and that the vast majority of the established teaching cohort - the Econocracy - have adhered rigidly to the pseudo-mathematical formularies that are their only stock-in-trade. That stock is being demonstrated to be putrid. I was a university teacher, specialising in the History of Economics, for a couple of decades until 1988. During that time I assiduously researched the question of how Economics was taking an increasingly perverse approach to the world; and meanwhile my colleagues selected me to be Dean of the Faculty and eventually Pro-Vice-Chancellor, which I like to think indicates that I was taken seriously as a person.
By 1988 it was clear that common sense and Economics were becoming implacably opposed. The Thatcherites were busily destroying industry, blinded by the mantras of open competition and monetarism that undermined the traditional support from the state budget for the economy [which was repaid as economic growth produced the tax revenue that increased the state's capacity to spend on infrastructure developments, research and product development, and popular welfare]. So I bailed out of academic life, into one of the great support organisations that underpin the skills on which the City of London depends for its unique depth of resources which constantly renew its role as the world's leading financial centre. I have continued to watch the consolidation of Thatcherism into 'austerity', which in turn gives the government the ludicrous notion that state spending [on almost anything] is a 'bad thing'.
There are, of course, the glaring exceptions: of which the most conspicuous are HS2 and Hinckley Point, where the state is in for tens of billions of pounds of useless and unwanted spending. Otherwise, spending by the state is a bad thing: especially on peoples' welfare.
Today's News on the BBC is headed by the facts disclosed in a report on tower blocks that has become critical in the light of the Grenfell Tower tragedy. Sixty-eight per cent of the tower blocks in the UK have only one staircase, almost 40 per cent have some form of cladding [of which a yet-to-be determined proportion are flammable], and only two per cent have sprinkler systems. Sprinklers have been proven as a valid means of quenching fires, and thus preventing their spread, for centuries. When Britain had extensive factories and warehouses, the insurance companies employed inspectors who had the right of entry to premises to check that the sprinklers were installed and operational: if they were not, the insurance was immediately cancelled. Factory Inspectors also had to duty to check on the effectiveness of spinkler systems, and could close units that were non-compliant; and in most local authority areas buildings were only licensed for use if certified as compliant with local specifications by the Fire Brigade. The present shoddy government have made it as clear as they clarify anything - which is not very far - that they will expect local authorities to use their own resources, to the extent of using up all their reserves to begin to introduce measures to address the fire hazard in the blocks that they control.
The Econocracy supports the government line: state spending, bad. Occupiers should pay competitive prices for their flats; and if they want safety measures built in they must pay more for that assurance. If their earnings or benefits or pensions will not cover the higher rents, they must move their homes; or get better jobs. For myriad reasons, such as access to schools and hospitals, proximity to relatives who need or provide care, lack of skills or lack of drive, millions of people cannot get better jobs or pay higher rents. The Econocracy has no patience with such people: they clog up the system and prevent the 'model' from functioning as they think it should, in all its clockwork simplicity.
We need a new Political Economy, that takes account of people as they are, and has their development and the welfare as its highest goals. The housing situation - with hundreds of thousands of households outside the tower blocks effectively homeless - is a perfect example of the Econocrats' model economy not working: because it is utterly out of kilter with the realities of human existence.
By 1988 it was clear that common sense and Economics were becoming implacably opposed. The Thatcherites were busily destroying industry, blinded by the mantras of open competition and monetarism that undermined the traditional support from the state budget for the economy [which was repaid as economic growth produced the tax revenue that increased the state's capacity to spend on infrastructure developments, research and product development, and popular welfare]. So I bailed out of academic life, into one of the great support organisations that underpin the skills on which the City of London depends for its unique depth of resources which constantly renew its role as the world's leading financial centre. I have continued to watch the consolidation of Thatcherism into 'austerity', which in turn gives the government the ludicrous notion that state spending [on almost anything] is a 'bad thing'.
There are, of course, the glaring exceptions: of which the most conspicuous are HS2 and Hinckley Point, where the state is in for tens of billions of pounds of useless and unwanted spending. Otherwise, spending by the state is a bad thing: especially on peoples' welfare.
Today's News on the BBC is headed by the facts disclosed in a report on tower blocks that has become critical in the light of the Grenfell Tower tragedy. Sixty-eight per cent of the tower blocks in the UK have only one staircase, almost 40 per cent have some form of cladding [of which a yet-to-be determined proportion are flammable], and only two per cent have sprinkler systems. Sprinklers have been proven as a valid means of quenching fires, and thus preventing their spread, for centuries. When Britain had extensive factories and warehouses, the insurance companies employed inspectors who had the right of entry to premises to check that the sprinklers were installed and operational: if they were not, the insurance was immediately cancelled. Factory Inspectors also had to duty to check on the effectiveness of spinkler systems, and could close units that were non-compliant; and in most local authority areas buildings were only licensed for use if certified as compliant with local specifications by the Fire Brigade. The present shoddy government have made it as clear as they clarify anything - which is not very far - that they will expect local authorities to use their own resources, to the extent of using up all their reserves to begin to introduce measures to address the fire hazard in the blocks that they control.
The Econocracy supports the government line: state spending, bad. Occupiers should pay competitive prices for their flats; and if they want safety measures built in they must pay more for that assurance. If their earnings or benefits or pensions will not cover the higher rents, they must move their homes; or get better jobs. For myriad reasons, such as access to schools and hospitals, proximity to relatives who need or provide care, lack of skills or lack of drive, millions of people cannot get better jobs or pay higher rents. The Econocracy has no patience with such people: they clog up the system and prevent the 'model' from functioning as they think it should, in all its clockwork simplicity.
We need a new Political Economy, that takes account of people as they are, and has their development and the welfare as its highest goals. The housing situation - with hundreds of thousands of households outside the tower blocks effectively homeless - is a perfect example of the Econocrats' model economy not working: because it is utterly out of kilter with the realities of human existence.
Saturday, 2 September 2017
Doctor Fox and Free Trade
A former medical practitioner, Liam Fox PC MP, the Secretary of State for Trade, is chafing at the bit He cannot begin any substantial work towards the task that he has supposedly been given - to arrange post-Brexit trade agreements with countries outside the European Union - until it is finally decided to what extent [if any] the United Kingdom will remain in the European Economic Area after 2020. It is beginning to dawn on Mrs May that a 'hard Brexit' will be calamitous for the British economy. Far from enabling the country to hold its head high among the major powers, solitary Britain would be seen for what it is: an ill-managed struggling economy with more legacy issues than thriving new world-class companies, with a huge and growing balance-of-payments deficit and massive external indebtedness.
Nevertheless, Dr Fox is apparently buoyed-up by the dogma that free trade is a universal 'good thing'; because that is what members of the Econocracy tell him. The professors who can no longer con their more intelligent students still hold sway with the headbanging Brexiteers who seem to control the present government; partly because the sorts of things that they say make the current policy ['no deal is better than a bad deal'] seem almost rational.
In the ever-narrowing intellectual universe that the professors inhabit, inconvenient facts can simply be ignored. So they chose not to notice that the eighteenth century, when Britain pursued protectionist policies, was a period of high economic growth during which the agricultural and industrial revolutions were accomplished. The period when so-called free trade was at its peak, 1848-1914, was the age of imperialism, when European monarchies led by Britain with its globally dominant navy and Russia with its serf army conquered all of northern Asia. The European empires controlled the world, with the exception of the United States.
For every free trade agreement that now exists between countries there are hundreds of inhibitions on free trade. Smoking, alcohol and mind-changing drugs are to varying degrees controlled by law, penal taxation and religious interdiction. Health and safety laws can easily be used to control imports when a government agency chooses to use such rules to restrain some trades. 'Free trade' in sex is increasingly subject to controls and bans. Point protectionism remains a powerful tool of government, when a country slaps a tax on a competitively-priced import on the grounds that the import is too disruptive to the market for competing products made in the country concerned.
Free trade is, and always was, a fantasy; and the more democratic a country may be - in the sense that the government has to respond the the demands of statistically-important minorities of its citizens - the less chance there is of that country implementing free trade arrangements that can do damage to the economic interests of such minorities. This, and no 'ideal' of free trade preached by Econocratic professors, is the reality of the trading world; and always will remain so.
