It has been a primary axiom of government for millennia that the first duty of a government is to defend itself and its people from enemies who would wish to despoil either the public or the personal assets of the members of the community. This requires maintaining a sufficient police system to keep private individuals safe and secure, and sufficient armed forces, sufficiently well equipped, to secure the position of the nation in the world.
Some states are democratic in nature, some are autocratic; and these differences mean that the means by which governments fulfill their primary duty vary enormously. In Britain, we have been lucky to have a generally democratic and fair system; with a reasonable status among nations: though we now know that these are significantly in danger.
People are decreasingly confident that the system is fair, and that the state has added to the duties of defence and law-and-order the obligations to educate the nation in a fair and sufficient system of schools and higher institutions and the obligation to maintain systems of health provision and social care that meet the recognised needs of an ever-changing population. This past week's budget has again shown the utter failure of a regime of Osbornian austerity to correct the disastrous mistakes of the Thatcherites or the idle complacency of the Blair-Brown era. The promise to patch and mend the schools and the health service, and to ignore [for the time being] the increasingly urgent needs of social care and the police and the military, are generally recognised to be not good enough.
As if to epitomise this situation, the Queen's Guard at Buckingham Palace today will be provided by the Royal Navy. Some beancounters in the Admiralty and the Army have recognised that so many of the navy's submarines and surface ships are stuck in harbour because of poor maintenance and a shortage of sailors and of supplies that some seventy sailors can be scraped together to relieve the pressure on the diminished Household Division.
This is not a vainglorious bleat about Britain's lost glory. It is not even a hint that we should try to restore the Empire. But it is recognition - shared with a significant cohort of Tory MPs - that the cuts in defence are dangerous. The more the police is diminished, set against the terrorist threat, the more the army and the navy may be needed to "come to the aid of the civil power" as substitute police and firefighters. If those troops are not there, the nation is in danger.
Against this argument, the government is bleating that the UK has the biggest defence budget in Europe. So, when did Russia cease to be in Europe? Putin has almost completely rebuilt the front-line Russian forces, replacing the decrepit rabble that Yeltsin left behind and raising national morale hugely. France spends less through the formal military budget than the UK; but by other means it maintains the capability to design and build now warplanes, warships, tanks and guns. Yet again, the excuses that civil servants are supplying to minister to defend the indefensible has become embarrassing. In the twenty-first century, Britain cannot aspire to rule the waves: but we must avoid sinking beneath them.
Showing posts with label Putin. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Putin. Show all posts
Sunday, 26 November 2017
Wednesday, 8 November 2017
China, Russia and Trump
The President of the USA is due to arrive in China today. It has been much heralded as the first great occasion when the newly enhanced President Xi will be able to demonstrate his mastery of the regime and the magnificence of the show that can be put on for Mr Trump.
In the run up to this visit, Trump has been forced to recognise that there is a very longstanding and close alliance between Russia and China. He has admitted that any plan more tightly to contain North Korea depends almost equally on the two powers that have land borders with that 'rogue state'. While China has been the main supplier of essential imports to the Pyongyang regime, Russia has also been a friendly facilitator over many years.
There is little room for doubt that both China and Russia are sorry that North Korea has developed its nuclear capabilities so far that Kim can be bombastic to the USA: and, by implication, a major nuisance to Russia and to China. On the other hand, they have noted both Trump's reciprocal bombast towards Pyongyang and his deeply ambiguous situation in regard to Russia.
As Secretary of State and as a presidential candidate, Hillary Clinton took a high moral stand on Russia's adventurism in the Ukraine, both the Donbass region and Crimea: she was a major influence on the introduction of sanctions that have affected Russia's trade and the general standard of living of the population negatively and [in a few areas] dramatically. Hence, Russia used all the covert means at its disposal [which are vast] to ensure that Trump had the best chance possible in the general election one year ago. It is very doubtful whether the mass of Russian intervention in any way swayed the election result which, like the Brexit vote in the UK, reflected the despair of swathes of US voters at the failure of the economic and social systems to maintain the American Dream in the rustbucket. The sheer originality - which the literati dismiss as the absurdity - of Trump's approach was combined with a deeply instinctive populism to grab people's attention and stimulate the enthusiasm of the 'forgotten people' in pockets right across the USA. It is noteworthy that Bernie Saunders almost hit the same note from a different pitch, in enthusing the metropolitan young: against him Hillary Clinton displayed increasingly platitudinous arrogance, shouting instead of speaking and thus diminishing any impact that her actual sentences might have achieved.
Russia and China have doubtless agreed a common approach to Trump; based on flattery interspersed with spoonfulls of bitter realism. Mr Xi will spend the next couple of days honouring and further educating the US president. President Putin will be in the same room with them in the following days at the pan-Pacific conference, and it is there, rather than Beijing, that any new understanding on how to deal with North Korea will be agreed.
At the end of the Gorbachev years I twice made the [supposedly] direct flight from Moscow to Beijing, which each time made a heavy - unannounced - landing in Novosibirsk. This was necessary because the old Illyushin aircraft could not carry enough fuel for a non-stop journey. Both times the most conspicuous cohort of passengers were people with massive bags full of empty bags; whose business was to buy up whatever consumer goods were available from the new workshop-factories in China and take them back to Moscow in their many bags. They had a hard time with Russian customs on the way home [doubtless lessened by cash handouts when the KGB turned a blind eye] but their trade was highly lucrative. Russia has never facilitated the sort of entrepreneurial activity that enabled China to build up its balance of payments surplus with the industrial west, and is still largely dependent on China to supply the everyday manufactured goods that middle England takes for granted [and which mostly come into Britain from the emergent economies, not least China]. In exchange for this mass of imports - which are no longer imported by individual chancers as they were in the 'nineties - Russia can pay in oil and other materials; and by allowing Chinese firms to become farming contractors, mostly in the far east where the supply of Russian labour and enterprise are most thinly stretched.
Russia and China are hugely and closely inter-dependent all along the longest international border in the world. This interdependence was slightly set back by the extremities of the Cultural Revolution in China, and then by the economic chaos that followed from the collapse of the USSR. But the long northern border of Russia with China - right to the very eastern point of the Asian mainland - remains, even though other former-soviet republics now border China to the west. The two economies are even more closely symbiotic than that of Canada with the USA, and there will be no room for doubt that the briefings given to President Trump will have emphasised the point. To general surprise, 'The Donald' appears to have been paying more attention to his briefings of late than he did in his early days in office. He is to be watched, closely, over both his days in Beijing and in the ensuing wider conference. Great-power politics could well be reshaped; with North Korea as the carcass to be picked over; rather than the existential threat that it appeared to be in White House demonology just a month ago.
In the run up to this visit, Trump has been forced to recognise that there is a very longstanding and close alliance between Russia and China. He has admitted that any plan more tightly to contain North Korea depends almost equally on the two powers that have land borders with that 'rogue state'. While China has been the main supplier of essential imports to the Pyongyang regime, Russia has also been a friendly facilitator over many years.
There is little room for doubt that both China and Russia are sorry that North Korea has developed its nuclear capabilities so far that Kim can be bombastic to the USA: and, by implication, a major nuisance to Russia and to China. On the other hand, they have noted both Trump's reciprocal bombast towards Pyongyang and his deeply ambiguous situation in regard to Russia.
As Secretary of State and as a presidential candidate, Hillary Clinton took a high moral stand on Russia's adventurism in the Ukraine, both the Donbass region and Crimea: she was a major influence on the introduction of sanctions that have affected Russia's trade and the general standard of living of the population negatively and [in a few areas] dramatically. Hence, Russia used all the covert means at its disposal [which are vast] to ensure that Trump had the best chance possible in the general election one year ago. It is very doubtful whether the mass of Russian intervention in any way swayed the election result which, like the Brexit vote in the UK, reflected the despair of swathes of US voters at the failure of the economic and social systems to maintain the American Dream in the rustbucket. The sheer originality - which the literati dismiss as the absurdity - of Trump's approach was combined with a deeply instinctive populism to grab people's attention and stimulate the enthusiasm of the 'forgotten people' in pockets right across the USA. It is noteworthy that Bernie Saunders almost hit the same note from a different pitch, in enthusing the metropolitan young: against him Hillary Clinton displayed increasingly platitudinous arrogance, shouting instead of speaking and thus diminishing any impact that her actual sentences might have achieved.
Russia and China have doubtless agreed a common approach to Trump; based on flattery interspersed with spoonfulls of bitter realism. Mr Xi will spend the next couple of days honouring and further educating the US president. President Putin will be in the same room with them in the following days at the pan-Pacific conference, and it is there, rather than Beijing, that any new understanding on how to deal with North Korea will be agreed.
At the end of the Gorbachev years I twice made the [supposedly] direct flight from Moscow to Beijing, which each time made a heavy - unannounced - landing in Novosibirsk. This was necessary because the old Illyushin aircraft could not carry enough fuel for a non-stop journey. Both times the most conspicuous cohort of passengers were people with massive bags full of empty bags; whose business was to buy up whatever consumer goods were available from the new workshop-factories in China and take them back to Moscow in their many bags. They had a hard time with Russian customs on the way home [doubtless lessened by cash handouts when the KGB turned a blind eye] but their trade was highly lucrative. Russia has never facilitated the sort of entrepreneurial activity that enabled China to build up its balance of payments surplus with the industrial west, and is still largely dependent on China to supply the everyday manufactured goods that middle England takes for granted [and which mostly come into Britain from the emergent economies, not least China]. In exchange for this mass of imports - which are no longer imported by individual chancers as they were in the 'nineties - Russia can pay in oil and other materials; and by allowing Chinese firms to become farming contractors, mostly in the far east where the supply of Russian labour and enterprise are most thinly stretched.
