I have rabbited on about sprinklers in buildings on several occasions in the past, most notably in the context of the Grenfell Tower disaster in Kensington. I do it today in the context of another issue that has surfaced in the media in the past 24 hours: namely the fact - as officially recorded - that fewer new schools are built with sprinkler systems than in past decades.
Sprinklers are devices to produce a heavy shower of water inside a building that is on fire, and if they are properly installed to a good design [and an appropriate specification of devices used] they massively reduce the risk of destruction of the contents of the building and of death and serious damage to people and animals. There are advanced techniques for drying-out water-damaged assets.
The aspect of the prevalent free-markets dogma that is most directly damaging to human beings is the reduction and removal of controls that prevent dangerous structures and situations from being permitted. There was an almost-golden age of safety in factories and public buildings, when the local fire brigade had the power to insist that safety systems like supplementary escape staircases and sprinkler systems had to be installed in a building before it was granted a 'fire certificate' that permitted a range of uses of the premises. Buildings with fire certificates were usually acceptable to be insured - with their contents, including liabilities to people and to other entities than the owner or operator of the building - but nevertheless the insurance companies employed their own Inspectors who could enter the premises and check that safety systems, including sprinklers, were appropriate and properly maintained and fully functional. That last sentence is important, because it is possible to have a well-designed system that is regularly inspected but which can be switched off [or the water turned off] by human oversight or negligence: or as part of the preparations for a fraudulent insurance claim for loss of goods kept in the building which were burned in a fire where the sprinklers 'failed to operate'.
The free marketeers have been dominant in the United Kingdom since the Labour government submitted to the International Monetary Fund [IMF] in 1976: in return for being allowed a loan which was intended to 'stabilise' the external value of the pound sterling during a period of extremely high inflation and 'industrial strife', the Callaghan government accepted [very reluctantly] the free-market dogma that the Thatcher regime was to embrace after their election victory in 1979. On that reckoning, the free markets dogmatists - the Econocracy - have dominated society and the economy for forty-one years [though I have pointed out several times that 364 then-practicing Economists signed a letter to the Times in 1982 rejecting the dogma that was to gain hegemony by 2002].
The period since the autumn of 1976 is exactly the period of Britain's absolute decline as a manufacturing country. We have wantonly destroyed coal mining, most steelmaking, large-scale commercial shipbuilding, our separate aircraft industry, the mass production of textiles and most of the armaments industry [including even the capacity to supply uniforms for a mass military]. The economy has grown because new industries have arisen in high technology such as pharmaceuticals and microprocessors, and in the games and the entertainments industries; due to the brilliance of British inventors, some of them in the university system. The balance of payments deficit has been mitigated by sales of much of the new intellectual property to aliens.
At least equally important for the growth of the economy has been the expansion of government and personal debt. Some of the government's debt has been hidden from the official balance sheet, for example in the PFI schemes by which schools and hospitals have been built and funded by businesses on the understanding that the government [or agencies including the NHS and local authorities and their semi-independent social housing departments] will pay for the use of those buildings when complete. Those charges will for decades to come be paid out of the users' annual budgets; and the debt that would otherwise be required to build them is not listed in the public accounts.
In order to pare bits of expenditure off the public accounts, both from the admitted debt for construction and from the the running costs of premises, devices like sprinklers have been made optional. Building operators - including providers of social housing and free schools and the trusts that manage [and profit from] 'academies' - are exempted from costly requirements such as installing and maintaining sprinklers. Thus the 'economic burden' of building and operating the facilities is reduced: and so is the safety and utility of the premises.
The extreme shabbiness of this policy has rightly been attacked by the Commissioner of the London Fire Brigade, Dany Cotton. Human lives - even those of children is school and in care - are at unnecessary risk: due to the implementation of policies directly derived from Econocratic dogma. Thus has Economics become directly and fundamentally inhumane.
Economics is fundamentally unscientific. The economic crisis has speeded the shift of power to emergent economies. In Britain and the USA the theory of 'rational markets' removed controls from the finance sector, and things can still get yet worse. Read my book, No Confidence: The Brexit Vote and Economics - http://amzn.eu/ayGznkp
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Showing posts with label IMF. Show all posts
Showing posts with label IMF. Show all posts
Wednesday, 25 October 2017
Sprinklers: A Key Indicator of Economic and Social Wellbeing
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Saturday, 30 September 2017
Brexit Buffoons, Regulations and Point Protectionism
Boris Johnson has sounded-off again, this time to the Sun, with his demands about Brexit. The transition must be absolutely no more than two years, and the UK should not accept new EU regulations in that period. This keeps him in front of the 'hard Brexiteers' in the Conservative Party, ahead of what is certain to be a very painful party conference for the Prime Minister who decided to hold an election, then ran it the way her close advisers suggested, and so lost her parliamentary majority. Members of the party from all factions know that the Corbyn-McDonnell chances of winning a general election [in England, Wales, and - just possibly - the lost Labour heartlands of Scotland] are astonishingly high. Thus the Tories dare not topple the leader, simply because there is no obvious alternative who could surely prevent the party from disintegrating sufficiently to force a general election.
Thus the Conservatives have to negotiate Brexit: with an increasing majority of the party daily becoming more aware [as are Labour MPs] that the complete separation of the UK from the European Economic Area would put the livelihoods of all sixty million people who depend on the UK economy in grave jeopardy. The Minority of fervent Brexiteers, together with the ambitious chancers who have joined them, assert that the UK can open up huge vistas of trade all over the world, by making trade agreements with a whole raft of countries under WTO Rules.
The World Trade Organisation had its origins in GATT - the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - which was set up alongside the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development [normally called the World Bank] and the International Monetary Fund [IMF] by the victorious allies at the end of the Second World War in the belief that the two devastating wars of the twentieth century were largely economic in origin. The USSR was wholly, dogmatically convinced that the First World War was the result of expansionist imperialist competition between the European powers; and they ascribed the second to a re-run of the same conflict between a resurgent Germany and the 'Anglo-Saxon' states that had succeeded in 1918 and then dissipated the fruits of victory in the Depression of the 'thirties. The USA and the UK shared the view that the competitive inefficiencies of capitalism had exacerbated the economic problems of the late 'twenties and early 'thirties. The idea behind the new system was to provide transparent means by which each economy could grow as part of a successful international community.
The USSR soon withdrew from active participation in the institutions, and compelled its satellites to leave as well. Then the international organisations served the 'capitalist' world, in an uneasy relationship with the 'third world' of notionally 'non-aligned' countries [which asserted their independence of both the USSR-led and US-led pattern of alliances that maintained the cold war from 1949 to 1992]. During that period the GATT became the WTO, and had to accommodate itself to a global reality where the rhetoric of free trade was greatly modified by each country building up defensive mounds of regulations that kept out many imports that other countries could offer them in greater quantity and of more sophisticated design than their own factories could produce; without imposing tariffs that openly breached WTO rules. When such rules failed, and a government wanted to exclude some import, they could - and did - simply impose 'extraordinary' tariffs, usually 'temporarily' to keep out the unwelcome export. That is what I have called point protectionism in this blog. The recent spat engineered in the USA by Boeing is merely one of thousands of examples.
If Boris Johnson and Liam Fox are such starry-eyed innocents that they believe that WTO Rules will be enough to ensure that the UK can make a safe transit into a post-EU trading world, they are profoundly dangerous.
Thus the Conservatives have to negotiate Brexit: with an increasing majority of the party daily becoming more aware [as are Labour MPs] that the complete separation of the UK from the European Economic Area would put the livelihoods of all sixty million people who depend on the UK economy in grave jeopardy. The Minority of fervent Brexiteers, together with the ambitious chancers who have joined them, assert that the UK can open up huge vistas of trade all over the world, by making trade agreements with a whole raft of countries under WTO Rules.
The World Trade Organisation had its origins in GATT - the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - which was set up alongside the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development [normally called the World Bank] and the International Monetary Fund [IMF] by the victorious allies at the end of the Second World War in the belief that the two devastating wars of the twentieth century were largely economic in origin. The USSR was wholly, dogmatically convinced that the First World War was the result of expansionist imperialist competition between the European powers; and they ascribed the second to a re-run of the same conflict between a resurgent Germany and the 'Anglo-Saxon' states that had succeeded in 1918 and then dissipated the fruits of victory in the Depression of the 'thirties. The USA and the UK shared the view that the competitive inefficiencies of capitalism had exacerbated the economic problems of the late 'twenties and early 'thirties. The idea behind the new system was to provide transparent means by which each economy could grow as part of a successful international community.
The USSR soon withdrew from active participation in the institutions, and compelled its satellites to leave as well. Then the international organisations served the 'capitalist' world, in an uneasy relationship with the 'third world' of notionally 'non-aligned' countries [which asserted their independence of both the USSR-led and US-led pattern of alliances that maintained the cold war from 1949 to 1992]. During that period the GATT became the WTO, and had to accommodate itself to a global reality where the rhetoric of free trade was greatly modified by each country building up defensive mounds of regulations that kept out many imports that other countries could offer them in greater quantity and of more sophisticated design than their own factories could produce; without imposing tariffs that openly breached WTO rules. When such rules failed, and a government wanted to exclude some import, they could - and did - simply impose 'extraordinary' tariffs, usually 'temporarily' to keep out the unwelcome export. That is what I have called point protectionism in this blog. The recent spat engineered in the USA by Boeing is merely one of thousands of examples.
If Boris Johnson and Liam Fox are such starry-eyed innocents that they believe that WTO Rules will be enough to ensure that the UK can make a safe transit into a post-EU trading world, they are profoundly dangerous.
Friday, 28 September 2012
What is Spain Up To?
Spain has already inflicted huge economic sanctions on its citizens: 25% unemployment [at least], reduced pensions and increased age of retirement, underfunded schools and hospitals, bankrupt local authorities, tens of thousands of incomplete and unsold dwellings, increased taxes ... and the catalogue could go on and on. While the banks have borrowed from EU institutions and from foreign banks even in recent days, the markets are betting against the Spanish state being able to submit formally to the conditions that would be applied to a formal 'bailout' by the European Union, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Since it is generally understood that the conditions on any formal baliout would be very harsh, why should the Spanish government not have done what the Greeks did: take the bailout as soon as possible, and blame the Germans [and the rest of the EU] for the harsh treayment meted out to the population?
Simplistically, Prime Minister Rajoy is asserted to be over-endowed with Spanish pride; which makes him exceedingly reluctant to submit to mere north Europeans. More realistically, he has hoped to be able to avoid a bailout altogether. Meanwhile, his government has demonstrated that the Spanish state is sufficiently robust to be able to enforce very hard economic policies. Most importantly he has emphasised and demonstrated the huge difference between the Spanish situation, and the popular response to it, and that of Greece. Spain has presented strong evidence against the domino theory.
Greece will some day fairly soon be forced to withdraw from the euro; but that need not precipitate a gaderene rush by specluators to force Portugal, Sapin or Italy also to fail to manage their economy withon the eurozone.
Whenever Spain now applies for a bailout, on conditions that it will partially be able to dictate, that will not be a signal for the progressive withdrawal of all the weaker southern states from the euro. Spain has not just bought time for itself to get agreed terms; it has ensured that the gulf between Greece and the rest has become consolidated. Yes, there are demonstrations verging on the riotous in Spain; dismay affects most of the population some of the time, and some of the population all of the time; but there is not yet the degree of hopelessness and despair that now characterises the vast majority of Greeks.
The whole situation is classically tragic, but redemption for Greece is vastly different - and much more painful to achieve - than is the possibility to turn the Spanish economy round within the eurozone.
Simplistically, Prime Minister Rajoy is asserted to be over-endowed with Spanish pride; which makes him exceedingly reluctant to submit to mere north Europeans. More realistically, he has hoped to be able to avoid a bailout altogether. Meanwhile, his government has demonstrated that the Spanish state is sufficiently robust to be able to enforce very hard economic policies. Most importantly he has emphasised and demonstrated the huge difference between the Spanish situation, and the popular response to it, and that of Greece. Spain has presented strong evidence against the domino theory.