Nevertheless, Dr Fox is apparently buoyed-up by the dogma that free trade is a universal 'good thing'; because that is what members of the Econocracy tell him. The professors who can no longer con their more intelligent students still hold sway with the headbanging Brexiteers who seem to control the present government; partly because the sorts of things that they say make the current policy ['no deal is better than a bad deal'] seem almost rational.
In the ever-narrowing intellectual universe that the professors inhabit, inconvenient facts can simply be ignored. So they chose not to notice that the eighteenth century, when Britain pursued protectionist policies, was a period of high economic growth during which the agricultural and industrial revolutions were accomplished. The period when so-called free trade was at its peak, 1848-1914, was the age of imperialism, when European monarchies led by Britain with its globally dominant navy and Russia with its serf army conquered all of northern Asia. The European empires controlled the world, with the exception of the United States.
For every free trade agreement that now exists between countries there are hundreds of inhibitions on free trade. Smoking, alcohol and mind-changing drugs are to varying degrees controlled by law, penal taxation and religious interdiction. Health and safety laws can easily be used to control imports when a government agency chooses to use such rules to restrain some trades. 'Free trade' in sex is increasingly subject to controls and bans. Point protectionism remains a powerful tool of government, when a country slaps a tax on a competitively-priced import on the grounds that the import is too disruptive to the market for competing products made in the country concerned.
Free trade is, and always was, a fantasy; and the more democratic a country may be - in the sense that the government has to respond the the demands of statistically-important minorities of its citizens - the less chance there is of that country implementing free trade arrangements that can do damage to the economic interests of such minorities. This, and no 'ideal' of free trade preached by Econocratic professors, is the reality of the trading world; and always will remain so.
Saturday, 26 August 2017
Religion, Power and Money
Yesterday much of northern India - a vast area - was affected by riots, following the conviction of a guru of two rapes, which occurred several years ago. Along with the railways and Indian Army, the British Raj left behind for modern India a functioning system of courts: while slow and sometimes affected by corruption and political influence, the judicial system is broadly fair and follows the law. So there is a fair chance that the verdict will stand scrutiny.
That will not affect the actions of the people who want to believe that the man is a true prophet, and that he should be immune from civil penalties; and some among them will be incapable of accepting that he has behaved in ways that the civil law regards as criminal. He has been showered with praise and with a huge amount of money by the people who follow him. An unknown number of men have castrated themselves at his behest, as a way of assuring that they will lead pure lives [at least, in the sense of sexual abstinence]. This is evidence that the mesmeric power of suggestion that has emanated from him is quite exceptional. Rich and poor devotees have contributed to his fortune by making donations, by purchasing his goodwill and his guidance, and through buying his writings and watching the films of which he is the producer and the star.
I have seen no evidence that the guru has advocated that his cult should develop into a militant force such as has now become common in fragments of Islam. It is probable that the rioting arises from a sense of outrage and shock among his followers at his conviction, which implicitly challenges any concept of his perfection as an exemplary super-human.
Millions of people from all layers of Hindu society have paid a lot, relative to their income, to experience the mindfulness and inner contentment that they claim to receive from following his precepts. How far the rioting represents the resentment of shattered delusions, and how much anger at an apparent injustice, will become clearer as people settle down and contemplate their future in the acceptance this the conviction is a fact. Some people will quietly abandon his cult, some will proclaim their disillusion; and many others - perhaps millions - will assert that their faith is undimmed. His actions and utterances from now on will, of course, be hugely influential in determining whether the faithful hold firm and enable him to rebuild something like the position he has occupied in the recent past. It will be interesting to see how these matters pan out.
Meanwhile, this case provides an interesting contrast to what has happened in recent decades in Christianity and in Islam. The decline of Christianity in the developed West has continued, while it has continued to expand in competition with Islam in much of Africa. Throughout the world, the decline is most apparent in the sects and churches that are 'progressive'; while Christian denominations and sub-sets that adopt conservative positions have largely thrived. Similar trends are apparent in Islam. Most of the men in traditionally Islamic territories and communities continue to obey the Prophet's injunction to attend prayers in the mosque, while leading otherwise secular lives [though usually requiring their womenfolk to conform to conservative, largely tribal dress codes and patterns of behaviour]. Yet sub-sets of the community have been increasingly susceptible to backward-looking interpretations of the religion and of the Prophesies on which it was founded.
While many western Christians are less than lukewarm about the existence of Heaven and Hell, the attainment of unspeakable bliss in heaven after the travails, struggles and imperfections of life in the material world is the promised reward: to which jihadists are offered a short cut. The more conservative a sect's belief in Heaven and Hell may be, the stronger that belief is as a motive for how earthly life is to be conducted.
The guru is in the great tradition of self-proclaimed prophets who offer a means to achieve inner peace in this imperfect world, followed by celestial rewards. The millions of poundsworth of wealth that has been showered on him shows the ongoing potency of such promises and practices. The Econocracy have no explanation of this phenomenon - common all over the world and throughout humanity - of people willing to surrender earthly wealth for the hope of spiritual contentment. It is obviously an important aspect of human character and aspiration, which will merit further consideration as the interesting incident in India develops.
That will not affect the actions of the people who want to believe that the man is a true prophet, and that he should be immune from civil penalties; and some among them will be incapable of accepting that he has behaved in ways that the civil law regards as criminal. He has been showered with praise and with a huge amount of money by the people who follow him. An unknown number of men have castrated themselves at his behest, as a way of assuring that they will lead pure lives [at least, in the sense of sexual abstinence]. This is evidence that the mesmeric power of suggestion that has emanated from him is quite exceptional. Rich and poor devotees have contributed to his fortune by making donations, by purchasing his goodwill and his guidance, and through buying his writings and watching the films of which he is the producer and the star.
I have seen no evidence that the guru has advocated that his cult should develop into a militant force such as has now become common in fragments of Islam. It is probable that the rioting arises from a sense of outrage and shock among his followers at his conviction, which implicitly challenges any concept of his perfection as an exemplary super-human.
Millions of people from all layers of Hindu society have paid a lot, relative to their income, to experience the mindfulness and inner contentment that they claim to receive from following his precepts. How far the rioting represents the resentment of shattered delusions, and how much anger at an apparent injustice, will become clearer as people settle down and contemplate their future in the acceptance this the conviction is a fact. Some people will quietly abandon his cult, some will proclaim their disillusion; and many others - perhaps millions - will assert that their faith is undimmed. His actions and utterances from now on will, of course, be hugely influential in determining whether the faithful hold firm and enable him to rebuild something like the position he has occupied in the recent past. It will be interesting to see how these matters pan out.
Meanwhile, this case provides an interesting contrast to what has happened in recent decades in Christianity and in Islam. The decline of Christianity in the developed West has continued, while it has continued to expand in competition with Islam in much of Africa. Throughout the world, the decline is most apparent in the sects and churches that are 'progressive'; while Christian denominations and sub-sets that adopt conservative positions have largely thrived. Similar trends are apparent in Islam. Most of the men in traditionally Islamic territories and communities continue to obey the Prophet's injunction to attend prayers in the mosque, while leading otherwise secular lives [though usually requiring their womenfolk to conform to conservative, largely tribal dress codes and patterns of behaviour]. Yet sub-sets of the community have been increasingly susceptible to backward-looking interpretations of the religion and of the Prophesies on which it was founded.
While many western Christians are less than lukewarm about the existence of Heaven and Hell, the attainment of unspeakable bliss in heaven after the travails, struggles and imperfections of life in the material world is the promised reward: to which jihadists are offered a short cut. The more conservative a sect's belief in Heaven and Hell may be, the stronger that belief is as a motive for how earthly life is to be conducted.
The guru is in the great tradition of self-proclaimed prophets who offer a means to achieve inner peace in this imperfect world, followed by celestial rewards. The millions of poundsworth of wealth that has been showered on him shows the ongoing potency of such promises and practices. The Econocracy have no explanation of this phenomenon - common all over the world and throughout humanity - of people willing to surrender earthly wealth for the hope of spiritual contentment. It is obviously an important aspect of human character and aspiration, which will merit further consideration as the interesting incident in India develops.
