'The Bank', with a capital letter, means the Central Bank in any country or community: in our case, the Bank of England; and 'the banks', as a collective, means all the other firms and partnerships that the Bank recognises as legitimate banks and thus it is authorised to give them instructions and to trade with them. Specifically, it will sell them bonds and other debt certificates [from a list of approved categories] and lend them money at a publicly announced rate of interest called 'base rate'. A large proportion of the Econocracy [the prevailing rat-pack of professors of Economics] argue that if the management of the banks by the Bank is perfectly calibrated the economy can operate perfectly. If the money-managing institutions work perfectly, the whole economy can achieve 'equilibrium': a state where all the resources available to the human race are allocated to their optimum uses.
This is a model of perfection. The realities of human existence make it a total nonsense: but the Econocracy currently has control of the channels of advice to governments, and most of the economic commentators in the media, in banks and investing institutions are required to parrot the prevailing orthodoxy: though there have always been some brave spirits who have the wit and the integrity to deny the validity of the whole structure.
So-called Monetarism, a package of ideas formulated by Econocrats in terms that could be explained to politicians and to students, was introduced in the USA in the later nineteen sixties, when the flaws in the attempt at practical neo-Keynesianism had generated a disastrous wage-price spiral as trade unions demanded pay increases to match price increases [as reported on official indexes of 'inflation']. In the early nineteen seventies the major oil-exporting countries tripled the royalties that they charged for access to their oil and natural gas; and this sent up the prices of all goods and services because of the universal impact of the costs of fuel for vehicles to deliver goods and people to where they were wanted, and the price of fuel for the provision of energy to heat homes and schools and to power factories. Additionally, petroleum was a vital ingredient in many plastics and polymers. So all prices were rising, hence wage demands took on a new stridency: and governments tried to stop the 'spiral' going out of control.
The Monetarists argued that if real control was given to the Bank and the government backed up the Bank in issuing stringent instructions to banks as to when and on when terms they could lend money to whom, that would strangle the spiral of rising wages and prices. Employers would not be able to borrow from their banks on affordable terms: so instead of borrowing to pay workers inflated wages, they would have to tell them "take what is on offer, or we'll have to close down and sack you all". Similarly, consumers would be told that they could only stay in the homes on which they were servicing mortgages provided they paid penal interest rates which went as high as 15%: which left them with little to spend on other things. So if they kept the house and the car, paying high mortgage interest and high interest on their car loans and the loans against which they had bought their fridges and TV sets, they had to reduce consumption of everything else.
The Thatcher government adopted their own version of this policy straight after their election in 1979, and by 1992 they were well on the way to implementing it. Economic growth slowed dramatically; and wage growth slowed even more. Then the government itself stopped creating money with which to maintain activity in the coal mines and the shipyards. They compensated for the loss of income that they suffered as the real economy declined from the tax revenue that they received on North Sea oil and by the sale of the privatised industries. They cut back heavily on government spending on defence and in support of industries that had previously been considered essential for national survival: steel, shipbuilding, aerospace and coal. The economy was dramatically changed, as the 'real' material productive sectors were decimated and the financial services - notably 'investment banking' - began to predominate: and that sector of the economy was supposedly susceptible to refined control by the Bank.
Thus, by 2005 the 'real' - the material - economy on which human animals depend for their continued existence and comfort was utterly denigrated and largely despoiled; and the finance sector was put in a position to undermine the entire economy through its greedy overindulgence in speculative deals that the Bank did not even understand. This is the achievement of the Econocracy. The real incomes [money wages adjusted so that their current purchasing-power can be computed] of the mass of the British population have been static for a decade. Over those years, 2007-2017, plenty of jobs have been created; almost all of them in activities that do not result in any substantive increment to the real economy. There has been a spectacular degree of material stagnation which, set alongside the government's obsession with 'austerity' [in which they have been mentored by the same Econocrats] leaves almost everyone with an awareness that the economy is not "working for me". That is because the economy is being driven in obedience to an abstract model. The fundamental reality, that the economy should be the mechanism that serves material, living, aspirational individuals, has no place in contemporary Economics. That is why Economics must be brought down from its high place in academic temples, and opened up for radical restructuring.