Russia and China are hugely and closely inter-dependent all along the longest international border in the world. This interdependence was slightly set back by the extremities of the Cultural Revolution in China, and then by the economic chaos that followed from the collapse of the USSR. But the long northern border of Russia with China - right to the very eastern point of the Asian mainland - remains, even though other former-soviet republics now border China to the west. The two economies are even more closely symbiotic than that of Canada with the USA, and there will be no room for doubt that the briefings given to President Trump will have emphasised the point. To general surprise, 'The Donald' appears to have been paying more attention to his briefings of late than he did in his early days in office. He is to be watched, closely, over both his days in Beijing and in the ensuing wider conference. Great-power politics could well be reshaped; with North Korea as the carcass to be picked over; rather than the existential threat that it appeared to be in White House demonology just a month ago.
Tuesday, 7 November 2017
Russia Today
Given his origins in St Petersburg which, as Leningrad, had been downgraded and largely left to rot under the Soviet regime; plus his subsequent career in the KGB, I am continually astonished how ably President Vladimir Putin is coping with the massive range of issues and responsibilities that fall on his shoulders.
He succeeded the drunken shell of the once-outstanding Boris Yeltsin, under whose presidency of Russia - just one of the successor states to the collapsed Soviet Union - the crumbling economy had been despoiled and brought to the brink of ruin. Crass and corrupt 'privatisation' [which had supposedly been intended to hand out shares in all major assets to the mass of the people] had enabled the most competent of the former 'fixers' to acquire control of massive corporations and rightly earn the description as 'oligarchs' and as a 'mafia'. Under the Soviet regime, especially when strict Stalinist controls and planning targets were relaxed, the economy was only able to function by factory managers and farm directors operating a massive black market in which clothing and shoes were bartered for industrial output and food, so that the towns' workers could be fed and the oppressed involuntary farmhands shod; while the factories and farms turned in less than their planned output to the official channels of distribution. This huge trade was managed by risk-takers who were occasionally arrested when one of them failed to bribe the local party officials sufficiently, or when some illicit trade became so much of a public scandal in the region where it was perpetrated that action simply had to be taken to restore some credibility to the regime.
The spread of television gave millions of people more awareness of how low the standard of living for hard-working Soviet subjects had become, in comparison to western Europe and the USA. The diffusion of access to telephones allowed millions of people - especially in western Russia, Belarus, the Ukraine, the Baltic Republics [which had slightly better access to knowledge of Scandinavia] and the European satellite states - to begin personal bartering to raise their own standard of living. Swapping knowledge, access to better schools and hospitals, and admission to the queue for buying cars, electrical goods, western records and properly-made jeans. This development of trade went on through the stagnant years of Brezhnev's presidency, and reached such proportions in the early years of Gorbachev's rule that his government took strenuous measures to drive this illicit trade further underground so that the government's plans to develop a real consumer economy might have some chance of success. With the collapse of Gorbachev's regime and into the chaos of the Yeltsin's years, it was only the illicit swap economy that kept most households going. as the formal economy collapsed.
Putin's achievement has been to create something very broadly like a market economy in less than twenty years. This accomplishment has been unprecedented: and it is recognised by the genuine 80%-plus approval rate that the president has received from the Russian population. The many faults of the regime, the corruption and the acts of oppression that are far too common, are well reported in the west. Those are is important aspects of life in modern Russia, which in an ideal world would quickly be rectified: but priorities have to be set, and a broad consensus of the population accepts the sequence that has been adopted.
He succeeded the drunken shell of the once-outstanding Boris Yeltsin, under whose presidency of Russia - just one of the successor states to the collapsed Soviet Union - the crumbling economy had been despoiled and brought to the brink of ruin. Crass and corrupt 'privatisation' [which had supposedly been intended to hand out shares in all major assets to the mass of the people] had enabled the most competent of the former 'fixers' to acquire control of massive corporations and rightly earn the description as 'oligarchs' and as a 'mafia'. Under the Soviet regime, especially when strict Stalinist controls and planning targets were relaxed, the economy was only able to function by factory managers and farm directors operating a massive black market in which clothing and shoes were bartered for industrial output and food, so that the towns' workers could be fed and the oppressed involuntary farmhands shod; while the factories and farms turned in less than their planned output to the official channels of distribution. This huge trade was managed by risk-takers who were occasionally arrested when one of them failed to bribe the local party officials sufficiently, or when some illicit trade became so much of a public scandal in the region where it was perpetrated that action simply had to be taken to restore some credibility to the regime.
The spread of television gave millions of people more awareness of how low the standard of living for hard-working Soviet subjects had become, in comparison to western Europe and the USA. The diffusion of access to telephones allowed millions of people - especially in western Russia, Belarus, the Ukraine, the Baltic Republics [which had slightly better access to knowledge of Scandinavia] and the European satellite states - to begin personal bartering to raise their own standard of living. Swapping knowledge, access to better schools and hospitals, and admission to the queue for buying cars, electrical goods, western records and properly-made jeans. This development of trade went on through the stagnant years of Brezhnev's presidency, and reached such proportions in the early years of Gorbachev's rule that his government took strenuous measures to drive this illicit trade further underground so that the government's plans to develop a real consumer economy might have some chance of success. With the collapse of Gorbachev's regime and into the chaos of the Yeltsin's years, it was only the illicit swap economy that kept most households going. as the formal economy collapsed.
Putin's achievement has been to create something very broadly like a market economy in less than twenty years. This accomplishment has been unprecedented: and it is recognised by the genuine 80%-plus approval rate that the president has received from the Russian population. The many faults of the regime, the corruption and the acts of oppression that are far too common, are well reported in the west. Those are is important aspects of life in modern Russia, which in an ideal world would quickly be rectified: but priorities have to be set, and a broad consensus of the population accepts the sequence that has been adopted.
Saturday, 28 October 2017
The Sovereign Club, Crimea and Catalonia
The Spanish king and his government are adamant that there should be no truck with a purported 'sovereign' administration that has just been announced to exist in the region/province of Catalonia. The United Nations has asserted that a 'solution' should be found within the Spanish Constitution. Washington has declared that Catalonia is simply part of Spain, and that fact will not change in the perception of the United States [which fought a very nasty civil war to preserve their Union]. Britain, France and Germany have made similar assertions: there will be no recognition of a rebel 'government' by any European Union member state.
President Putin deeply deplores the fact that the Gorbachev administration in the last stage of the Soviet Union acted in accordance with the 'Stalin Constitution' which had enshrined the myth that the state was a federation of independent [largely ethnically-based] sovereign republics. This was very particularly Stalin's constitutional speciality. He had been sent to Vienna in the early years of the twentieth century to find out how the Habsburg regime was coping with the question of Nationality in Austria-Hungary. Slovaks and Czechs were asserting that they were distinct national groups, with a right to statehood of their own. Minorities of the population spoke Romanian, Polish, Ukrainian and various forms of German in distinctive territories split between the Kingdom of Hungary and the Austrian Empire [and the latter contained a massive range of entities from the Kingdom of Bohemia to small counties that were notionally sovereign]. The heir to the throne [Franz Ferdinand, who was to be killed in 1914 thus triggering the war that ended the monarchy] was said to want to change the 'dual monarchy' of Austria-Hungary into a 'trial' [or triple] monarchy with autonomy for the Slavs, in deference to his Czech wife.
Stalin produced a convoluted account of his thoughts on nationality, and after the revolution he was appointed Commissar for Nationalities. As the Soviet Union consolidated its absolute power over all the former Russian Empire, except Finland, it did not matter that a constitutional charade was enacted whereby the political entity was asserted to be a federation of notionally independent states. However, come the end of the Second World War, in their anxiety to keep Stalin on-side with the new United Nations, Britain, France and the USA agreed that three of the Soviet republics should each be independent members: Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. After Stalin's death, Khrushchev - a Ukrainian - almost casually transferred the Crimea from Russia to Ukraine: it did not seem to matter, at the time. The facts that the Crimea had been hard fought for under Peter the Great and Catherine II, and was seen as strategically important, did not cause any controversy while the USSR was operated as a single hegemonic state.
However, suddenly in 1990, the USSR collapsed; while the Communist party stooges who held office as the presidents and premiers of the various [formally fully sovereign] Socialist Republics simply colluded to ignore Gorbachev and his collapsing central authority and go their own ways. The largest component of the Union, Russia, had the charismatic Boris Yeltsin on hand to crush a half-cock attempt by party old hands to reverse all the democratic changes that Gorbachev had instituted: and as head of the Russian Republic's government Yeltsin established his hold over the biggest and most complex Soviet Socialist Republic; thus of Moscow. A notional federation was established of the former Soviet Republics, while the asserted sovereign authority in each of them began doling out the national assets to their families and friends. The Russian Republic itself became the Russian Federation including all the Autonomous Republics and Regions that Russia has inherited from Stalin's manipulations of notional boundaries. Yeltsin and his associates employed American Economists to assist them with a hugely corrupt and corrupting 'privatisation', which transferred much of industry to the hands of the so-called 'oligarchs' and caused massive deprivation to the mass of the population.
Putin's rise to power came after the damage derived from Stalin's constitutional machinations and Yeltsin's alcoholic incompetence had been done. In territorial terms, he has tried to rectify what he sees as two major failures: the transfer of the Crimea to Ukraine and the welfare of millions of Russians whose families were settled in the southern and eastern Ukraine, particularly in the reigns of Peter I, Catherine II and Stalin's post-1945 implant of Russian speakers into territory known as 'New Russia' that he had assigned to Ukraine. Stalin planted similar minorities of Russians in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; which has ensured that those countries have become very keen members of NATO in order to preserve their territorial integrity. Putin's attempts to make minor revisions of Stalin's and Khrushchev's cavalier actions, at the expense of Ukraine, have placed him under sanction by the western powers, who have set their faces against all tinkering with the pattern of states that was admitted to the United Nations in 1945 and subsequently. I have drawn attention previously to the idiocy of keeping the colonial frontiers in Africa: but they are also part of the stasis that goes with the present, deeply flawed concept of sovereignty.