Sunday, 20 August 2017
Why Bannon Had to Go: The Importance of China
On leaving the White House, Steve Bannon promised to wage war on the enemies of the President of the United States. Of course, he means that he is ready to fight anyone who challenges his idea of the 'mission' of the United States: which may now come to include Donald Trump, if Trump can retain the presidency.
The idea of waging a trade war against China, even at the price of ignoring the buildup of North Korea's nuclear arsenal and Kim's development of rockets capable of reaching the continental USA, is far too crude to be practicable.
The rustbelt that provided a huge cohort of dedicated followers of the Trump line was not created by the Chinese. Factory sites became derelict, and lives were 'ruined', in consequence of thousands of decisions that were taken by US Corporations; with the encouragement and support of the Econocracy. Many of those decisions were based on the fact that components for advanced manufacturing could more cheaply be bought from emergent countries - including China - than by building and equipping new factories in the US and training the appropriate workforce. This enabled major corporations to concentrate their investment on the 'top end' of manufacturing, and on research and development for innovative products.
Simultaneously, American retailers found new cheaper sources of consumer products, which could thus be sold [largely under the retailers' 'own-brands'] at prices that could maintain some shreds of a consumerist lifestyle even for the ex-industrial workers and their children who survived on government benefits in the rustbelt. Hence imports from emergent countries, not just China, enabled their mass-producers of such products to expand their capacity and reduce their costs. Hence they improved their competitiveness with surviving US manufacturers of similar goods; many of whom were ruined. This all suited the model of 'free markets' that forms the basis of recent econocratic theory. The fact that it left individuals who were sunk in mortgaged houses without the means [economic or intellectual] unable to move on from where they were, rather than to seek new economic opportunities for themselves, is beneath the radar of the Econocracy. Equally invisible to most Econocrats is the fact that as the proportion of the population who are sunk in misery expands, so the communities in which they live progressively lack the will and the means to renew or replace collapsing infrastructure. Until an urban area falls so far into dereliction that it becomes a source of potential danger to the rest of the country - as happened with Detroit a few years ago - national government ignores the problem, while the bankrupt local government is incapable of tackling it. Even after a major assault on poverty and its causes, large areas of greater Detroit remain deeply depressed; and eyesores have not been removed.
While the rustbelt was consolidating, the lead by which the USA is ahead of the rest of the world in advanced technologies has become greater than ever. America remains the predominant and military power in the world, and even despite Chinese efforts to develop and promote competitors like Alibaba their corporations remain far behind the US in developing intellectual property. And here is the pressure point. Bannon's reason for wanting a trade war with China rests precisely on the point that China is determined to catch up with the USA in all areas, and that China will use fair means or foul: just as the US did in the nineteenth century when piracy of European intellectual property was fostered by state and federal governments, principally by deferring the development of laws to protect alien intellectual property until there was an equal danger of American inventors loosing out in global competition.
Bannon has picked on an aspect of trade policy that is used heavily by China now, and was used in Europe and America over a couple of centuries. This is the requirement that the technology used in imported devices and products should be understood, so that the items can be allowed into the country on health and safety grounds. It involves requiring the intending importer [or the company hoping to open a subsidiary plant in China] to disclose the technical matters that - whether reasonably or not - the Chinese regulators say is necessary for the product to be sold as safe and healthy in China. Once those technological data are disclosed to Chinese authorities, there is a danger that they will be leaked to Chinese competitors for their commercial benefit; as has happened in Europe and North America in the past.
To treat this as an act of war is absurd: it is a matter for patient negotiation, case by case; always remembering that in such issues it is best to speak gently, and carry a big stick. America needs better to coordinate the ambitions of US companies to develop trade with China with the need to protect American intellectual property. Steve Bannon will have done his country a huge service by highlighting the issue; but his use of bellicose rhetoric meant that his role in government had to be brought to an end.
The idea of waging a trade war against China, even at the price of ignoring the buildup of North Korea's nuclear arsenal and Kim's development of rockets capable of reaching the continental USA, is far too crude to be practicable.
The rustbelt that provided a huge cohort of dedicated followers of the Trump line was not created by the Chinese. Factory sites became derelict, and lives were 'ruined', in consequence of thousands of decisions that were taken by US Corporations; with the encouragement and support of the Econocracy. Many of those decisions were based on the fact that components for advanced manufacturing could more cheaply be bought from emergent countries - including China - than by building and equipping new factories in the US and training the appropriate workforce. This enabled major corporations to concentrate their investment on the 'top end' of manufacturing, and on research and development for innovative products.
Simultaneously, American retailers found new cheaper sources of consumer products, which could thus be sold [largely under the retailers' 'own-brands'] at prices that could maintain some shreds of a consumerist lifestyle even for the ex-industrial workers and their children who survived on government benefits in the rustbelt. Hence imports from emergent countries, not just China, enabled their mass-producers of such products to expand their capacity and reduce their costs. Hence they improved their competitiveness with surviving US manufacturers of similar goods; many of whom were ruined. This all suited the model of 'free markets' that forms the basis of recent econocratic theory. The fact that it left individuals who were sunk in mortgaged houses without the means [economic or intellectual] unable to move on from where they were, rather than to seek new economic opportunities for themselves, is beneath the radar of the Econocracy. Equally invisible to most Econocrats is the fact that as the proportion of the population who are sunk in misery expands, so the communities in which they live progressively lack the will and the means to renew or replace collapsing infrastructure. Until an urban area falls so far into dereliction that it becomes a source of potential danger to the rest of the country - as happened with Detroit a few years ago - national government ignores the problem, while the bankrupt local government is incapable of tackling it. Even after a major assault on poverty and its causes, large areas of greater Detroit remain deeply depressed; and eyesores have not been removed.
While the rustbelt was consolidating, the lead by which the USA is ahead of the rest of the world in advanced technologies has become greater than ever. America remains the predominant and military power in the world, and even despite Chinese efforts to develop and promote competitors like Alibaba their corporations remain far behind the US in developing intellectual property. And here is the pressure point. Bannon's reason for wanting a trade war with China rests precisely on the point that China is determined to catch up with the USA in all areas, and that China will use fair means or foul: just as the US did in the nineteenth century when piracy of European intellectual property was fostered by state and federal governments, principally by deferring the development of laws to protect alien intellectual property until there was an equal danger of American inventors loosing out in global competition.
Bannon has picked on an aspect of trade policy that is used heavily by China now, and was used in Europe and America over a couple of centuries. This is the requirement that the technology used in imported devices and products should be understood, so that the items can be allowed into the country on health and safety grounds. It involves requiring the intending importer [or the company hoping to open a subsidiary plant in China] to disclose the technical matters that - whether reasonably or not - the Chinese regulators say is necessary for the product to be sold as safe and healthy in China. Once those technological data are disclosed to Chinese authorities, there is a danger that they will be leaked to Chinese competitors for their commercial benefit; as has happened in Europe and North America in the past.
To treat this as an act of war is absurd: it is a matter for patient negotiation, case by case; always remembering that in such issues it is best to speak gently, and carry a big stick. America needs better to coordinate the ambitions of US companies to develop trade with China with the need to protect American intellectual property. Steve Bannon will have done his country a huge service by highlighting the issue; but his use of bellicose rhetoric meant that his role in government had to be brought to an end.
Thursday, 17 August 2017
The Uses of University
The principal social purpose of universities today is to keep around 44% of the age group 18-22 out of the jobs market and [in the main] in a life of sufficient social indulgence to keep them from radicalisation in support of any real or imagined cause. In England [which forms the bulk of the population] the cost of achieving this objective has been shunted from the state budget into a La-la-Land where it appears as a debt owed by the graduate community; which no one believes will be repaid in full, or even in half. The fact that the interest that is added to the accumulated debt has now increased to more than 6% - compound - makes the dream of repayment even more laughable.
It is still argued in some quarters that the universities have an economic purpose, to train the inventors of the future and to nurture some of the best researchers as teachers in the universities who combine their pedagogic work with the selection of the best students to join their research teams who will thus extend and perpetuate their work. This happens, on a depressingly small scale in comparison to the massive size of the university sector overall. Some buildings that were provided by the state in the nineteen sixties and seventies for university schools of science - especially of applied science and engineering - have been 're-purposed' to take some of the expansion in social studies: especially business and media. Where applied science capacity has been maintained, since the mid-seventies it has been occupied by an increasing proportion of overseas students [at both undergraduate and postgraduate levels] who mostly take their skills to competitor countries after graduating. Around the best scientific, medical and engineering departments have been gathered spin-off companies, which have developed innovations formed in the academic context into potentially successful businesses. Where these grow into conspicuous successes, the probability of them being taken over and developed by aliens, rather than by British capitalists, is overwhelming.