Greece will some day fairly soon be forced to withdraw from the euro; but that need not precipitate a gaderene rush by specluators to force Portugal, Sapin or Italy also to fail to manage their economy withon the eurozone.
Whenever Spain now applies for a bailout, on conditions that it will partially be able to dictate, that will not be a signal for the progressive withdrawal of all the weaker southern states from the euro. Spain has not just bought time for itself to get agreed terms; it has ensured that the gulf between Greece and the rest has become consolidated. Yes, there are demonstrations verging on the riotous in Spain; dismay affects most of the population some of the time, and some of the population all of the time; but there is not yet the degree of hopelessness and despair that now characterises the vast majority of Greeks.
The whole situation is classically tragic, but redemption for Greece is vastly different - and much more painful to achieve - than is the possibility to turn the Spanish economy round within the eurozone.
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Tuesday, 10 July 2012
Concern at the IMF: About What?
The Managing Director of the IMF has expressed concern about the probability that their forecasts for economic growth throughout the world must be downgraded. Her foreboding is justified by the regular downward revision of estimates for growth that are being published in various countries, especially in the light of the ongoing crisis in the eurozone and its potential negative impact on its trading partners in other parts of the world. In the face of such a negative mood among Economists, politicians, journalists, bankers and some business managers it is unsurprising that there is a growing feeling of unease among the general public.
During the so-called credit crunch of 2007-8 many governments tried to secure the future of banks in their territories by guaranteeing the deposits that people and businesses had placed in those banks. When banks could not meet depositors' demands for cash from their own resources the government supplied the money. Governments that had control of their own currencies, such as the US dollar and the British pound, could authorise their central banks to create 'new' money and make it available to the banks: some went further and actually create the money with which to buy control of threatened banks. In the USA this process was extended to the one insurance company, AIG, that had ruined itself by creating contracts by which it guaranteed to fund banks in certain circumstances which had been thought highly improbable until they happened to several big banks all at once.
In countries that did not have control of their money supply, notably those in the eurozone, the means available to governments to stabilise the economic situation were seriously constrained. For seven years before the credit crunch occurred the member countries of the eurozone issued bonds and bills [certificates of government debt] denominated in euros; and bonds that had been issued before the creation of the euro had become redeemable in euros. Those governments could not follow the lead of the Americans and the British in creating the money that they had to pay out to buy the bonds that fell due to be cashed: they had to borrow the necessary euros from the European Central Bank or the International Monetary Fund, or tap new funds created by other eurozone governments. In considering any of those options a government was faced with strict conditions attaching to any loan, that usually included the imposition of restrictive economic policies. At an early stage in the banking crisis the Irish government decided to guarantee all banks' obligations, raised a large loan and imposed dramatically restrictive conditions on the economy. Southern European members of the eurozone faced up to the crisis more slowly and then took the very different stance of demanding bail-out loans and prevaricated about imposing the conditions that they had accepted, threatening the northern eurozone countries with progressive economic collapse and political chaos. The northern eurozone countries regard this as simple cheating and are resisting any further concessions to the south unless they are accompanied by enforceable sanctions. Meanwhile the population of the whole Union is getting used to commentators covering the arguments about the possible withdrawal of some countries from the euro or the collapse of the entire venture. The fact that the eurozone is not coterminous with the European Union is widely understood: the Union could survive either the defection of some members or the total collapse of the single currency.
The possibility of chaos in much of the EU - the world's largest economic bloc - is the cause of worry throughout the world economy. The shabby history of the Union - the political fudges, the pervasive unaccountability of the Brussels bureaucracy and the notorious 'democratic deficit' by which the eurorats have evaded public concerns in aggregating power in their own hands - has created the circumstances in which there is little mass empathy with any proposal to give more power to the Union. Spaniards and Italians would like the Union to be able to grab Germany's wealth and hand it to them in return for promises to which nobody gives the slightest credibility: Germany would never assent to such a scheme. The extension of another loan to Spain, agreed overnight, is an allocation of the existing funds which the Finns and the Dutch and the Slovaks and the Germans have already written off. This time round the northern eurozone members seem to be so little concerned about this further handout that they have agreed to give the Spanish government longer to impose austerity.
And so the sorry saga drags on. Greece will leave the euro. With that example in their sights it is just possible that the Spanish, the Portuguese and the Italians will accept enough 'discipline' to keep the euro staggering along for a year or two. There is no hope of Europe leading the world economy to a new era of prosperity; and not much sign of the emergent economies or the US providing a 'motor' to drag the global economy into an era of growth. New thinking is needed, urgently.
During the so-called credit crunch of 2007-8 many governments tried to secure the future of banks in their territories by guaranteeing the deposits that people and businesses had placed in those banks. When banks could not meet depositors' demands for cash from their own resources the government supplied the money. Governments that had control of their own currencies, such as the US dollar and the British pound, could authorise their central banks to create 'new' money and make it available to the banks: some went further and actually create the money with which to buy control of threatened banks. In the USA this process was extended to the one insurance company, AIG, that had ruined itself by creating contracts by which it guaranteed to fund banks in certain circumstances which had been thought highly improbable until they happened to several big banks all at once.
In countries that did not have control of their money supply, notably those in the eurozone, the means available to governments to stabilise the economic situation were seriously constrained. For seven years before the credit crunch occurred the member countries of the eurozone issued bonds and bills [certificates of government debt] denominated in euros; and bonds that had been issued before the creation of the euro had become redeemable in euros. Those governments could not follow the lead of the Americans and the British in creating the money that they had to pay out to buy the bonds that fell due to be cashed: they had to borrow the necessary euros from the European Central Bank or the International Monetary Fund, or tap new funds created by other eurozone governments. In considering any of those options a government was faced with strict conditions attaching to any loan, that usually included the imposition of restrictive economic policies. At an early stage in the banking crisis the Irish government decided to guarantee all banks' obligations, raised a large loan and imposed dramatically restrictive conditions on the economy. Southern European members of the eurozone faced up to the crisis more slowly and then took the very different stance of demanding bail-out loans and prevaricated about imposing the conditions that they had accepted, threatening the northern eurozone countries with progressive economic collapse and political chaos. The northern eurozone countries regard this as simple cheating and are resisting any further concessions to the south unless they are accompanied by enforceable sanctions. Meanwhile the population of the whole Union is getting used to commentators covering the arguments about the possible withdrawal of some countries from the euro or the collapse of the entire venture. The fact that the eurozone is not coterminous with the European Union is widely understood: the Union could survive either the defection of some members or the total collapse of the single currency.
The possibility of chaos in much of the EU - the world's largest economic bloc - is the cause of worry throughout the world economy. The shabby history of the Union - the political fudges, the pervasive unaccountability of the Brussels bureaucracy and the notorious 'democratic deficit' by which the eurorats have evaded public concerns in aggregating power in their own hands - has created the circumstances in which there is little mass empathy with any proposal to give more power to the Union. Spaniards and Italians would like the Union to be able to grab Germany's wealth and hand it to them in return for promises to which nobody gives the slightest credibility: Germany would never assent to such a scheme. The extension of another loan to Spain, agreed overnight, is an allocation of the existing funds which the Finns and the Dutch and the Slovaks and the Germans have already written off. This time round the northern eurozone members seem to be so little concerned about this further handout that they have agreed to give the Spanish government longer to impose austerity.
And so the sorry saga drags on. Greece will leave the euro. With that example in their sights it is just possible that the Spanish, the Portuguese and the Italians will accept enough 'discipline' to keep the euro staggering along for a year or two. There is no hope of Europe leading the world economy to a new era of prosperity; and not much sign of the emergent economies or the US providing a 'motor' to drag the global economy into an era of growth. New thinking is needed, urgently.
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Tuesday, 19 June 2012
Guff at the G20
Some of the people who are regarded as the most important 'leaders' and office-holders in the world have been to the seaside in Mexico with the ostensible purpose of stabilising the global economy. The slow-motion unwinding of the eurozone has been extended by the emergent powers placing additional credit with the International Monetary Fund so that it will be available to be pumped into Europe: conditions will be specified but it is most unlikely that these would be so draconian that they would ensure that the euro collapses. Low-grade politicians who hold on to power by default in countries outside the eurozone have again admonished those inside the common currency to get their act together; once more these focus on trying to bully Germany into dissipating its savings on helping other eurozone countries. So far, Germany has declined to obey, and the President of the EU Commission has blamed 'North America' for the crisis.
My analysis firmly locates the origin of the global financial crisis in London, England. With the 'big bang' of 1986.the Thatcher government smashed the traditional division of financial transactions in the City of London between stock brokers and jobbers, banks and merchant banks, separate exchanges for different types of transaction, self-regulation within each sector and ultimate oversight from the Bank of England [which preferred to steer market members into approved ways of working by winks and nods and secret meetings]. The phrase big bang had become central to theoretical physics, to describe the moment immediately after the creation of the universe when its great expansion and diversification began. By applying that phrase to the finance sector enthusiastic commentators implied that here was a new beginning in a newly structured market that could grow immeasurably and bring great profit to the participants: who could then be taxed to meet some of the growing deficit on government income as industry was destroyed while farming and fisheries were left to wallow under heavily protectionist EU regulations. The rapidly advancing capabilities of computers enabled the markets to be operated at speeds and with complexity far beyond the former trading patterns that had depended on word-of-mouth and typewriters. New types of 'product' - most obviously derivatives and new processes for securitisation - burgeoned on an almost astronomical scale, and old contract types such as futures were reformatted and used in vastly different new ways. The world's banks brought business to London and Wall Street looked set to lose the dominance of global markets that it had gained in the nineteen-thirties and consolidated through the Second World War, Marshall Aid and Cold War. Ferocious lobbying of the politicians in Washington led to the repeal of legislation that had mandated the separation of 'retail' and 'wholesale' banking, and had differentiated banking from broking; with the specific intention of enabling Wall Street to compete with the City of London. Small differences in regulations led globalised businesses to put some business in New York, some in London and a little in other centres such as Hong Kong and Singapore.
Thus far the London big bang was the origin for the new pattern of trade; but then the US government decided to tap into the markets in the interests of social engineering. Given that such huge and flexible financial markets existed, surely they could be required to lend money to people who sat at the bottom of the heap in society. Let even the poorest become home-owners and thus gain some pride of possession and learn to earn the money necessary to service their mortgages and care for their homes. Mortgage lenders were required to allocate some of their funds to 'sub-prime' mortgage borrowers: two government-backed institutions underpinned the mortgage market, but the wholesale market practitioners became increasingly keen to securitise 'bundles' of mortgages and re-sell the securities into the general financial markets. After a very few years just about every bank and securities manager included some sub-prime mortgages buried within their so-called 'assets'. Once it was demonstrated that hundreds of thousands of feckless Americans were not paying their mortgage debts or maintaining their houses well, it was clear that some portion of the 'value' of many hundreds of thousands of 'assets' was non-existent. Thus the trigger for the crisis was squeezed in North America, but financial institutions from all over the world were deep in the mess and the resultant reckoning is ongoing. American sub-prime lending was the mechanism for the disaster; but its origin lay in the reckless gamble by the Thatcher government.
My analysis firmly locates the origin of the global financial crisis in London, England. With the 'big bang' of 1986.the Thatcher government smashed the traditional division of financial transactions in the City of London between stock brokers and jobbers, banks and merchant banks, separate exchanges for different types of transaction, self-regulation within each sector and ultimate oversight from the Bank of England [which preferred to steer market members into approved ways of working by winks and nods and secret meetings]. The phrase big bang had become central to theoretical physics, to describe the moment immediately after the creation of the universe when its great expansion and diversification began. By applying that phrase to the finance sector enthusiastic commentators implied that here was a new beginning in a newly structured market that could grow immeasurably and bring great profit to the participants: who could then be taxed to meet some of the growing deficit on government income as industry was destroyed while farming and fisheries were left to wallow under heavily protectionist EU regulations. The rapidly advancing capabilities of computers enabled the markets to be operated at speeds and with complexity far beyond the former trading patterns that had depended on word-of-mouth and typewriters. New types of 'product' - most obviously derivatives and new processes for securitisation - burgeoned on an almost astronomical scale, and old contract types such as futures were reformatted and used in vastly different new ways. The world's banks brought business to London and Wall Street looked set to lose the dominance of global markets that it had gained in the nineteen-thirties and consolidated through the Second World War, Marshall Aid and Cold War. Ferocious lobbying of the politicians in Washington led to the repeal of legislation that had mandated the separation of 'retail' and 'wholesale' banking, and had differentiated banking from broking; with the specific intention of enabling Wall Street to compete with the City of London. Small differences in regulations led globalised businesses to put some business in New York, some in London and a little in other centres such as Hong Kong and Singapore.