Showing posts with label neo-Keynesianism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label neo-Keynesianism. Show all posts
Wednesday, 19 July 2017
Sunday, 16 July 2017
Economics - Again
A few days ago, I had a brief discussion with a student of History about my views on Economics and the Econocracy, referring him to the website of the Post Crash Economics Society where I first saw the very apposite term, Econocracy. On our next encounter [in the pub where he earns a crust as a part-time barman] he told me that he had mentioned my stance to a friend who is studying Economics; and the friend had vehemently disagreed with me. Perhaps we will be able to have a face-to-face discussion some time. In the mean time, I will post here today the briefest summary of my views.
I had the great good luck to go up to university when classes were small - my year in Politics and Economics comprised just 12 students - but teachers were good and libraries well resourced. The era of electronic access to data had not yet arisen, so we had to read: and we read voraciously.
At that time what we now call neo-Keyesianism was in the ascendancy, and models of the entire economy had been constructed in the National Institute for Economic and Social Research [NIESR], in the Treasury and in various universities. Given the state of development of computers at that time the models were crude and simplistic, and they could only be manipulated laboriously. Nevertheless, estimates could be made of the impact on the modeled economy of the policy options that were available to governments. These options came in two categories, monetary policy and fiscal policy. Monetary policy involved the creation of money; implicitly by the Bank of England on behalf of and with the authority of the government that owned the Bank. Banning the creation of money was a means of limiting the rate of growth of the economy; and encouraging the Bank to create money to lend to the trading institutions in the economy was a way of stimulating the growth of the money supply more generally. It was taken as a sign to the commercial banks that they could risk making more loans of their own money [deposited by their customers] whenever the Bank of England was stimulating the money supply; thus the amount by which spending could increase was very much greater than the amount by which the Bank increased the supply. Any commercial bank could borrow money from the Bank of England at a 'bank rate' [later called the 'base rate'] which was publicly announced; and lending by commercial banks was made at rates higher than the bank rate. The banks charged their customers rates of interest that varied according to the perceived riskiness of the loan. When the Bank of England had the nod from the government, it lowered bank rate; which was a clear indication to all the banks that they could drop the rates they charged to their customers, and perhaps risk extending the range. Thus a drop in bank rate, accompanied by an increase in the Bank of England's willingness to lend, signaled that banks and their customers should invest to expand the economy; thus expanding trade generally and stimulating economic growth and job opportunities in many sectors of the system could be increased.
However, at that time there were major constraints on the expansion of credit extended by banks. Their customers were required to pay cash deposits on durable consumer goods, and were only allowed to borrow a set percentage of the purchase price. Thus the spread of TV sets, washing machines and other desirable consumer goods was slowed down by the legal requirement for would-be buyers to save up for the deposit before they could enter into a hire-purchase agreement under which [having paid the deposit] they could pay off their borrowing while they had the use of the device. The firms that made the television sets were protected from foreign competition by import tariffs and controls on the amount of foreign currency that businesses could buy: so the system of monetary policy operated within a physically controlled system of protection. The present situation, where consumers can borrow huge amounts of credit and thus create the 'consumer demand' that 'drives' the economy was unthinkable. The world in which neo-Keynesiansim appeared to thrive was utterly different from the world in which we live now; and over the next few days I will outline how that change happened.
I try to keep my blogs at a modest length, and hope that anyone who becomes interested in my ideas will word-search through the archive.
I had the great good luck to go up to university when classes were small - my year in Politics and Economics comprised just 12 students - but teachers were good and libraries well resourced. The era of electronic access to data had not yet arisen, so we had to read: and we read voraciously.