East Germany was allowed to vanish into West Germany, and an independent Scotland arising from due democratic process would have gained international acceptance: provided it had been set on the international stage by the United Kingdom government acting as its sponsor.
On the other hand, if the Chechens declared themselves independent of the Russian Federation, President Putin could call on the UN to help him to suppress such pretension; at least, with verbal assurances such as have been given to Spain in respect of Catalonia.
The Catalans are having an exciting game; but they need to learn from history, quickly; before hotheads start getting hurt.
President Putin deeply deplores the fact that the Gorbachev administration in the last stage of the Soviet Union acted in accordance with the 'Stalin Constitution' which had enshrined the myth that the state was a federation of independent [largely ethnically-based] sovereign republics. This was very particularly Stalin's constitutional speciality. He had been sent to Vienna in the early years of the twentieth century to find out how the Habsburg regime was coping with the question of Nationality in Austria-Hungary. Slovaks and Czechs were asserting that they were distinct national groups, with a right to statehood of their own. Minorities of the population spoke Romanian, Polish, Ukrainian and various forms of German in distinctive territories split between the Kingdom of Hungary and the Austrian Empire [and the latter contained a massive range of entities from the Kingdom of Bohemia to small counties that were notionally sovereign]. The heir to the throne [Franz Ferdinand, who was to be killed in 1914 thus triggering the war that ended the monarchy] was said to want to change the 'dual monarchy' of Austria-Hungary into a 'trial' [or triple] monarchy with autonomy for the Slavs, in deference to his Czech wife.
Stalin produced a convoluted account of his thoughts on nationality, and after the revolution he was appointed Commissar for Nationalities. As the Soviet Union consolidated its absolute power over all the former Russian Empire, except Finland, it did not matter that a constitutional charade was enacted whereby the political entity was asserted to be a federation of notionally independent states. However, come the end of the Second World War, in their anxiety to keep Stalin on-side with the new United Nations, Britain, France and the USA agreed that three of the Soviet republics should each be independent members: Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. After Stalin's death, Khrushchev - a Ukrainian - almost casually transferred the Crimea from Russia to Ukraine: it did not seem to matter, at the time. The facts that the Crimea had been hard fought for under Peter the Great and Catherine II, and was seen as strategically important, did not cause any controversy while the USSR was operated as a single hegemonic state.
However, suddenly in 1990, the USSR collapsed; while the Communist party stooges who held office as the presidents and premiers of the various [formally fully sovereign] Socialist Republics simply colluded to ignore Gorbachev and his collapsing central authority and go their own ways. The largest component of the Union, Russia, had the charismatic Boris Yeltsin on hand to crush a half-cock attempt by party old hands to reverse all the democratic changes that Gorbachev had instituted: and as head of the Russian Republic's government Yeltsin established his hold over the biggest and most complex Soviet Socialist Republic; thus of Moscow. A notional federation was established of the former Soviet Republics, while the asserted sovereign authority in each of them began doling out the national assets to their families and friends. The Russian Republic itself became the Russian Federation including all the Autonomous Republics and Regions that Russia has inherited from Stalin's manipulations of notional boundaries. Yeltsin and his associates employed American Economists to assist them with a hugely corrupt and corrupting 'privatisation', which transferred much of industry to the hands of the so-called 'oligarchs' and caused massive deprivation to the mass of the population.
Putin's rise to power came after the damage derived from Stalin's constitutional machinations and Yeltsin's alcoholic incompetence had been done. In territorial terms, he has tried to rectify what he sees as two major failures: the transfer of the Crimea to Ukraine and the welfare of millions of Russians whose families were settled in the southern and eastern Ukraine, particularly in the reigns of Peter I, Catherine II and Stalin's post-1945 implant of Russian speakers into territory known as 'New Russia' that he had assigned to Ukraine. Stalin planted similar minorities of Russians in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; which has ensured that those countries have become very keen members of NATO in order to preserve their territorial integrity. Putin's attempts to make minor revisions of Stalin's and Khrushchev's cavalier actions, at the expense of Ukraine, have placed him under sanction by the western powers, who have set their faces against all tinkering with the pattern of states that was admitted to the United Nations in 1945 and subsequently. I have drawn attention previously to the idiocy of keeping the colonial frontiers in Africa: but they are also part of the stasis that goes with the present, deeply flawed concept of sovereignty.
East Germany was allowed to vanish into West Germany, and an independent Scotland arising from due democratic process would have gained international acceptance: provided it had been set on the international stage by the United Kingdom government acting as its sponsor.
On the other hand, if the Chechens declared themselves independent of the Russian Federation, President Putin could call on the UN to help him to suppress such pretension; at least, with verbal assurances such as have been given to Spain in respect of Catalonia.
The Catalans are having an exciting game; but they need to learn from history, quickly; before hotheads start getting hurt.
Friday, 20 October 2017
Ecological Disaster
Almost certainly, the most important news from Europe this week is the result of a long-term study of insect life in the German countryside. This has shown that over the last 30 years - an incredibly short period in evolutionary terms - up to 84% of the TOTAL of insect life, over almost all species, has declined when the incidence of creatures is counted at the peak of the summer [when the populations of most insects should be at the highest level].
The importance of insects in the crop cycle for most plant types has been recognised by humans for millennia, and it has been re-emphasised as the population of bees has declined over recent decades with a whole series of diseases and alien species destroying the populations of hives and also the survival and reproduction of solitary bees. That this catastrophe has befallen almost all European insects in a very short period is truly alarming. Insects and plants have evolved symbiotically over millions of years; and mammals are utterly dependent on that symbiosis for their foods.
The culprits are well recognised, especially a small range of herbicides and insecticides that are used in massive quantities - particularly in Europe - with the desired effect of protecting crops in the short term. The lobbies for these substances to be banned will grow larger and louder from now on, with many farmers joining in as the risk to pollination of their crops hits their pockets.When the necessary measures have belatedly been taken, nature will almost certainly act as it usually has, and provide the climatic and other conditions in which populations can rebuild themselves quickly. But it may not work that way: the ecological disaster may already have gone so far that the spaces left by the vanished insects could be taken up by alien species that do not support the main farmed crops, and present health hazards to human beings.
There have been many, crystal clear warnings from various ecological pressure groups, not least the ludicrously-named 'organic' movement [who ever saw an inorganic cabbage?], and they have been ignored. The German data are incontrovertible, and are largely replicated across the continent: so something most be done, and will be done, and things may just turn out all right.
A parallel crisis has been reported from the mass use of antibiotics in cattle and other mammalian species of farmed animals and in zoos: the powerful chemicals become dispersed in the waterways and thus return to the life-cycle of which humans are a part: accelerating the rate at which viruses and bacteria evolve to counteract the effects of the drugs on their own ecology. The British medical establishment has warned that when the rate of evolution of bacterial and virological resistance to antibiotics outpaces the development of new and replacement antibiotics, it will become unsafe to perform almost any form of surgery. I include viruses alongside bacteria here because it has become common to give antibiotics to people experiencing virological attacks because in many cases patients find it has a placebo effect: thus they demand antibiotics and doctors often succumb to such demands in order to avoid complaints from patients. This matter has been presented to the media for several years, and the impact of the message has somewhat been muted by the development of more advanced antibiotics; but there is no assurance that the pharmacologists will continue to outpace the evolution of bacteria, and it is irrational for people to assume that science will always triumph.
There is nothing new in the reported decline of insect species: the decline in several bird species has been associated with the decline of their prey for several decades. But nothing adequate has been done about it, and now the 'eleventh hour' has passed and Europe is in the twelfth hour. This is a far more massive challenge than Islam, Jihad, populism, Putin or Trump: and it cannot be avoided.
The importance of insects in the crop cycle for most plant types has been recognised by humans for millennia, and it has been re-emphasised as the population of bees has declined over recent decades with a whole series of diseases and alien species destroying the populations of hives and also the survival and reproduction of solitary bees. That this catastrophe has befallen almost all European insects in a very short period is truly alarming. Insects and plants have evolved symbiotically over millions of years; and mammals are utterly dependent on that symbiosis for their foods.
The culprits are well recognised, especially a small range of herbicides and insecticides that are used in massive quantities - particularly in Europe - with the desired effect of protecting crops in the short term. The lobbies for these substances to be banned will grow larger and louder from now on, with many farmers joining in as the risk to pollination of their crops hits their pockets.When the necessary measures have belatedly been taken, nature will almost certainly act as it usually has, and provide the climatic and other conditions in which populations can rebuild themselves quickly. But it may not work that way: the ecological disaster may already have gone so far that the spaces left by the vanished insects could be taken up by alien species that do not support the main farmed crops, and present health hazards to human beings.
There have been many, crystal clear warnings from various ecological pressure groups, not least the ludicrously-named 'organic' movement [who ever saw an inorganic cabbage?], and they have been ignored. The German data are incontrovertible, and are largely replicated across the continent: so something most be done, and will be done, and things may just turn out all right.
A parallel crisis has been reported from the mass use of antibiotics in cattle and other mammalian species of farmed animals and in zoos: the powerful chemicals become dispersed in the waterways and thus return to the life-cycle of which humans are a part: accelerating the rate at which viruses and bacteria evolve to counteract the effects of the drugs on their own ecology. The British medical establishment has warned that when the rate of evolution of bacterial and virological resistance to antibiotics outpaces the development of new and replacement antibiotics, it will become unsafe to perform almost any form of surgery. I include viruses alongside bacteria here because it has become common to give antibiotics to people experiencing virological attacks because in many cases patients find it has a placebo effect: thus they demand antibiotics and doctors often succumb to such demands in order to avoid complaints from patients. This matter has been presented to the media for several years, and the impact of the message has somewhat been muted by the development of more advanced antibiotics; but there is no assurance that the pharmacologists will continue to outpace the evolution of bacteria, and it is irrational for people to assume that science will always triumph.