Thus far the London big bang was the origin for the new pattern of trade; but then the US government decided to tap into the markets in the interests of social engineering. Given that such huge and flexible financial markets existed, surely they could be required to lend money to people who sat at the bottom of the heap in society. Let even the poorest become home-owners and thus gain some pride of possession and learn to earn the money necessary to service their mortgages and care for their homes. Mortgage lenders were required to allocate some of their funds to 'sub-prime' mortgage borrowers: two government-backed institutions underpinned the mortgage market, but the wholesale market practitioners became increasingly keen to securitise 'bundles' of mortgages and re-sell the securities into the general financial markets. After a very few years just about every bank and securities manager included some sub-prime mortgages buried within their so-called 'assets'. Once it was demonstrated that hundreds of thousands of feckless Americans were not paying their mortgage debts or maintaining their houses well, it was clear that some portion of the 'value' of many hundreds of thousands of 'assets' was non-existent. Thus the trigger for the crisis was squeezed in North America, but financial institutions from all over the world were deep in the mess and the resultant reckoning is ongoing. American sub-prime lending was the mechanism for the disaster; but its origin lay in the reckless gamble by the Thatcher government.
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Friday, 25 May 2012
Greek Bondage, Eurobonds and Project Bonds
Greece is likely to leave the eurozone: I have said it ever since the bubble was exposed and it becomes more likely every week. More and more Greeks resent the restraints on public spending that have been imposed [not just by the EU, but more significantly by the IMF] to correct the inane profligacy that the eurorats studiously ignored for more than a decade. So intoxicated were the Brussels sprouts by their power to exploit the inertia and ignorance of the pseudo-statesmen who were notionally their political masters that they just pressed on with the delusory agenda of full integration that assumed - contrary to available evidence - that all eurozone members were behaving 'responsibly' according to EU treaties and agreements. Ancient Greece was a slave-powered society: Greece today is bound by truly oppressive rules imposed by aliens. The Greek situation is so extreme that once it is tackled by measures that can be given a fair chance of bringing the economy into balance, the other enfeebled eurozone economies can be ring-fenced affordably to the rest of the European Union; possibly even including contributions from Sweden and other EU states that are outside the eurozone.
Investments that might be made in Greece after exit from the euro, by public sector and private investors from Europe and beyond, could support substantial growth of the 'real economy': but only if the investors are sure of the security of the investments. Foreigners will not invest if their assets could be written off by hyperinflation, or if they faced a high probability of being nationalised, or be immobilised by strikes that freeze the stream of revenue. Similar strictures would apply in any eurozone country where investment was sought for projects devised to strengthen productive resources or improve the infrastructure: Italy, Spain, Ireland, Portugal and - potentially - France.
The experience of several countries that have tried quantitative easing [usually explained as 'printing money'] is that the 'new money' is not used to buy industrial assets or stock in material trade, but to enable the central bank to buy bonds that might otherwise plummet in price if there were no buyers. The propaganda machine says that the intention is to sustain real economic growth: in reality quantitative easing is an additional way of shoring-up 'banks' that brings a huge threat of future inflation of costs and prices [and an additional erosion of personal wealth]. The players in financial markets are very clear of the real nature of this charade and they will not support any such policy by buying bonds issued by a government that is not pursuing serious economic discipline. Thus in Europe there is a strong lobby - led by the less-responsible governments - for the creation of 'eurobonds' that would be guaranteed by all eurozone governments. The funds thus accumulated would be lent to countries and to banks that found it difficult to raise funds in other ways. In effect it would be slightly covert way of getting Germany to shore up financial institutions in Spain, Italy, Ireland, France [and possibly even Greece]. It is absolutely unsurprising that Germany is resisting this.
But now the evidence is unequivocal that the eurozone is in danger of collapsing, with or without Greece, so the Germans have indicated a willingness to consider issuing 'project bonds' with some sort of eurozone backing [perhaps through the European Central Bank]. This would stimulate employment and spending in member countries by building roads, airports, housing estates and other infrastructure that would have demonstrable material existence. The buyers of the bonds would become the indirect owners of the assets, and could be recipients of interest payments directly raised from the assets: this would give a limited guarantee that the money would be properly used according to the intention of the investors. That guarantee would only be as good as the legal system and the economic order within which the investment would take place. Politicians are fantasisers, liars and cheats: the investments would have to be ring-fenced from political chicanery; then the idea may begin to take up some serious attention.
Investments that might be made in Greece after exit from the euro, by public sector and private investors from Europe and beyond, could support substantial growth of the 'real economy': but only if the investors are sure of the security of the investments. Foreigners will not invest if their assets could be written off by hyperinflation, or if they faced a high probability of being nationalised, or be immobilised by strikes that freeze the stream of revenue. Similar strictures would apply in any eurozone country where investment was sought for projects devised to strengthen productive resources or improve the infrastructure: Italy, Spain, Ireland, Portugal and - potentially - France.
The experience of several countries that have tried quantitative easing [usually explained as 'printing money'] is that the 'new money' is not used to buy industrial assets or stock in material trade, but to enable the central bank to buy bonds that might otherwise plummet in price if there were no buyers. The propaganda machine says that the intention is to sustain real economic growth: in reality quantitative easing is an additional way of shoring-up 'banks' that brings a huge threat of future inflation of costs and prices [and an additional erosion of personal wealth]. The players in financial markets are very clear of the real nature of this charade and they will not support any such policy by buying bonds issued by a government that is not pursuing serious economic discipline. Thus in Europe there is a strong lobby - led by the less-responsible governments - for the creation of 'eurobonds' that would be guaranteed by all eurozone governments. The funds thus accumulated would be lent to countries and to banks that found it difficult to raise funds in other ways. In effect it would be slightly covert way of getting Germany to shore up financial institutions in Spain, Italy, Ireland, France [and possibly even Greece]. It is absolutely unsurprising that Germany is resisting this.
But now the evidence is unequivocal that the eurozone is in danger of collapsing, with or without Greece, so the Germans have indicated a willingness to consider issuing 'project bonds' with some sort of eurozone backing [perhaps through the European Central Bank]. This would stimulate employment and spending in member countries by building roads, airports, housing estates and other infrastructure that would have demonstrable material existence. The buyers of the bonds would become the indirect owners of the assets, and could be recipients of interest payments directly raised from the assets: this would give a limited guarantee that the money would be properly used according to the intention of the investors. That guarantee would only be as good as the legal system and the economic order within which the investment would take place. Politicians are fantasisers, liars and cheats: the investments would have to be ring-fenced from political chicanery; then the idea may begin to take up some serious attention.
Wednesday, 16 May 2012
Greece in Europe and Another Wasted Opportunity for Britain
I interrupt my mini-series on the only truly positive prospect that faces Britain to comment on the 'new' situation in Europe following Greek and French elections.
My long-standing adherence to the view that Greece must, eventually, escape the intolerable burdens of eurozone membership is unchanged. Of course severance would be a plunge into the unknown, a choice between the devil and the deep blue sea [or, as my fellow Lancastrians put it, a choice between muck or nettles]; but the certainty of pain for Greek people while their country remains within the zone has now been confirmed. The new French President went to Berlin to agree with the Chancellor that the current EU policy must remain in place. This has been amplified this morning by the German Finance Minister who has declared that every detail of the Greek bail-out deal is part of an integrated whole and that no tinkering can be attempted without unscrambling the whole deal. The IMF has admitted that their contingency planning for a Greek exit from the euro is [necessarily] in an advanced state.
In this painful situation, British government debt is being sold at the lowest price since the modern system of public finance began around 330 years ago: London interest rates are a record lows because so many international investors are viewing Britain as a 'safe haven' for their money. They want to diminish their exposure to the euro in case a Greek exit causes 'contagion' affecting Portugal, Spain, Ireland, Italy and possibly even France. The Japanese yen has limited appeal, Brazil and Switzerland have taken steps to keep out 'hot money', the Chinese currency is not fully transferable, Indian money is not even trusted by the gold-hoarding home population and there is a limit to how many US dollars any portfolio can safely contain. So the familiar old pound sterling came under 'positive' pressure, regardless of the fact that the buyers understand the long-term fragility of the UK economy. If the UK had a government capable of capturing opportunity it would now create a huge investment pool to finance the Grand Oceanic Project that I am advocating, taking advantage of these unique monetary circumstances: but no such government is in prospect.
My long-standing adherence to the view that Greece must, eventually, escape the intolerable burdens of eurozone membership is unchanged. Of course severance would be a plunge into the unknown, a choice between the devil and the deep blue sea [or, as my fellow Lancastrians put it, a choice between muck or nettles]; but the certainty of pain for Greek people while their country remains within the zone has now been confirmed. The new French President went to Berlin to agree with the Chancellor that the current EU policy must remain in place. This has been amplified this morning by the German Finance Minister who has declared that every detail of the Greek bail-out deal is part of an integrated whole and that no tinkering can be attempted without unscrambling the whole deal. The IMF has admitted that their contingency planning for a Greek exit from the euro is [necessarily] in an advanced state.
In this painful situation, British government debt is being sold at the lowest price since the modern system of public finance began around 330 years ago: London interest rates are a record lows because so many international investors are viewing Britain as a 'safe haven' for their money. They want to diminish their exposure to the euro in case a Greek exit causes 'contagion' affecting Portugal, Spain, Ireland, Italy and possibly even France. The Japanese yen has limited appeal, Brazil and Switzerland have taken steps to keep out 'hot money', the Chinese currency is not fully transferable, Indian money is not even trusted by the gold-hoarding home population and there is a limit to how many US dollars any portfolio can safely contain. So the familiar old pound sterling came under 'positive' pressure, regardless of the fact that the buyers understand the long-term fragility of the UK economy. If the UK had a government capable of capturing opportunity it would now create a huge investment pool to finance the Grand Oceanic Project that I am advocating, taking advantage of these unique monetary circumstances: but no such government is in prospect.
Wednesday, 11 April 2012
Gold and Value
When a group of aspirant 'scientists' developed modern Economics, between 1860 and 1875, they were not able to dream up any alternative to the monetary system that was endorsed by the precursor Science of Political Economy. So in tandem with their normative [and highly imaginative] concept of 'perfect' results being achieved by the free operation of their theory of supply-and-demand, they accepted the definition of money as a special commodity, recognised and often managed by the state, that served the functions of:
a medium of exchange
a means of making deferred payments
a measure of value
a store of value.
In retrospect, these attributes only applied to money that was based on a Gold Standard; and by coincidence the spread of Economics through the world's universities was accompanied by the spread of the gold standard. Between 1870 and 1914 a succession of countries adopted the principle that the national currency was pegged to gold, so that at the start of the first world war a British Pound or a US Dollar was defined in terms of equivalence to gold: so-many dollars for one ounce of gold, so many pounds to an ounce of gold. Anyone who held pound notes could go to the Bank of England and demand [and receive] gold - in the form of sovereign coins, which were legal tender; and similar rules applied in the USA and Russia and France and most other advanced economies. Just a few states maintained a 'silver standard'; and a few, mostly the imperial possessions of western states, had a gold-exchange standard that seemed to work but no Economist clearly understood it until a bright young man presented a brief, brisk and profound account of how it worked: this was the serendipitous first publication by John Maynard Keynes.