It is also worth noting that much of the best spun-off development has been in business parks funded by richly-endowed colleges, especially in Cambridge; which have been better resourced that spin-offs from Manchester or Sheffield Universities. Bullshit about the Northern Powerhouse has drawn heavily on the resources of the universities in the region for its rhetoric: but the Oxbridge endowments have not been matched by state funding for spin-offs from the multiple universities in Leeds or Birmingham.
The chief function of the universities is indeed to maintain intelligent young people in suspense over a period of years in which they have a good chance of being softened by drink, drugs, sex and idleness, or of being diverted into sports and hobbies that absorb their attention in ways that are not economically or politically disruptive. The school results that determine which university and course [if any] pupils in England, Wales and Northern Ireland will take up are being announced today, and the universities are competing vigorously to attract the best talent [insofar as it is revealed by A-level results]. The short-term motives for this are to be able to claim a 'high quality' of intake to keep a flow of good applicants coming to the university, and to get their fees through the university's books. The longer-term objective is to be a survivor when the inevitable cull of the over-bloated higher education system is begun. Economic and social usefulness will then be asserted as the criteria for selection as to which institutions should be culled and which retained: but the objectivity and validity of those criteria will be subject to challenge. The outcome, as to the size, shape and orientation of the higher education system cannot now be predicted.
There still are great scholars and sensible researchers in the British higher educational system. One such has just challenged the increasing optimism of government and the media about the extent of the oil and gas supplies that can be gained by fracking shale. He has gently suggested that the shales that are to be found in the UK are mostly too new [in Geological terms] to yield much that is economically useful. So another bubble may be about to burst: which shows how important it is - and always has been - to develop and retain the applied sciences: they can provide counterbalance to the fantasies that emerge from the Econocracy, which currently corrupt far too great a proportion of the university population.
It is still argued in some quarters that the universities have an economic purpose, to train the inventors of the future and to nurture some of the best researchers as teachers in the universities who combine their pedagogic work with the selection of the best students to join their research teams who will thus extend and perpetuate their work. This happens, on a depressingly small scale in comparison to the massive size of the university sector overall. Some buildings that were provided by the state in the nineteen sixties and seventies for university schools of science - especially of applied science and engineering - have been 're-purposed' to take some of the expansion in social studies: especially business and media. Where applied science capacity has been maintained, since the mid-seventies it has been occupied by an increasing proportion of overseas students [at both undergraduate and postgraduate levels] who mostly take their skills to competitor countries after graduating. Around the best scientific, medical and engineering departments have been gathered spin-off companies, which have developed innovations formed in the academic context into potentially successful businesses. Where these grow into conspicuous successes, the probability of them being taken over and developed by aliens, rather than by British capitalists, is overwhelming.
It is also worth noting that much of the best spun-off development has been in business parks funded by richly-endowed colleges, especially in Cambridge; which have been better resourced that spin-offs from Manchester or Sheffield Universities. Bullshit about the Northern Powerhouse has drawn heavily on the resources of the universities in the region for its rhetoric: but the Oxbridge endowments have not been matched by state funding for spin-offs from the multiple universities in Leeds or Birmingham.
The chief function of the universities is indeed to maintain intelligent young people in suspense over a period of years in which they have a good chance of being softened by drink, drugs, sex and idleness, or of being diverted into sports and hobbies that absorb their attention in ways that are not economically or politically disruptive. The school results that determine which university and course [if any] pupils in England, Wales and Northern Ireland will take up are being announced today, and the universities are competing vigorously to attract the best talent [insofar as it is revealed by A-level results]. The short-term motives for this are to be able to claim a 'high quality' of intake to keep a flow of good applicants coming to the university, and to get their fees through the university's books. The longer-term objective is to be a survivor when the inevitable cull of the over-bloated higher education system is begun. Economic and social usefulness will then be asserted as the criteria for selection as to which institutions should be culled and which retained: but the objectivity and validity of those criteria will be subject to challenge. The outcome, as to the size, shape and orientation of the higher education system cannot now be predicted.
There still are great scholars and sensible researchers in the British higher educational system. One such has just challenged the increasing optimism of government and the media about the extent of the oil and gas supplies that can be gained by fracking shale. He has gently suggested that the shales that are to be found in the UK are mostly too new [in Geological terms] to yield much that is economically useful. So another bubble may be about to burst: which shows how important it is - and always has been - to develop and retain the applied sciences: they can provide counterbalance to the fantasies that emerge from the Econocracy, which currently corrupt far too great a proportion of the university population.
Sunday, 6 August 2017
Politics, Economics and Science
There are degrees that purport to qualify their graduands in 'Political Science': there are even some professorships under that title in British universities. That there is some degree of scientific precision in some aspects of the study of politics has been proved in recent British general elections, where 'Exit Polls' that systematically ask voters how they have actually voted have displayed an astonishing degree of accuracy; as demonstrated 24 hours later when all the votes are counted. I describe this accuracy as "astonishing" because it contrasts with Opinion Polls conducted right down to the day before the election, which are often wildly wide of the mark; thus, politicians and commentators who rely on them can grossly be misled, as were most of both those groups when the Tories' chances were over-rated and Labour's popularity was grossly under-reported in the polls before the election this year. This appears to show that people are in large measure unsure how to vote [or whether they will vote] until the last minute, while it can be inferred that many do not tell the truth in advance of their casting their ballots. After voting, people seem more confident that they can not be swayed in their decision-making by the lift of the questioner's eyebrow or their sniff of disapproval; so then they tell the truth, and the statisticians and psychologists who set and assess the actual questions to be asked are vindicated in the precise methods that they use.
The scope of 'Political Science' is much wider than this, of course. Where it combines statistical rigour with sound social analysis or experimentally validated psychology, interesting and potentially useful data are produced. But where it attempts to explain the underlying factors which make a population of humans behave in this way or that to determine the direction of government it can only follow the conclusions presented by sociology, psychology or history: and within each of those disciplines there is no agreement on what are the rock-bottom principles emergent from the study that should be followed by government with the same degree of authority as applies to Botany, Geology or Medical Science. There are, of course, fundamental disputes within the natural sciences; but there is also a sufficient consensus to validate measures that are taken to support public health, safe transport and the control of thousands of potentially dangerous substances.
Politicians with some degree of common sense - and many such people still exist, though their expression of their views is often limited by the need to have the support of their party at the next election - make a mix-and-match pragmatic personal portfolio of ideas drawn from the natural sciences, and from academic politics, history, psychology and sociology; and accept that they must be willing to change their understanding in line with new facts [including new false interpretations that capture the public mood]. This inner assessment of the situation is necessarily combined with what the electorate in the particular constituency where the politician is based understand and want. This is a precarious situation to be in and politicians usually recognise their vulnerability within the nexus of shifting popular opinion.
The biggest intellectual problem that many politicians face is that of Economics: the pseudo-science that has been captured by the Econocracy, the hegemonic advocates of the crazy dogma that markets can become so developed - on their own - that they produce results that could not be bettered by any amount of detailed direction from the political machine. The tragedy to which that dogma has given rise is that in the countries that have partially opened up their markets to untrammeled competition it has increasingly become apparent that untrammeled [or even relatively unrestricted] free operation of markets conduces against humans having an inner sense of wellbeing. This is now the very nub of political debate in the USA and in the United Kingdom, and must be a major theme in this blog for the next few days.
The scope of 'Political Science' is much wider than this, of course. Where it combines statistical rigour with sound social analysis or experimentally validated psychology, interesting and potentially useful data are produced. But where it attempts to explain the underlying factors which make a population of humans behave in this way or that to determine the direction of government it can only follow the conclusions presented by sociology, psychology or history: and within each of those disciplines there is no agreement on what are the rock-bottom principles emergent from the study that should be followed by government with the same degree of authority as applies to Botany, Geology or Medical Science. There are, of course, fundamental disputes within the natural sciences; but there is also a sufficient consensus to validate measures that are taken to support public health, safe transport and the control of thousands of potentially dangerous substances.