There is nothing new in the reported decline of insect species: the decline in several bird species has been associated with the decline of their prey for several decades. But nothing adequate has been done about it, and now the 'eleventh hour' has passed and Europe is in the twelfth hour. This is a far more massive challenge than Islam, Jihad, populism, Putin or Trump: and it cannot be avoided.
Sunday, 3 September 2017
North Korea: Utter Pointlessness
Stalin argued throughout his political career that all the privations that his regime placed on tens of millions of of people, and the punishments and penalties inflicted on millions, were all necessary impositions on the route towards creating a better society than humanity had ever provided in the past. It is impossible to know how much he believed it at the successive phases of his career, but there are many metres-length of the books in which his writings and speeches were recorded, still lying in the deeper stacks of many libraries. He spent a huge amount of his time giving massive speeches, writing for the press, and producing ideological tomes: and there is good reason to believe that most of this output is genuinely his own. He was obsessively concerned that the gulags and the torture chambers served a positive purpose: and many intelligent and able people believed him; or, at least, were prepared to acquiesce in both his regime and his ideology.
No such motivation has been claimed for the North Korean dictator, who was pictured yesterday 'inspecting' what was said to be a hydrogen bomb that was capable of being fitted into an existing model of ballistic missile. Then, within hours, seismologists were announcing that there had been an earth tremor under North Korea that was consistent with a deeply buried nuclear weapon test.
The immense achievement in such a deprived country making such weaponry is quite extraordinary. It is built on three generations of enslaving the people both physically and mentally, while the regime has steadily built up its destructive capabilities. Russia and China are two of the countries that have land borders with North Korea, so there can be no doubt that the threat of nuclear attack can apply to them as well as to South Korea. Yet it is the USA, and to a much lesser extent Japan, that are most obviously threatened, along with South Korea.
Hereditary dictator Kim III has never pretended to any idealistic objective. No attempt is made to mitigate the appalling living conditions in which his half-starved subjects are made to conduct their lives. The Chinese have continued in broad terms to support his continuance in power, as have the Russians: President Xi and President Putin would probably very much rather not have this troublesome neighbour plaguing them, but they do nothing materially to weaken him.
Diplomats and experts on world affairs, in large numbers, assert that North Korea's weapons buildup is intended to force the US [and, by implication, its dependencies and allies] to enter into talks with the regime. The object of such talks would be blackmail: Kim would [so the peaceniks say] agree somehow to 'neutralise' his weapons in return for assurances that he, and presumably Kim IV and Kim V in due course, would continue to hold his power and access the west's luxury goods for himself and his courtiers. Perpetual immunity to enjoy power, and to oppress the millions of his subjects, is an utterly squalid objective. There is no idealistic pretence about it, as there was about the Chinese cultural revolution and even Hitler's gas chambers.
This is a new step towards a deeper hell than terror states have ever achieved before. It is highly dangerous. China presumably wishes that the rogue regime had been killed off a few decades ago, but the clock cannot be turned back. The Chinese are glad that the maniac's target is the USA and not the Han mainland, but given the instability of the situation in Pyongyang, Beijing must be more acutely worried by the nuisance neighbour as his destructive capability is developed. This is a world problem; but the world's institutions do not have any answer to it: and Mr Trump is on the front line.
No such motivation has been claimed for the North Korean dictator, who was pictured yesterday 'inspecting' what was said to be a hydrogen bomb that was capable of being fitted into an existing model of ballistic missile. Then, within hours, seismologists were announcing that there had been an earth tremor under North Korea that was consistent with a deeply buried nuclear weapon test.
The immense achievement in such a deprived country making such weaponry is quite extraordinary. It is built on three generations of enslaving the people both physically and mentally, while the regime has steadily built up its destructive capabilities. Russia and China are two of the countries that have land borders with North Korea, so there can be no doubt that the threat of nuclear attack can apply to them as well as to South Korea. Yet it is the USA, and to a much lesser extent Japan, that are most obviously threatened, along with South Korea.
Hereditary dictator Kim III has never pretended to any idealistic objective. No attempt is made to mitigate the appalling living conditions in which his half-starved subjects are made to conduct their lives. The Chinese have continued in broad terms to support his continuance in power, as have the Russians: President Xi and President Putin would probably very much rather not have this troublesome neighbour plaguing them, but they do nothing materially to weaken him.
Diplomats and experts on world affairs, in large numbers, assert that North Korea's weapons buildup is intended to force the US [and, by implication, its dependencies and allies] to enter into talks with the regime. The object of such talks would be blackmail: Kim would [so the peaceniks say] agree somehow to 'neutralise' his weapons in return for assurances that he, and presumably Kim IV and Kim V in due course, would continue to hold his power and access the west's luxury goods for himself and his courtiers. Perpetual immunity to enjoy power, and to oppress the millions of his subjects, is an utterly squalid objective. There is no idealistic pretence about it, as there was about the Chinese cultural revolution and even Hitler's gas chambers.
This is a new step towards a deeper hell than terror states have ever achieved before. It is highly dangerous. China presumably wishes that the rogue regime had been killed off a few decades ago, but the clock cannot be turned back. The Chinese are glad that the maniac's target is the USA and not the Han mainland, but given the instability of the situation in Pyongyang, Beijing must be more acutely worried by the nuisance neighbour as his destructive capability is developed. This is a world problem; but the world's institutions do not have any answer to it: and Mr Trump is on the front line.
Tuesday, 29 August 2017
All Quiet on the Eastern Front?
A North Korean ballistic missile was fired yesterday, whose trajectory went over the centre of Japan before it was ditched in the Pacific Ocean to the east of Japan. This was a hugely provocative act: yet the Japanese stock market was unaffected by the news: the main index fell by less than 100 points,and that can be attributed to a number of minor technical adjustments within the market. There is no reason to think that the news story had an impact on the market.
Japanese ministers again mentioned the possibility of reviewing defence policy, which has been constrained since 1945 by the terms of the treaties that followed the Japanese surrender at the end of the Second World War; but no immediate action was taken.
Commentators on the world's stock markets have felt the need to comment on this lack of any response in the level of stock and share prices to a significant demonstration of the rogue state's rapidly developing power to attack its neighbours, which is regarded as, a side-issue to its plan to develop the capability to attack the continental USA. The general view is that the main markets [in the the Americas, in Europe including the UK, and in Asia] are all in a euphoric condition, carried ever-forward by the massive creation of 'money' by the central banks over the past decade. The cautious withdrawal of the policies by which the capitalist system was 'saved' in 2008-9, by the US Federal Reserve over recent months has not affected that highly positive set of conditions for dealers and players in the global market.
Two other factors are in play. The first is, that if there were to be any direct action by the USA or by any other threatened power against North Korea the consequences would be calamitous and totally unpredictable. The possibilities of a thermonuclear response by North Korea to an attack by the US Air Force, using high explosives in an attempt to destroy buried facilities are so enormous that nobody can assess the effects that would ensue: so the possibility cannot be factored in to stock market price adjustments. The second factor is that governments in the region appear to assume that the Chinese have the power forcibly to 'discipline' North Korea, and would use it, if they judged that the situation really needed it.
Inevitably, it has already been announced that the United Nations Security Council will meet this afternoon, for another session of tut-tutting and to allow the main players to make their positions even clearer and for the North Koreans to say - as ever - that they do not care what the UN says or does.
North Korea has land borders with South Korea, China and Russia. North Korea was created by Stalin's USSR, before the Peoples' Republic of China was established. The position of Russia in relation to North Korea is no less important now than it was in 1950 at the time of the Korean War. Though Chinese troops rather than Soviet forces actually entered the land war, the supplies for the Communist side came from the USSR. It is inconceivable that Mr Putin is not hugely influential in Pyongyang, though the connection is downplayed in the public discussion of the matter; and lazy commentators have taken the view that the North Korean dictator pays little attention to Russia. It will be very important to take note of exactly what the Russian delegate says in the Security Council today: the nuance will matter. The state of US-Russian relations is important in what happens in North Korea, and pretty well the whole of the US political system is in a dangerously anti-Russian frame of mind at present. This does not play out in the calculations of the world's stock markets, but it is a factor not to be forgotten
Japanese ministers again mentioned the possibility of reviewing defence policy, which has been constrained since 1945 by the terms of the treaties that followed the Japanese surrender at the end of the Second World War; but no immediate action was taken.
Commentators on the world's stock markets have felt the need to comment on this lack of any response in the level of stock and share prices to a significant demonstration of the rogue state's rapidly developing power to attack its neighbours, which is regarded as, a side-issue to its plan to develop the capability to attack the continental USA. The general view is that the main markets [in the the Americas, in Europe including the UK, and in Asia] are all in a euphoric condition, carried ever-forward by the massive creation of 'money' by the central banks over the past decade. The cautious withdrawal of the policies by which the capitalist system was 'saved' in 2008-9, by the US Federal Reserve over recent months has not affected that highly positive set of conditions for dealers and players in the global market.
Two other factors are in play. The first is, that if there were to be any direct action by the USA or by any other threatened power against North Korea the consequences would be calamitous and totally unpredictable. The possibilities of a thermonuclear response by North Korea to an attack by the US Air Force, using high explosives in an attempt to destroy buried facilities are so enormous that nobody can assess the effects that would ensue: so the possibility cannot be factored in to stock market price adjustments. The second factor is that governments in the region appear to assume that the Chinese have the power forcibly to 'discipline' North Korea, and would use it, if they judged that the situation really needed it.