It was serendipitous because within just a few months of the start of the war all the combatant European countries had to abandon the 'Old Gold Standard' and move uncertainly each to their own gold-exchange standard. Britain had the one global expert on the subject, and Keynes was drawn into the centre of the government to lead a new way of managing the unprecedented amount of payments that passed through the Exchequer to pay for the war. He recognised at once that the massive creation of paper money made any return to the old system impossible: and that the attempt to equal the inflation of the money supply with the issue of government bonds that were notionally equivalent to gold reserves was pure fantasy. The idea that war-loan would be redeemed in the postwar world by payments of gold-standard money was absurd: but it was built into the unprecedented system of war propaganda which most government ministers allowed themselves to believe. The United States kept its gold standard, and required its allies to pay gold-standard money or gold-standard guaranteed bonds [denominated in dollars] for the supplies that they necessarily bought from the USA.
Thus at the end of the war the victorious allies recognised their obligations to pay each other immense sums of 'money'. To make this easier for them, they demanded vast reparations from Germany, and those payments were written in to the Treaty of Versailles. The Austro-Hungarian monarchy had collapsed into a significant number of separate new countries that acknowledged no obligation for the debts or other obligations of the former empire: so no reparations could be expected from there. The collapse of the Russian monarchy also meant that the massive holding of Russian state and corporate debt, that were due to be serviced in gold-standard roubles or pounds, had become worthless. Thus most of the load was dumped on Germany, which was obliged to deliver gold, coal, steel and other commodities free of charge, principally to France and Belgium, so that the 'victors' could meet their obligations to their own people and to foreigners in gold-standard money . Keynes had been taken to the negotiations as an economic adviser, and he resigned in exasperation when it was clear that even if Lloyd George understood Keynes's advice the Prime Minister would not act on it. Keynes came home and set out his objections in the prophetic tract on The Economic Consequences of the Peace. As the inflation that Keynes had predicted to be inevitable gathered pace in the ensuing years, the government forged ahead with its plan to restore the monetary system and in 1925 Winston Churchill as Chancellor of the Exchequer proudly announced the 'restoration of the Gold Standard' [which was in fact a variant of the gold-exchange standard]. Keynes published his reckoning of the inevitable Economic Consequences of Mr Churchill and pressed on with his main work; which resulted in 1929 in the publication of the Treatise on Money.
Since then 'money' issued by governments has gone through many redefinitions, has been subject to massive manipulation, and has been subjected to assorted 'analyses' by various schools of Economists whose only common link is to have been wrong in their predictions and disastrous when they have become policy advisers. Their 'profession' has avoided open acceptance of Keynes's Treatise; and the International Monetary Fund - of which Keynes was one of the founders - has still not adopted his concept that world financial stability can only be achieved if they create a global reserve currency [bancor] to which national currencies relate in a disciplined order. Exactly a century has been lost since Keynes wrote on Indian Currency and Finance and there is still no sign of his plain solutions being adopted.
In a world of ill-managed currencies, reckless debt creation and the inevitable consequential inflation, it is obvious that money is NOT a 'measure of value'. After the default of Greece we are all reminded that money is NOT a stable means of making deferred payments; and it would be a very poor joke for anyone to suggest that money is a 'store of value'. It is a 'medium of exchange' simply and solely because the law demands that prices are quoted and debts are denominated and settled in the national currency. Money is used because it has to be used: it is an imposition of the incompetent state, and the one certainty is that it loses purchasing-power: the longer you keep it [whether as banknotes or on deposit] it looses 'value'.
In future blogs I will develop this simple story that Keynes's genius is better appreciated when he is recognised as an authority on money, instead of being misrepresented as an inflation-inducing proponent of 'big government'. Over the recent past hundreds of millions of lives in the postindustrial countries have been conducted under a massive cloud of monetary delusions in an environment of debt; a system that is becoming unsustainable. Keynes warned what would happen if such fantasies were pursued: it is now sensible to return to what he wrote, on the record, and to understand his theories in the context of the pre-Economics science of Political Economy on which he built.
a medium of exchange
a means of making deferred payments
a measure of value
a store of value.
In retrospect, these attributes only applied to money that was based on a Gold Standard; and by coincidence the spread of Economics through the world's universities was accompanied by the spread of the gold standard. Between 1870 and 1914 a succession of countries adopted the principle that the national currency was pegged to gold, so that at the start of the first world war a British Pound or a US Dollar was defined in terms of equivalence to gold: so-many dollars for one ounce of gold, so many pounds to an ounce of gold. Anyone who held pound notes could go to the Bank of England and demand [and receive] gold - in the form of sovereign coins, which were legal tender; and similar rules applied in the USA and Russia and France and most other advanced economies. Just a few states maintained a 'silver standard'; and a few, mostly the imperial possessions of western states, had a gold-exchange standard that seemed to work but no Economist clearly understood it until a bright young man presented a brief, brisk and profound account of how it worked: this was the serendipitous first publication by John Maynard Keynes.
It was serendipitous because within just a few months of the start of the war all the combatant European countries had to abandon the 'Old Gold Standard' and move uncertainly each to their own gold-exchange standard. Britain had the one global expert on the subject, and Keynes was drawn into the centre of the government to lead a new way of managing the unprecedented amount of payments that passed through the Exchequer to pay for the war. He recognised at once that the massive creation of paper money made any return to the old system impossible: and that the attempt to equal the inflation of the money supply with the issue of government bonds that were notionally equivalent to gold reserves was pure fantasy. The idea that war-loan would be redeemed in the postwar world by payments of gold-standard money was absurd: but it was built into the unprecedented system of war propaganda which most government ministers allowed themselves to believe. The United States kept its gold standard, and required its allies to pay gold-standard money or gold-standard guaranteed bonds [denominated in dollars] for the supplies that they necessarily bought from the USA.
Thus at the end of the war the victorious allies recognised their obligations to pay each other immense sums of 'money'. To make this easier for them, they demanded vast reparations from Germany, and those payments were written in to the Treaty of Versailles. The Austro-Hungarian monarchy had collapsed into a significant number of separate new countries that acknowledged no obligation for the debts or other obligations of the former empire: so no reparations could be expected from there. The collapse of the Russian monarchy also meant that the massive holding of Russian state and corporate debt, that were due to be serviced in gold-standard roubles or pounds, had become worthless. Thus most of the load was dumped on Germany, which was obliged to deliver gold, coal, steel and other commodities free of charge, principally to France and Belgium, so that the 'victors' could meet their obligations to their own people and to foreigners in gold-standard money . Keynes had been taken to the negotiations as an economic adviser, and he resigned in exasperation when it was clear that even if Lloyd George understood Keynes's advice the Prime Minister would not act on it. Keynes came home and set out his objections in the prophetic tract on The Economic Consequences of the Peace. As the inflation that Keynes had predicted to be inevitable gathered pace in the ensuing years, the government forged ahead with its plan to restore the monetary system and in 1925 Winston Churchill as Chancellor of the Exchequer proudly announced the 'restoration of the Gold Standard' [which was in fact a variant of the gold-exchange standard]. Keynes published his reckoning of the inevitable Economic Consequences of Mr Churchill and pressed on with his main work; which resulted in 1929 in the publication of the Treatise on Money.
Since then 'money' issued by governments has gone through many redefinitions, has been subject to massive manipulation, and has been subjected to assorted 'analyses' by various schools of Economists whose only common link is to have been wrong in their predictions and disastrous when they have become policy advisers. Their 'profession' has avoided open acceptance of Keynes's Treatise; and the International Monetary Fund - of which Keynes was one of the founders - has still not adopted his concept that world financial stability can only be achieved if they create a global reserve currency [bancor] to which national currencies relate in a disciplined order. Exactly a century has been lost since Keynes wrote on Indian Currency and Finance and there is still no sign of his plain solutions being adopted.
In a world of ill-managed currencies, reckless debt creation and the inevitable consequential inflation, it is obvious that money is NOT a 'measure of value'. After the default of Greece we are all reminded that money is NOT a stable means of making deferred payments; and it would be a very poor joke for anyone to suggest that money is a 'store of value'. It is a 'medium of exchange' simply and solely because the law demands that prices are quoted and debts are denominated and settled in the national currency. Money is used because it has to be used: it is an imposition of the incompetent state, and the one certainty is that it loses purchasing-power: the longer you keep it [whether as banknotes or on deposit] it looses 'value'.
In future blogs I will develop this simple story that Keynes's genius is better appreciated when he is recognised as an authority on money, instead of being misrepresented as an inflation-inducing proponent of 'big government'. Over the recent past hundreds of millions of lives in the postindustrial countries have been conducted under a massive cloud of monetary delusions in an environment of debt; a system that is becoming unsustainable. Keynes warned what would happen if such fantasies were pursued: it is now sensible to return to what he wrote, on the record, and to understand his theories in the context of the pre-Economics science of Political Economy on which he built.
Thursday, 5 April 2012
BRICS Ascendant
Readers of most Newspapers in the postindustrial economies, and the wider spectrum of society that half-notice news headlines on television and radio, have been left unaware of the fact that the last days of March produced major news in the field of Political Economy, from Delhi. A meeting of the Heads of Government of China, India, Brazil, Russia and South Africa disappointed US and EU delusionists who hoped that major areas of disagreement - and different perceptions of their national interests - would cause this group of countries [commonly called the BRICS] to come to no practically-useful agreements. They instead issued their Delhi Declaration summarising a developing shared view of the state of the global economy, an increasing frustration with the unfairness of the nineteen-forties institutions that regulate world affairs [insofar as such matters are regulated], and a shared determination to gain appropriate recognition for their group - and for its members individually - in global institutions.
Their importance in the global economy has already gained recognition as a fact, as more of the goods in a typical European or American hardware store are marked as having been made in some of those countries; and oil, crops, minerals and other 'primary products' from those sources are increasingly important. China has gained control of the global market in 'rare earths' as well as a massive market share in simple manufacturing. Indian firms control globally renowned brands of high-quality cars and have exported their software building and managing skills into the highest technology laboratories and factories worldwide. Brazil is increasingly gaining respect for the balance between sectors that is being achieved as it grown rapidly. Despite the threat to economic stability that is posed by Zimbabwe-style pressure to dispossess 'white' firms and farms that comes from the 'left' of the ruling party, South Africa has managed to display economic data that currently justify their membership of the club. Enemies stress the weaknesses of Russia - declining population, oligarchy, corruption, the failure to establish 'real democracy' and the dubiety of the rule of law - but the combination of military strength and natural resources that always provided the basis for Tsarist power is still enough to ensure the global significance of the biggest country on the planet.
The Delhi group asserted that half of the world economic growth that is forecast for the next few years will take place in those countries. When 'the west' was in the lead, its Economists and politicians extolled their role as 'the locomotive' for the world economy: the concept has quietly been forgotten now that the BRICS can claim to be the motive forces for the present era. The most influential of the post-war institutions, the International Monetary Fund [IMF], was structured to serve the victorious wartime allies and even after many revisions to reflect changes in the world [and much weakening of the role of the US dollar] the EU together has 36% of the votes, the US still has 17%, and the BRICS together have just 11%: while their turnover is 28% of the global economy [and rising quickly as the west stagnates]. The Delhi assembly criticised this, demanded a reorganisation of the United Nations, and especially of the permanent seats on the Security Council, to reflect the shift in power. The rigidity of the World Bank - and the probability that yet another American would become its chairman - led to the BRICS examining the possibility of creating a South-South Development Bank through which they could lend money to each other and their emergent-country clients.
If the old-world institutions do not open themselves to recognition of the shift in the basic facts of Global Political Economy, they will compel the BRICS to set up their own parallel institutions: and the potential of global institutions to foster Peace among the Nations, which was promised to the whole world by the victors of 1945 - which included China and Russia and Imperial India - will be vitiated. The BRICS have the resources and the ability to go their own way: within the first half of the present century the Chinese and Indian economies will both be larger than the American. If these powers are not welcomed with due respect into the global institutions, the postindustrial countries will be much the loosers.