At that time what we now call neo-Keyesianism was in the ascendancy, and models of the entire economy had been constructed in the National Institute for Economic and Social Research [NIESR], in the Treasury and in various universities. Given the state of development of computers at that time the models were crude and simplistic, and they could only be manipulated laboriously. Nevertheless, estimates could be made of the impact on the modeled economy of the policy options that were available to governments. These options came in two categories, monetary policy and fiscal policy. Monetary policy involved the creation of money; implicitly by the Bank of England on behalf of and with the authority of the government that owned the Bank. Banning the creation of money was a means of limiting the rate of growth of the economy; and encouraging the Bank to create money to lend to the trading institutions in the economy was a way of stimulating the growth of the money supply more generally. It was taken as a sign to the commercial banks that they could risk making more loans of their own money [deposited by their customers] whenever the Bank of England was stimulating the money supply; thus the amount by which spending could increase was very much greater than the amount by which the Bank increased the supply. Any commercial bank could borrow money from the Bank of England at a 'bank rate' [later called the 'base rate'] which was publicly announced; and lending by commercial banks was made at rates higher than the bank rate. The banks charged their customers rates of interest that varied according to the perceived riskiness of the loan. When the Bank of England had the nod from the government, it lowered bank rate; which was a clear indication to all the banks that they could drop the rates they charged to their customers, and perhaps risk extending the range. Thus a drop in bank rate, accompanied by an increase in the Bank of England's willingness to lend, signaled that banks and their customers should invest to expand the economy; thus expanding trade generally and stimulating economic growth and job opportunities in many sectors of the system could be increased.
However, at that time there were major constraints on the expansion of credit extended by banks. Their customers were required to pay cash deposits on durable consumer goods, and were only allowed to borrow a set percentage of the purchase price. Thus the spread of TV sets, washing machines and other desirable consumer goods was slowed down by the legal requirement for would-be buyers to save up for the deposit before they could enter into a hire-purchase agreement under which [having paid the deposit] they could pay off their borrowing while they had the use of the device. The firms that made the television sets were protected from foreign competition by import tariffs and controls on the amount of foreign currency that businesses could buy: so the system of monetary policy operated within a physically controlled system of protection. The present situation, where consumers can borrow huge amounts of credit and thus create the 'consumer demand' that 'drives' the economy was unthinkable. The world in which neo-Keynesiansim appeared to thrive was utterly different from the world in which we live now; and over the next few days I will outline how that change happened.
I try to keep my blogs at a modest length, and hope that anyone who becomes interested in my ideas will word-search through the archive.
Friday, 14 July 2017
Britain-in-Europe Survived as a 'Service Economy'
Yesterday, I hinted at the crucial fact that in 1948 the British people generally accepted that the country needed to rebuild its balance of payments; but their interests as consumes came to predominate over the recognised priority for productive investment in the economy. Following the collapse of neo-Keynesianism, the entry of the UK into the EEC was a vital step in the next major development. Within the cocoon of the EEC, then the EU, Britain was brought within a vast shelter that [it was hoped] could save any member country from economic catastrophe.
After Mrs Thatcher had eviscerated the economy, her successors were obliged to express admiration for her achievement in 'rebuilding' it. So, as the balance of payments worsened and the material economy continued to decay, it became imperative for the European shelter to be toughened. Mrs Thatcher herself huffed and puffed about Europe's exactions - and she gained an unprecedented rebate when other member states admitted that Britain was, indeed, being screwed under the prevailing formula - then she signed up to integrationist agreements. John Major, a hugely under-estimated figure, won a general election and proceeded to lead the country into the 'inevitable' process of political association of the EEC states with the passage of the Maastricht Treaty. A significant number of Conservative MPs, who he apparently classed as 'the Bastards', recognised that a political price was being paid for an economic shelter; and several of them did not like it. Thus they sought to oppose the surrender of ultimate sovereignty to the European Union: and though Britain went fully into the Union, there were many who resented it, in both major political parties.
Tony Blair's contempt for any history but his own, and for any political principle more profound that his convenience, led him to pack the House of Lords with donors who spared him the need to mollycoddle the trade union leaders whose predecessors has dominated the Labour Party through their control of the purse strings. His cavalier attempt to abolish the ancient office of Lord Chancellor showed how superficial he was; and the scandal of the Gulf War has rightly become the basis for an ineradicable contempt for his unconcern with truth; and apparently for the lives of British forces and Iraqui civilians. He allowed the drift towards further integration of EU institutions to continue, while considering himself a 'bridge' between the USA and the EU. Gordon Brown's brief period in office was dominated by the economic crisis, to which he and his Chancellor, Alastair Darling, responded well.