Politicians with some degree of common sense - and many such people still exist, though their expression of their views is often limited by the need to have the support of their party at the next election - make a mix-and-match pragmatic personal portfolio of ideas drawn from the natural sciences, and from academic politics, history, psychology and sociology; and accept that they must be willing to change their understanding in line with new facts [including new false interpretations that capture the public mood]. This inner assessment of the situation is necessarily combined with what the electorate in the particular constituency where the politician is based understand and want. This is a precarious situation to be in and politicians usually recognise their vulnerability within the nexus of shifting popular opinion.
The biggest intellectual problem that many politicians face is that of Economics: the pseudo-science that has been captured by the Econocracy, the hegemonic advocates of the crazy dogma that markets can become so developed - on their own - that they produce results that could not be bettered by any amount of detailed direction from the political machine. The tragedy to which that dogma has given rise is that in the countries that have partially opened up their markets to untrammeled competition it has increasingly become apparent that untrammeled [or even relatively unrestricted] free operation of markets conduces against humans having an inner sense of wellbeing. This is now the very nub of political debate in the USA and in the United Kingdom, and must be a major theme in this blog for the next few days.
Thursday, 3 August 2017
Another Showery Thursday
Now that virtually all the school holidays are under way, in the whole of the United Kingdom, the weather is - at best - indifferent, and in some parts of the country today will be unpleasantly cool and rainy. Nobody can claim to be surprised by this: it is the recurrent weather pattern for the time of year, over many decades. Sometimes the weather is exceptionally warm and sunny, sometimes colder than this year: but this is pretty well in the middle of the experience of the normal adult. For children, it can be disappointing; and this used to knock-back on the parents who had to turn their disappointment into constructive activity.
But here we can note the great societal change of the past decade. Thirty years ago, before the internet was accessible to households, children played; indoors if cold or wet weather was prevalent, out of doors much of the time when the weather was reasonable or good. Now it is difficult to get many children to go out to play [even in 'safe' places] because of their preoccupation with chat-rooms, on-line games and other experiences that they get on their phones, tablets and laptops. Virtual reality and instant communication with other sedentary communicants have replaced the interaction that really used to take place in meadows and hedgerows. But with this change there has developed a deeply unhealthy intensification of the downside that always existed in children's play.
In previous generations it was common for a child to run home to complain that she or he had been excluded from a game, or that the owner of the cricket bat had taken it home [thus ending the game] because they refused to accept that they were 'out', or that some fight had become too serious so that someone was hurt, or that the group had descended to name-calling and abuse that had become hurtful. These were all incidents in a session of play between people in who were in direct physical contact with their peer group; and usually the same afternoon the same groups of neighbourhood children would start play again with the relationships between them reset.
In the new generation, abuse, bullying and other offensive behaviour can build up over days, weeks and even months. Suicides are not unique, though mercifully they remain rare: but many thousands of children abuse each other, and receive abuse, online. Though most of this negative behaviour is at the intellectual level of the children; an increasing proportion of it is not. Children can access adult sites [even if their parents think they are barred, the means of getting around censorship are transmitted between open-minded young people] and discover ranges of abuse that extend far beyond pornography.
Just as their behaviour towards other real children whom they do not meet in the holidays [or ever] can become abusive, conducted from the privacy of their own rooms and their private devices; so their understanding of the world they live in - both the world of children and the world of adults - is shaped for them individually by what they discover for themselves in the infinite collective memory to which they are able to gain exposure. It is increasingly difficult for any child to be innocent of the dark side of human nature, including their own instincts and interests; but it is easy to conceal what they have learned on the net when parents try to assess their development. Most children are adept actors, especially with the audience that they best understand: their parents; and most children resort to untruth, at least occasionally, which is not always recognised by adult interlocutors. Thus children's world has changed, and is changing ever more quickly. Immature minds can access worlds that could be kept from their parents' generation, and [despite a increasing media coverage of the phenomena] there is very little guidance for teachers, parents and other carers - not least, grandparents - in coping with stubborn silences that mask shameful knowledge.
Thus is growing up a generation of economic decision-takers whose base in knowledge and in on-line experience is utterly different from that of adults who emerged into society in the nineteen-seventies. There are many good signs: smoking and drinking heavily are taboo - except for the minorities who descend into dangerous substance abuse. Young people are polite and helpful, in general: but does this mask their real attitude to society and to their elders, as formulated in the privacy that lies behind their passwords? These questions will be of fundamental importance to the economy, as a new pattern of consumer preferences comes to predominate. I am prepared to bet that they will take the reality of economic life ever further away from the simplistic supply-and-demand models on which the Econocracy have built their elaborate superstructure.
But here we can note the great societal change of the past decade. Thirty years ago, before the internet was accessible to households, children played; indoors if cold or wet weather was prevalent, out of doors much of the time when the weather was reasonable or good. Now it is difficult to get many children to go out to play [even in 'safe' places] because of their preoccupation with chat-rooms, on-line games and other experiences that they get on their phones, tablets and laptops. Virtual reality and instant communication with other sedentary communicants have replaced the interaction that really used to take place in meadows and hedgerows. But with this change there has developed a deeply unhealthy intensification of the downside that always existed in children's play.
In previous generations it was common for a child to run home to complain that she or he had been excluded from a game, or that the owner of the cricket bat had taken it home [thus ending the game] because they refused to accept that they were 'out', or that some fight had become too serious so that someone was hurt, or that the group had descended to name-calling and abuse that had become hurtful. These were all incidents in a session of play between people in who were in direct physical contact with their peer group; and usually the same afternoon the same groups of neighbourhood children would start play again with the relationships between them reset.
In the new generation, abuse, bullying and other offensive behaviour can build up over days, weeks and even months. Suicides are not unique, though mercifully they remain rare: but many thousands of children abuse each other, and receive abuse, online. Though most of this negative behaviour is at the intellectual level of the children; an increasing proportion of it is not. Children can access adult sites [even if their parents think they are barred, the means of getting around censorship are transmitted between open-minded young people] and discover ranges of abuse that extend far beyond pornography.
Just as their behaviour towards other real children whom they do not meet in the holidays [or ever] can become abusive, conducted from the privacy of their own rooms and their private devices; so their understanding of the world they live in - both the world of children and the world of adults - is shaped for them individually by what they discover for themselves in the infinite collective memory to which they are able to gain exposure. It is increasingly difficult for any child to be innocent of the dark side of human nature, including their own instincts and interests; but it is easy to conceal what they have learned on the net when parents try to assess their development. Most children are adept actors, especially with the audience that they best understand: their parents; and most children resort to untruth, at least occasionally, which is not always recognised by adult interlocutors. Thus children's world has changed, and is changing ever more quickly. Immature minds can access worlds that could be kept from their parents' generation, and [despite a increasing media coverage of the phenomena] there is very little guidance for teachers, parents and other carers - not least, grandparents - in coping with stubborn silences that mask shameful knowledge.
Thus is growing up a generation of economic decision-takers whose base in knowledge and in on-line experience is utterly different from that of adults who emerged into society in the nineteen-seventies. There are many good signs: smoking and drinking heavily are taboo - except for the minorities who descend into dangerous substance abuse. Young people are polite and helpful, in general: but does this mask their real attitude to society and to their elders, as formulated in the privacy that lies behind their passwords? These questions will be of fundamental importance to the economy, as a new pattern of consumer preferences comes to predominate. I am prepared to bet that they will take the reality of economic life ever further away from the simplistic supply-and-demand models on which the Econocracy have built their elaborate superstructure.
Friday, 28 July 2017
Rethinking Economics and the Econocracy
Yesterday, after I had issued my lament for society on this blog: in which I specifically deplored the large number of students who receive degrees in Economics, I opened my TIMES to find a piece by Richard Barwell and Anthony Yates in which the 'basics' of Econocratic dogma are defended against the relative attractiveness of 'fashionable concepts'. Yates is a professor of Economics in Birmingham and Barwell is 'senior Economist' in a bank, and the article makes it pretty clear that students in Birmingham are not going to be encouraged to dabble with the growing international network which sometimes uses the descriptor Rethinking Economics.