Their importance in the global economy has already gained recognition as a fact, as more of the goods in a typical European or American hardware store are marked as having been made in some of those countries; and oil, crops, minerals and other 'primary products' from those sources are increasingly important. China has gained control of the global market in 'rare earths' as well as a massive market share in simple manufacturing. Indian firms control globally renowned brands of high-quality cars and have exported their software building and managing skills into the highest technology laboratories and factories worldwide. Brazil is increasingly gaining respect for the balance between sectors that is being achieved as it grown rapidly. Despite the threat to economic stability that is posed by Zimbabwe-style pressure to dispossess 'white' firms and farms that comes from the 'left' of the ruling party, South Africa has managed to display economic data that currently justify their membership of the club. Enemies stress the weaknesses of Russia - declining population, oligarchy, corruption, the failure to establish 'real democracy' and the dubiety of the rule of law - but the combination of military strength and natural resources that always provided the basis for Tsarist power is still enough to ensure the global significance of the biggest country on the planet.
The Delhi group asserted that half of the world economic growth that is forecast for the next few years will take place in those countries. When 'the west' was in the lead, its Economists and politicians extolled their role as 'the locomotive' for the world economy: the concept has quietly been forgotten now that the BRICS can claim to be the motive forces for the present era. The most influential of the post-war institutions, the International Monetary Fund [IMF], was structured to serve the victorious wartime allies and even after many revisions to reflect changes in the world [and much weakening of the role of the US dollar] the EU together has 36% of the votes, the US still has 17%, and the BRICS together have just 11%: while their turnover is 28% of the global economy [and rising quickly as the west stagnates]. The Delhi assembly criticised this, demanded a reorganisation of the United Nations, and especially of the permanent seats on the Security Council, to reflect the shift in power. The rigidity of the World Bank - and the probability that yet another American would become its chairman - led to the BRICS examining the possibility of creating a South-South Development Bank through which they could lend money to each other and their emergent-country clients.
If the old-world institutions do not open themselves to recognition of the shift in the basic facts of Global Political Economy, they will compel the BRICS to set up their own parallel institutions: and the potential of global institutions to foster Peace among the Nations, which was promised to the whole world by the victors of 1945 - which included China and Russia and Imperial India - will be vitiated. The BRICS have the resources and the ability to go their own way: within the first half of the present century the Chinese and Indian economies will both be larger than the American. If these powers are not welcomed with due respect into the global institutions, the postindustrial countries will be much the loosers.
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Saturday, 14 January 2012
Rating the Eurozone - Again!
One of the most depressing items in the British press this past week was a full-page advert from 'the Actuarial profession' announcing the huge number of people who have qualified by examination to join the ranks of those who have ruined private pensions and now threaten the future viability of general insurance. Actuaries can also find employment in Rating Agencies, those widely-despised institutions that did so much harm to the global financial system when they allowed their greed for fees to outrun even vestigial common sense.
Despite the bad publicity that they have received - and largely thanks to actuaries' nostalgic determination to give undue weight to Agency ratings [because there is no alternative to what they used to purport to do] - the Agencies continue to publish ratings; and often this has an impact that is disproportionate to its validity. But in some cases Agencies, desperate to rehabilitate their reputation and to rebuild their revenues, explain a rating change in terms that display insight and good observation of reality. Yesterday's downgrading of nine countries' sovereign debt was a fair commentary on the state of those economies in the context of the eurozone.
Cyprus is in some ways a Greek dependency and though its economic situation, notably the state debt as a percentage of Gross National Product, is less stressed than that of Greece the interdependency of the two economies [and especially of Cypriot banks with Greek banks] makes the smaller country's finances very weak because Greece is chronically weak. So it is appropriate that Cyprus joins Italy, Portugal and Spain in being down-rated by two notches on the Standard and Poor's scale. This downgrade, the most recent of a significant series, reduces Portuguese state bonds to 'junk' status. Italy, Spain and Portugal have recently had new governments which are pledged to enforce whatever packages of restrictive measures are necessary to secure continuing support from the eurozone and from the IMF [the International Monetary Fund]. It is utterly impossible to predict how far the populations of these countries will tolerate the high taxation and the worsening standard of living that will have to continue for an indefinite future period if the deficits are to be eliminated.
Slovakia, Slovenia, Ireland and Austria join France in having their state debt de-rated by one grade. Austria and the two states that were parts of Hungary for centuries before 1919, Slovenia and Slovakia, have deep economic ties with Hungary which is outside the eurozone and has recently conducted policies that are on [and sometimes beyond] the boundaries of democratic acceptability. Austrian Banks, in particular, have lent heavily to Hungarian banks - borrowing that was largely used to fuel a housing bubble - and the chances of repayment in full have become negligible. So downgrading those three countries' state credit ratings is entirely reasonable. Ireland is managing the macroeconomics of crisis very well, but the depression is becoming more intense, emigration is rising and the banks [which are mostly state-owned] are having to accept larger and larger losses on bad loans that were made in the years when Ireland claimed the nickname of The Celtic Tiger.
France is the greatest casualty of the downgrading, and the most appropriate. President Sarkozy has tried hard to persuade Chancellor Merkel to use Germany's accumulated reserves to support the debts of all the governments whose countries are in the eurozone. Aware that German voters deplore the idea of covering feckless southern peoples for their foolish economic management, and for lying abut the liabilities that they have accumulated, Markel has tried to cap the commitment that Germany would make to bail-out funds. At the same time, Germany and France have led the eurozone [as such] in demanding that the most indebted states in the system must adopt strict austerity. Looking at this scene, Standard and Poor's analysts have built forward projections for what might be the economic future for each eurozone country: and the result is that the countries that are being compelled to restrict their state spending while maximising taxation cannot be expected to grow their national economies fast enough to begin to generate earnings that will enable them both to carry on servicing their debts and to invest in new industries, in high technology and in innovative business structures. The more successfully the austerity measures bite into the economic system, the less resilient and dynamic the economies of the chronic debtor states will be.
The only means open to a Rating Agency to issue a practical warning in support of such an observation is to downgrade their rating of the debt issued by the countries concerned. That makes it more expensive for them to borrow money, so it reduces the chances of the government adopting Keynesian methods to revitalise the economy. It makes a self-fulfilling prophesy of the Agency analysis: and the predicted negative outcome has a high probability of eventuation. Lower [or negative] growth in much of Europe will further imperil the collective viability of the eurozone: and it could possibly undermine the European Union as such. The very policies that are being imposed on eurozone countries in the cause of responsibility and stability may well cause greater chaos, despair and socio-economic dissolution than has yet been imagined. In this context, S&P's small adjustment to sovereign debt ratings may well be a harbinger of a very nasty future. In earlier centuries Europeans of all traditions accepted the validity of cautionary tales like the Prodigal Son, of axioms like 'waste not, want not' and of adages such as 'you will reap what you have sown'. In the last third of the twentieth century clever fools thought that they could defy both traditional morality and simple arithmetic. They were wrong, and the price that future generations might have to pay for that folly remains beyond computation.
In short-term practical affairs, what will be the impact of Standard and Poor's downgrading of all those countries' state debts?
For the British, it is a hopeful sign that the Agencies continue to shrug off demands from some downgraded eurozone states for Britain's debt also to be downgraded; but that happy state will not continue unless the maintenance of austerity in state spending by the UK is balanced by economic growth and a marked reduction in the balance of payments deficit. Positive growth of the UK economy has to be seen by the middle of 2013 - at the latest - or downgrading will be inescapable.
Meanwhile, the eviction of Greece from the euro is unavoidable: the key question is, whether France and Germany choose to continue supporting Greek governments until the whole eurozone collapses, or whether Greece will be expelled [or allowed to slink away] soon, enabling the rest of the system to avoid a general implosion. If Greece is put out of the system quickly, the euro can probably survive as the common currency in sixteen enfeebled countries; but even then the subsequent three years will be a precarious period. Standard and Poor's may have the French spitting venom in their direction just now, but they gain brownie points for being of sound judgement on his point, this time round.
Despite the bad publicity that they have received - and largely thanks to actuaries' nostalgic determination to give undue weight to Agency ratings [because there is no alternative to what they used to purport to do] - the Agencies continue to publish ratings; and often this has an impact that is disproportionate to its validity. But in some cases Agencies, desperate to rehabilitate their reputation and to rebuild their revenues, explain a rating change in terms that display insight and good observation of reality. Yesterday's downgrading of nine countries' sovereign debt was a fair commentary on the state of those economies in the context of the eurozone.
Cyprus is in some ways a Greek dependency and though its economic situation, notably the state debt as a percentage of Gross National Product, is less stressed than that of Greece the interdependency of the two economies [and especially of Cypriot banks with Greek banks] makes the smaller country's finances very weak because Greece is chronically weak. So it is appropriate that Cyprus joins Italy, Portugal and Spain in being down-rated by two notches on the Standard and Poor's scale. This downgrade, the most recent of a significant series, reduces Portuguese state bonds to 'junk' status. Italy, Spain and Portugal have recently had new governments which are pledged to enforce whatever packages of restrictive measures are necessary to secure continuing support from the eurozone and from the IMF [the International Monetary Fund]. It is utterly impossible to predict how far the populations of these countries will tolerate the high taxation and the worsening standard of living that will have to continue for an indefinite future period if the deficits are to be eliminated.
Slovakia, Slovenia, Ireland and Austria join France in having their state debt de-rated by one grade. Austria and the two states that were parts of Hungary for centuries before 1919, Slovenia and Slovakia, have deep economic ties with Hungary which is outside the eurozone and has recently conducted policies that are on [and sometimes beyond] the boundaries of democratic acceptability. Austrian Banks, in particular, have lent heavily to Hungarian banks - borrowing that was largely used to fuel a housing bubble - and the chances of repayment in full have become negligible. So downgrading those three countries' state credit ratings is entirely reasonable. Ireland is managing the macroeconomics of crisis very well, but the depression is becoming more intense, emigration is rising and the banks [which are mostly state-owned] are having to accept larger and larger losses on bad loans that were made in the years when Ireland claimed the nickname of The Celtic Tiger.
France is the greatest casualty of the downgrading, and the most appropriate. President Sarkozy has tried hard to persuade Chancellor Merkel to use Germany's accumulated reserves to support the debts of all the governments whose countries are in the eurozone. Aware that German voters deplore the idea of covering feckless southern peoples for their foolish economic management, and for lying abut the liabilities that they have accumulated, Markel has tried to cap the commitment that Germany would make to bail-out funds. At the same time, Germany and France have led the eurozone [as such] in demanding that the most indebted states in the system must adopt strict austerity. Looking at this scene, Standard and Poor's analysts have built forward projections for what might be the economic future for each eurozone country: and the result is that the countries that are being compelled to restrict their state spending while maximising taxation cannot be expected to grow their national economies fast enough to begin to generate earnings that will enable them both to carry on servicing their debts and to invest in new industries, in high technology and in innovative business structures. The more successfully the austerity measures bite into the economic system, the less resilient and dynamic the economies of the chronic debtor states will be.
The only means open to a Rating Agency to issue a practical warning in support of such an observation is to downgrade their rating of the debt issued by the countries concerned. That makes it more expensive for them to borrow money, so it reduces the chances of the government adopting Keynesian methods to revitalise the economy. It makes a self-fulfilling prophesy of the Agency analysis: and the predicted negative outcome has a high probability of eventuation. Lower [or negative] growth in much of Europe will further imperil the collective viability of the eurozone: and it could possibly undermine the European Union as such. The very policies that are being imposed on eurozone countries in the cause of responsibility and stability may well cause greater chaos, despair and socio-economic dissolution than has yet been imagined. In this context, S&P's small adjustment to sovereign debt ratings may well be a harbinger of a very nasty future. In earlier centuries Europeans of all traditions accepted the validity of cautionary tales like the Prodigal Son, of axioms like 'waste not, want not' and of adages such as 'you will reap what you have sown'. In the last third of the twentieth century clever fools thought that they could defy both traditional morality and simple arithmetic. They were wrong, and the price that future generations might have to pay for that folly remains beyond computation.
In short-term practical affairs, what will be the impact of Standard and Poor's downgrading of all those countries' state debts?