Inevitably, it has already been announced that the United Nations Security Council will meet this afternoon, for another session of tut-tutting and to allow the main players to make their positions even clearer and for the North Koreans to say - as ever - that they do not care what the UN says or does.
North Korea has land borders with South Korea, China and Russia. North Korea was created by Stalin's USSR, before the Peoples' Republic of China was established. The position of Russia in relation to North Korea is no less important now than it was in 1950 at the time of the Korean War. Though Chinese troops rather than Soviet forces actually entered the land war, the supplies for the Communist side came from the USSR. It is inconceivable that Mr Putin is not hugely influential in Pyongyang, though the connection is downplayed in the public discussion of the matter; and lazy commentators have taken the view that the North Korean dictator pays little attention to Russia. It will be very important to take note of exactly what the Russian delegate says in the Security Council today: the nuance will matter. The state of US-Russian relations is important in what happens in North Korea, and pretty well the whole of the US political system is in a dangerously anti-Russian frame of mind at present. This does not play out in the calculations of the world's stock markets, but it is a factor not to be forgotten
Monday, 29 May 2017
Putin Near Paris
President Putin is today due to visit France, where he will open an exhibition on Franco-Russian relations over three centuries and have lunch with President Macron in a house once lent to Peter the Great of Russia during his study-tour of western Europe.
Macron will go into the meeting with a list of conversational objectives, all of which will be to some extent constrained by his commitment to the European Union. The French president's smirk during last week's Trump tirade against those members of NATO who under-provide for their defence spending will have been copied into Putin's file; together with a reminder that France [unlike the UK] has a truly independent capability to deliver nuclear weapons. Britain's nuclear missiles are under joint American-UK control; France's are entirely at the disposal of M Macron. This alone makes France a 'power', and the commitment that Macron has expressed to a closer EU must be set alongside that independent capability. France is also one of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, which alone will justify the two presidents comparing their positions on the major global issues that have recently been on the Council's agenda, and those that might appear there soon.
France was, in effect, the colonial power over Syria from 1919 to the nineteen-fifties, under the Franco-British carve-up of the Arab lands that were separated from the Ottoman Empire as a result of the First World War. More recently, France has played little active part in the awful war in Syria, as the Russian commitment to the Assad regime has been increasing. France has huge background knowledge and understanding of the country, and the opinion of the French establishment [of which Macron is a selected product] may be helpful to Putin as he looks through the murk that is deepening in Syria as Trump appears to be more willing to take more military action against Assad. France's role in helping to keep the EU states [and NATO, as such] out of that conflict can be useful to Putin; and reinforcing the pressure for a benign neutrality of 'Europe' towards Russia will be well worth the visit.
Closer to home, for Putin, are the questions of Ukraine and Crimea. France has supported the NATO and EU policies of utter opposition to the recent Russian seizure of the Crimea, including the imposition of sanctions. The French economy has suffered slightly from the loss of trade with Russia that has resulted from the sanctions; and gained no benefit from them. There may be time in the two presidents' wide-ranging discussion to exchange hints on how that standoff could be resolved.
Russia regards Ukraine as an integral part of a single homeland. Kiev, now the Ukrainian capital, was the centre of the first city-state that grew into Russia. Moscow [the Grand Duchy of Muscovy] is a much more recent development; and deep in Russian history and sentiment are the sense that Moscow and Kiev belong together in a single state. The fact that the people who speak Ukrainian were abominably brutalised during Stalin's collectivisation of agriculture made many of them willing, at first, to welcome the German invaders in 1942 as liberators. Within a year most people recognised their mistake: the racist brutality of the Nazis exceeded even what Stalin's police had imposed, and thus the eventual Soviet victory was welcomed; at first. Then the Communist regime imported ethnic Russians who had been made homeless by the war to rebuild the shattered industrial cities, especially in the Donbas, adding linguistic complexity to the situation within the Soviet Republic of Ukraine [which, along with Belarussia was a given a separate seat in the UN, alongside Russia, as an inducement for Stalin to join the organisation]. The separate soviet republics had no independent power anyway, until the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics simply fell apart when Gorbachev lost his grip. Then the former soviet republics gained international recognition as sovereign states, as that term was generally understood in international law. Colonel Putin and his colleagues in the KGB watched, aghast, as the Baltic states, the Balkan states, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and even Putin's former workplace East Germany joined NATO and applied to be admitted to the EU.
While Belarus was consolidated as a puppet state to Russia, Ukraine made attempts to establish itself as a significant, independent European power; but fell prey to corruption, faction and alien interference. Russia would like the Ukraine to form a close federating with Russia, accepting Russian foreign and defence policy. France has joined with its allies in opposing Russian attempts to push that situation along. There is every reason to expect that Putin will push Macron to take a more pragmatic view of the Ukrainian [and thus the Crimean] situation than have his predecessors; and it would be interesting to know what quid-pro-quo Putin is able to offer France on that delicate topic.
Macron will go into the meeting with a list of conversational objectives, all of which will be to some extent constrained by his commitment to the European Union. The French president's smirk during last week's Trump tirade against those members of NATO who under-provide for their defence spending will have been copied into Putin's file; together with a reminder that France [unlike the UK] has a truly independent capability to deliver nuclear weapons. Britain's nuclear missiles are under joint American-UK control; France's are entirely at the disposal of M Macron. This alone makes France a 'power', and the commitment that Macron has expressed to a closer EU must be set alongside that independent capability. France is also one of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, which alone will justify the two presidents comparing their positions on the major global issues that have recently been on the Council's agenda, and those that might appear there soon.
France was, in effect, the colonial power over Syria from 1919 to the nineteen-fifties, under the Franco-British carve-up of the Arab lands that were separated from the Ottoman Empire as a result of the First World War. More recently, France has played little active part in the awful war in Syria, as the Russian commitment to the Assad regime has been increasing. France has huge background knowledge and understanding of the country, and the opinion of the French establishment [of which Macron is a selected product] may be helpful to Putin as he looks through the murk that is deepening in Syria as Trump appears to be more willing to take more military action against Assad. France's role in helping to keep the EU states [and NATO, as such] out of that conflict can be useful to Putin; and reinforcing the pressure for a benign neutrality of 'Europe' towards Russia will be well worth the visit.
Closer to home, for Putin, are the questions of Ukraine and Crimea. France has supported the NATO and EU policies of utter opposition to the recent Russian seizure of the Crimea, including the imposition of sanctions. The French economy has suffered slightly from the loss of trade with Russia that has resulted from the sanctions; and gained no benefit from them. There may be time in the two presidents' wide-ranging discussion to exchange hints on how that standoff could be resolved.
Russia regards Ukraine as an integral part of a single homeland. Kiev, now the Ukrainian capital, was the centre of the first city-state that grew into Russia. Moscow [the Grand Duchy of Muscovy] is a much more recent development; and deep in Russian history and sentiment are the sense that Moscow and Kiev belong together in a single state. The fact that the people who speak Ukrainian were abominably brutalised during Stalin's collectivisation of agriculture made many of them willing, at first, to welcome the German invaders in 1942 as liberators. Within a year most people recognised their mistake: the racist brutality of the Nazis exceeded even what Stalin's police had imposed, and thus the eventual Soviet victory was welcomed; at first. Then the Communist regime imported ethnic Russians who had been made homeless by the war to rebuild the shattered industrial cities, especially in the Donbas, adding linguistic complexity to the situation within the Soviet Republic of Ukraine [which, along with Belarussia was a given a separate seat in the UN, alongside Russia, as an inducement for Stalin to join the organisation]. The separate soviet republics had no independent power anyway, until the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics simply fell apart when Gorbachev lost his grip. Then the former soviet republics gained international recognition as sovereign states, as that term was generally understood in international law. Colonel Putin and his colleagues in the KGB watched, aghast, as the Baltic states, the Balkan states, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and even Putin's former workplace East Germany joined NATO and applied to be admitted to the EU.
While Belarus was consolidated as a puppet state to Russia, Ukraine made attempts to establish itself as a significant, independent European power; but fell prey to corruption, faction and alien interference. Russia would like the Ukraine to form a close federating with Russia, accepting Russian foreign and defence policy. France has joined with its allies in opposing Russian attempts to push that situation along. There is every reason to expect that Putin will push Macron to take a more pragmatic view of the Ukrainian [and thus the Crimean] situation than have his predecessors; and it would be interesting to know what quid-pro-quo Putin is able to offer France on that delicate topic.
Friday, 23 March 2012
Mismanaging News
George Osborne has committed a major gaffe in public relations, by describing his biggest tax 'raid' in this year's Budget as a mere simplification of the tax system. The resentment that this has set in train will mature slowly, and be disastrous for the man's image and for his party. Meanwhile, in the twenty-four hours since he made the cock-up he has resorted to an item of crude propaganda. In the tradition of Potemkin, Stalin and Putin, his sycophants have arranged with Glaxo Smithkline to announce their decision to extend factories in the UK on Budget Day, and even to say that decisions in the Budget were favourable to the decision. Osborne touted his sneer around the TV and radio studios to extol the great investment, and suggest that it was vastly more important than the granny tax.
The company's plans must have been in train for many months. It would have been outrageously improper if the Treasury had shared their plans for setting rates of corporation tax with the company over that period. The actual reasons for the Glaxo decision British manufacturing is becoming 'affordable' again to international companies, as has been evident over many months past in the motor and fashion industries. The company owns sites and has infrastructure with skilled staff around the UK. It will be easier and possibly cheaper to invest in the UK, with or without tinkering the tax system. One can speculate what inducement was offered to the company to arrange its announcement to coincide with Budget Day, but it was probably trivial.