Yates and Barwell deny that Economics has become a narrow programme of dogma, which takes comfort in adapting simplified versions of mathematical models that have been tested and proven in Physics and Engineering, apparently to vindicate their assertions about how aspects of the economy can be understood. They refer to awards of a pseudo-Nobel Prize [called the 'Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics', and endowed by a group of bankers many decades after the real Nobel Prizes were set up] to individuals in various 'applied' areas of Economic comment and research. The Times writers imply that students can - if they so wish - divert their attention to the byways around Economics that have been explored by some of these pseudo-Nobel 'laureates' [this is my summary of their point] but such deviant study does not help them to become Econocrats.
To be gazetted as an Economist, apparently, the student must accept that the models developed by their teachers upon the work of their teachers are uniquely logical because they are mathematical. This is a re-run in these depressing times of economic failure of the argument that was first advanced in the eighteen-sixties, a period of great economic optimism, by one of the first Economists. William Stanley Jevons who held the professorship of Political Economy in Owens College, the forerunner of the University of Manchester, wrote that if Political Economy was going to be developed into a real science it must become mathematically based. He had himself come to Political Economy from a base in science. As a young man he had experienced the thrilling period of the Australian gold rush when - as in California and the Yukon - the news that gold nuggets were to be found lying on the ground and at the bed of streams brought a rush of hungry, ambitious men from all over Europe to try their luck. Jevons went to the gold field as an assayist, verifying gold discoveries and frequently disappointing those who had not found the real thing. He had plenty of time to observe the weather, the sky and the common astronomical phenomena. At that time, there was a high level of sunspot activity; which was very visible from Australia. Jevons was not the first person to form the notion that the level of sunspot activity affected the amount of solar radiation coming to the earth, and that this must surely affect the weather; but he extended the notion to become a putative explanation of the trade cycle. He wrote extensively on the applicability of statistical data to the economy, and thus earned his professorial chair. He even caused the creation of a Royal Commission - the highest level of government inquiry - by his publication of The Coal Question a book in which he declared that the entire prosperity of the United Kingdom since the first stirrings of the industrial revolution had depended on the development of steam power [both in locomotives and ships, and in stationary engines in mines and mills]. Steam power was derived from coal. Coal was still abundant in Britain in the middle decades of the nineteenth century, but demand was increasing and Jevons recognised that if the coal ran out, the economy would come to a full stop. Thus he tried to calculate the nation's coal reserves, set this against expanding demand, and concluded that well before the date when the lines expressing the depletion of reserves and the rising demand for coal converged, the national debt must be paid off and a whole new energy basis for the economy would have to be found. The Commission took evidence, cogitated, and decided that the crisis was far enough in the future not to be bothered with the issue in the short term. Jevons' two most significant attempts to cause the economy to be managed according to statistical data to which he had access were unsuccessful, but as the university system expanded teachers of Political Economy preferred to be called Economists, and tried better to develop Jevons' insight that their subject could gain credibility if it was shown to align with statistical data and mathematical models.
The first half of the twentieth century was disfigured by two world war and the removal of Russia from the normal world economy. The half-century after 1950 saw a divided human community, where the 'capitalist' states tried the flawed 'neo-Keynesian' model for economic management until it led to the chaos of the seventies, then the 'rational markets' [monetarist] model which gave the world the crash of 2007-8 [which the Econocracy did not foresee]. Economics has never given society at large any models that align with reality and with political imperatives. Thus the assumption by Barwell and Yates that the way for students to gain a broad understanding that will help them to serve humanity usefully is by learning the models that the professoriat have a vested interest in, carries no credibility. Hence contemporary students from Jevons' old stamping ground of Manchester began the challenge to the Econocracy which is simply based on the assumption that 'enough is enough'.
Yates and Barwell deny that Economics has become a narrow programme of dogma, which takes comfort in adapting simplified versions of mathematical models that have been tested and proven in Physics and Engineering, apparently to vindicate their assertions about how aspects of the economy can be understood. They refer to awards of a pseudo-Nobel Prize [called the 'Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics', and endowed by a group of bankers many decades after the real Nobel Prizes were set up] to individuals in various 'applied' areas of Economic comment and research. The Times writers imply that students can - if they so wish - divert their attention to the byways around Economics that have been explored by some of these pseudo-Nobel 'laureates' [this is my summary of their point] but such deviant study does not help them to become Econocrats.
To be gazetted as an Economist, apparently, the student must accept that the models developed by their teachers upon the work of their teachers are uniquely logical because they are mathematical. This is a re-run in these depressing times of economic failure of the argument that was first advanced in the eighteen-sixties, a period of great economic optimism, by one of the first Economists. William Stanley Jevons who held the professorship of Political Economy in Owens College, the forerunner of the University of Manchester, wrote that if Political Economy was going to be developed into a real science it must become mathematically based. He had himself come to Political Economy from a base in science. As a young man he had experienced the thrilling period of the Australian gold rush when - as in California and the Yukon - the news that gold nuggets were to be found lying on the ground and at the bed of streams brought a rush of hungry, ambitious men from all over Europe to try their luck. Jevons went to the gold field as an assayist, verifying gold discoveries and frequently disappointing those who had not found the real thing. He had plenty of time to observe the weather, the sky and the common astronomical phenomena. At that time, there was a high level of sunspot activity; which was very visible from Australia. Jevons was not the first person to form the notion that the level of sunspot activity affected the amount of solar radiation coming to the earth, and that this must surely affect the weather; but he extended the notion to become a putative explanation of the trade cycle. He wrote extensively on the applicability of statistical data to the economy, and thus earned his professorial chair. He even caused the creation of a Royal Commission - the highest level of government inquiry - by his publication of The Coal Question a book in which he declared that the entire prosperity of the United Kingdom since the first stirrings of the industrial revolution had depended on the development of steam power [both in locomotives and ships, and in stationary engines in mines and mills]. Steam power was derived from coal. Coal was still abundant in Britain in the middle decades of the nineteenth century, but demand was increasing and Jevons recognised that if the coal ran out, the economy would come to a full stop. Thus he tried to calculate the nation's coal reserves, set this against expanding demand, and concluded that well before the date when the lines expressing the depletion of reserves and the rising demand for coal converged, the national debt must be paid off and a whole new energy basis for the economy would have to be found. The Commission took evidence, cogitated, and decided that the crisis was far enough in the future not to be bothered with the issue in the short term. Jevons' two most significant attempts to cause the economy to be managed according to statistical data to which he had access were unsuccessful, but as the university system expanded teachers of Political Economy preferred to be called Economists, and tried better to develop Jevons' insight that their subject could gain credibility if it was shown to align with statistical data and mathematical models.
The first half of the twentieth century was disfigured by two world war and the removal of Russia from the normal world economy. The half-century after 1950 saw a divided human community, where the 'capitalist' states tried the flawed 'neo-Keynesian' model for economic management until it led to the chaos of the seventies, then the 'rational markets' [monetarist] model which gave the world the crash of 2007-8 [which the Econocracy did not foresee]. Economics has never given society at large any models that align with reality and with political imperatives. Thus the assumption by Barwell and Yates that the way for students to gain a broad understanding that will help them to serve humanity usefully is by learning the models that the professoriat have a vested interest in, carries no credibility. Hence contemporary students from Jevons' old stamping ground of Manchester began the challenge to the Econocracy which is simply based on the assumption that 'enough is enough'.
Thursday, 27 July 2017
Education, Immigration and Austerity
More than thirty years ago I was Dean of Social Sciences in a major English University, from which I had previously graduated. As a graduate, I regularly receive information from the university, accompanied by invitations to make donations to various aspects of the work that goes on there. In the latest issue, they gave figures for the numbers of graduates in each faculty: and social sciences was more than twice as prolific as any other Faculty. When I was on the staff, social sciences were similar in size [and therefore in numbers of graduates] to the arts, science and engineering faculties.
During the time when I was Dean, the worst of the Thatcherite destruction was being done to the steel and related engineering industries in the region: which had the impact of reducing dramatically the potential for growth of the materials sciences parts of engineering. In the subsequent decades demand from students - especially, from UK students - has been pathetic in applied sciences [which mean that there has been plenty of capacity to train tens of thousands of scientists and engineers and metallurgists for emergent economies], poor in pure sciences and weak in the 'hard' arts like languages. The result is that Britain has been preparing people to do parasitic jobs in the media and other sectors where no material product emerges, and in financial services [which, at high risk, brings significant income to Britain from the world economy: and which could now be threatened by Brexit].