For the British, it is a hopeful sign that the Agencies continue to shrug off demands from some downgraded eurozone states for Britain's debt also to be downgraded; but that happy state will not continue unless the maintenance of austerity in state spending by the UK is balanced by economic growth and a marked reduction in the balance of payments deficit. Positive growth of the UK economy has to be seen by the middle of 2013 - at the latest - or downgrading will be inescapable.
Meanwhile, the eviction of Greece from the euro is unavoidable: the key question is, whether France and Germany choose to continue supporting Greek governments until the whole eurozone collapses, or whether Greece will be expelled [or allowed to slink away] soon, enabling the rest of the system to avoid a general implosion. If Greece is put out of the system quickly, the euro can probably survive as the common currency in sixteen enfeebled countries; but even then the subsequent three years will be a precarious period. Standard and Poor's may have the French spitting venom in their direction just now, but they gain brownie points for being of sound judgement on his point, this time round.
Monday, 19 December 2011
Globalism and Money
The impending admission to membership of the Russian Federation - the world's eleventh-biggest economy on the currently accepted statistical formulae - will bring over 95% of world trade under the auspices of the World Trade Organisation [WTO]. The eagerness of the emergent countries to be members of this organisation indicates that there are significant benefits that attach to membership; but a quick check on recent press coverage indicates that the WTO is a faltering set-up.It has never quite delivered the hopes that are routinely expressed by the member states' negotiators as they enter the conference room at the start of each of an endless series of 'rounds' of deliberation which have been intended to improve the openness and proper reporting of world business. Yet the WTO is nevertheless recognised that it is the best mechanism that is available for fostering relatively free trade around the whole world.
The predecessor of the WTO was established in parallel with two new institutions for managing the world's monetary system: technical devices which could support statesmen in their effort to establish an open world economy, starting at the end of the Second World War. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development [commonly called the World Bank] was designed to raise capital in the relative rich areas of the world to lend to governments and agencies which could invest in damaged or underdeveloped regions and industries. The International Monetary Fund {IMF] was intended to serve as a Central Bank for the world economy.
To a limited extent, the World Bank has performed the role that was allocated to it; though from the very early days after its foundation the refusal of the then-USSR to participate in World Bank activities, or to allow its satellites to join, meant that between1948 and 1992 its loans were confined to the de-industrialising powers and the non-communist post-colonial countries. In many instances the political affiliations of undemocratic 'pro-western' regimes enabled them to get World Bank loans and technical support. The USA - including the 'military-industrial complex' - had the predominating influence over the Bank because the US was by far the greatest contributor as well as the host to its head office.
The IMF was also barred to the communist world by Stalin's decree. Thus until the nineteen-eighties the IMF was an organisation of the 'capitalist' world; though most of that zone adopted the aspirations of the 'mixed economy'. Following the second world war the majority of democratic governments significantly increased the services and benefits that they provided for their citizens, at a rate far greater than the rate of growth of their economies. They were enabled to achieve this apparently impossible trick of stretching consumption ahead of production through adopting a bizarre combination of bowdlerised Keynesianism with massive financial manipulation by the state.The inevitable consequence of this self-deception was the great inflation of the nineteen-seventies; which was followed by the adoption of monetarism, under which regime state spending continued to run in excess of the taxation yielded by the economy in many countries. Alongside excessive state spending - which was matched by an increase in the public debt - private spending was also allowed to rise above earnings at the cost of increased individual and household indebtedness. The United States edged towards its own version of the welfare state in very small steps throughout the postwar years, increasing the pace when European and Australasian governments began to reduce and remove some elements of social provision as the impossibility of perpetually expanding the deficit became apparent. The cost of welfare and health care to the US authorities become a notable drag on the national economy only under the Clinton Administration. Thereafter it proved intractable under George W Bush as he accepted the necessity to keep social stresses at a minimum within the USA as it engaged in the overseas adventures by which the Administration responded to the attack of 11 September 2001.
The Vietnam War had stirred huge protests in the US, where domestic socio-economic disasters - especially the racial divide - had created a huge segment of the population who were profoundly and personally disaffected, and the anti-war movement had provided them with an urgent moralistic focus for their dissent. There was no similar opposition to the Iraq or Afghan wars, though their cost to the US Treasury was colossal. The US government was able to sell all the debt it created, largely to China and to other emergent powers, while US consumers cheerfully bought imports that were cheaper than US-made products: which increased unemployment and welfare dependency in the USA and reduced the potential growth of the taxable capacity of the economy; while public and personal indebtedness increased. The Obama presidency heralded a massive expansion of spending on healthcare: offset only to a small degree by the termination of the Iraq war and a general cap on defence spending. A huge programme of public works, designed to slow that rate of growth of unemployment, was funded by selling yet more debt to the new industrial powers and to the oil exporters: whose investments in US stocks was so great that the US Administration was unafraid of the lenders ceasing to support the finances of the USA.
Since 1945 several governments have become incapable of perpetually convincing the holders of their debt certificates that they were safe assets: so the market in that state's debt collapsed. Countries including Argentina, Mexico and [in 1976] the United Kingdom needed the assistance of the IMF to stabilise their finances. It did not serve any good purpose for the rest of the capitalist world if a country was allowed to fail economically. In cases where default was iminent the IMF tried to strike a deal with the existing government if it was considered to be able to maintain law-and-order and to enforce austerity measures on the population. If the pre-existing regime could not meet that specification a government had to be set up in which the IMF had some confidence before a deal could be done, as has been seen in Italy and Greece in recent weeks. Greece and Italy are unusual among petitioners to the IMF in that they are parts of a common currency zone: their deals with the IMF had to be brokered and supported by the EU and the eurozone, which made the negotiations more complex and the issues involved less easy for outsiders to assess.
Nevertheless the essential components of every IMF 'rescue' have been the same: the country concerned is required to apply strict controls to its spending and borrowing, to reduce its welfare state [and usually its defence spending as well], and in some cases it is encouraged to default on part of its debt. In that eventuality the government issues replacement debt certificates that are expressed in devalued currency units and/or for fewer units of currency. Such measures are justified by the assumption that the creditors should have recognised that the debt certificates that they were holding could not possibly be paid off in full by the debtor state. If banks, other businesses and individuals were holding debt certificates that had lost value, from greed, stupidity or inertia, they deserved to 'get a haircut'.
The IMF reconstruction loan came in the form of another currency - usually US Dollars - which boosted the reserves of the Central Bank of the state that was restructuring its economy and its debt. In exchange for giving 'assistance' the IMF was able to impose a degree of discipline on the defaulting state, and to check that the restrictive policy was more-or-less being followed by the government until the internal finances and external balances were in an acceptable condition. This last-resort enforcement role of the IMF was a far cry from what Lord Keynes had proposed during the second world war. He suggested that they way to avoid any repetition of the depression of the nineteen-thirties was to have an international monetary agency that issued its own money - bancor - that would be recognised by all states and controlled by global consensus. Countries would settle their debts with each other by making transfers of bancor at the IMF, and if a state had a good reason to run a deficit for a period - usually to finance a promising major investment - it would borrow bancor to make the necessary settlement: and duly repay the debt to the IMF in bancor over an agreed timescale.
As the major contributor to financing the war that was coming to its conclusion, and in the expectation of gaining massively by trade with war-torn countries, the US did not agree to Keynes's model. Its negotiators insisted that the US Dollar must remain unconditionally under US sovereign control, and should maintain its 'real' value as being exchangeable for one thirty-second of an ounce of gold [i.e. one ounce of gold was - notionally - exchanged for $32]. Hence the IMF was set up with the dollar as its unit of account and all the other member countries had to fix their currency at so-many dollars and cents per unit. The British pound sterling entered the system at $4.
Under the original rules of the IMF, when a country ran up an excessive balance-of-payments deficit it was compelled either to impose financial discipline that brought payments and receipts into balance and instituted a plan to pay down the accumulated deficit, or it had to obtain the consent of the IMF to devalue its currency formally; which resulted in the cost of the debt being reduced in terms of foreign currencies. As Britain's welfare state repeatedly led to excessive consumption vis-a-vis economic output, the pound was devalued from $4 to $2.8 after only three years, and was devalued to $2.4 in the 'sixties. Then in 1973 the USA was not able to maintain the parity of the dollar: Richard Nixon abrogated the gold valuation of the dollar and since then countries have engaged in a process of devaluations by default: they have allowed inflation to take place, enabled borrowing to run ahead, and granted the masses living standards that were not sustainable in the long term. Commentators with limited historical understanding have expressed concern that countries and currency zones could now engage in devaluation competitively with other countries, in the hope of exporting economic stress; as was tried with disastrous consequences in the early nineteen thirties. Such expressions of concern miss the simple truth, that competitive devaluations have been taking place since 1973. If there is an intensification of the process in the near future this will exacerbate the already-obvious danger that world trade could grind to a halt.
None of the weak eurozone countries can devalue the euro unilaterally and the IMF is keen to keep the eurozone in being to serve as a co-disciplinarian over the member countries that are at-risk of default. A common argument being voiced in Britain is that the IMF is constituted to help countries, not currency zones; so the UK should not provide extra funding for the IMF to support the euro even though the lack of such support might destroy the common currency. Despite British hesitation it appears that China and the USA are willing for the IMF to take a punt on the euro, in the interests of stabilising global trade and employment and business: so it is likely to continue with its efforts. The eventual outcome is unpredictable; but the extent of the disaster that would follow a failure of the euro will increasingly be emphasised.
How different things would have been over the past helf-century if Keyenes's version of the IMF had been operational since 1945! Bowdlerised Keynesianism would have been impossible to apply within any country; so in the absence of rampanty inflation monetarism would never have arisen. Living standards and benefits systems would have remained more modest and affordable, de-industrialisation would have been dismissed as an absurd notion and industrial innovation would have been encouraged in the absence of casino banking. It is highly desirable that the International Monetary Fund should look at options for fundamental reform of its structure and its policies, which could enhance its role as a global economic provider and - when necessary - as a monetary and fiscal police force. It should begin by dusting-down Keynes's propositions from 1944 and assessing how much a modern version of them could serve the world far better than the current arrangements.
The predecessor of the WTO was established in parallel with two new institutions for managing the world's monetary system: technical devices which could support statesmen in their effort to establish an open world economy, starting at the end of the Second World War. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development [commonly called the World Bank] was designed to raise capital in the relative rich areas of the world to lend to governments and agencies which could invest in damaged or underdeveloped regions and industries. The International Monetary Fund {IMF] was intended to serve as a Central Bank for the world economy.
To a limited extent, the World Bank has performed the role that was allocated to it; though from the very early days after its foundation the refusal of the then-USSR to participate in World Bank activities, or to allow its satellites to join, meant that between1948 and 1992 its loans were confined to the de-industrialising powers and the non-communist post-colonial countries. In many instances the political affiliations of undemocratic 'pro-western' regimes enabled them to get World Bank loans and technical support. The USA - including the 'military-industrial complex' - had the predominating influence over the Bank because the US was by far the greatest contributor as well as the host to its head office.
The IMF was also barred to the communist world by Stalin's decree. Thus until the nineteen-eighties the IMF was an organisation of the 'capitalist' world; though most of that zone adopted the aspirations of the 'mixed economy'. Following the second world war the majority of democratic governments significantly increased the services and benefits that they provided for their citizens, at a rate far greater than the rate of growth of their economies. They were enabled to achieve this apparently impossible trick of stretching consumption ahead of production through adopting a bizarre combination of bowdlerised Keynesianism with massive financial manipulation by the state.The inevitable consequence of this self-deception was the great inflation of the nineteen-seventies; which was followed by the adoption of monetarism, under which regime state spending continued to run in excess of the taxation yielded by the economy in many countries. Alongside excessive state spending - which was matched by an increase in the public debt - private spending was also allowed to rise above earnings at the cost of increased individual and household indebtedness. The United States edged towards its own version of the welfare state in very small steps throughout the postwar years, increasing the pace when European and Australasian governments began to reduce and remove some elements of social provision as the impossibility of perpetually expanding the deficit became apparent. The cost of welfare and health care to the US authorities become a notable drag on the national economy only under the Clinton Administration. Thereafter it proved intractable under George W Bush as he accepted the necessity to keep social stresses at a minimum within the USA as it engaged in the overseas adventures by which the Administration responded to the attack of 11 September 2001.