The came the Cameron-Clegg coalition. The LibDems were fanatically pro-'European', so for the five years of the coalition government the subjection of the UK to the EU was welcomed: the economic protection that it gave to the UK was recognised, and as the major financial centre to have survived well when the dust settled after the great crash of 2007-8 London was proven to be an asset to the whole of the EU. Of course, French and German bankers resented this situation; but their banks had to build up their London operations to remain globally competitive. Thus in the period 2010-15 a sub-set of the service sector, the financial services, became central to the economic offering that the EU made to the rest of the world. After five years of coalition the LibDems were adamant that they needed to stand [and to crash] as an independent party in the 2015 general election; while David Cameron [with an arrogant insouciance reminiscent of Tony Blair] promised a referendum on membership of the Union hoping, once and for all, to show that the 'Bastards' were a declining and impotent minority within the British state. Cameron was surprised to win the election, and he decided to call the referendum on the basis that a simple majority was required, with no limiting conditions. He apparently expected something over 70% of those who voted to favour continued membership of the Union. He had not foreseen that the referendum could be opened up as an avenue for the pent-up resentment of large swathes of the nation against his austerity policies, against deindustrialisation, against alien immigration, and simply against authority. The more the odious apostle of austerity, George Osborne, predicted doom and disaster, so the more people were tempted to vote against the government.
Thus came about Brexit. Cameron stood down, shocked at the consequences of his actions. The largely unknown Theresa May became the surprise premier, and she immediately grasped the wrong end of the stick on Brexit. Without comprehension of the importance of the economic cocoon, she set in train a process which - if it were continued to the end - would be calamitous. On her minsters' first presentation of major Brexit legislation - yesterday - it immediately became clear that she would not get away with it. The nation is about to descend into faction, debate and disagreement that will be reflected in both houses of parliament and in all the devolved assemblies. Things are getting interesting: and the only certainty is that Brexit as Mrs May has misconstrued it has gone into protracted death throes,
After Mrs Thatcher had eviscerated the economy, her successors were obliged to express admiration for her achievement in 'rebuilding' it. So, as the balance of payments worsened and the material economy continued to decay, it became imperative for the European shelter to be toughened. Mrs Thatcher herself huffed and puffed about Europe's exactions - and she gained an unprecedented rebate when other member states admitted that Britain was, indeed, being screwed under the prevailing formula - then she signed up to integrationist agreements. John Major, a hugely under-estimated figure, won a general election and proceeded to lead the country into the 'inevitable' process of political association of the EEC states with the passage of the Maastricht Treaty. A significant number of Conservative MPs, who he apparently classed as 'the Bastards', recognised that a political price was being paid for an economic shelter; and several of them did not like it. Thus they sought to oppose the surrender of ultimate sovereignty to the European Union: and though Britain went fully into the Union, there were many who resented it, in both major political parties.
Tony Blair's contempt for any history but his own, and for any political principle more profound that his convenience, led him to pack the House of Lords with donors who spared him the need to mollycoddle the trade union leaders whose predecessors has dominated the Labour Party through their control of the purse strings. His cavalier attempt to abolish the ancient office of Lord Chancellor showed how superficial he was; and the scandal of the Gulf War has rightly become the basis for an ineradicable contempt for his unconcern with truth; and apparently for the lives of British forces and Iraqui civilians. He allowed the drift towards further integration of EU institutions to continue, while considering himself a 'bridge' between the USA and the EU. Gordon Brown's brief period in office was dominated by the economic crisis, to which he and his Chancellor, Alastair Darling, responded well.
The came the Cameron-Clegg coalition. The LibDems were fanatically pro-'European', so for the five years of the coalition government the subjection of the UK to the EU was welcomed: the economic protection that it gave to the UK was recognised, and as the major financial centre to have survived well when the dust settled after the great crash of 2007-8 London was proven to be an asset to the whole of the EU. Of course, French and German bankers resented this situation; but their banks had to build up their London operations to remain globally competitive. Thus in the period 2010-15 a sub-set of the service sector, the financial services, became central to the economic offering that the EU made to the rest of the world. After five years of coalition the LibDems were adamant that they needed to stand [and to crash] as an independent party in the 2015 general election; while David Cameron [with an arrogant insouciance reminiscent of Tony Blair] promised a referendum on membership of the Union hoping, once and for all, to show that the 'Bastards' were a declining and impotent minority within the British state. Cameron was surprised to win the election, and he decided to call the referendum on the basis that a simple majority was required, with no limiting conditions. He apparently expected something over 70% of those who voted to favour continued membership of the Union. He had not foreseen that the referendum could be opened up as an avenue for the pent-up resentment of large swathes of the nation against his austerity policies, against deindustrialisation, against alien immigration, and simply against authority. The more the odious apostle of austerity, George Osborne, predicted doom and disaster, so the more people were tempted to vote against the government.