The material economy requires workers to do jobs that are alien to UK graduates, who are 'too good' for farm work or for ordinary jobs in the retail and hospitality sectors, or in building and construction; so those jobs have been taken up by migrants, many from the EU and many from beyond Europe. Thus it is important to note that simply barring EU immigrants will not make the total net migration statistics 'look right'; but it will denude agriculture, construction and hospitality of their essential workforces.
The educational system has totally failed to create the British workforce that Britain needs. Teaching tens of thousands of young people every year the dogmatic nonsense that is uttered by the Econocracy makes the situation worse, because it renders reality incomprehensible to the people who are supposedly educated to illuminate economic life.
Thus the material economy has stagnated: except for those areas of the services sector which largely import the material components of the things they use, and import their labour: to which the British population comes - largely with borrowed money - to buy consolation for their nagging awareness that their incomes have generally not grown [in real terms] for more than ten years. Companies are hoarding their profits, or returning them to shareholders in buy-backs [in the cases where they still make profits, usually in overseas markets]. The only conspicuous sphere of investment is the proliferation of branches of quirky dineries, nail-bars and bars; none of which are famous for longevity.
The misapplication of neo-Keynesianism in the later nineteen-sixties and early' seventies means that it has been impossible to persuade an 'Economics Profession' dominated by 'rational markets' nonsense that a keynesian stimulus would restart the real economy. Instead, successive government have adopted and stuck to the policy of austerity; which has clearly become a mantra that will eventually provoke a populist revolt. The misdirection of education over the last four decades means that the economy lacks the people who could implement a Keynesian reflation of the economy; and the economic devastation that the Thatcherite monetarists achieved means that many of the means by which a traditional Keynesian restoration of economic growth could be accomplished do not exist. Yet is is only by a strong pattern of state support for the revival of construction and manufacturing that the economy can be rebuilt. It will be a task of immense complexity; but it must be achievable.
More of this in the coming days.
During the time when I was Dean, the worst of the Thatcherite destruction was being done to the steel and related engineering industries in the region: which had the impact of reducing dramatically the potential for growth of the materials sciences parts of engineering. In the subsequent decades demand from students - especially, from UK students - has been pathetic in applied sciences [which mean that there has been plenty of capacity to train tens of thousands of scientists and engineers and metallurgists for emergent economies], poor in pure sciences and weak in the 'hard' arts like languages. The result is that Britain has been preparing people to do parasitic jobs in the media and other sectors where no material product emerges, and in financial services [which, at high risk, brings significant income to Britain from the world economy: and which could now be threatened by Brexit].
The material economy requires workers to do jobs that are alien to UK graduates, who are 'too good' for farm work or for ordinary jobs in the retail and hospitality sectors, or in building and construction; so those jobs have been taken up by migrants, many from the EU and many from beyond Europe. Thus it is important to note that simply barring EU immigrants will not make the total net migration statistics 'look right'; but it will denude agriculture, construction and hospitality of their essential workforces.
The educational system has totally failed to create the British workforce that Britain needs. Teaching tens of thousands of young people every year the dogmatic nonsense that is uttered by the Econocracy makes the situation worse, because it renders reality incomprehensible to the people who are supposedly educated to illuminate economic life.
Thus the material economy has stagnated: except for those areas of the services sector which largely import the material components of the things they use, and import their labour: to which the British population comes - largely with borrowed money - to buy consolation for their nagging awareness that their incomes have generally not grown [in real terms] for more than ten years. Companies are hoarding their profits, or returning them to shareholders in buy-backs [in the cases where they still make profits, usually in overseas markets]. The only conspicuous sphere of investment is the proliferation of branches of quirky dineries, nail-bars and bars; none of which are famous for longevity.
The misapplication of neo-Keynesianism in the later nineteen-sixties and early' seventies means that it has been impossible to persuade an 'Economics Profession' dominated by 'rational markets' nonsense that a keynesian stimulus would restart the real economy. Instead, successive government have adopted and stuck to the policy of austerity; which has clearly become a mantra that will eventually provoke a populist revolt. The misdirection of education over the last four decades means that the economy lacks the people who could implement a Keynesian reflation of the economy; and the economic devastation that the Thatcherite monetarists achieved means that many of the means by which a traditional Keynesian restoration of economic growth could be accomplished do not exist. Yet is is only by a strong pattern of state support for the revival of construction and manufacturing that the economy can be rebuilt. It will be a task of immense complexity; but it must be achievable.
More of this in the coming days.
Thursday, 20 July 2017
BBC Salaries and the 'Paradox of Value'
The media - not least, the BBC itself - has had a field-day taking apart the data that the BBC has been required to publish on the salaries paid to people who appear on television; if they are paid more than the prime minister. These are only partial data, because [as has been pointed out in all the reports that I have seen] those presenters who sell their services through production companies are not paid salaries as such, so do not appear in the list. Those like Graham Norton, who are part salaried and part freelance only display the salary portion of their earnings: for this, and myriad other reasons, the data are of no effective use. But that has not presented any obstacle to the pontificators who have taken politically correct positions and argued that it is 'scandalous' that men are paid more than women, and that no person from an ethnic minority is among the highest-paid.
It would be possible for the BBC to award salaries [and refuse to employ non-salaried presenters] according to a popularity poll conducted by the Guardian, which was recently shown to the overwhelmingly the Corporation's favoured 'newspaper'; but it is most unlikely that the vast mass of the population would agree with that ranking. I am constantly astonished at the vulgarity of much of the output on all channels that appears to be highly popular.
Adam Smith, the founding father of the Econocracy, wrote about a so-called 'paradox of value'. Items that are absolute necessity for the continued survival of human beings, like bread and cheese, are cheap, while essentially 'useless' objects like gem diamonds are massively expensive. Human society is paradoxical: what people are prepared to strive and compete to get seems quite irrational to other people. Once a man or a woman has enough food to eat, a place to shelter and clothing that seems to them adequate, the preferences that they display thereafter if they are able to widen the pattern of their consumption seem utterly silly to other people. There are no natural laws to direct people's choices. Various religious guidance is offered; but more often than not that steers wealth towards the religion and those who lead it, and offers no valid guidance to individuals on how to manage their own disbursement of their incomes.
The medical professions have become vocal in expressing their view as to what consumption and behaviour is healthy and what is not, and sometimes there is sufficient evidence to convince people that the advice is basically sound. Politicians are presented with speeches to read out, in attempts to steer public behaviour in directions that are seen as affordable and socially desirable; but everyone views such utterances with cynicism.
Ultimately there is no valid system for valuation of anything or anybody's action. Some things, like poisons and poisoners, can generally be condemned; but they are at the extremes of consumer behaviour and they are threatening to the majority of consumers: so collective action against them is self-defence by the majority. There will never be a definition of 'value': so there is no 'true' way of differentiating Graham Norton from Fiona Bruce. They and their agents are left to haggle; and that is the only way it can be.
It would be possible for the BBC to award salaries [and refuse to employ non-salaried presenters] according to a popularity poll conducted by the Guardian, which was recently shown to the overwhelmingly the Corporation's favoured 'newspaper'; but it is most unlikely that the vast mass of the population would agree with that ranking. I am constantly astonished at the vulgarity of much of the output on all channels that appears to be highly popular.
Adam Smith, the founding father of the Econocracy, wrote about a so-called 'paradox of value'. Items that are absolute necessity for the continued survival of human beings, like bread and cheese, are cheap, while essentially 'useless' objects like gem diamonds are massively expensive. Human society is paradoxical: what people are prepared to strive and compete to get seems quite irrational to other people. Once a man or a woman has enough food to eat, a place to shelter and clothing that seems to them adequate, the preferences that they display thereafter if they are able to widen the pattern of their consumption seem utterly silly to other people. There are no natural laws to direct people's choices. Various religious guidance is offered; but more often than not that steers wealth towards the religion and those who lead it, and offers no valid guidance to individuals on how to manage their own disbursement of their incomes.