The Vietnam War had stirred huge protests in the US, where domestic socio-economic disasters - especially the racial divide - had created a huge segment of the population who were profoundly and personally disaffected, and the anti-war movement had provided them with an urgent moralistic focus for their dissent. There was no similar opposition to the Iraq or Afghan wars, though their cost to the US Treasury was colossal. The US government was able to sell all the debt it created, largely to China and to other emergent powers, while US consumers cheerfully bought imports that were cheaper than US-made products: which increased unemployment and welfare dependency in the USA and reduced the potential growth of the taxable capacity of the economy; while public and personal indebtedness increased. The Obama presidency heralded a massive expansion of spending on healthcare: offset only to a small degree by the termination of the Iraq war and a general cap on defence spending. A huge programme of public works, designed to slow that rate of growth of unemployment, was funded by selling yet more debt to the new industrial powers and to the oil exporters: whose investments in US stocks was so great that the US Administration was unafraid of the lenders ceasing to support the finances of the USA.
Since 1945 several governments have become incapable of perpetually convincing the holders of their debt certificates that they were safe assets: so the market in that state's debt collapsed. Countries including Argentina, Mexico and [in 1976] the United Kingdom needed the assistance of the IMF to stabilise their finances. It did not serve any good purpose for the rest of the capitalist world if a country was allowed to fail economically. In cases where default was iminent the IMF tried to strike a deal with the existing government if it was considered to be able to maintain law-and-order and to enforce austerity measures on the population. If the pre-existing regime could not meet that specification a government had to be set up in which the IMF had some confidence before a deal could be done, as has been seen in Italy and Greece in recent weeks. Greece and Italy are unusual among petitioners to the IMF in that they are parts of a common currency zone: their deals with the IMF had to be brokered and supported by the EU and the eurozone, which made the negotiations more complex and the issues involved less easy for outsiders to assess.
Nevertheless the essential components of every IMF 'rescue' have been the same: the country concerned is required to apply strict controls to its spending and borrowing, to reduce its welfare state [and usually its defence spending as well], and in some cases it is encouraged to default on part of its debt. In that eventuality the government issues replacement debt certificates that are expressed in devalued currency units and/or for fewer units of currency. Such measures are justified by the assumption that the creditors should have recognised that the debt certificates that they were holding could not possibly be paid off in full by the debtor state. If banks, other businesses and individuals were holding debt certificates that had lost value, from greed, stupidity or inertia, they deserved to 'get a haircut'.
The IMF reconstruction loan came in the form of another currency - usually US Dollars - which boosted the reserves of the Central Bank of the state that was restructuring its economy and its debt. In exchange for giving 'assistance' the IMF was able to impose a degree of discipline on the defaulting state, and to check that the restrictive policy was more-or-less being followed by the government until the internal finances and external balances were in an acceptable condition. This last-resort enforcement role of the IMF was a far cry from what Lord Keynes had proposed during the second world war. He suggested that they way to avoid any repetition of the depression of the nineteen-thirties was to have an international monetary agency that issued its own money - bancor - that would be recognised by all states and controlled by global consensus. Countries would settle their debts with each other by making transfers of bancor at the IMF, and if a state had a good reason to run a deficit for a period - usually to finance a promising major investment - it would borrow bancor to make the necessary settlement: and duly repay the debt to the IMF in bancor over an agreed timescale.
As the major contributor to financing the war that was coming to its conclusion, and in the expectation of gaining massively by trade with war-torn countries, the US did not agree to Keynes's model. Its negotiators insisted that the US Dollar must remain unconditionally under US sovereign control, and should maintain its 'real' value as being exchangeable for one thirty-second of an ounce of gold [i.e. one ounce of gold was - notionally - exchanged for $32]. Hence the IMF was set up with the dollar as its unit of account and all the other member countries had to fix their currency at so-many dollars and cents per unit. The British pound sterling entered the system at $4.
Under the original rules of the IMF, when a country ran up an excessive balance-of-payments deficit it was compelled either to impose financial discipline that brought payments and receipts into balance and instituted a plan to pay down the accumulated deficit, or it had to obtain the consent of the IMF to devalue its currency formally; which resulted in the cost of the debt being reduced in terms of foreign currencies. As Britain's welfare state repeatedly led to excessive consumption vis-a-vis economic output, the pound was devalued from $4 to $2.8 after only three years, and was devalued to $2.4 in the 'sixties. Then in 1973 the USA was not able to maintain the parity of the dollar: Richard Nixon abrogated the gold valuation of the dollar and since then countries have engaged in a process of devaluations by default: they have allowed inflation to take place, enabled borrowing to run ahead, and granted the masses living standards that were not sustainable in the long term. Commentators with limited historical understanding have expressed concern that countries and currency zones could now engage in devaluation competitively with other countries, in the hope of exporting economic stress; as was tried with disastrous consequences in the early nineteen thirties. Such expressions of concern miss the simple truth, that competitive devaluations have been taking place since 1973. If there is an intensification of the process in the near future this will exacerbate the already-obvious danger that world trade could grind to a halt.
None of the weak eurozone countries can devalue the euro unilaterally and the IMF is keen to keep the eurozone in being to serve as a co-disciplinarian over the member countries that are at-risk of default. A common argument being voiced in Britain is that the IMF is constituted to help countries, not currency zones; so the UK should not provide extra funding for the IMF to support the euro even though the lack of such support might destroy the common currency. Despite British hesitation it appears that China and the USA are willing for the IMF to take a punt on the euro, in the interests of stabilising global trade and employment and business: so it is likely to continue with its efforts. The eventual outcome is unpredictable; but the extent of the disaster that would follow a failure of the euro will increasingly be emphasised.
How different things would have been over the past helf-century if Keyenes's version of the IMF had been operational since 1945! Bowdlerised Keynesianism would have been impossible to apply within any country; so in the absence of rampanty inflation monetarism would never have arisen. Living standards and benefits systems would have remained more modest and affordable, de-industrialisation would have been dismissed as an absurd notion and industrial innovation would have been encouraged in the absence of casino banking. It is highly desirable that the International Monetary Fund should look at options for fundamental reform of its structure and its policies, which could enhance its role as a global economic provider and - when necessary - as a monetary and fiscal police force. It should begin by dusting-down Keynes's propositions from 1944 and assessing how much a modern version of them could serve the world far better than the current arrangements.
Monday, 12 December 2011
Money, Democracy and Economy
Evidence is accumulating that the International Monetary Fund [IMF] is preparing to work closely with the European Central Bank [ECB] to prolong the survival of the euro for long enough to allow Greece to demonstrate whether or not an austerity regime can be imposed with sufficient rigour to allow the country to remain in the eurozone. Whether or not the Greek economy meets the challenge under the very difficult current circumstances, it is highly probable that Chinese resources will also be transmitted via the IMF and the ECB to prop up the rest of the eurozone. Chinese government deposits with the IMF are extremely secure, and China is happy to take a greater share of control of the IMF which is a corollary of increasing its deposits. The USA is watching this situation jealously: so the Americans will most probably also agree to support the ECB to prevent the Chinese becoming too influential.
This set of moves will help to offset the risk of an intensification of the recession that is already gripping the whole of the EU. The recession is already set to last through most of 2012, and could go on longer. Trade between Europe and North America is important on both sides of the Atlantic so it is a direct US interest that Europe will be a good customer for US commerce and industry in a presidential election year. Both China and the sovereign wealth funds that are held by oil-exporting states and by Singapore are looking for businesses in Europe that will be a good buy during the recession. China will gain both the turnover and the institutional experience of the European firms that they may come to own; and - more importantly - they will take control of the intellectual property that the companies have accumulated. They will own the speculative research and the design capabilities of their European subsidiaries, which they can carry forward in China or in Europe as they see fit. They will be able to put their European brand-names on products made in China, greatly increasing the value-added to Chinese industrial output. The Chinese owners will be free to decide whether or not to run-down their European factories, and they will have the option to make their brands in China and sell them at European prices.
Such takeovers, followed by technology transfer to China, will mean that European consumers will still have access to the same brands; but employment and production in Europe will decrease and profits will be exported, so European spending-power will permanently be diminished. The de-industrialisation that has been undermining Britain and the USA for the past half-century will spread rapidly in Europe, even in Germany, unless specific measures are taken to prevent the alienation of ownership.
The massive middle classes in India, China, Brazil and other leading emergent economies are the most avid buyers of quons - brands - [see PPE via the link from this site] and an increasing mass of the population aspire to follow them. Exporting leading brands will be a huge boost to the national balance of payments of the countries that will have bought the brands, and will give them increased profits to apply to new investment. This is the outcome of the operation of the Iron Law of Wages. The EU as a whole has broken the law for decades and the inescapable payback is now being taken by the rest of the world. Proper, provident Germany has not participated in the profligacy; but is straight in the firing line now that redress is being taken. Because of their loyalty to the European fantasy Germans are now at risk of losing some control of their own economy and of the technology in which they have led the world. They have deferred - perhaps permanently - the day on which they would have to open their currency reserves ad lib to bail-out the most profligate members of the euro. But because of their loyalty to the EU they have placed at risk their control of technology and of the brands that they have exported so successfully over recent decades.
Meanwhile there is a daft shouting-match developing in Britain, between those who think that David Cameron has in some degree 'saved' the City of London by declining to support the implementation by the EU Commission and the Court of the Merkel package of financial stringency that has been endorsed by the other 26 member states, and those who argue that Cameron has damaged the vital interests - and the prestige - of the United Kingdom. The Deputy Prime Minister expressed both views, in a perfect vignette of Liberal Democrat policymaking. It is not clear how the new eurozone agreement will be 'policed', and most probably some fudging mechanism will be cobbled together in the drafting of the Compact that is now to begin. It is expected that most of the 26 'inner European' states will agree to impose a Robin Hood Tax, or Tobin Tax, on financial transactions. Britain could veto a tax change, under the Lisbon Treaty; but the veto power would not be applicable to a regulatory change under which the EU might apply service charges or other 'penalties' to the financial services sectors of the UK economy.
The sound and fury of the debate will help nobody. It is, however, incontrovertible that the United Kingdom is again offering itself as a test-bed for seat-of-the-pants economic policy experimentation. Unlike the bowdlerised Keynesianism that was tried in the nineteen-sixties and the crude but clearly articulated monetarism of the nineteen-eighties, the present experiment in austerity management has no underpinning economic theory and no ideology. It stems from a naive pragmatism that was hastily cobbled together by professional politicians from the fundamentally incompatible Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties. It has nothing substantial to contribute to a global dialogue on responding systematically to a crisis which is has reached its high pitch of intensity because the world has allowed the postindustrial countries to breach the Iron Law for almost half a century. The resulting pain is being felt intensely in Greece, and is beginning to cause serious stress in most member countries of the European Union, not always in proportion to the extent to which individual countries breached the Iron Law. It is impossible to predict where this will lead in terms of socio-political tension, but it is inevitable in conventionally democratic societies that the complacency of the democracy itself will be challenged. Nothing can be taken for granted but it becoming common to question whether democratic principles have failed, or whether the disaster is the product of a perverse and irrelevant political class that has emerged in separation from the rest of society.
China has a huge political caste, who have been segregated for the entire length of their careers from the toil and economic stress of life as it is experienced by the vast migrant working class and by both the megarich and the tens of millions of middle-class consumers. There are great hazards in attempting to climb the greasy pole of party hierarchy, and even greater risks if party apparatchiks dabble corruptly with business; but the people who reach the top are generally of the highest quality. The near-miracle of economic and monetary management that has been accomplished over the past two decades is the best evidence of this. Western commentators have regularly predicted disaster, from hyperinflation through 'stagnation' in the property sector to mass unemployment, while standards of living have risen consistently. Democratic rights as defined in Magna Charta or the US Constitution and Bill of Rights have not been matched in China, and the lack of such rights is probably to the detriment of the Chinese people; but it seems generally to be accepted in the country that it is fair enough to concentrate first on economic development, and then to allow for the development of more open institutions. Dissent in China is very much a minuscule minority activity and is often ethnically based or specifically aroused by corrupt land seizures. The internet and mobile technology ensure that dissent and repression are more widely reported when it occurs; and the government is increasingly open to treating the dissentients more fairly. But the western model no longer looks like an inevitable endgame for Chinese youth to aspire to.