Osborne used the same trick a few weeks earlier, when he grabbed for his own publicity machine the announcement that a Chinese Wealth Fund was buying a block of shares in Thames Water. This transaction had been arranged as a business deal over some months but the announcement was arranged to coincide with the Chancellor's 'triumphant' return from a nugatory visit to China. There was no correlation between the visit and the deal: the announcement was crude propaganda. Such are the standards and practices that impress the current crop of puerile politicians: indeed a country gets the government that it deserves!
The company's plans must have been in train for many months. It would have been outrageously improper if the Treasury had shared their plans for setting rates of corporation tax with the company over that period. The actual reasons for the Glaxo decision British manufacturing is becoming 'affordable' again to international companies, as has been evident over many months past in the motor and fashion industries. The company owns sites and has infrastructure with skilled staff around the UK. It will be easier and possibly cheaper to invest in the UK, with or without tinkering the tax system. One can speculate what inducement was offered to the company to arrange its announcement to coincide with Budget Day, but it was probably trivial.
Osborne used the same trick a few weeks earlier, when he grabbed for his own publicity machine the announcement that a Chinese Wealth Fund was buying a block of shares in Thames Water. This transaction had been arranged as a business deal over some months but the announcement was arranged to coincide with the Chancellor's 'triumphant' return from a nugatory visit to China. There was no correlation between the visit and the deal: the announcement was crude propaganda. Such are the standards and practices that impress the current crop of puerile politicians: indeed a country gets the government that it deserves!
Sunday, 11 March 2012
Why Should Putin Cheat
The great paradox of the current situation in Russia is that Vladimir Putin's rating in the opinion polls declines as the accusations increase that he had arranged a massive manipulation of last year's parliamentary election and the recent presidential election. More and more evidence has been presented, some describe the most blatant vote stuffing, impersonation and non-identification of voters. Despite immense publicity, videocameras in polling stations, and the emergence of an army of 'observers' equipped with up-to-the-minute ICT, examples of the most idiotic visible breaches of the simple rules for the conduct of polling stations were reported in the presidential poll.
The great question in the western media has been; how stupid is this man? How arogant is he? Certainly his self-publicity shows a degree of hubris and of contempt for intellectual opponents. He and his cohorts do not seem to have recognised the profundity of the change in the Russian intelligentsia that has been facilitated by contemporary technology. Classically the Russian intellectual isolated himself in an unheated garret, with insufficient food, while he produced elaborate prose about issues that were imprecisely defined. His contemporary successor thrives in crowds and thinks in the cloud, the blogosphere. The new intellectual feels strength in numbers and reassurance in white ribbons - coincidentally the colour of the old regime's hopeless fightback against the Bolshevik revolution..
I reckon that the explanation for the 'cheating' by Putin's cohorts is much more simple. There is no sense of 'civil service' in Russia. People randomly survived - often well - as servants of the party, when the state was subordinate to the party. Then came the collapse of the Soviet Union and the effectual evanescence of the Communist Party. The military stayed in being, and so did the security services: the notorious KGB. Putin was quite a minor officer in that immense service but as all institutions collapsed those who had been verified insiders were accepted by an informal network as 'one of us'. Ex-KGB officers will not welcome the analogy [though most of them are bright enough to accept it] that the reputed ODESSA network that spirited SS personnel out of Europe in the later nineteen forties was replicated - without attribution - by the KGB after 1990. Such a network brought Putin to the Presidency, as Yeltsin collapsed into alcoholic incoherence.
.
Thereafter, all those officials across the whole of that vast country who had lost their directive from a 'centre' still knew very well how to ensure that 'advice' from Moscow were implemented at the local level. They enthusiastically supported Putin in a notionally-contested election, using the methods that had been routine in the Brezhnev era. They have simply carried on doing what had been done for more than half a century. They don't need to be told to stuff ballot boxes: they would find it strange to be told not so to do. The new city-slicker tactic of bussing selected voters from polling station to polling station is new, a product of affluence [and an indication that the regime is slightly fazed by democracy] that was easily spotted by dissidents toting mobile-phone cameras.
It would probably have been impossible for Putin to make all the officials who were responsible for the conduct of elections behave as if they were the Town Clerk of Walmington-on-Sea, who was pompously obsessed to serve democracy without partiality. Putin probably welcomed the assurance of winning successive elections that the soviet tradition gave to him in thousands of polling stations, but it is more likely than not that he did not ask for it. Plenty of crass examples of ballot-rigging have been collected by the opposition, but I would be astonished there was any trail of evidence that took the inauguration of such gerrymandering back to Putin personally, or to his immediate circle. When a country has been corrupted utterly for more than half a century, as was the USSR, officials learn to guess what 'the Boss' wants and they try under their own steam to make that happen. If they guess wrong: tough. If they guess right, they survive a little longer and just may get a step of promotion. The successor regime has not yet scratched the surface of the embedded bureaucracy: especially those aspects of the system that are gathered together only occasionally, as for elections. It remains to be seen how far the favour that the 'corrupt' election officials did to the president-elect will harm his reputation in the medium term. That may influence the next election; but Putin is there now.
The great question in the western media has been; how stupid is this man? How arogant is he? Certainly his self-publicity shows a degree of hubris and of contempt for intellectual opponents. He and his cohorts do not seem to have recognised the profundity of the change in the Russian intelligentsia that has been facilitated by contemporary technology. Classically the Russian intellectual isolated himself in an unheated garret, with insufficient food, while he produced elaborate prose about issues that were imprecisely defined. His contemporary successor thrives in crowds and thinks in the cloud, the blogosphere. The new intellectual feels strength in numbers and reassurance in white ribbons - coincidentally the colour of the old regime's hopeless fightback against the Bolshevik revolution..
I reckon that the explanation for the 'cheating' by Putin's cohorts is much more simple. There is no sense of 'civil service' in Russia. People randomly survived - often well - as servants of the party, when the state was subordinate to the party. Then came the collapse of the Soviet Union and the effectual evanescence of the Communist Party. The military stayed in being, and so did the security services: the notorious KGB. Putin was quite a minor officer in that immense service but as all institutions collapsed those who had been verified insiders were accepted by an informal network as 'one of us'. Ex-KGB officers will not welcome the analogy [though most of them are bright enough to accept it] that the reputed ODESSA network that spirited SS personnel out of Europe in the later nineteen forties was replicated - without attribution - by the KGB after 1990. Such a network brought Putin to the Presidency, as Yeltsin collapsed into alcoholic incoherence.
.
Thereafter, all those officials across the whole of that vast country who had lost their directive from a 'centre' still knew very well how to ensure that 'advice' from Moscow were implemented at the local level. They enthusiastically supported Putin in a notionally-contested election, using the methods that had been routine in the Brezhnev era. They have simply carried on doing what had been done for more than half a century. They don't need to be told to stuff ballot boxes: they would find it strange to be told not so to do. The new city-slicker tactic of bussing selected voters from polling station to polling station is new, a product of affluence [and an indication that the regime is slightly fazed by democracy] that was easily spotted by dissidents toting mobile-phone cameras.
It would probably have been impossible for Putin to make all the officials who were responsible for the conduct of elections behave as if they were the Town Clerk of Walmington-on-Sea, who was pompously obsessed to serve democracy without partiality. Putin probably welcomed the assurance of winning successive elections that the soviet tradition gave to him in thousands of polling stations, but it is more likely than not that he did not ask for it. Plenty of crass examples of ballot-rigging have been collected by the opposition, but I would be astonished there was any trail of evidence that took the inauguration of such gerrymandering back to Putin personally, or to his immediate circle. When a country has been corrupted utterly for more than half a century, as was the USSR, officials learn to guess what 'the Boss' wants and they try under their own steam to make that happen. If they guess wrong: tough. If they guess right, they survive a little longer and just may get a step of promotion. The successor regime has not yet scratched the surface of the embedded bureaucracy: especially those aspects of the system that are gathered together only occasionally, as for elections. It remains to be seen how far the favour that the 'corrupt' election officials did to the president-elect will harm his reputation in the medium term. That may influence the next election; but Putin is there now.
Tuesday, 6 December 2011
Politicians: Out of their Depth?
Witty people who have never borne political or business responsibility can be highly vocal in expressing their criticism - and their ridicule, quickly descending into contempt - for office-holders who are struggling to pursue their ends in difficult, unpredictable and often adverse conditions. There are a large number of leaders at the present time who seem to have a limited [or even obtuse] perception of the situations that they are attempting to manage.Critical opposition is very often easier to mount than is reasoned presentation of feasible alternative options. Let us take a few examples that are in the News this evening.
In Moscow and other Russian cities there are small but significant demonstrations against the continuance of Vladimir Putin in office: either as Prime Minister or as President. These are at least matched numerically by demonstrating supporters of Putin's party; but it is notably oppositionists who are being arrested. In recent months, around the time of his announcement that he will again run for the Presidency of the Russian Federation, Putin has presented himself as a fitness fanatic, and a game hunter, and a supporter of the Arts, and a politico-economic polymath, and a populist who was astonished to hear boos directed at him when he came into the arena during a recent sporting event. He has done enough positive things for the country to enable him to seek re-election on the basis of that healthy record; but he seems to be unable to believe that. He also appears to lack any vision about how he can increase genuine popular support by tackling endemic problems that have emerged in a rapidly developing and changing socio-economic nexus. He has tried to project a 'personality' that is so multi-faceted as to be unsustainable, as well as fundamentally incredible; while he has been notoriously indulgent to corruption. He will never convince the punters that he is Superman; and by every device that he uses to try to demonstrate the impossible he increases the opportunities for satire. Even his fiercest critics have conceded that he has had every chance to gain the presidency by a real electoral majority: but now he is threatening his chances both by inviting ridicule at his antics, and by his toleration of cronyism and corrupt business practice, and by the exploitation of political and bureaucratic processes by venial officials who he retains in post. This is very sad for him [and it could be terminal, if he allows his personality to sink into megalomania] and it is tragic for Russia which he has demonstrated the ability to serve so well.