Thus came about Brexit. Cameron stood down, shocked at the consequences of his actions. The largely unknown Theresa May became the surprise premier, and she immediately grasped the wrong end of the stick on Brexit. Without comprehension of the importance of the economic cocoon, she set in train a process which - if it were continued to the end - would be calamitous. On her minsters' first presentation of major Brexit legislation - yesterday - it immediately became clear that she would not get away with it. The nation is about to descend into faction, debate and disagreement that will be reflected in both houses of parliament and in all the devolved assemblies. Things are getting interesting: and the only certainty is that Brexit as Mrs May has misconstrued it has gone into protracted death throes,
Monday, 12 December 2011
Money, Democracy and Economy
Evidence is accumulating that the International Monetary Fund [IMF] is preparing to work closely with the European Central Bank [ECB] to prolong the survival of the euro for long enough to allow Greece to demonstrate whether or not an austerity regime can be imposed with sufficient rigour to allow the country to remain in the eurozone. Whether or not the Greek economy meets the challenge under the very difficult current circumstances, it is highly probable that Chinese resources will also be transmitted via the IMF and the ECB to prop up the rest of the eurozone. Chinese government deposits with the IMF are extremely secure, and China is happy to take a greater share of control of the IMF which is a corollary of increasing its deposits. The USA is watching this situation jealously: so the Americans will most probably also agree to support the ECB to prevent the Chinese becoming too influential.
This set of moves will help to offset the risk of an intensification of the recession that is already gripping the whole of the EU. The recession is already set to last through most of 2012, and could go on longer. Trade between Europe and North America is important on both sides of the Atlantic so it is a direct US interest that Europe will be a good customer for US commerce and industry in a presidential election year. Both China and the sovereign wealth funds that are held by oil-exporting states and by Singapore are looking for businesses in Europe that will be a good buy during the recession. China will gain both the turnover and the institutional experience of the European firms that they may come to own; and - more importantly - they will take control of the intellectual property that the companies have accumulated. They will own the speculative research and the design capabilities of their European subsidiaries, which they can carry forward in China or in Europe as they see fit. They will be able to put their European brand-names on products made in China, greatly increasing the value-added to Chinese industrial output. The Chinese owners will be free to decide whether or not to run-down their European factories, and they will have the option to make their brands in China and sell them at European prices.
Such takeovers, followed by technology transfer to China, will mean that European consumers will still have access to the same brands; but employment and production in Europe will decrease and profits will be exported, so European spending-power will permanently be diminished. The de-industrialisation that has been undermining Britain and the USA for the past half-century will spread rapidly in Europe, even in Germany, unless specific measures are taken to prevent the alienation of ownership.
The massive middle classes in India, China, Brazil and other leading emergent economies are the most avid buyers of quons - brands - [see PPE via the link from this site] and an increasing mass of the population aspire to follow them. Exporting leading brands will be a huge boost to the national balance of payments of the countries that will have bought the brands, and will give them increased profits to apply to new investment. This is the outcome of the operation of the Iron Law of Wages. The EU as a whole has broken the law for decades and the inescapable payback is now being taken by the rest of the world. Proper, provident Germany has not participated in the profligacy; but is straight in the firing line now that redress is being taken. Because of their loyalty to the European fantasy Germans are now at risk of losing some control of their own economy and of the technology in which they have led the world. They have deferred - perhaps permanently - the day on which they would have to open their currency reserves ad lib to bail-out the most profligate members of the euro. But because of their loyalty to the EU they have placed at risk their control of technology and of the brands that they have exported so successfully over recent decades.