This set of moves will help to offset the risk of an intensification of the recession that is already gripping the whole of the EU. The recession is already set to last through most of 2012, and could go on longer. Trade between Europe and North America is important on both sides of the Atlantic so it is a direct US interest that Europe will be a good customer for US commerce and industry in a presidential election year. Both China and the sovereign wealth funds that are held by oil-exporting states and by Singapore are looking for businesses in Europe that will be a good buy during the recession. China will gain both the turnover and the institutional experience of the European firms that they may come to own; and - more importantly - they will take control of the intellectual property that the companies have accumulated. They will own the speculative research and the design capabilities of their European subsidiaries, which they can carry forward in China or in Europe as they see fit. They will be able to put their European brand-names on products made in China, greatly increasing the value-added to Chinese industrial output. The Chinese owners will be free to decide whether or not to run-down their European factories, and they will have the option to make their brands in China and sell them at European prices.
Such takeovers, followed by technology transfer to China, will mean that European consumers will still have access to the same brands; but employment and production in Europe will decrease and profits will be exported, so European spending-power will permanently be diminished. The de-industrialisation that has been undermining Britain and the USA for the past half-century will spread rapidly in Europe, even in Germany, unless specific measures are taken to prevent the alienation of ownership.
The massive middle classes in India, China, Brazil and other leading emergent economies are the most avid buyers of quons - brands - [see PPE via the link from this site] and an increasing mass of the population aspire to follow them. Exporting leading brands will be a huge boost to the national balance of payments of the countries that will have bought the brands, and will give them increased profits to apply to new investment. This is the outcome of the operation of the Iron Law of Wages. The EU as a whole has broken the law for decades and the inescapable payback is now being taken by the rest of the world. Proper, provident Germany has not participated in the profligacy; but is straight in the firing line now that redress is being taken. Because of their loyalty to the European fantasy Germans are now at risk of losing some control of their own economy and of the technology in which they have led the world. They have deferred - perhaps permanently - the day on which they would have to open their currency reserves ad lib to bail-out the most profligate members of the euro. But because of their loyalty to the EU they have placed at risk their control of technology and of the brands that they have exported so successfully over recent decades.
Meanwhile there is a daft shouting-match developing in Britain, between those who think that David Cameron has in some degree 'saved' the City of London by declining to support the implementation by the EU Commission and the Court of the Merkel package of financial stringency that has been endorsed by the other 26 member states, and those who argue that Cameron has damaged the vital interests - and the prestige - of the United Kingdom. The Deputy Prime Minister expressed both views, in a perfect vignette of Liberal Democrat policymaking. It is not clear how the new eurozone agreement will be 'policed', and most probably some fudging mechanism will be cobbled together in the drafting of the Compact that is now to begin. It is expected that most of the 26 'inner European' states will agree to impose a Robin Hood Tax, or Tobin Tax, on financial transactions. Britain could veto a tax change, under the Lisbon Treaty; but the veto power would not be applicable to a regulatory change under which the EU might apply service charges or other 'penalties' to the financial services sectors of the UK economy.
The sound and fury of the debate will help nobody. It is, however, incontrovertible that the United Kingdom is again offering itself as a test-bed for seat-of-the-pants economic policy experimentation. Unlike the bowdlerised Keynesianism that was tried in the nineteen-sixties and the crude but clearly articulated monetarism of the nineteen-eighties, the present experiment in austerity management has no underpinning economic theory and no ideology. It stems from a naive pragmatism that was hastily cobbled together by professional politicians from the fundamentally incompatible Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties. It has nothing substantial to contribute to a global dialogue on responding systematically to a crisis which is has reached its high pitch of intensity because the world has allowed the postindustrial countries to breach the Iron Law for almost half a century. The resulting pain is being felt intensely in Greece, and is beginning to cause serious stress in most member countries of the European Union, not always in proportion to the extent to which individual countries breached the Iron Law. It is impossible to predict where this will lead in terms of socio-political tension, but it is inevitable in conventionally democratic societies that the complacency of the democracy itself will be challenged. Nothing can be taken for granted but it becoming common to question whether democratic principles have failed, or whether the disaster is the product of a perverse and irrelevant political class that has emerged in separation from the rest of society.
China has a huge political caste, who have been segregated for the entire length of their careers from the toil and economic stress of life as it is experienced by the vast migrant working class and by both the megarich and the tens of millions of middle-class consumers. There are great hazards in attempting to climb the greasy pole of party hierarchy, and even greater risks if party apparatchiks dabble corruptly with business; but the people who reach the top are generally of the highest quality. The near-miracle of economic and monetary management that has been accomplished over the past two decades is the best evidence of this. Western commentators have regularly predicted disaster, from hyperinflation through 'stagnation' in the property sector to mass unemployment, while standards of living have risen consistently. Democratic rights as defined in Magna Charta or the US Constitution and Bill of Rights have not been matched in China, and the lack of such rights is probably to the detriment of the Chinese people; but it seems generally to be accepted in the country that it is fair enough to concentrate first on economic development, and then to allow for the development of more open institutions. Dissent in China is very much a minuscule minority activity and is often ethnically based or specifically aroused by corrupt land seizures. The internet and mobile technology ensure that dissent and repression are more widely reported when it occurs; and the government is increasingly open to treating the dissentients more fairly. But the western model no longer looks like an inevitable endgame for Chinese youth to aspire to.
Thursday, 1 December 2011
Central Banks to the Rescue: Again!
In a significant concerted move a consortium of central banks [the currency-issuing banks of major countries] have jointly offered funds to the International Monetary Fund [IMF] which it will lend to central banks that decide they need it to lend to banks within their jurisdiction. This seems arcane to ordinary people who are only conscious that the purchasing power of their wages and/or benefits is going down while credit is getting harder to get and more expensive.Having urged people to borrow on their credit cards and in enlarged mortgages over many years of apparent prosperity, the banks are now notably unaccommodating to families and to small businesses. So if the banks are 'helping' people less, how can it be that they need to borrow more? And why should their central banks - which habitually lend to banks in their countries - want to borrow money from the IMF? If most of the major central banks have money to lend to the IMF, why are they not just lending it to banks in their own territory?
The US Federal Reserve [supported by other central banks] will indirectly give limited but significant support to the euro. International banks have begun to show their lack of confidence in the durability of the euro by selling bonds denominated in euros and buying US dollars and assets denominated in dollars. Despite the deficit on US finances, the size and strength of the US economy can still be trusted; while nobody can say how great would be the chaos that would follow if the euro collapsed. What would French government bonds be worth, in yen or pounds sterling, after a collapse of the euro? Anybody's guess is as good as anybody else's; but most commentators would reckon that French bonds would be worth more than Greek bonds, when most euro-denominated bonds were catastrophically devalued. German bonds might increase in value after a euro collapse; but the whole scenario is beyond anyone's capability accurately to forecast. So governments and central banks have adopted the view that everything must be done to prevent it happening. This is understood to mean that the European Central Bank must have enough dollars to be able to buy enough bonds to keep the market going. If the dollars are made available by the IMF, there will be strings attached: IMF loans are always conditional on the assisted country [or economic union] maintaining agreed economic policies. So the European Central Bank will be required to enforce discipline on member states' governments, or refuse to buy bonds that they have issued and let them be bankrupted. This suits the Germans very well, and worries the French who do not want the European project to be fractured by some of the reckless Club Med states dropping out of the eurozone [and maybe out of the EU as well].
So the new funding via the IMF is another step in the pathetic saga of governments and central banks making up new policy and risking inflationary pressure on the whole economy in order to 'calm the markets'. This determination to propitiate the financial trading corporations - generically known as 'banks' - shows that the governments are still scared by bankers' behaviour.
Yet the banks are created under the company law of individual countries, and are granted licenses to trade in other countries under each nation's laws. Their units of account are currencies issued by the central banks of sovereign states. Sovereign states can give instructions to central banks and central banks could enforce much greater discipline on banks than they have done in the past couple of decades: if that control was applied, and looked like failing, new rules could be imposed by governments. There is a fear that some countries would adopt new rules and others would not [or would apply them in a non-standard way], to their short-term advantage and to the disadvantage of other countries' economists. So there is to be a new round of buying the banks' quiescence while the political negotiations about the future management of the eurozone drag on. The stock markets globally rose on the news: and a superficial, brittle sort of 'confidence' returned; notwithstanding the increased risk of worldwide inflation.
The Chinese central bank took separate synergistic action to increase lending to the faltering manufacturing and property sectors. So the real confidence that has very slightly been increased by the central banks' actions on November 30, 2011 is that the political masters of all the major economies are capable of working together. There is no indication that the beggar-your-neighbour policies that intensified the global depression in the early nineteen thirties will be allowed to emerge. There is a good chance that governments will eventually become scared enough to act on Franklin D Roosevelt's most famous dictum, that "the only thing to fear is fear itself": it is especially true of the fear of bankers, but it seems that things will have to get much worse before the politicians grasp the nettle.
The US Federal Reserve [supported by other central banks] will indirectly give limited but significant support to the euro. International banks have begun to show their lack of confidence in the durability of the euro by selling bonds denominated in euros and buying US dollars and assets denominated in dollars. Despite the deficit on US finances, the size and strength of the US economy can still be trusted; while nobody can say how great would be the chaos that would follow if the euro collapsed. What would French government bonds be worth, in yen or pounds sterling, after a collapse of the euro? Anybody's guess is as good as anybody else's; but most commentators would reckon that French bonds would be worth more than Greek bonds, when most euro-denominated bonds were catastrophically devalued. German bonds might increase in value after a euro collapse; but the whole scenario is beyond anyone's capability accurately to forecast. So governments and central banks have adopted the view that everything must be done to prevent it happening. This is understood to mean that the European Central Bank must have enough dollars to be able to buy enough bonds to keep the market going. If the dollars are made available by the IMF, there will be strings attached: IMF loans are always conditional on the assisted country [or economic union] maintaining agreed economic policies. So the European Central Bank will be required to enforce discipline on member states' governments, or refuse to buy bonds that they have issued and let them be bankrupted. This suits the Germans very well, and worries the French who do not want the European project to be fractured by some of the reckless Club Med states dropping out of the eurozone [and maybe out of the EU as well].
So the new funding via the IMF is another step in the pathetic saga of governments and central banks making up new policy and risking inflationary pressure on the whole economy in order to 'calm the markets'. This determination to propitiate the financial trading corporations - generically known as 'banks' - shows that the governments are still scared by bankers' behaviour.
Yet the banks are created under the company law of individual countries, and are granted licenses to trade in other countries under each nation's laws. Their units of account are currencies issued by the central banks of sovereign states. Sovereign states can give instructions to central banks and central banks could enforce much greater discipline on banks than they have done in the past couple of decades: if that control was applied, and looked like failing, new rules could be imposed by governments. There is a fear that some countries would adopt new rules and others would not [or would apply them in a non-standard way], to their short-term advantage and to the disadvantage of other countries' economists. So there is to be a new round of buying the banks' quiescence while the political negotiations about the future management of the eurozone drag on. The stock markets globally rose on the news: and a superficial, brittle sort of 'confidence' returned; notwithstanding the increased risk of worldwide inflation.
The Chinese central bank took separate synergistic action to increase lending to the faltering manufacturing and property sectors. So the real confidence that has very slightly been increased by the central banks' actions on November 30, 2011 is that the political masters of all the major economies are capable of working together. There is no indication that the beggar-your-neighbour policies that intensified the global depression in the early nineteen thirties will be allowed to emerge. There is a good chance that governments will eventually become scared enough to act on Franklin D Roosevelt's most famous dictum, that "the only thing to fear is fear itself": it is especially true of the fear of bankers, but it seems that things will have to get much worse before the politicians grasp the nettle.
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