The medical professions have become vocal in expressing their view as to what consumption and behaviour is healthy and what is not, and sometimes there is sufficient evidence to convince people that the advice is basically sound. Politicians are presented with speeches to read out, in attempts to steer public behaviour in directions that are seen as affordable and socially desirable; but everyone views such utterances with cynicism.
Ultimately there is no valid system for valuation of anything or anybody's action. Some things, like poisons and poisoners, can generally be condemned; but they are at the extremes of consumer behaviour and they are threatening to the majority of consumers: so collective action against them is self-defence by the majority. There will never be a definition of 'value': so there is no 'true' way of differentiating Graham Norton from Fiona Bruce. They and their agents are left to haggle; and that is the only way it can be.
Wednesday, 19 July 2017
The Tragic Triumph of the Econocracy
'The Bank', with a capital letter, means the Central Bank in any country or community: in our case, the Bank of England; and 'the banks', as a collective, means all the other firms and partnerships that the Bank recognises as legitimate banks and thus it is authorised to give them instructions and to trade with them. Specifically, it will sell them bonds and other debt certificates [from a list of approved categories] and lend them money at a publicly announced rate of interest called 'base rate'. A large proportion of the Econocracy [the prevailing rat-pack of professors of Economics] argue that if the management of the banks by the Bank is perfectly calibrated the economy can operate perfectly. If the money-managing institutions work perfectly, the whole economy can achieve 'equilibrium': a state where all the resources available to the human race are allocated to their optimum uses.
This is a model of perfection. The realities of human existence make it a total nonsense: but the Econocracy currently has control of the channels of advice to governments, and most of the economic commentators in the media, in banks and investing institutions are required to parrot the prevailing orthodoxy: though there have always been some brave spirits who have the wit and the integrity to deny the validity of the whole structure.
So-called Monetarism, a package of ideas formulated by Econocrats in terms that could be explained to politicians and to students, was introduced in the USA in the later nineteen sixties, when the flaws in the attempt at practical neo-Keynesianism had generated a disastrous wage-price spiral as trade unions demanded pay increases to match price increases [as reported on official indexes of 'inflation']. In the early nineteen seventies the major oil-exporting countries tripled the royalties that they charged for access to their oil and natural gas; and this sent up the prices of all goods and services because of the universal impact of the costs of fuel for vehicles to deliver goods and people to where they were wanted, and the price of fuel for the provision of energy to heat homes and schools and to power factories. Additionally, petroleum was a vital ingredient in many plastics and polymers. So all prices were rising, hence wage demands took on a new stridency: and governments tried to stop the 'spiral' going out of control.
The Monetarists argued that if real control was given to the Bank and the government backed up the Bank in issuing stringent instructions to banks as to when and on when terms they could lend money to whom, that would strangle the spiral of rising wages and prices. Employers would not be able to borrow from their banks on affordable terms: so instead of borrowing to pay workers inflated wages, they would have to tell them "take what is on offer, or we'll have to close down and sack you all". Similarly, consumers would be told that they could only stay in the homes on which they were servicing mortgages provided they paid penal interest rates which went as high as 15%: which left them with little to spend on other things. So if they kept the house and the car, paying high mortgage interest and high interest on their car loans and the loans against which they had bought their fridges and TV sets, they had to reduce consumption of everything else.
The Thatcher government adopted their own version of this policy straight after their election in 1979, and by 1992 they were well on the way to implementing it. Economic growth slowed dramatically; and wage growth slowed even more. Then the government itself stopped creating money with which to maintain activity in the coal mines and the shipyards. They compensated for the loss of income that they suffered as the real economy declined from the tax revenue that they received on North Sea oil and by the sale of the privatised industries. They cut back heavily on government spending on defence and in support of industries that had previously been considered essential for national survival: steel, shipbuilding, aerospace and coal. The economy was dramatically changed, as the 'real' material productive sectors were decimated and the financial services - notably 'investment banking' - began to predominate: and that sector of the economy was supposedly susceptible to refined control by the Bank.
Thus, by 2005 the 'real' - the material - economy on which human animals depend for their continued existence and comfort was utterly denigrated and largely despoiled; and the finance sector was put in a position to undermine the entire economy through its greedy overindulgence in speculative deals that the Bank did not even understand. This is the achievement of the Econocracy. The real incomes [money wages adjusted so that their current purchasing-power can be computed] of the mass of the British population have been static for a decade. Over those years, 2007-2017, plenty of jobs have been created; almost all of them in activities that do not result in any substantive increment to the real economy. There has been a spectacular degree of material stagnation which, set alongside the government's obsession with 'austerity' [in which they have been mentored by the same Econocrats] leaves almost everyone with an awareness that the economy is not "working for me". That is because the economy is being driven in obedience to an abstract model. The fundamental reality, that the economy should be the mechanism that serves material, living, aspirational individuals, has no place in contemporary Economics. That is why Economics must be brought down from its high place in academic temples, and opened up for radical restructuring.
This is a model of perfection. The realities of human existence make it a total nonsense: but the Econocracy currently has control of the channels of advice to governments, and most of the economic commentators in the media, in banks and investing institutions are required to parrot the prevailing orthodoxy: though there have always been some brave spirits who have the wit and the integrity to deny the validity of the whole structure.
So-called Monetarism, a package of ideas formulated by Econocrats in terms that could be explained to politicians and to students, was introduced in the USA in the later nineteen sixties, when the flaws in the attempt at practical neo-Keynesianism had generated a disastrous wage-price spiral as trade unions demanded pay increases to match price increases [as reported on official indexes of 'inflation']. In the early nineteen seventies the major oil-exporting countries tripled the royalties that they charged for access to their oil and natural gas; and this sent up the prices of all goods and services because of the universal impact of the costs of fuel for vehicles to deliver goods and people to where they were wanted, and the price of fuel for the provision of energy to heat homes and schools and to power factories. Additionally, petroleum was a vital ingredient in many plastics and polymers. So all prices were rising, hence wage demands took on a new stridency: and governments tried to stop the 'spiral' going out of control.
The Monetarists argued that if real control was given to the Bank and the government backed up the Bank in issuing stringent instructions to banks as to when and on when terms they could lend money to whom, that would strangle the spiral of rising wages and prices. Employers would not be able to borrow from their banks on affordable terms: so instead of borrowing to pay workers inflated wages, they would have to tell them "take what is on offer, or we'll have to close down and sack you all". Similarly, consumers would be told that they could only stay in the homes on which they were servicing mortgages provided they paid penal interest rates which went as high as 15%: which left them with little to spend on other things. So if they kept the house and the car, paying high mortgage interest and high interest on their car loans and the loans against which they had bought their fridges and TV sets, they had to reduce consumption of everything else.
The Thatcher government adopted their own version of this policy straight after their election in 1979, and by 1992 they were well on the way to implementing it. Economic growth slowed dramatically; and wage growth slowed even more. Then the government itself stopped creating money with which to maintain activity in the coal mines and the shipyards. They compensated for the loss of income that they suffered as the real economy declined from the tax revenue that they received on North Sea oil and by the sale of the privatised industries. They cut back heavily on government spending on defence and in support of industries that had previously been considered essential for national survival: steel, shipbuilding, aerospace and coal. The economy was dramatically changed, as the 'real' material productive sectors were decimated and the financial services - notably 'investment banking' - began to predominate: and that sector of the economy was supposedly susceptible to refined control by the Bank.
Thus, by 2005 the 'real' - the material - economy on which human animals depend for their continued existence and comfort was utterly denigrated and largely despoiled; and the finance sector was put in a position to undermine the entire economy through its greedy overindulgence in speculative deals that the Bank did not even understand. This is the achievement of the Econocracy. The real incomes [money wages adjusted so that their current purchasing-power can be computed] of the mass of the British population have been static for a decade. Over those years, 2007-2017, plenty of jobs have been created; almost all of them in activities that do not result in any substantive increment to the real economy. There has been a spectacular degree of material stagnation which, set alongside the government's obsession with 'austerity' [in which they have been mentored by the same Econocrats] leaves almost everyone with an awareness that the economy is not "working for me". That is because the economy is being driven in obedience to an abstract model. The fundamental reality, that the economy should be the mechanism that serves material, living, aspirational individuals, has no place in contemporary Economics. That is why Economics must be brought down from its high place in academic temples, and opened up for radical restructuring.
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