Meanwhile there is a daft shouting-match developing in Britain, between those who think that David Cameron has in some degree 'saved' the City of London by declining to support the implementation by the EU Commission and the Court of the Merkel package of financial stringency that has been endorsed by the other 26 member states, and those who argue that Cameron has damaged the vital interests - and the prestige - of the United Kingdom. The Deputy Prime Minister expressed both views, in a perfect vignette of Liberal Democrat policymaking. It is not clear how the new eurozone agreement will be 'policed', and most probably some fudging mechanism will be cobbled together in the drafting of the Compact that is now to begin. It is expected that most of the 26 'inner European' states will agree to impose a Robin Hood Tax, or Tobin Tax, on financial transactions. Britain could veto a tax change, under the Lisbon Treaty; but the veto power would not be applicable to a regulatory change under which the EU might apply service charges or other 'penalties' to the financial services sectors of the UK economy.
The sound and fury of the debate will help nobody. It is, however, incontrovertible that the United Kingdom is again offering itself as a test-bed for seat-of-the-pants economic policy experimentation. Unlike the bowdlerised Keynesianism that was tried in the nineteen-sixties and the crude but clearly articulated monetarism of the nineteen-eighties, the present experiment in austerity management has no underpinning economic theory and no ideology. It stems from a naive pragmatism that was hastily cobbled together by professional politicians from the fundamentally incompatible Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties. It has nothing substantial to contribute to a global dialogue on responding systematically to a crisis which is has reached its high pitch of intensity because the world has allowed the postindustrial countries to breach the Iron Law for almost half a century. The resulting pain is being felt intensely in Greece, and is beginning to cause serious stress in most member countries of the European Union, not always in proportion to the extent to which individual countries breached the Iron Law. It is impossible to predict where this will lead in terms of socio-political tension, but it is inevitable in conventionally democratic societies that the complacency of the democracy itself will be challenged. Nothing can be taken for granted but it becoming common to question whether democratic principles have failed, or whether the disaster is the product of a perverse and irrelevant political class that has emerged in separation from the rest of society.
China has a huge political caste, who have been segregated for the entire length of their careers from the toil and economic stress of life as it is experienced by the vast migrant working class and by both the megarich and the tens of millions of middle-class consumers. There are great hazards in attempting to climb the greasy pole of party hierarchy, and even greater risks if party apparatchiks dabble corruptly with business; but the people who reach the top are generally of the highest quality. The near-miracle of economic and monetary management that has been accomplished over the past two decades is the best evidence of this. Western commentators have regularly predicted disaster, from hyperinflation through 'stagnation' in the property sector to mass unemployment, while standards of living have risen consistently. Democratic rights as defined in Magna Charta or the US Constitution and Bill of Rights have not been matched in China, and the lack of such rights is probably to the detriment of the Chinese people; but it seems generally to be accepted in the country that it is fair enough to concentrate first on economic development, and then to allow for the development of more open institutions. Dissent in China is very much a minuscule minority activity and is often ethnically based or specifically aroused by corrupt land seizures. The internet and mobile technology ensure that dissent and repression are more widely reported when it occurs; and the government is increasingly open to treating the dissentients more fairly. But the western model no longer looks like an inevitable endgame for Chinese youth to aspire to.
This set of moves will help to offset the risk of an intensification of the recession that is already gripping the whole of the EU. The recession is already set to last through most of 2012, and could go on longer. Trade between Europe and North America is important on both sides of the Atlantic so it is a direct US interest that Europe will be a good customer for US commerce and industry in a presidential election year. Both China and the sovereign wealth funds that are held by oil-exporting states and by Singapore are looking for businesses in Europe that will be a good buy during the recession. China will gain both the turnover and the institutional experience of the European firms that they may come to own; and - more importantly - they will take control of the intellectual property that the companies have accumulated. They will own the speculative research and the design capabilities of their European subsidiaries, which they can carry forward in China or in Europe as they see fit. They will be able to put their European brand-names on products made in China, greatly increasing the value-added to Chinese industrial output. The Chinese owners will be free to decide whether or not to run-down their European factories, and they will have the option to make their brands in China and sell them at European prices.
Such takeovers, followed by technology transfer to China, will mean that European consumers will still have access to the same brands; but employment and production in Europe will decrease and profits will be exported, so European spending-power will permanently be diminished. The de-industrialisation that has been undermining Britain and the USA for the past half-century will spread rapidly in Europe, even in Germany, unless specific measures are taken to prevent the alienation of ownership.