President Obama's gift, which is also his curse and his potential doom, is his fluency. He can be highly articulate both in set speeches and in off-the-cuff utterances; but the more he says off-script, the more apparent it is to the growing army of his critics that his understanding of issues is incomplete [at least], his power to analyse complex data appears to be exiguous, and he appears to have no attainable plans for delivering benefits to voters, despite the release of many billions of dollars by his administration and by the Federal Reserve system acting in cahoots with the federal government. The more Obama takes centre-stage and holds forth, the less credible he appears to be; the more money his administration spends, the less relevant he seems to be in the legislative process and yet he carries the primary blame for the lack of impact of the limited policies that are adopted.
The remarkable Prime Minister of India, Manmohan Singh, is constantly criticised for doing too much and to little to grow the economy, for obstructing measures of liberalisation and for letting in too much alien capitalism, for tolerating the residual curse of the caste system and for indulging capricious [and probably crooked] untouchable politicians, for being locked-in to party-political croneyism and for being meritocratic. All of which adds up to showing balance, moderation, and a positive skill in directing a cabinet of more than thirty ministers and in getting responses out of an immense, inert bureaucracy. This is an outstanding political achievement that is working to the economic and social benefit of a massive and fast-expanding population.
No such single figure prevails in China. The complex hierarchy of past, present and future holders of the highest posts in the echelons of the Communist Part - and thus of the state- is partially understood by foreign commentators; though all assessments of power shifts and secret alliances are subject constantly to revision. No system that channels humans who are heavily endowed with ambition and personality through the corridors of the Great Hall of the People and the courtyards of the Forbidden City can work as smoothly as the Chinese authorities would have one believe: but their system has responded remarkably well to the complex processes of liberalisation and hugely rapid economic change and development, delivering 9%+ economic growth despite the turmoil in global capital markets and its impact on American and European buyers of Chinese goods. In recent days various Chinese ministers and bank officials have popped up as expert spokespersons on the specific issues of the day; talking truth to the diminishing western powers, asserting China's independent assessment of policy options, emphasising that their country is now a responsible global superpower and demonstrating that this truly is the case.
The different modes of success of Indian and Chinese leadership do not betoken a general superiority of Asian political models, or of Asian politicians over the rest of the global crop. I have lost count of the succession of ineffectual Japanese Prime Ministers who have come and gone since I first had the privilege of being a visiting professor there; and the politics of South Korea hardly bear forensic examination. Thailand has a Prime Minister who was elected solely because she is somebody's sister; and the entire country is scared of what will happen when the revered King dies and his heir - generally regarded as a wastrel, or worse - claims the inheritance. Sri Lanka is a military dictatorship, Pakistan is prey to factions that assemble and undermine sullenly-consensual governments that exist by striking compromises with the military. Politics in Indonesia and Malaysia is being edged slowly in the direction of 'moderate Islamism', which also seems to be the trend is the Arab world from Saudi Arabia to Morocco. Iran is suffering an attempt at permanent revolution that could be ridiculous if it were not armed to be dangerous to its neighbours; while Iraq is the agonised outcome of more than half a century of conflict.
We have not yet glanced at the prevailing political mode in most Asian states, nor any in Latin America: so there is much of the world left to review in future blogs. One area that must briefly be mentioned in this wide-ranging look at the political effectiveness of various people and situations is Europe. Two countries - Italy and Greece - are directly ruled by EU Proconsuls; and half a dozen are constitutional monarchies where the party-political mix in government is pragmatic and is not existentially important. In France, Germany and the United Kingdom, despite very different rhetoric surrounding the relative position of the state government to the EU, it is clear that their politically-insecure leaders see the maintenance of the Union as the key priority. The original purpose of the Union was to prevent a third 'world' war: now it is seen as potentially [though not yet actually] an entity big enough to allow the European economy that is being overtaken by emergent powers to have a chance of survival on the world stage. The political leaders in the predominant EU member states, and [often more so] in the smaller states that follow them, are focussed on what Europe can do for the economic environment, and thus enable growth to return and eventually generate enough new wealth to transcend the present gloomy prospect. That was the proposition on which Heath 'sold' the EEC to the British Parliament and people, and Cameron and Merkel and Sarkozi are relying upon the same hope today. Not much fruit has sprung from Heath's planting of forty years ago and the politicians of 2011 understand that they cannot get away for long simply by saying that the long-term gains [when we are all dead] will make the short-term pains [that will be felt for several years of the immediate future] worth while. The message is impossible to deliver in a positive package, but that is the message to which the inescapable impact of the Iron Law of Wages has driven them. For European connoisseurs of politician rhetoric, if for nobody else, interesting times lie ahead.
For an explanation of the Iron Law of Wages, see Personal Political Economy which is accessible from this site.
No such single figure prevails in China. The complex hierarchy of past, present and future holders of the highest posts in the echelons of the Communist Part - and thus of the state- is partially understood by foreign commentators; though all assessments of power shifts and secret alliances are subject constantly to revision. No system that channels humans who are heavily endowed with ambition and personality through the corridors of the Great Hall of the People and the courtyards of the Forbidden City can work as smoothly as the Chinese authorities would have one believe: but their system has responded remarkably well to the complex processes of liberalisation and hugely rapid economic change and development, delivering 9%+ economic growth despite the turmoil in global capital markets and its impact on American and European buyers of Chinese goods. In recent days various Chinese ministers and bank officials have popped up as expert spokespersons on the specific issues of the day; talking truth to the diminishing western powers, asserting China's independent assessment of policy options, emphasising that their country is now a responsible global superpower and demonstrating that this truly is the case.
The different modes of success of Indian and Chinese leadership do not betoken a general superiority of Asian political models, or of Asian politicians over the rest of the global crop. I have lost count of the succession of ineffectual Japanese Prime Ministers who have come and gone since I first had the privilege of being a visiting professor there; and the politics of South Korea hardly bear forensic examination. Thailand has a Prime Minister who was elected solely because she is somebody's sister; and the entire country is scared of what will happen when the revered King dies and his heir - generally regarded as a wastrel, or worse - claims the inheritance. Sri Lanka is a military dictatorship, Pakistan is prey to factions that assemble and undermine sullenly-consensual governments that exist by striking compromises with the military. Politics in Indonesia and Malaysia is being edged slowly in the direction of 'moderate Islamism', which also seems to be the trend is the Arab world from Saudi Arabia to Morocco. Iran is suffering an attempt at permanent revolution that could be ridiculous if it were not armed to be dangerous to its neighbours; while Iraq is the agonised outcome of more than half a century of conflict.
We have not yet glanced at the prevailing political mode in most Asian states, nor any in Latin America: so there is much of the world left to review in future blogs. One area that must briefly be mentioned in this wide-ranging look at the political effectiveness of various people and situations is Europe. Two countries - Italy and Greece - are directly ruled by EU Proconsuls; and half a dozen are constitutional monarchies where the party-political mix in government is pragmatic and is not existentially important. In France, Germany and the United Kingdom, despite very different rhetoric surrounding the relative position of the state government to the EU, it is clear that their politically-insecure leaders see the maintenance of the Union as the key priority. The original purpose of the Union was to prevent a third 'world' war: now it is seen as potentially [though not yet actually] an entity big enough to allow the European economy that is being overtaken by emergent powers to have a chance of survival on the world stage. The political leaders in the predominant EU member states, and [often more so] in the smaller states that follow them, are focussed on what Europe can do for the economic environment, and thus enable growth to return and eventually generate enough new wealth to transcend the present gloomy prospect. That was the proposition on which Heath 'sold' the EEC to the British Parliament and people, and Cameron and Merkel and Sarkozi are relying upon the same hope today. Not much fruit has sprung from Heath's planting of forty years ago and the politicians of 2011 understand that they cannot get away for long simply by saying that the long-term gains [when we are all dead] will make the short-term pains [that will be felt for several years of the immediate future] worth while. The message is impossible to deliver in a positive package, but that is the message to which the inescapable impact of the Iron Law of Wages has driven them. For European connoisseurs of politician rhetoric, if for nobody else, interesting times lie ahead.
For an explanation of the Iron Law of Wages, see Personal Political Economy which is accessible from this site.
Wednesday, 23 November 2011
Old Allies
The generally negative view that is taken of Queen Mary I of England - "Bloody Mary" [Tudor] - does not readily accommodate the range of her interests and activities. My own perspective on her reign was dramatically developed in the still-communist Moscow Kremlin when I saw a magnificent exhibit of English silver, diplomatic gifts from the Queen to the then obscure and isolated emergent state of Muscovy. English navigators had made their way to the northern port of Murmansk, then Russia's only outlet to the seas. Mary's sister and successor Elizabeth intermittently pursued trade and alliance with Russia; while ducking a marriage proposal from Ivan the Terrible. The travails of British politics in the first half of the seventeenth century weakened the political aspect of the interaction, but that did not inhibit the development of the 'English village' outside the walls of Moscow. The inhabitants of that settlement represented the first 'window to the west' that was accessible to the young prince, then co-Tsar Peter.
When Peter manoeuvred himself into the sole sovereignty, and had established his autocracy absolutely on the state, he travelled west to test the tales that he had heard of western society, civilisation and - above all - technology. He visited all the major west-European states, and spent long enough in each to gain an image of its military preparations and its specialist skills in science and manufacturing. In several cases he demanded to be put through a crash apprenticeship in a skill that appealed to him; in between talks with monarchs and challenging private seminars with such luminaries as Isaac Newton. Besides huge height and outrageously greedy manners [for experiences, food, drink and sex] he impressed everyone with his intelligence and his grasp of concepts.He returned to Russia stuffed with data, plans and the ambition to make Russia an advanced western power. Successful military action secured him a toehold on the Gulf of Finland, and there on a collection of sandy islands he set about building a great capital city. St Petersburg was typically described as Peter's 'window to the west' but more importantly he saw it as the exemplar for what he hoped to make the whole of Russia. Right down to the Revolution of 1917, though it grew as a European city [albeit with an extreme climate and a restrictive police regime] of great distinction.
Trade and technology transfer with Britain, and west Europe generally, remained very important to imperial Russia; but a specific and unique role for Britain arose when Tsar Alexander I split from Napoleon's hegemonic European empire and reopened the Tudor route from Britain to the Russian northern ports. Wellington and Kutusov defeated the French and their satellites starting from two corners of Europe, and they eventually met in conquered Paris. The obvious synergy of Britain and Russia wore thin during the 'great game' when Russia advanced its frontier through central Asia towards Afghanistan, where the British Raj in India repeatedly failed to capture control. The absurd Crimean war was the only open conflict between the two and by 1900 Russia and Britain were moving towards an alliance to stem the perceived Napoleonic ambitions of the Kaiser, who was a first cousin both the the Tsar and King George V. The war undermined the monarchy and Russia passed into the purgatory of 'permanent revolution' which was interrupted by the second world war.
The old alliance of convenience [and necessity] was reactivated for the war period, then was quickly abandoned in the cold war. Since the collapse of communism Britain has been at best half-hearted in its attempts to develop effective links with the Russian Federation. Some British firms including farm management companies have done very well in Russia, as have relatively few providers of financial services: but the British government has been overcautious in its engagement with the regime. This is stupid. Incidents where Russian agencies have acted in a pre-liberation manner against opponents of the regime on British soil have been outrageous and demand a powerful reaction: but not self-harming, po-faced isolationism. Putin is going to win the forthcoming election, and it will be a genuine result from a flawed system. Whether he will thereafter undermine his position by megalomaniac self-advertisement, or learn to present himself in a more statesmanlike manner, will be more important to the British press than it should be to the Foreign Office.
It is worth reflecting that democracy has been economically disastrous for Britain; while Putin and his cronies have stabilised the chaos to which their predecessors had brought the country as Boris Yeltsin sank into alcoholic incomprehension.Western Economists had applied their naive models of markets to the crisis of the economy that Gorbachev had been unable to rescue. Privatisation was a disaster: at first. It enabled sharp elbowed fixers to become the 'oligarchs' who personally controlled huge industries and agglomerations of financial power. Cometh the hour, cometh the man. Putin worked out a unique route to controlling their firms in the public interest. To take the businesses back into soviet-style state control would be a disaster: the Gorbachev experience proved that. To nationalise them and re-sell them could either be a re-run of the Yeltsin disaster or hand the facilities over the foreign corporations. So it was preferable to make the oligarchs keep control - and responsibility - for huge industries; and lock them in to the state. Some have been required to serve as provincial governors, some in other state service; some have been allowed to live abroad provided their firms conform to government requirements; and the recalcitrant few who challenged the system have been deprived of their assets and in some conspicuous cases of their liberty.
It is not a pretty system; it is not democratic in the 'Anglo-Saxon' sense; but it serves its purpose. Russia can build nuclear power plant: by contrast Britain sold Westinghouse and refused a modest loan to Forgemasters. Russia can design and build military aircraft; Britain takes a diminishing role in precarious international projects and has destroyed the independent civil aviation sector. Russia can build warships and submarines: so can Britain - now - but that capability is under threat. Russia develops its plant in steel, aluminium and other sectors; alien owners are reducing the capacity of their shrunken British equivalents. Russian organisation and management are still crude and inefficient; but business education and management training are spreading rapidly. The educational system is conservative, but young adults are highly literate, articulate and numerate; as are graduates over the whole age spectrum. Pensions are modest, but pensioners are protected and caring interpersonal relationships predominate. Alcoholism is a national crisis and the low birth rate is a cause of alarm. Medical facilities need massive investment and the training of appropriate staff: but everything in slowly and patchily improving. Everybody knows what destruction communism wrought; and they also know how ruinous their crash-course in market capitalism was: they did not starve under post-war communism, but millions came close to that in 1991-2.
The British people is instinctively reluctant to surrender sovereignty to a 'Napoleonic' European Union. When asked 'what is the alternative to subjection in the EU?' there are several potential responses: a return to Commonwealth preference, maybe: or membership of an 'outer circle' of the European Common Market, around the core Union, with Norway, Switzerland, Russia: and maybe Turkey. That prospect is as promising as subjugation to the EU is unpalatable.
When Peter manoeuvred himself into the sole sovereignty, and had established his autocracy absolutely on the state, he travelled west to test the tales that he had heard of western society, civilisation and - above all - technology. He visited all the major west-European states, and spent long enough in each to gain an image of its military preparations and its specialist skills in science and manufacturing. In several cases he demanded to be put through a crash apprenticeship in a skill that appealed to him; in between talks with monarchs and challenging private seminars with such luminaries as Isaac Newton. Besides huge height and outrageously greedy manners [for experiences, food, drink and sex] he impressed everyone with his intelligence and his grasp of concepts.He returned to Russia stuffed with data, plans and the ambition to make Russia an advanced western power. Successful military action secured him a toehold on the Gulf of Finland, and there on a collection of sandy islands he set about building a great capital city. St Petersburg was typically described as Peter's 'window to the west' but more importantly he saw it as the exemplar for what he hoped to make the whole of Russia. Right down to the Revolution of 1917, though it grew as a European city [albeit with an extreme climate and a restrictive police regime] of great distinction.
Trade and technology transfer with Britain, and west Europe generally, remained very important to imperial Russia; but a specific and unique role for Britain arose when Tsar Alexander I split from Napoleon's hegemonic European empire and reopened the Tudor route from Britain to the Russian northern ports. Wellington and Kutusov defeated the French and their satellites starting from two corners of Europe, and they eventually met in conquered Paris. The obvious synergy of Britain and Russia wore thin during the 'great game' when Russia advanced its frontier through central Asia towards Afghanistan, where the British Raj in India repeatedly failed to capture control. The absurd Crimean war was the only open conflict between the two and by 1900 Russia and Britain were moving towards an alliance to stem the perceived Napoleonic ambitions of the Kaiser, who was a first cousin both the the Tsar and King George V. The war undermined the monarchy and Russia passed into the purgatory of 'permanent revolution' which was interrupted by the second world war.
The old alliance of convenience [and necessity] was reactivated for the war period, then was quickly abandoned in the cold war. Since the collapse of communism Britain has been at best half-hearted in its attempts to develop effective links with the Russian Federation. Some British firms including farm management companies have done very well in Russia, as have relatively few providers of financial services: but the British government has been overcautious in its engagement with the regime. This is stupid. Incidents where Russian agencies have acted in a pre-liberation manner against opponents of the regime on British soil have been outrageous and demand a powerful reaction: but not self-harming, po-faced isolationism. Putin is going to win the forthcoming election, and it will be a genuine result from a flawed system. Whether he will thereafter undermine his position by megalomaniac self-advertisement, or learn to present himself in a more statesmanlike manner, will be more important to the British press than it should be to the Foreign Office.
It is worth reflecting that democracy has been economically disastrous for Britain; while Putin and his cronies have stabilised the chaos to which their predecessors had brought the country as Boris Yeltsin sank into alcoholic incomprehension.Western Economists had applied their naive models of markets to the crisis of the economy that Gorbachev had been unable to rescue. Privatisation was a disaster: at first. It enabled sharp elbowed fixers to become the 'oligarchs' who personally controlled huge industries and agglomerations of financial power. Cometh the hour, cometh the man. Putin worked out a unique route to controlling their firms in the public interest. To take the businesses back into soviet-style state control would be a disaster: the Gorbachev experience proved that. To nationalise them and re-sell them could either be a re-run of the Yeltsin disaster or hand the facilities over the foreign corporations. So it was preferable to make the oligarchs keep control - and responsibility - for huge industries; and lock them in to the state. Some have been required to serve as provincial governors, some in other state service; some have been allowed to live abroad provided their firms conform to government requirements; and the recalcitrant few who challenged the system have been deprived of their assets and in some conspicuous cases of their liberty.
It is not a pretty system; it is not democratic in the 'Anglo-Saxon' sense; but it serves its purpose. Russia can build nuclear power plant: by contrast Britain sold Westinghouse and refused a modest loan to Forgemasters. Russia can design and build military aircraft; Britain takes a diminishing role in precarious international projects and has destroyed the independent civil aviation sector. Russia can build warships and submarines: so can Britain - now - but that capability is under threat. Russia develops its plant in steel, aluminium and other sectors; alien owners are reducing the capacity of their shrunken British equivalents. Russian organisation and management are still crude and inefficient; but business education and management training are spreading rapidly. The educational system is conservative, but young adults are highly literate, articulate and numerate; as are graduates over the whole age spectrum. Pensions are modest, but pensioners are protected and caring interpersonal relationships predominate. Alcoholism is a national crisis and the low birth rate is a cause of alarm. Medical facilities need massive investment and the training of appropriate staff: but everything in slowly and patchily improving. Everybody knows what destruction communism wrought; and they also know how ruinous their crash-course in market capitalism was: they did not starve under post-war communism, but millions came close to that in 1991-2.
The British people is instinctively reluctant to surrender sovereignty to a 'Napoleonic' European Union. When asked 'what is the alternative to subjection in the EU?' there are several potential responses: a return to Commonwealth preference, maybe: or membership of an 'outer circle' of the European Common Market, around the core Union, with Norway, Switzerland, Russia: and maybe Turkey. That prospect is as promising as subjugation to the EU is unpalatable.
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