The massive middle classes in India, China, Brazil and other leading emergent economies are the most avid buyers of quons - brands - [see PPE via the link from this site] and an increasing mass of the population aspire to follow them. Exporting leading brands will be a huge boost to the national balance of payments of the countries that will have bought the brands, and will give them increased profits to apply to new investment. This is the outcome of the operation of the Iron Law of Wages. The EU as a whole has broken the law for decades and the inescapable payback is now being taken by the rest of the world. Proper, provident Germany has not participated in the profligacy; but is straight in the firing line now that redress is being taken. Because of their loyalty to the European fantasy Germans are now at risk of losing some control of their own economy and of the technology in which they have led the world. They have deferred - perhaps permanently - the day on which they would have to open their currency reserves ad lib to bail-out the most profligate members of the euro. But because of their loyalty to the EU they have placed at risk their control of technology and of the brands that they have exported so successfully over recent decades.
Meanwhile there is a daft shouting-match developing in Britain, between those who think that David Cameron has in some degree 'saved' the City of London by declining to support the implementation by the EU Commission and the Court of the Merkel package of financial stringency that has been endorsed by the other 26 member states, and those who argue that Cameron has damaged the vital interests - and the prestige - of the United Kingdom. The Deputy Prime Minister expressed both views, in a perfect vignette of Liberal Democrat policymaking. It is not clear how the new eurozone agreement will be 'policed', and most probably some fudging mechanism will be cobbled together in the drafting of the Compact that is now to begin. It is expected that most of the 26 'inner European' states will agree to impose a Robin Hood Tax, or Tobin Tax, on financial transactions. Britain could veto a tax change, under the Lisbon Treaty; but the veto power would not be applicable to a regulatory change under which the EU might apply service charges or other 'penalties' to the financial services sectors of the UK economy.
The sound and fury of the debate will help nobody. It is, however, incontrovertible that the United Kingdom is again offering itself as a test-bed for seat-of-the-pants economic policy experimentation. Unlike the bowdlerised Keynesianism that was tried in the nineteen-sixties and the crude but clearly articulated monetarism of the nineteen-eighties, the present experiment in austerity management has no underpinning economic theory and no ideology. It stems from a naive pragmatism that was hastily cobbled together by professional politicians from the fundamentally incompatible Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties. It has nothing substantial to contribute to a global dialogue on responding systematically to a crisis which is has reached its high pitch of intensity because the world has allowed the postindustrial countries to breach the Iron Law for almost half a century. The resulting pain is being felt intensely in Greece, and is beginning to cause serious stress in most member countries of the European Union, not always in proportion to the extent to which individual countries breached the Iron Law. It is impossible to predict where this will lead in terms of socio-political tension, but it is inevitable in conventionally democratic societies that the complacency of the democracy itself will be challenged. Nothing can be taken for granted but it becoming common to question whether democratic principles have failed, or whether the disaster is the product of a perverse and irrelevant political class that has emerged in separation from the rest of society.
China has a huge political caste, who have been segregated for the entire length of their careers from the toil and economic stress of life as it is experienced by the vast migrant working class and by both the megarich and the tens of millions of middle-class consumers. There are great hazards in attempting to climb the greasy pole of party hierarchy, and even greater risks if party apparatchiks dabble corruptly with business; but the people who reach the top are generally of the highest quality. The near-miracle of economic and monetary management that has been accomplished over the past two decades is the best evidence of this. Western commentators have regularly predicted disaster, from hyperinflation through 'stagnation' in the property sector to mass unemployment, while standards of living have risen consistently. Democratic rights as defined in Magna Charta or the US Constitution and Bill of Rights have not been matched in China, and the lack of such rights is probably to the detriment of the Chinese people; but it seems generally to be accepted in the country that it is fair enough to concentrate first on economic development, and then to allow for the development of more open institutions. Dissent in China is very much a minuscule minority activity and is often ethnically based or specifically aroused by corrupt land seizures. The internet and mobile technology ensure that dissent and repression are more widely reported when it occurs; and the government is increasingly open to treating the dissentients more fairly. But the western model no longer looks like an inevitable endgame for Chinese youth to aspire to.
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